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A growing body of critical literature seeks to identify conceptual and 
practical problems accompanying the realisation of mainstream ‘eco-
city’ initiatives around the world. However, little attention has been 
paid to the status of the ‘city’ itself within the broader discourse. If 
eco-cities are to be more than experimental ‘technological showcases’, 
and aim to transform urban life more generally, the question of what 
types of ‘cityness’ will ensue is of considerable importance. To effect 
a more significant sustainability transition, eco-city plans and 
policies may need somehow to encompass a more nuanced 
conceptualisation of cities as complex, unpredictable, and emergent 
spaces. The incompatibility of such a conceptualisation with liberal-
modernist modes of planning means that radically innovative new 
approaches to eco-city development may need to be found. 
 
This thesis considers whether the eco-city, theorised as a multiple 
process of real-world experimentation, may shed some light on how 
‘cityness’ might better be planned for in future. To do so, it 
conceptualises cityness through the lens of ‘publicness’. It makes an 
original contribution to knowledge by developing a new theoretical 
model of publicness as an ‘assemblage’ of space and behaviour, with 
an ‘emergent’ and ‘civic’ modality. It thereby extends recent debates 
over the idea of ‘urban assemblage’, and makes innovative links 
between theories of planning and of the public. This model informs 
the analysis of original empirical research, investigating the 
conceptualisation of the public in an international sample of official 
eco-city documents, and exploring the publicness of two 
implemented initiatives, in Portland, Oregon (US) and newly built 
Sejong City (South Korea). 
 
The research finds that publicness tends to be poorly articulated in 
mainstream eco-city plans and policies, with potentially negative 
implications for sustainability in the ‘urban age’. However, it also 
argues that state institution-led planning – even when experimental 
‘governance’ approaches are adopted – may inevitably be limited in 
its ability to encompass the emergent public life of the city. The thesis 
concludes by considering the prospects for overcoming or more 
productively acknowledging these limits in future. 
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Chapter One  




This thesis contributes to a growing body of critical literature which 
seeks to identify conceptual and practical problems accompanying 
the realisation of ‘eco-city’ initiatives around the world. The term 
‘eco-city’ is used here as an umbrella label to describe a broad range 
of contemporary urban-scale initiatives aiming in various ways to 
further the goal of sustainable development. The focus here is on 
initiatives in which policy-makers play at least an enabling role. Such 
initiatives are worthy of study precisely because they have become 
increasingly ‘mainstreamed’ into policy-making internationally since 
the turn of the century (Joss, 2011a; Joss, Cowley & Tomozeiu, 2013). 
In this sense, as a global body of discourse and practice backed by 
considerable financial and political resources, the eco-city represents 
a potent collective hope for the future of human society.  
 
The significance of the contemporary eco-city is, however, 
ambiguous. The real-world policies and practices which it 
encompasses have historical links with, but should be distinguished 
from, the originally radical normative concept of the eco-city, 
minimally defined by Richard Register three decades ago as an 
“ecologically healthy city” (Register, 1987:3). Despite the 
normalisation of this aspirational idea over time, and its apparent 
acceptance at different levels of government, it would still be difficult 
to contradict Register’s accompanying assertion that “no such city 
exists” (ibid). In referring to eco-city initiatives, then, the intention is 
not to suggest that any particular existing urban settlements are in 
fact ‘sustainable’ in an absolute sense, but rather to indicate an 
unfurling process of ongoing experimental practices. In an optimistic 
light, any given eco-city initiative, particularly when accompanied by 
critical reflection and knowledge-sharing, might be welcomed more 
pragmatically as “just…a step in a much more ambitious 




more sustainably in tune with their broader context and future needs” 
(Ryser, 2014:123). Conversely, however, contemporary outcomes 
may invite the more cynical conclusion that the eco-city’s 
transformative potential has largely been compromised as its 
practices have emerged through existing political institutions and 
market structures. Depending on one’s perspective, then, the case 
might be made that eco-city initiatives, individually or collectively, 
represent a constructively incremental approach to a series of 
pressing global problems; or that they have come to serve little more 
than ‘business as usual’. 
 
At this stage, a preliminary demarcation of the empirical subject 
matter may be useful.  In particular, the focus on urban sustainability 
initiatives recognised in official policy-making requires further 
justification. If more radically transformative sustainability ideas and 
practices are sought, it may be tempting to reject ‘mainstream’ 
activity on the grounds of the probability of its conservative 
orientation. Whitehead contrasts the “rhetorical commitments” of 
policy-makers with what Krueger and Agyeman (2005) call ‘actually 
existing sustainabilities’ in cities, which “occur outside of officially 
sanctioned programmes for sustainability” (Whitehead, 2012:29). 
Arguably, it is in ‘grassroots’ initiatives, taking place outside state 
institutions (Feola & Nunes, 2014), that more innovative challenges 
to the status quo might be found (Bulkeley & Castán Broto, 2013:366).  
 
This approach, however, carries with it some risk of romanticising 
the import of ‘bottom-up’ or ‘community-led’ initiatives. With 
reference to the relevant literature, Feola and Nunes (2014) outline a 
series of impediments often faced by grassroots organisations which 
seek to effect societal change. These include: their reliance on actors 
with limited funding and personal influence; a lack of continuity due 
to reliance on voluntary participation; a lack of visibility; and the 
possibility that they are demographically or attitudinally untypical of 
the communities which they seek to represent. Feola and Nunes 
suggest that commentators have tended to focus on apparently 
successful examples, without considering the reasons for the failure 
of others. Perhaps more importantly, unless grassroots initiatives 
have revolutionary impact, their transformative effects will arise 
through negotiations with the wider world; grassroots initiatives are 




into their broader context. The focus here on the mainstream, then, is 
not in denial of the agency or influence of grassroots urban 
sustainability initiatives (Seyfang & Smith, 2007); but the history of 
the eco-city, as will be discussed in Chapter Two, is precisely one in 
which earlier countercultural grassroots ideas, originally tested in 
peripheral (and even non-urban) ‘niches’, have grown in their scope 
and scalar ambition, and come to be actively promoted by official 
institutions in the so-called ‘urban age’. Contemporary eco-cities, 
moreover, may remain locally situated and constrained, but are also 
enabled by global networks of practice and discourse (Späth & 
Rohracher, 2012) which are reproduced within policy-making at 
different levels. The international dimensions of this enabling 
discourse appear to provide favourable conditions for the ongoing 
global proliferation of the individual eco-city initiatives with which it 
is co-constituted. To understand why this proliferation has not 
translated into a more convincing shift towards urban sustainability, 
it seems sensible to question the mainstream policy discourse itself. 
 
Nevertheless, the thesis aims to avoid falling into a trap identified 
by Bulkeley and Castán Broto (2013) in relation to ‘climate change 
experiments’: that of reading the eco-city exclusively through the 
lens of institutional policy. The practices of the eco-city exceed that 
which is institutionally recognised, promoted or directly regulated; 
the policy and planning mechanisms supporting contemporary 
initiatives more typically enable or reflect ‘hybrid’ governance 
arrangements involving a wide variety and combination of non-state 
actors (Joss et al., 2013). And even those initiatives which adopt more 
obviously ‘top-down’ approaches, and are built on ‘greenfield’ sites, 
will be shaped as cities by the people that come to live in them. It 
makes little sense in any case to draw a binary distinction between 
plans and their socio-political contexts; from an alternative 
perspective, plans are technologies which form only one aspect of a 
dynamic process of development. The real-world eco-city, in short, 
cannot be directly inferred from the institutionally intended one; 
rather, it is the negotiated hybridity of eco-cities which allows them 
potentially to function as “new political spaces for experimentation” 
(Bulkeley & Castán Broto, 2013:368). And while institutional backing 
may be a significant factor in shaping the outcomes of such 




which results is not straightforward. Exploring this relationship is 
one of the key concerns of the thesis.  
 
The eco-city, in the sense outlined above, has been critiqued from 
a variety of angles in recent years. The empirical concerns and 
analytical perspectives adopted in this literature vary, including, for 
example: the connections and disconnections between eco-city 
developments and their wider urban context (eg Hodson & Marvin, 
2010; Joss & Molella, 2013; Caprotti, 2014; Caprotti et al., 2015); the 
processes through which exported eco-city plans are translated into 
local contexts (eg Chang & Sheppard, 2013; Hult, 2013; Rapoport, 
2015); the governance processes through which initiatives are 
realised (e.g Joss, 2011b; 2015); the foregrounding of economic 
considerations over others (eg Romero Lankao, 2007; Datta, 2012; 
Cugurullo, 2013a; 2013b); and the potential consequences of framing 
sustainability in strongly technological terms (eg Yigitcanlar & Lee, 
2013; Hult, 2013; Shwayri, 2013; Carvalho, 2014; Caprotti, 2015). This 
thesis draws on such critical perspectives and others, but its original 
contribution lies in a shift of primary focus onto the nature of the city 
as envisaged in, and resulting from, related plans and policies. This 
‘cityness’ is analysed from the perspective of its ‘publicness’. The 
central claim of the thesis is that the city is poorly conceptualised 
within mainstream eco-city discourse, and that this has problematic 
implications for the ambition of furthering the broader goal of 
sustainable development.  
 
This introductory chapter aims to locate the ensuing discussion of 
the eco-city within a set of broader unresolved contemporary 
questions, in order further to justify its significance as an object of 
critical enquiry. It then outlines a series of more specific questions 
which guide the discussion and the methods adopted to answer 
these, and provides an overview of the thesis structure. 
 
 
1.1  The Rise of the (Eco-)City 
A variety of conditions appear to have enabled, or overdetermined, 
the emergence of eco-city thinking and practices. First, 
environmental concerns of different types have increasingly 
informed policy-making and shaped public debate since the 1980s, 




development’, and most recently in the shape of concerns over 
‘climate change’ (see Chapter Two). In the Global South, eco-city 
thinking offers potentially constructive solutions to socially and 
environmentally problematic forms of urbanisation (Joss, 2010); in 
the North, it may appeal as an imaginative transformational 
direction for cities in the post-industrial age (ibid). Cities more 
generally have increasingly become the focus for contemporary 
insecurities (Caprotti, 2015); although many environmental, social, 
political, and economic contemporary crises appear to be definitively 
“diffuse and systemic”, cities are the stages on which they are visibly 
played out (ibid:4). The new understanding that such crises are no 
longer contained within state boundaries chimes with the so-called 
‘hollowing out’ (Jessop, 1994:264) of the nation state, with cities and 
city regions adopting a more vocal role, and imagined as more 
powerful economic agents, in the global political and economic arena. 
All this is set against the background of the widespread assertion 
that we now live in the ‘urban age’ (Brenner & Schmid, 2014; Joss, 
2015): according to the United Nations (UN, 2008), the majority of 
humans now live in urban areas. If, then, the city appears to have 
become an increasingly dominant spatial frame through which 
solutions to global problems are envisaged, the eco-city in particular 
purports to represent a holistic solution to what Jordan and Huitema 
(2014:715–716) call the “many complex ‘mega trends’ that are rapidly 
changing the world – population growth, rapidly intensifying 
resource use – and their associated ‘wicked’ policy problems, not 
least climate change”. It may be no exaggeration to claim that 
“debates over the shape of ecocities of the future look more and more 
like debates over the city of the future” (Caprotti, 2015:90–91). 
 
Just a few decades ago, however, the idea of investing hope for the 
future in cities would have struck many observers as peculiar. This is 
not to deny the significant influence of many historical attempts to 
improve urban environments (Kargon & Molella, 2008; Joss, 2010; 
2015); there is some continuity over time in the understanding of the 
city as the locus where ecological, social, and economic problems 
become manifest (Caprotti, 2015). Rather, what distinguishes 
mainstream contemporary discourse about cities from that of, say, 
the 1970s (as will be discussed in Chapter Two) is the reversal of the 
conclusion that large cities were outmoded, or at least that their 




resolution of the problems which they were thought to cause. Older 
assumptions that growth necessarily takes place at the expense of the 
environment (Meadowcroft, 2000:371) have been supplanted by 
understandings that cities are potentially advantageous in terms of 
lower per capitum resource consumption as a result of density, offer 
democratic and cultural benefits in their tendency towards social 
diversity and inclusion, and exhibit efficient economies of 
agglomeration. The city no longer primarily represents a series of 
social and environmental problems, but is also often eulogistically 
presented as the solution to these problems, and urban 
transformation has come to be promoted as the key to a sustainable 
global future. 
 
The close links between the elevation of the ideal of ‘sustainable 
development’ 1  (SD) to the status of an international consensus 
concept (Blowers, 1997; Adger & Jordan, 2009b; Dobson, 2009; 
Cuthill, 2010; Cochrane, 2010) and the growth of the eco-city 
phenomenon are explored in Chapter Two. Since it would seem 
eccentric to refute the desirability of a sustainable global future, on 
its own terms at least, the notion of SD explicitly positions us as 
responsible towards this future. By implication, then, actions which 
undermine this possibility are positioned as irresponsible. In the case 
of governmental action, the obligation clearly arises to act in ways 
which are at least informed by the intention to shape a more 
sustainable future. Rather than being a “spontaneous social product”, 
SD implies “goal-directed intervention by governments and other 
actors” (Meadowcroft, 2007:302). In this sense, the eco-city might be 
interpreted as not only representing our hopes for the future, but 
also describing contemporary approaches to the intentional planning 
of this future. 
 
 
1.2  The Problem with ‘Planning’ 
Problematically, however, SD’s rise to prominence in recent decades 
has coincided with an ongoing collapse of faith in our ability to ‘plan’ 
things in a traditional sense. Our contemporary sensibility renders 
‘planning’ itself hubristic (van Assche & Verschraegen, 2008); the 
                                                          
1
  The terms ‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable development’ are used 




world seems increasingly complex, uncertain, and non-linear 
(Rosenau, 2000; Chandler, 2014a). Following the arguments made by 
social theorists such as Beck (1992) and Giddens (1991), Healey 
characterises this sensibility in terms of an “anxiety” caused partly 
“because we know so much about what is happening all over the 
place in our knowledge-rich worlds”, and partly from the sense that 
“we live in worlds of multiple forces, over which we have limited 
control” (Healey, 1997:3). In broad terms, Mol (2002:165) suggests 
that the older philosophical quest to establish certainty (“how can we 
be sure?”) has been usurped by the question of how we can or should 
act in the face of an “undetermined world, where doubt can always 
be raised” (“how can we live with doubt?”).  
 
If the goal of planning has always been the “rational mastery of 
the irrational” (Mannheim, 1940; cited in Healey, 1997:9), our 
confidence that we can achieve mastery over the world is challenged 
by a growing awareness of its irrationality. The long-term nature of 
the demands of SD only exacerbates this challenge. Policy-makers 
are hampered from meeting the challenge not only by short-term 
electoral cycles, but also by the evident impossibility of certainty in 
long-term predictions (Paterson, 2007:518), with SD in particular 
characterised by uncertain knowledge (Voß et al., 2007; Grunwald, 
2007), ambiguities in its concrete goals (Voß et al., 2007, Walker & 
Shove, 2007), and the likelihood of non-linear feedback loops and 
unexpected consequences (Voß et al., 2007).  The problem of 
planning in the face of such uncertainty is in fact recognised within 
Agenda 21, the implementational planning document arising from the 
very influential ‘Rio Summit’ in 1992 (see Chapter Two), as a 
justification for a ‘precautionary principle’ within SD: 
“In the face of threats of irreversible environmental 
damage, lack of full scientific understanding should not be 
an excuse for postponing actions which are justified in 
their own right. The precautionary approach could 
provide a basis for policies relating to complex systems 
that are not yet fully understood and whose consequences 
of disturbances cannot yet be predicted” 
(UNDESA, 1992:35.3). 
 
This is not to imply the existence of a previous era in which 
policy-makers and planners of different types operated in conditions 




“has for decades had to deal with the problem of complexity” 
(Luhmann, 1997: 41, cited in van Assche and Verschraegen, 2008:264). 
However, there was an older hope at least that it might “find better 
solutions using an approximate method of building models or 
simulations, by a slow adaptation of society to planning” (ibid). By 
the time Luhmann was diagnosing the “desolate state” (ibid) of 
planning, it had already gained a negative reputation through its 
association with centralised, often authoritarian approaches to post-
WWII reconstruction (Giddens, 2009:95). The practical failure of 
older approaches to “cope with the complexities of a developed 
economic system” (Giddens, 2009:95) was further evidenced by the 
collapse of the Soviet system, such that “the very word ‘planning’ 
came under a shadow” (ibid) in its wake. And yet, Giddens argues, 
“whenever we think about the future in a systematic way, in the 
sense of attempting to shape or guide it, planning of some sort is 
inevitable” (ibid). Similarly, in commenting on Luhmann’s “dismal 
diagnosis” that the “hope of a reconciliation between planning and 
society is now lost”, van Assche and Verschraegen (2008:264) reject 
the inference that contemporary society no longer needs planning: 
rather, it remains “difficult, almost impossible, to abandon the notion 
of steering and to let the future come as it comes” (Luhmann, 1997:41, 
cited in van Assche and Verschraegen, 2008:264).  
 
Following on from this, one conclusion might be that new modes 
of planning are required, possibly involving conceptual shifts of 
agency, new vocabularies, and new ambitions. Or, less radically, that 
planning’s ‘problem’ is in part a reputational one; even if its past 
failures describe attempts to plan the unplannable, there may still be 
a role for strong governmental involvement in certain realms of life – 
and particularly in those cases where catastrophe is unlikely to be 
averted through unguided collective agency. If climate change poses 
a significant threat to mankind, and this threat appears only to have 
grown over time, the case might be made for stronger governmental 
involvement in facing up to it. Giddens (2009) is among those who 
adopt this position: “Unregulated markets”, he argues, are unsuited 
to the task of tackling problems such as climate change precisely 
because they have “no long-term perspective” (Giddens, 2009:128). 
Either way, it remains unclear what a revived form of plan-making, 
better equipped to deal with the global problems faced by the 





Theorists of urban planning more specifically are no strangers to 
this dilemma. On the one hand, an older faith in the emancipatory 
potential of rational decision-making, based on scientific knowledge 
(Beauregard, 1989; Hillier, 2002), has ceded ground since the 1970s to 
the understanding that town planners typically have to deal with 
what Rittel & Webber (1973) labelled ‘wicked’ problems (Hartmann, 
2012). Such problems cannot be definitively formulated, and may 
themselves be symptoms of other problems; the success of any urban 
interventions undertaken to address wicked problems can only ever 
be assessed from different perspectives, rather than in an absolute or 
consensual way (ibid). While cities and the built environment have 
been extensively theorised by urbanists as spatial phenomena 
expressing “complex processes” (Karadimitriou, 2010:425), the social 
sciences which once offered the promise of ordering this 
environment now too tend to theorise their broader subject matter as 
comprising “complex adaptive systems, self-organising, self-
referential, autopoietic, and thus with their own strategies and 
expectations, with intertwining processes of emergence and adaption” 
(Geyer & van der Zouwen, 2001:11). Insofar as urban development 
has been expanded conceptually to embrace socio-economic and 
environmental considerations more explicitly, there is no longer an 
expectation that it can “be ‘planned’ by governmental action in a 
linear way, from intention, to plan, to outcome as planned” (Healey, 
2006:3). Rather than aspiring to certainty about outcomes, urban 
policy-makers are therefore forced to work on the basis of guesswork 
about the future and incremental experimentalism (ibid).  
 
Older approaches to planning as a technical exercise which was at 
the time “not seen as politically contentious” (Taylor, 1998:35) have 
been reinterpreted as value-laden (Thomas, 1994) and flawed in their 
assumption of the singularity of ‘public interest’ (Taylor, 1998:34). 
The historic reliance of urban planning on representational diagrams 
and the legal codification of space has been retheorised as a process 
of selective truth creation rather than neutral description (Murdoch, 
2006:132); not only will the real “complex, teeming metropolis” 
(Taylor, 1998:36) always exceed the horizon of such representations, 
but the methods and processes of planning are thus problematically 
performative: they “enact” (Law & Urry, 2004) particular normative 




urban planning is “no longer seen as a generic, discrete activity 
separate from political processes”, but rather “as part of such 
processes. Rationality in planning is now embedded within such 
processes” (Allmendinger, 2002:42), and there is widespread 
acknowledgement of the significance of different types of power in 
shaping planning outcomes (see eg Flyvbjerg, 1998; Yiftachel, 1998; 
Hillier, 2002). Faith in the authority of plans has been undermined by 
the very awareness that their content is not inevitable, but arises out 
of multiple possibilities and is shaped by contingent political 
processes (Hillier, 2002). 
 
While, then, traditional ‘top-down’ urban planning, based on 
hierarchy and positivism, is no longer seen as effective or desirable in 
many western countries (Friedmann, 2005:190–192), its broader 
applicability as a mode of development has been further undermined 
by a theoretical refocusing on the Global South in recent years among 
urban scholars (see eg Robinson, 2006; Yiftachel, 2006; Shatkin, 2007; 
Watson, 2009a; Parnell & Robinson, 2012). Based on such studies, it 
has been widely argued that informality and extra-legality is or has 
become the norm for urban life and development across large parts 
of the world (see eg: Al-Sayyad & Roy, 2003; Watson, 2009b; 
Chiodelli & Moroni, 2014a; Singh, 2014; Eskemose Andersen et al, 
2015). In what have been called ‘informal hypergrowth’ cities, large 
proportions of the urban population have "built their own city 
without any reference whatsoever to the whole bureaucratic 
apparatus of planning and control in the formal city next door" (Hall 
& Pfeiffer, 2000, cited in Roy, 2005:148). Even if it is acknowledged 
that traditional urban planning may achieve some of its aims in the 
developing world, it still tends to have limited reach, and may 
actively create problems (Rakodi, 2001).2  The question of how to 
direct sustainable urban development through institutional plans 
and policies, in other words, only appears to be more pressing when 
a more global view of urban life is taken. Given its global ambitions, 
the eco-city potentially brings the contours of this dilemma into 
sharp relief. It would seem unclear how its ambitions might be 
achieved intentionally by policy-makers if planning appears to 
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  While developing cities have thus been characterised as exhibiting a “complex 
continuum of legality and illegality” (Roy, 2005:149), McFarlane and Waibel 
(2012) argue that the interface between informal and formal processes in 





function internationally as only a minor factor among many others in 
shaping urban space, and when urbanisation most typically proceeds 
in the absence of, or as a result of the unintended consequences of, 
planning undertaken by state authorities. 
 
At the same time, this theoretical crisis of urban planning has not 
translated into its practical abandonment. It is unclear to what extent 
practitioners share the same concerns as theorists, or actively turn to 
theory for guidance (Campbell & Marshall, 1998; Sanyal, 2002; 
Binder, 2012; Harrison, 2014). Despite local inflections and changes 
over time, the practices of planning continue fundamentally to 
provide “a simple and highly structured view of the world and how 
to act in the face of inherent complexity” (Allmendinger, 2002:42), 
adhering to the “quintessentially modernist notion that socio-spatial 
phenomena are amenable to some form of monitoring and control” 
(Karadimitriou, 2010:425).  
 
The suggestion that practitioners’ aspiration to respectability as 
‘scientific’ professionals (Allmendinger, 2002:42) may partly account 
for their adherence to this worldview need not imply that planners 
are delusional, nor that their intentions are dangerously misguided. 
Rather, planners continue to act despite being “confused as to their 
roles and responsibilities” (Watson, 2009b:158), since there remains 
“a degree of benign social control…at the heart of any public 
planning activity because a total lack of societal control and order 
may result in chaos and anarchy. Planning provides a response to 
that possibility” (Yiftachel, 1998:395–396). Again, then, the desire to 
shape a better future, or a sense of responsibility to do so, is in 
tension with, but has not been undermined by, the theorised and 
empirically observed difficulties inherent in this responsibility. 
 
 To argue that planning retains “quintessentially modernist” 
(Karadimitriou, 2010:425) underpinnings, furthermore, is not to 
refute that a broad shift over time can be identified in planning 
processes, towards flexibility and wider inclusion, in the turn to so-
called ‘communicative’ planning (related to the broader rise of 
‘governance’ approaches (Rydin, 2013:5), which will be discussed 
further below). This shift is an uneven one – particularly outside the 
the Global North, Watson (2009b:154) notes, older ‘masterplanning’ 




to reposition planners as no longer the “sole agents responsible for 
managing land and urban development (under a Keynesian 
mandate)”, but instead “just one of a range of players in shaping the 
city” (Watson, 2009b:158). It is as a response to, rather than in 
ignorance of, the crisis of faith in scientific rationalism as a basis for 
diagnosing problems and identifying solutions to socio-spatial issues, 
and in acknowledgement of the role of contingent power in planning 
processes, that communicative planning approaches were first 
advanced in the 1970s (Healey, 1997). Communicative planning 
theorists have departed from a positivist position to argue that better 
planning decisions – in the sense of these being more “robust, 
feasible, and just” (Innes & Booher, 2015:198) – result from 
collaborative efforts among networks of actors (ibid); that these 
should be underpinned not by neutral analysis conducted by 
government experts, but rather by “pragmatic joint inquiry” (ibid). In 
such approaches, then, relevant values and interests are not so much 
given as revealed through context-specific discursive interactions; 
the power of communication (ibid) is embraced, rather than the 
assumption that governmental actors represent, or should be 
empowered to represent, a pre-given public interest. 
 
The assumptions underlying this tendency include the ideas that 
all forms of knowledge (including scientific knowledge) are socially 
constructed; that “rational systemic analysis” is only one of many 
forms of knowledge; that individual preferences are derived from 
social contexts rather than autonomously; and that there is no single 
identifiable public interest so much as a diversity of interests and 
expectations (Healey, 1997:29). By extension, emphasis is placed on 
the need to achieve consensus in a given, contingent context, and on 
the need for accountability “to all those with a ‘stake’ in a place” 
(ibid), with the role of the planner idealised as that of the ‘process 
manager’ (Versteeg & Hajer, 2010:168). While, then, planning 
perhaps inevitably continues to rely on ‘closure’ (Allmendinger, 
2002:180), this does not imply an ongoing ideal of absolute scientific 
truth and knowability, so much as it sits in uneasy tension with a 
more pragmatic relativism. The shift towards the discursive, context-
specific legitimisation of decision-making still leaves intact the 






Murdoch conceptualises the shift in planning practices over time 
explicitly as an attempt to embrace emergent complexity and 
heterogeneity, but comments that “there are few signposts available 
showing how planning might reach its new destination” (Murdoch, 
2006:157). He relates this specifically to the challenge of how to 
reconceptualise the space of planning: away from a ‘smooth’ 
Euclidean space into which orderly entities will be placed, towards a 
more open-ended, heterogeneous conceptual spatiality. Other 
writers who argue for ‘Non-Euclidean planning’ or ‘postmodern’ 
urban planning of different types (see Chapter Five) similarly prefer 
to make the case for these as a broad direction, but do not provide 
clear guidance as to how they could be institutionalised. In any case, 
there appears to be little evidence in the case of the eco-city, as will 
be discussed in Chapter Five, of a new progressive conception of 
spatiality; rather, space is mobilised rhetorically in plans and policies 
to justify particular normative agendas.  
 
More optimistically, it might be argued that experimental 
approaches continue to evolve, and a process of ongoing “social 
learning” (Friedmann, 2005:214) is possible if these experiments are 
accompanied by critical reflection both among planners and 
“relevant publics” (ibid). Joss (2015) has recently argued that the 
future of sustainable city depends in large part on the nature of the 
public debate surrounding it. This argument sets out a direction, but 
need not imply the possibility of devising a specific prescription for 
elevating planning practice from its current status as “a (relatively 
weak) restraint on market forces in the physical development of 
cities and regions” (Friedmann, 2005:214) to become a more vibrant, 
open-ended social learning process. Arguably, the challenge is not to 
determine this outcome in advance so much as to discover it through 
close observation of novel modes of organisation which emerge from 
the processes of development themselves.  
 
Given the wide variety of political, environmental, economic and 
cultural contexts through which eco-cities are implemented, and – 
accordingly – the variety of deliverance mechanisms and types of 
actors involved, the eco-city would seem a potentially rich source of 
clues for how the ‘problem of planning’ might be resolved in future. 
Its modes of implementation range from apparently very traditional 




up place-specific thinking and problem-solving into the heart of the 
institutional process, more clearly aligned with ‘communicative’ 
approaches to urban planning. The eco-city phenomenon, in this 
sense, is just as much an experiment in city management as it is in 
‘eco’ technology. 
 
In equal measure, then the eco-city represents a collective hope for 
the future of humanity, and attests to a collective uncertainty about 
how to realise this hope. But the ‘problem of planning’ which it 
illustrates is located within a still wider set of debates and questions, 
relating to what might be called an ongoing crisis of liberal 
modernity. This thesis at least implicitly intervenes in these debates, 
even though they do not form its main target. They are outlined 
below because they constitute an important contextual backdrop for 
the discussion and analytical mobilisation of ‘publicness’ later in the 
thesis. Another key concern of the thesis, as mentioned earlier, is to 
test the idea that in some ways the eco-city may be serving, as a 
result of the process of mainstreaming, to reproduce the structural 
conditions of unsustainable ‘business as usual’. Since these dominant 
structural conditions are widely labelled as ‘neoliberal’ in character, 
the broader intended sense of this term, and its relationship to 
classical liberalism, is outlined below. 
 
 
1.3  Liberal Modernity, Neoliberalism, and Beyond 
The growth of the liberal state is generally understood as being tied 
up with that of secularity, commerce and bourgeois property 
ownership from the seventeenth century onwards (Crouch, 2011). Its 
fundamental commitments are to “civil liberties and criticism of any 
political power exercised by organised religion” (ibid:3), such that 
“any form of liberalism must be concerned with the freedom of the 
individual” (Graham, 1992:150), with a concomitant desire to 
maintain “various separations of state from economy; of church from 
polity; of all of these…from moral judgements over how individuals 
conducted their lives” (ibid:4). Associated elaborate legal and 
institutional mechanisms arose largely in order to “protect the 
autonomy of the private property owner” (Habermas, 1989:79). The 
defining feature of liberalism relevant to this thesis is, then, its 




state and the ‘private’ (individual and economic) world beyond. If 
the sanctity of ‘privacy’ is thereby the primary concern of liberalism, 
the governability or otherwise of this private world falls outside the 
remit of the ideal liberal state.  
 
‘Modernity’ is associated with liberalism if only because of its 
contemporaneity; Giddens offers a ‘first approximation’ of 
modernity as referring to “modes of social life or organisation which 
emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and 
which subsequently became more or less worldwide in their 
influence” (Giddens, 1991:1). In broad terms, modernity is associated 
with rationalising Enlightenment thought and the accumulation of 
secular knowledge as a means to emancipate humans from older 
feudal forms of social organisation (Habermas, 1983; Harvey, 
1990:12–13). The “modern notion of self-determination” opposed the 
“traditional teleological cosmic order” (Bielskis, 2005:8) with the 
promise of the possibility of projecting “human values and desires 
on the world through scientific instrumental rationality, enabling the 
active intervention into and exploitation of nature” (ibid). Such 
ambitions are central to traditional conceptualisations of ‘planning’ 
in the sense that they promote “the value of scientific knowledge, 
empirical enquiry and acting in the world to improve it” (Healey, 
1997:8). From the late eighteenth century onwards, the possibility 
arose that “rather than being perpetually vulnerable to the volatility 
of the markets, or the power of big capitalist companies”, it might be 
possible to plan “the trajectory of the future” (Healey, 1997:9) 
through the scientific management of both the natural environment 
(Barry, 2007:43) and the “socio-spatial relations unfolding within 
states and cities” (Healey, 1997:9).  
 
If “liberalism is the political theory, ideology, and institutional 
practice/order of modernity” (Bielskis, 2005:9), then the ‘boundary 
work’ of liberalism referred to above also seems well attuned to 
modernity in the light of Bauman’s (1991) interpretation of the latter 
as an ongoing – though finally, in his view, futile and pernicious – 
attempt to delineate an orderly ‘inside’ from a chaotic ‘outside’. Such 
practices of rational delineation are reflected in the codification of 
civil law which, for Habermas (1989:74–81), played a key role in both 
the liberalisation of the market, and the demarcation of an 




the private sphere, and whose emancipatory promise lay in critical, 
rational discussion made possible by the existence of ‘civil society’, in 
contradistinction to the domination and coercion characterising older 
modes of social organisation.  
 
If, then, classical liberalism sought to protect personal and 
economic life from state interference, ‘neoliberalism’ is widely 
interpreted as a reaction to the model of social democracy which 
arose following the second world war, including what Jessop (2002) 
calls the ‘Keynesian welfare national state’ (KWNS). The nineteenth 
century liberal laissez-faire model had appeared to lead to cycles of 
boom and bust, with disastrous social consequences internationally; 
KWNS aimed to curb these excesses by expanding the role of the 
state, so as to guide the development of society and the economy on 
the basis of rational planning (ibid). The period was marked by a 
general consensus that state intervention in market processes was 
necessary to ensure the welfare of citizens, with fiscal and monetary 
policies in particular aiming to “dampen business cycles and ensure 
full employment” (Harvey, 2007:10). Indicatively, this was the 
heyday of deterministic ‘top-down’ urban planning in western cities, 
marked by a “highly ordered” normative view of urban structure, 
and aiming to be “comprehensive” in its scope (Taylor, 1998:22–27). 
The post-WWII phase of ‘liberal modernity’ might therefore be 
understood as one in which the rationalising tendencies of 
modernity were valorised over the boundaries idealised by 
liberalism.  
 
By the 1970s, many centralised approaches to social and economic 
organisation had attracted widespread criticism. While 
Keynesianism was understood as having led to inflationary crises in 
the West (Crouch, 2011:1; Harvey, 2007:12), the ongoing economic 
collapse of the Soviet bloc might be interpreted as having illustrated 
dramatically the problematic implications of state encroachment into 
the private spheres of the individual and the market.3 A growing 
                                                          
3
  A distinction has been drawn between the state-official Soviet ideology in which all 
personal interests were subordinated to the collective, and a reality from the 1950s 
onwards of the growing importance of essentially private networks of influence and 
economic activity, amounting in their totality to what has been called an ‘informal public 
sphere’ (for a review, see Zdravomyslova & Voronkov, 2002). Although not officially 
acknowledged at the time, the systemic significance of private associational groups and 
informal systems of economic exchange in Soviet Russia has increasingly come to be 




sense of ecological crisis also came to be interpreted as 
“Enlightenment gone wrong” (Gare, 1995:5). The methodological and 
practical promise offered by modernity, that society might be both 
understood and directed on the basis of rationality, for the benefit of 
all, was questioned by the neoliberal assertion that “the knowledge 
necessary for policy interventions in complex life was not of the type 
acquired under the modernist social sciences with their assumptions 
of universal regularities of cause and effect” (Chandler, 2014b:52). 
Since “liberal modernist ‘top-down’ understandings of government” 
were flawed in their reliance on such assumptions, neoliberal 
theorists proposed that society might instead be more efficiently 
governed “from the ‘bottom-up’” (Chandler, 2014b:48).  
 
The application of such ideas to policy-making, associated 
particularly with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and US 
President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s (Harvey, 2006a; Crouch, 2011), 
involved ‘shrinking’ the state’, in order to facilitate the workings of 
the ‘distributed intelligence’ of the unfettered market – an idea 
usually associated with Friedrich Hayek (1945). The ‘roll-back’ 
(Healey, 1997:208; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Purcell, 2013:15) of the state 
that this entailed was not, however, predicated on the idea of the 
state’s redundancy; rather, that states should create “conditions 
under which the knowledge and initiative of individuals is given the 
best scope so that they can plan most successfully” (Hayek, 2001:37). 
The state, relatedly, might “legitimately use coercion to enforce 
operation of the free market” (Low, 1991:181). Hayek saw urban 
planning as conceptually problematic if its goal was to counter the 
negative social side-effects of market-based competition (Low, 
1991:171–175); instead, in his view, “planning and competition can 
only be combined by planning for competition, but not by planning 
against competition” (Hayek, 2001:43). Neoliberalism as understood 
in this thesis therefore follows the liberal tradition in respecting the 
sanctity of the private sphere, but also elevates this to a primary role 
in society’s collective decision-making processes; the role of the state 
is to set preconditions for private markets to work efficiently, but 
without interfering in the markets themselves. 
 
Questions have been raised, however, about the ways in which 
states have remained “selectively active” (Connolly, 2013:21) as 




continued to ‘plan’ in the sense that they have intentionally taken “a 
very active role in creating, maintaining, and protecting the 
preconditions of market self-regulation” (ibid). But this intervention 
has been criticised for its unevenness, on the basis that it has 
consistently benefitted certain groups more than others (see eg 
Crouch, 2011). Indeed, the term ‘neoliberalism’ has come to be used 
more or less interchangeably with the idea of ‘the interests of big 
business’, or to suggest the ideological work done to conceal these 
interests: Hartwich (2009) argues that it has become little more than a 
‘political swear word’, the contemporary targets of which almost 
never identify themselves as neoliberal.  
 
Thus, the status of the label ‘neoliberal’ has shifted from one 
describing a body of theory seeking to rescue liberalism from the 
path it took in the mid-twentieth century, to a term of abuse. 
Whatever evaluation is made either of its theories and practices, or of 
the coherence of critiques of these, its negative contemporary 
connotations serve at least to reflect a questioning of the practical 
effectiveness of dominant modes of government since the end of the 
twentieth century. These challenges appear only to have grown 
stronger following the global economic turmoil of the late 2000s (see 
eg Altvater, 2009; Peck et al., 2010; Crouch, 2011:vii; Aalbers, 2013) – 
in tandem with a growing unease that social and economic 
inequality have increased, and the lack of resolution to a looming 
sense of ecological catastrophe (see eg Brand & Görg, 2008; Brand, 
2009; Brie, 2009; Mccarthy, 2012). The perceived failure of 
neoliberalism in this sense represents the latest manifestation of an 
ongoing crisis of the liberal ideal. There is at least a theoretical call 
for new paradigms of governance to be advanced, wherein liberal 
modernity’s “constructed world of cause and effect and reductionist 
binaries” (Chandler, 2014a:12) is now understood as “a barrier to be 
overcome through new ways of conceiving the world that is to be 
governed” (ibid).   
 
If, at this time of renewed crisis in liberal modernity, the eco-city is 
at the vanguard of experimental attempts to further the ambition of 
shaping a more sustainable global future, again the sheer variety of 
the ways in which these experiments are managed would seem to 
suggest its potential for furthering our understanding of what some 




Two cases are studied in detail in this thesis, chosen partly because 
they represent opposite ends of a spectrum ranging from modernist 
to experimental planning processes (Chapter Four provides a fuller 
explanation of why these cases were selected). Sejong City in South 
Korea is currently being built by state mandate and at central 
government’s expense, having been meticulously planned by 
government officials. The role of the state in Portland’s EcoDistrict 
pilot initiative, conversely, only extended to a process of facilitation, 
whereby it was hoped local communities would decide on their own 
priorities for development and on the means of funding and 
delivering these.  
 
These two cases were approached with an open mind. Given 
contemporary suspicions about modernist planning, it may be 
tempting to reject the possibility of Sejong City furthering the goal of 
urban sustainability. It might be dismissed as a model for planning a 
sustainable future more generally, since its modus operandi may 
necessarily tend to impose an order reflective of an unsustainable 
status quo. Insofar as this status quo is a structurally neoliberal one, 
it may be possible to conclude that Sejong exemplifies what 
Whitehead (2013) has called ‘neoliberal urban environmentalism’. 
Those looking for lessons of one sort or another for how planning for 
sustainability might move beyond the liberal-modern tradition may 
be inclined instead to seek inspiration from cutting-edge experiments 
such as the EcoDistricts initiative.  
 
And yet the status of the EcoDistricts initiative, as an experimental 
planning approach, should also not be prejudged as necessarily 
progressive purely on the basis of its apparent innovativeness. In fact, 
as will be discussed in Chapter Six, it has a more ambiguous nature, 
which relates in large part to it being an example of a ‘governance’ 
approach to sustainability. Such approaches, as Joss (2011b; 2015) 
observes, are typical of many contemporary eco-cities; elsewhere, 
sustainability more generally has been interpreted as in large part a 
question of governance (Adger & Jordan, 2009a). The ambiguity of 
this tendency, in the light of the previous discussion, is briefly 
outlined below. 
 
‘Governance’ has been described as having become a “buzz-




here refers to an “apparently broad consensus [which] has developed 
around the idea that government is actually not the cockpit from 
which society is governed” (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000:136) or “the 
turning point of all movements in society” (Kickert, 1997:736). The 
hierarchical ‘logic of command’ (Gualini, 2010:59) implied by a 
“legally based, centralised, sovereign state authority, formally 
elected and possessing constitutional powers” (Gray, 2005:2, cited in 
Griffin, 2010a:365) has given way to an ontology in which 
government is “itself…part of society…merely one of the co-
directing actors in a market of societal traffic among various social 
actors” (Kickert, 1997:736), with policy-making processes understood 
as “an interplay among various actors” (Klijn & Koppenjan, 
2000:136). The government retains a central coordinatory role within 
practices of governance (Wheale, 2009; Rydin, 2010:48), but this is 
conceptualised less in terms of “planned steering” (Kickert, 1997:736) 
than with mediating the outcomes of “informally based, 
decentralised, shared, collective and inclusive decision-making 
structures” (Gray, 2005:2, cited in Griffin, 2010a:365). The agency of 
government is thus dispersed within “a mode of policy-making that 
is constitutively multi-actor and multi-level, stressing interconnected 
(strategic, ad-hoc)…patterns of relations” (Gualini, 2010:59). Its role 
is not so much to determine these relations as to play an active role in 
facilitating their ‘emergence’ (ibid) in a given setting. These 
interrelationships are understood both to legitimise policy-making, 
as well as enable its more effective implementation (Rydin, 2013:4). 
 
This approach to decision-making is productively ambivalent 
within the concerns of the current thesis. Gualini (2010:60) observes 
that two broad positions can be identified with regard to its 
significance. One of these considers governance in terms of “the 
emergence of new modes of policy-making lying at the very core of 
the state” (ibid). The central tenets of liberalism would certainly seem 
challenged if, as Gualini (2010:77) suggests, governance in this sense 
points towards a ‘cooperative state’, in which the “distinction 
between the subject and object of regulation begins to blur”. It also 
indicates a tension which Rhodes (1996:667) theorised as problematic 
for political institutions insofar as governance networks pose a 
“challenge to governability because they become autonomous and 
resist central guidance”. They therefore at least imply the possibility 





Even if this potential is acknowledged, the question arises of 
whether radical new approaches to sustainability will ever 
realistically be permitted to emerge through governance processes 
directed by existing liberal institutions. While such institutions may 
value incremental change, it seems unlikely that they will 
consciously seek to plot their own structural demise. This 
interpretation is more closely aligned with the second type of 
position on governance identified by Gualini: this uses the theoretical 
prism of neoliberalism to conceptualise governance as fundamentally 
a “’retreat’ or ‘withdrawal’ of the state” (Gualini, 2010:61). From this 
perspective, the governance approaches typical of contemporary eco-
city development might once again be criticised for reproducing 
unsustainability while adopting the rhetoric of radical change. Or, at 
least, it might be argued that the eco-city offers no guarantee of 
transformations which are more than superficial in the short term. In 
Chapter Six, the explanatory value of both of Gualini’s positions 
(hereafter referred to as the ‘post-liberal thesis’, and the ‘neo-liberal 
thesis’) is evaluated with reference to the EcoDistricts initiative. The 
former would predict the possibility that it offers useful lessons for 
the future by pointing towards some form of ‘post-liberal’ societal 
organisation. The latter would anticipate that it exemplifies the 
neoliberalisation of urban governance. 
 
If governance approaches are typical of contemporary urban 
planning more generally, Gualini’s neoliberal thesis chimes with 
Marxist critiques of the latter’s incrementalism and pragmatism as 
blind to the “deeper forces and structuring influences in society” 
(Allmendinger, 2002:124). Communicative planning more 
specifically has been repeatedly criticised for overestimating the 
ability of planners to “make much difference in the face of structures 
of domination in society” (Innes & Booher, 2015:198). In advocating 
action based on decisions emerging from specific contexts, 
governance may echo what Harrison (2014) understands as urban 
planning’s retreat from materiality into an ‘anti-realist’ ontology, in 
which truths are only recognised as locally embedded and discursive. 
If we are persuaded that threats such as climate change call instead 
for urgent action, it would seem rash to dismiss the potential for 
state-centric planning to deliver large-scale solutions. For those who 




indisputably in the public interest, top-down planning might at least 
produce more ‘efficient’ (Innes & Booher, 2015:198) outcomes. The 
case of sustainability, at least, may be one such goal, given its 
concerns for the survival of human society as a whole. If there is no 
guarantee that communicative governance processes will lead to 
outcomes furthering this goal, then these may waste resources at best, 
and be dangerous at worst. The possibility that top-down planning, 
albeit applicable only in particular circumstances, might lead to 
better, even if imperfect, sustainability outcomes, is explored with 
reference to Sejong City, in Chapter  Seven.  
 
Sejong might nevertheless be criticised as limited in its 
transformational ambitions: one of its key raisons d’être, as will be 
discussed, is to consolidate South Korea’s position within global 
circuits of commerce. And yet the charge that it thereby exemplifies 
the neoliberalisation of the eco-city is problematic. Gualini’s 
‘neoliberal’ critiques of governance, first of all, cannot be applied 
because of Sejong’s top-down approach. More importantly, the 
concept of neoliberalism implies a Eurocentric conceptual framework 
of liberal modernity, which may have less explanatory force in this 
Asian context. Potentially, then, Sejong holds a rather different set of 
lessons about how top-down planning might in some ways, and in 
certain non-western contexts, play a role in furthering the broader 
goal of sustainability; it bypasses the ‘problem of planning’ outlined 
at the beginning of this chapter insofar as that problem is framed by 
a western liberal set of parameters. If such an approach can be seen 
as desirable in certain contexts only, there are clear limits to its 
replicability. But this, in turn, may suggest that the ideal of 
replicability is underscored by an unrealistic expectation of the 
coherency of the ‘sustainable city’ as a global vision. If Sejong is 
shaped by – and perhaps can only be meaningfully evaluated in 
relation to – its own specific context, its successes and failures may 
teach us particular types of lessons about the significance of context 
in furthering the goal of a global sustainable future.    
 
In its totality, then, the eco-city illustrates in stark form a series of 
unresolved tensions within governmental attempts to plan the future 
at the current time. In the more immediate sense upon which the 
current thesis focuses, these tensions are manifest in the ambition of 




plans, it may appear to be more of a rhetorical construct which 
conceals other more specific agendas which attempt to impose a 
particular (possibly unsustainable) order on the city. At the same 
time, the ongoing search for new modes of planning, which may 
have been catalysed by the shift towards governance, potentially 
paves the way for new conceptualisations of city space upon which a 
more rounded urbanity might be founded. An alternative possibility, 
however, is that the ‘problem of planning’ is unresolvable in the case 
of the city (as perhaps elsewhere), leaving only the hope that a 
revised, but still essentially modernist, mode of planning represents 
the best hope for substantial sustainability-oriented urban 
transformation looking forwards. 
 
 
1.4  Analytical Framework: ‘Publicness’ 
An analysis of the ‘types of city’ envisioned in or resulting from eco-
city plans risks being an unfocused or impressionistic endeavour. If, 
moreover, the real city exceeds the planned one, it may equally 
exceed any particular analytical framework. To tame the subject 
matter, this thesis therefore focuses on what is here called the 
‘publicness’ of the eco-city. Publicness is not necessarily the only way 
of studying the qualities of ‘cityness’ associated with the eco-city (or 
any other body of urban development). However, it is argued (in 
Chapter Three) that publicness is of fundamental importance to the 
quality of cityness. Simultaneously, questions about the maintenance 
or blurring of boundaries between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ are 
clearly relevant to those of whether the eco-city is best understood as 
reproducing an essentially liberal status quo, or challenging this in 
some way. Since cities are spatialised entities, it is suggested that 
cities can be essentially understood as ‘public spaces’. Special 
emphasis is given in the thesis to the open spaces of the city; these are 
not presented as the only locations where publicness occurs, but 
nevertheless as particularly important ones. It is suggested that the 
evaluation of eco-cities as models of, or sources of inspiration for, 
urban life in the future should pay attention not only to their work as 
testing grounds or showcases for different types of technology, but 





To this end, the thesis introduces a new theoretical model of 
publicness as an ‘assemblage’ of spatiality and behaviour (see 
Chapter Three). It is argued that the idea of assemblage allows for a 
more rounded conception of the public qualities of the city than 
dominant accounts of public space permit. Publicness thus 
conceptualised has two modalities: the ‘civic’ and the ‘emergent’. 
Civic publicness describes a more constructed, compliant type of 
collective performance more closely aligned with the intended uses 
of space; emergent publicness is defined by challenges to spatial 
constraints and norms of different types, and is therefore more 
unpredictable and open-ended. The publicness of a particular space 
may oscillate between the two over time, and both may even be 
present in the same location. This variable quality of publicness is 
understood as an important indicator of the qualities of cityness 
envisioned and resulting in particular urban settings. It encompasses 
both what is planned and what takes place in spite of, or without 
regard to, what is planned for the city. Neither the civic nor emergent 
modality is elevated over the other in terms of desirability – real 
cities are characterised, rather, by both of these.  
 
This conception of publicness works as an analytical tool for 
exploring the problematic relationship between planning and urban 
sustainability, and its implications for the future. It focuses particular 
attention on the question of whether emergent publicness can or 
should be planned for, and informs the analysis of the two case 
studies in Chapters Six and Seven in particular. While the thesis does 
not propose a definitive resolution to the ‘problem of planning’ 
understood in this way, the research findings enable a discussion in 
the concluding chapter on the merits of three possible positions on 
the relationship between planning and publicness, as follows:   
 
1. Realistically, since the emergent publicness of city space can never be 
planned for, eco-city initiatives can only ever be ‘technological 
showcases’. Eco-city policy-makers and practitioners should therefore 
focus on developing experimental technologies, without concerning 
themselves unduly with the qualities of cityness which might result. 
 
2. While emergent publicness cannot be planned for, it can be planned 
against. Consequently, there is a potential for the dominant mode of 





3. There is no reason to reject the possibility that some contemporary or 
future approaches to ‘planning’ the eco-city might take better account 
of emergent ‘cityness’ 
 
Overall, the thesis argues that the ‘city’ rhetorically conjured up in 
eulogistic pro-urban sustainability policies is problematic because it 
obscures not only the relations between the planned and the real city, 
but also a series of specific agendas which offer only limited 
potential for transformative change. Challenging this rhetoric may 
allow us to reclaim the practices of eco-city development as a more 
modest, but potentially more democratic, process of experimentation.  
Simultaneously, it may be a mistake to submit too readily to the idea 
that state-centric planning is poorly placed to grapple with urban 
sustainability because of the complexities involved; in the concluding 
chapter, it is argued that our theorised inability to plan in the face of 
uncertainty might be interpreted as a type of story which itself 
reinforces the so-called ‘neoliberal’ agendas obscured by eco-city 
rhetoric, and that this story may not in any case have universal 
resonance. If we do nevertheless need to find more effective ways of 
planning the eco-city, and possibly ones not essentially framed by 
liberal modernity, then the model of publicness advanced here may 
be a useful conceptual tool with which to observe innovative forms 
of governance emerging as part of the broader experimental process 
of the eco-city. 
 
 
1.5  Central Research Questions  
The central question guiding the discussion is as follows: In what 
ways can eco-cities be characterised as ‘public’? Accordingly, the 
following grounded assumption is tested with regard to the 
envisionment of the eco-city: 
In many cases, the ‘public’ is poorly conceptualised in official 
documents related to the planning and description of eco-city 
initiatives. 
 





How does the assemblage of publicness in the eco-city differ from 
its conceptualisation in official documentation? 
 
To explore the possibility that plans for eco-cities are not in fact plans 
for truly public spaces, but rather driven by more limited, 
rhetorically obscured, agendas, the following question is posed: 




1.6  Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter Two serves to define the empirical subject matter, drawing 
on the academic literature on urban sustainability. It outlines the 
historical and contemporary characteristics of the eco-city, and 
locates these within a wider context of policies and ideas, with 
particular reference to the concept of sustainable development. 
Chapter Three draws on a different set of literatures (related to urban 
theory, publics, and space) to question the nature of the ‘city’ which 
is the stated focus of these ambitions. It proposes that the quality of 
‘cityness’ may be usefully approached through the lens of 
‘publicness’, and introduces the new model of publicness, which will 
be used to analyse the envisioned and actual publicness of eco-city 
initiatives later in the thesis. At the end of this chapter, the research 
questions above are reintroduced and discussed; Chapter Four then 
describes and justifies the methods adopted to explore them.  
 
The findings from the empirical research thus conducted are 
presented and discussed in Chapters Five to Seven. Chapter Five 
analyses the conceptualisation of publicness in a sample of eco-city 
documents from around the world. The following two chapters 
explore the relationship between planned publicness and the actual 
publicness which assembles in urban settings where eco-city plans 
and policies have been implemented. They do so by focusing on two 
rather different ‘critical’ case studies (Flyvbjerg, 2006). The first of 
these, in Chapter Six, analyses an example of ‘bottom-up’ governance, 
in Portland, Oregon (USA). In contrast, Chapter Seven studies the 
effects of adopting a more traditional, government-centric ‘top-down’ 





The concluding chapter begins by summarising the main findings 
and argument. It then returns to the three speculative propositions 
outlined above, to outline some of the key lessons that might be 
learnt from the contemporary eco-city about how we might more 
effectively plan a sustainable future. 
 
 
1.7  Overview of Methodology 
Following an initial literature review, empirical research was 
conducted in two phases. First, to understand the conceptualisation 
of eco-city publicness, discourse analysis was conducted on 
documentation from a sample of 12 initiatives of different types from 
around the world. Second, to explore the performed publicness 
which results from eco-city plans, the two case studies of 
implemented initiatives were selected for analysis from these 12. For 
both, further desk research was conducted into the context of the 
initiative, followed by in-situ fieldwork consisting of qualitative 
interviewing with key actors involved, and observation work in a 
sample of open spaces. In Portland, additionally, a short on-street 
survey was conducted among residents of the Gateway district (on 
which the fieldwork had a special focus). Chapter Four provides the 
rationale for the choice of methods, as well as further details of how 
the documentation was chosen, a more detailed justification for the 





Chapter Two   
Defining the Eco-City 
 
 
This chapter traces the international rise of a body of discourses and 
practices which are gathered together under the umbrella label of the 
‘eco-city’. The narrative serves two purposes: it enables the eco-city 
to be coherently defined as an object of study; and it begins to open 
up a series of unanswered critical questions to explored later in the 
thesis. These questions relate to the nature of the ‘cityness’ which the 
eco-city envisages and produces, and are developed more fully in 
Chapter Three. 
 
The use of the label ‘eco-city’ is not intended to capture or 
privilege any one established set of goals and practices. Rather, it 
covers a diffuse set of concepts, policy discourses, and practices 
which collectively attempt to respond to a series of contemporary 
agendas. Its contemporary multiplicity may be interpreted as 
reflecting a historical layering; the variously appearing tendencies, or 
‘dimensions’, of the eco-city which Roseland (1997) laid out in the 
1990s have not been displaced so much as augmented by newer 
approaches shaped by a changing discursive context. The 
definitional work which this chapter undertakes is therefore 
supported by a review of the key shifts in the broader context of 
environmental thought and policy-making over the last few decades. 
 
The historical narrative makes repeated reference to Joss, 
Tomozeiu and Cowley’s (2011) global survey of eco-city initiatives4  
(hereafter referred to as the Survey), among other sources. The Survey 
might more accurately be described as a ‘census’, since it aimed to 
profile all internationally reported eco-city initiatives (as defined by a 
particular set of criteria) which were currently at least at the planning 
or pilot stage. However, the Survey seeks neither to define the 
semantic boundaries of the ‘eco-city’ label by presenting the full 
breadth of its various historical and geographical uses, nor to 
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illustrate a pre-existing and widely accepted definition of the eco-city. 
Existing definitions, either of the normative prescriptive type, 5 or 
which take the form of performance indicators, have not converged 
into a single international standard (Gunawansa, 2011; Joss, 2012; 
Rapoport, 2014; Joss et al., 2015). The Survey necessarily therefore lays 
out its own conceptual boundaries. This is limiting insofar as 
different boundaries would logically result in a different list of cases 
being included. In particular, the focus on widely publicised 
initiatives with policy status carries some risk that less mainstream 
urban sustainability initiatives are under-represented. Its coverage is 
nevertheless aligned with (though does not define) the main focus of 
the current thesis: the endeavour of furthering the goal of 
sustainability through urban scale interventions which are supported 
or led by institutional policies and plans. 
 
To be included in the Survey, initiatives needed to meet the 
following criteria: to operate at a scale ranging from at least the 
neighbourhood level to that of the broader city-region; to encompass 
multiple sectors (such as urban transport, energy, and housing); and 
to have policy significance, defined as “policy status through, for 
example, municipal initiatives, national programmes or international 
co-operation agreements” (Joss et al., 2011:2). Use of the label ‘eco-
city’ was not a key criterion for inclusion; those adopting other 
cognate or closely related terms (for example, ‘low carbon city’ or 
‘sustainable city’ or ‘hi-tech eco-town’) 6  also qualified if they 
otherwise met the criteria for inclusion, and had been reported on 
internationally as ‘environmentally friendly’ urban developments.   
 
Three important limitations of the Survey as a source of data 
should be acknowledged. First, the criteria for inclusion are partly 
qualitative, with a corresponding risk that inclusion will have 
depended in some cases on subjective judgements; this undermines 
the survey’s replicability, with implications for data reliability 
(Burnham et al., 2004). Second, it focuses mainly on initiatives in 
specific locations, rather than on international frameworks which 
facilitate these. Third, it has not been updated since 2011. These 
reservations aside, the systematic nature of its compilation and the 
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  Examples of normative prescriptive theorists include Engwicht (1992), Register 
(2006), and Downton (2009).   
6
   See the Global Survey (Joss et al., 2011:4) for a glossary of common cognate terms, 




comprehensiveness of its coverage make the Survey a valuable 
document for the purposes of identifying broad diachronic trends 
and synchronic patterns in the discussion below. 
 
 
2.1  The Pioneers of the Eco-City (pre-1992)  
 
Joss (2010) identifies a preliminary eco-city ‘phase’ preceding the 
1992 United Nations Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, when the idea 
remained a “(normatively prescriptive) concept…with practical 
examples relatively few and far between”. Only 8 of the 178 
initiatives profiled in the Survey were launched before 1992 (Joss, 
Cowley & Tomozeiu, 2013). 7 Elsewhere, Rapoport (2010:3) typifies 
this early period with reference to ‘eco-villages’; echoing Barton and 
Kleiner (2000), she describes this as a category of settlement dating 
back to the 1970s, and taking the form of “small scale new 
communities” founded on principles of collaboration, self-sufficiency 
and environmental preservation. Lovell (2008:617) understands the 
early 1970s ‘sustainable housing movement’ as driven by an 
“upsurge in radical deep green environmentalism”, with 
technological innovation fulfilling a “desire for autonomy from 
modern society”. Dawson (2006) suggests that eco-villages have 
certain common characteristics: they are established by private 
citizens, based on a strong communitarian impulse and strong 
shared values, act as “centres of research, demonstration and (in 
most cases) training” (36), and aim to “win back some measure of 
control over community resources” (ibid) in the face of economic and 
cultural globalisation. Rapoport (2010) places in this same tradition 
the recent international Transition Towns movement, which aims to 
enhance local communities’ ability to withstand the effects of 
expected climate change and fossil fuel shortages (Barry & Quilley, 
2008; Smith, 2011; Taylor, 2012). Eco-villages, then, issue a challenge 
to established hierarchies of political organisation and human 
settlement, and networks of resource distribution. Even if they come 
to be recognised in institutional policies, they are fundamentally 
‘bottom-up’ initiatives, drawing on a philosophy of 
experimentational autonomy. 
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  The earliest explicit reference found by the author to the concept of an ‘eco-city’ 
is in a 1982 UNESCO publication related to the Man and Biosphere Programme, 





It would be inappropriate to include most such experiments under 
the ‘eco-city’ umbrella, however. Eco-villages sit outside not because 
of their disconnection from institutional frameworks (though this 
excludes all but a few examples from the main concerns of the 
present thesis, and from the dataset of the Survey), but rather of their 
essentially anti-urban conceptual orientation. The label ‘village’ itself 
might be interpreted as a rejection of urbanity – except in the rather 
different sense of ‘urban village/district’ (examples from the Survey 
include Green Village Philadelphia and Greenwich Millennium Village).8 
The earliest eco-city thinking, as will be discussed below, was 
significant and innovative precisely because it reversed an 
assumption of urban life’s incompatibility with the furtherance of 
ecological and social goals. At the same time, the break from earlier 
ecological thinking was not a clean one: ‘eco-village’ thinking 
continues to feed into certain types of eco-city development, 
alongside other discursive influences. The contemporary eco-city, 
moreover, has retained certain utopian characteristics which might 
be historically traced back to its immediate predecessor (even if, as 
will be discussed, these now serve different functions). 
 
Although writers such as Pepper (1996) and Bramwell (1989; 1994) 
trace contemporary tendencies within environmental thought back to 
earlier paradigmatic world views, the notion of the ‘environment’ as 
currently understood was constructed in the 1960s (Dryzek, 2005). 
Pugh (1996) dates its introduction into the UN agenda to 1962, when 
it reflected concerns over conditions specifically in industrialised 
countries. For the purposes of contextualising the anti-establishment 
stance of the ‘eco-village’, two foundational elements of this early 
environmentalism are particularly significant. First, the radicalisation 
of grass-roots politics beginning in the 1960s, which has been 
variously interpreted as part of the broader questioning of 
anthropocentric Enlightenment principles of ‘progress’ and the 
separation of ‘society’ from ‘nature’ (Latour, 1993; Hajer, 1995; 
Torgerson, 1999), and a reaction against technocracy (Feenberg, 1999; 
Torgerson, 1999). Second, the popularisation of neo-Malthusian 
‘limits discourses’ through publications including Hardin’s Tragedy of 
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  Taylor (2000:23) suggests that “the idea of the village, as a physical place and a 
social community, has exercised something of a hypnotic attraction for town 




the Commons (1968), Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb (1968) and the 
Limits to Growth report (Meadows et al., 1972) – with concerns over 
the finiteness of resources only exacerbated by the early 1970s oil 
crisis (Bramwell, 1989; Pugh, 1996).  
 
Hajer (1995) observes that the Limits to Growth report was in fact 
rejected by many radical environmentalists precisely because it was 
rooted in the technocratic tradition: it “formed the basis for a 
coalition of forces that saw a further integration and co-ordination 
among the dominant social powers as the logical solution” (86). Thus, 
alongside grass-roots environmentalism, the 1970s was also 
characterised by the development of “new vocabularies of 
environmental policy making” taking place in the “relatively 
concealed sphere of secondary policy-making institutes – such as the 
OECD, the IUCN, or the UNEP” (90). Yet Limits to Growth still had 
significance for grass-roots politics since “as a discursive power-
practice [it] was perhaps effective precisely because it concentrated 
on the definition of the problem” (83, italics added). It constructed the 
problem for the first time as a “global crisis” and a “world 
threatening collapse” (ibid). Early 1970s environmentalists responded 
to this construction with solutions which tended to be anti-
establishment, critical of economic development, and peripheral to 
mainstream politics (Dryzek, 2005). These responses ranged from 
‘preservationism’ in terms of critical natural resources (Haughton, 
1999) to strong ecocentrism (Pepper, 1996), and were marked by an 
underlying ideal of ‘steady state’ ecology (Dryzek, 2005).  
 
The seminal environmental texts of this period, however, 
contained very little discussion of urban issues (Brand & Thomas, 
2005). Brown’s (1981) Building a Sustainable Society, to take one 
example, is clearly framed by ‘limits to growth’ discourse, aiming for 
overall ‘stabilization’, with economic activity “more diffuse and less 
centralized” (9). Where Brown mentions the city at all, it is parasitical, 
constructed in opposition to a vulnerable rural world: “Each year, 
urban sprawl, village expansion, and highway construction claim 
several million acres of prime cropland, while land hungry farmers 
push cultivation onto ever more fragile soils” (ibid:5). In combining a 
strong commitment to environmental preservation with an “implicit 
rejection of economic growth” (Rapoport, 2010:7), the ‘eco-village’ 




Just as 1970s environmentalism was founded on a broad rejection 
of modernism (Cosgrove, 1990; Pepper, 1996), the modern city 
specifically was portrayed in a negative light in related 
contemporary popular texts. In Callenbach’s fictional Ecotopia, 
existing cities are relegated to the “barbarian past”, to be replaced by 
‘minicities’, interconnected but nevertheless “each one a self 
contained community” (Callenbach, 1975:30). Haughton (1999) sees 
in Ecotopia an example of what he calls the ‘self-reliant city’ model of 
urban sustainability, in which the dispersion of the built form is 
closely related to goals of social and participatory equity, with the 
notion of ‘progress’ rejected in favour of an environmental and 
economic ‘steady state’. Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful describes the 
growth of the modern city as “pathological”, and asserts that 
“probably the order of magnitude of 500,000 inhabitants could be 
looked upon as the upper limit”, beyond which “human degradation” 
is inevitable (Schumacher, 1973:50). Haughton identifies an “early 
1970s boom in ‘urban crisis’ literature”, often interested in defining 
the ‘optimum city size’, and which “wrongly foresaw the implosion 
of mega-cities such as New York and London”, as well as an ongoing 
“distinct tendency for people to assume that the good life is one 
which is best lived in smaller communities” (Haughton, 2007:278). 
 
Goodwin and Taylor (1982) identify a ‘communitarian branch’ of 
utopian thinking which is closely aligned with these tendencies – 
they suggest that it is typified by hostility to powerful nation-states, 
enthusiasm for local self-government, and a broad philosophy that 
‘small is beautiful’. They suggest that communitarian 
experimentation is typically viewed at least by the British 
establishment as “not worthy of serious study” (183), its perceived 
failure to deliver results flowing from its rejection of conventional 
channels of influence. Goodwin and Taylor propose, however, that 
communes should be understood in a more positive light, as “small-
scale schemes of experimentation” (ibid:182). Dawson understands 
eco-villages as “small, dense and rich concentrations of activity 
whose aim is to transform the nature of that which surrounds them” 
(Dawson, 2006:66). As utopian projects, they may represent a “useful 
source of socio-political truths and inspiration” (Goodwin & Taylor, 
1982:221), since they “relativize the present, allowing for objective 
judgements which we could not pass if it were viewed as an absolute” 




towards “escapist daydreams”, yet also draws on Sargisson (2000a; 
2000b) to valorise its potential for creating “‘free spaces’…in which 
we can carry out thought and practical experiments.” Sargisson 
(2000a) discusses Findhorn eco-village as an example of an ‘ecological 
intentional community’ underpinned by a philosophy of 
‘transgressive utopianism’. She understands utopias as “spaces in 
which we can be different”; they are transgressive in that they allow 
us to “break significantly with confining traditions of thought and 
behaviour” (ibid:140). Painted in this light, as intentionally bounded 
space where unconventional modes of living are trialled, in the hope 
of wider application, the eco-village chimes with the notion that 
certain eco-cities function as protected experimental ‘niches’ (Geels, 
2002b), as discussed in section 2.4 below.  
 
To label an eco-village as ‘utopian’ makes no claims about its 
practical application as a fully worked-out model of human 
habitation. Rather, it emphasises its potential as an open-ended (and 
often temporary (Goodwin & Taylor, 1982)) experiment attempting 
to “shift…the way that we think about our relationship to our 
environment” (Sargisson, 2000a). In contrast, the contemporary eco-
city claims to present unmediated practical solutions to the question 
of how we should live; it is concerned with the development or 
transformation of actual cities. It may be seem problematic, then, if 
the contemporary ‘sustainability movement’, as Vallance et al. 
(2011:346) argue, retains ‘[u]topian underpinnings’ which go 
unacknowledged. The denial of utopianism in understandings of 
sustainability as “simply, or at least mainly, a matter of bio-physical 
environmental integrity” (ibid) may mean that the possibility of 
tension between ‘technological fixes’ and established social 
structures, preferences and practices goes unaddressed. While 
utopian visions of the ‘good society’ have since antiquity been 
spatialised as “the quest for the good city” (Cugurullo, 2013b:68), 
their adoption by institutional actors rather than by marginalised 
groups or thinkers seeking to change the institutional status quo 
(ibid:78) may raise questions about these actors’ motivations. In the 
case of Masdar City in the United Arab Emirates, Cugurullo (2013a; 
2013b) argues that this unacknowledged utopianism in practice 




to a future ‘sustainable’ society remains unclear.9 If, more generally, 
state-driven utopian ‘grand visions’ are greeted with suspicion, and 
associated with the modernist excesses of the twentieth century 
(Pinder, 2002), the nature and implications of the eco-city’s rhetorical 
utopianism merit closer investigation (these are the focus of Chapter 
Five of this thesis, and are reconsidered in the concluding chapter).   
 
The ‘unacknowledged utopianism’ in contemporary 
manifestations of the eco-city may invite critical questions, then, but 
is genealogically linked to earlier radical discourses rejecting existing 
urban models in favour of smaller self-sufficient utopian 
communities. These formed the immediate historical context to the 
first significant use of the label ‘eco-city’ itself. This use is dated by 
Roseland (1997) to the publication of Richard Register’s Ecocity 
Berkeley in 1987. Register presented a normative vision, whose 
opening words evoke Bloch’s (1986) notion of a ‘concrete utopia’ – a 
wilful hope for positive change rooted in what is currently possible 
and which “simultaneously anticipate[s] and influence[s] the future”  
(Ganjavie, 2015:95). Bloch defines this in opposition to ‘abstract’ 
utopianism which takes the form of “compensatory” counterfactual 
imaginative visions which carry no expectation of being realised 
(ibid): 
“An ecocity is an ecologically healthy city. No such city 
exists. There are bits and pieces of the ecocity scattered 
about in present day cities and through history, but the 




Register’s idea was promoted over the next decade by Urban 
Ecology, an NGO of which Register was a founding member in 1975 – 
most notably via the organisation of three International Eco-city 
Conferences during the 1990s (Roseland, 1997). Roseland also cites 
David Engwicht’s (1992) Towards an Eco-City as a seminal text; 
Engwicht’s promotion of the city as a ‘fragile ecology’ of social 
exchanges, and his vilification of the private automobile, 
complement Register’s more environment-focused philosophy of 
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 Koch (2012) nevertheless alerts us to the risks of too readily accusing non-Western urban 
development projects of ‘utopianism’, arguing that the term may perform “highly 
political bordering practice[s]” (2445) through which ‘real’ Western modernity is 




‘ecologically healthy cities’, biodiversity, density and reduced energy 
use (Register, 2006). The Green City Program for the San Francisco Bay 
Area & Beyond (Berg et al., 1990) illustrates this new conceptualisation 
of the urban in relation to environmental problems. Rather than 
rejecting the idea of urban living, it advocates bringing nature back 
into the city, the use of renewable energy and public transport, and 
celebrates social diversity, as ways of making cities more ‘liveable’. 
Rather than framing the problem of increasing urbanisation in terms 
of the ‘overpopulated city’, it decries the lack of suitable plans to 
accommodate this extra population (ibid:xiii). Against a background 
in which the city had long been constructed as what Hinchliffe 
(1999:145) calls “the antithesis of environmentally sustainable futures, 
green living and the survival of ‘nature’”, either taming or being 
threatened by nature, its ‘other’ (Kaika, 2005), the concept of the eco-
city was provocatively oxymoronic.  
 
Despite this novelty, however, early eco-city thinking was 
derivative in other respects. Its concordance with environmental 
thinking of the 1960s and 1970s is indicated by Roseland’s (1997) 
observation that the nascent 1980s eco-city discourse conflated a 
variety of pre-existing concepts; the disparate examples he gives – 
including bioregionalism, ecofeminism, appropriate technology, 
environmental justice, the steady state, and the Gaia hypothesis – 
tend to have an anti-establishment, grass-roots bias, with a critical 
stance towards existing models of capitalist development. The Green 
City Program (Berg et al., 1990), for example, is explicitly developed 
within a bioregional framework, seeking to encourage small and 
cooperative businesses, barter and work-exchange schemes, and 
underpinned by a goal of ‘life-place vitality’. The presence of such 
countercultural discourses in contemporary eco-city thinking might 
therefore be understood as a continuation of earlier tendencies rather 
than as exceptional or anachronistic.  
 
An attempt to draw boundaries round the eco-city concept, 
beyond identifying its first use as a label, is problematised further by 
Roseland’s (1997:198) observation that the early eco-city drew on a 
“long line of thinkers and writers whose ideas were precursors to 
these concepts many decades ago”. Joss similarly aligns the eco-city 
with the Garden City movement, the ‘Techno-City’ (Kargon & 




the city” (Joss, 2010:240). The eco-city’s novelty does not, therefore, 
lie in the ambition of intervening in the built environment to achieve 
social, economic, or environmental outcomes (Joss, 2010). Rather, it 
constitutes a “new genre in urban planning and policy” (Joss, 
2011b:331) to the extent that it addresses specifically contemporary 
agendas. This reflects Whitehead’s suggestion that the sustainable 
city might usefully be thought of as “a strategy designed to address 
the traditional social and economic regulatory problems of urban 
areas, in and through a new set of environmental priorities and 
ecological practices” (Whitehead, 2003:1190). There is little reason to 
suppose that the early eco-city did not embrace older imaginations of 
the potentials of the city, but it was also in direct dialogue with what 
Meadowcroft (2000:371) calls the “‘growth versus environment’ 
polarity which typified environmental debate during the 1970s and 
early 1980s”. It was defined by the contemporary dilemmas which it 
attempted to solve, and these dilemmas were constructed on the 
basis of a historically contingent ontology.  
 
 
2.2  Phase Two: Rio and Beyond (1992-2005)  
 
The later stages of the ‘pioneer’ eco-city phase were marked by the 
relative mainstreaming of green politics through the 1980s in 
Northern Europe if not elsewhere, still informed largely through the 
lens of the ‘limits’ discourse (O’Riordan, 1989). The ‘green’ agenda 
increasingly related to cross-national issues - including acid rain, and 
ozone layer depletion (Pugh, 1996). In parallel, environmental issues 
were linked to those of international equity (Meadowcroft, 2000) 
including the degradation of rural areas (Pepper, 1996) and the 
growth of squatter settlements (Pugh, 1996) in developing countries. 
These developments set the stage for the international embrace of the 
notion of ‘sustainable development’ (SD) in the United Nations’ 
Brundtland Report (WCED, 1987).10  
                                                          
10  Earlier uses of the term ‘sustainable development’ have been identified with 
regard to fisheries (Dryzek, 2005), and in the World Conservation Strategy 
(IUCN et al., 1980) (Hopwood et al., 2005), but these focused specifically on 
environmental issues, without elaborating on their connections to socio-
economic ones.  According to Dryzek (2005), the two words had occasionally 
been joined together since the early 1970s in radical third-world discourse; 
Pezzoli (1997) observes that the term ‘sustainable development’ was used at UN 
conferences in the early 1970s in a way which clearly looked forward to the 




SD attempted to break with previous dialectical oppositions by 
suggesting that “ecology and economy are becoming ever more 
interwoven locally, regionally, nationally, and globally” (WCED, 
1987:Overview/15), combining concerns for both in its often-quoted 
definition as meeting “the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs” (ibid:Chapter 2/1).11 The ensuing 1992 Rio de Janeiro Earth 
Summit is widely recognised as pivotal moment when “awareness of 
the global dimension of the ecological crisis was ‘finally’ accepted 
and confronted politically around the world” (Fischer & Hajer, 
1999:1) alongside issues of inter- and intra-generational 
environmental justice (Haughton, 1999; Ehresman & Stevis, 2011). 
Over the course of the decade, SD came to be discussed around the 
‘three pillars’ of the economy, environment, and society (Kates et al., 
2005). 
 
SD has continued to have the status of a ‘consensus concept’ since 
the 1990s (Blowers, 1997; Dobson, 2009; Cuthill, 2010), and may have 
become the “common sense of the contemporary age” (Cochrane, 
2010:373). Despite its global spread, however, the presence of voices 
dissenting from this consensus mark it out as a historically 
contingent policy discourse rather than necessarily “the ‘climax’ of 
environmental discourse per se” (Fischer & Hajer, 1999:2). Some of 
the boundaries of this discourse are therefore outlined below to 
                                                                                                                                                   
sustainability draw on a rather longer history; he credits Saxon Adminstrator 
Hans Carl von Carlowitz with the first conceptualisation of the ‘three pillars’ of 
sustainability (‘nachhalten’) with reference to intergenerational equity, in 1713. 
However, while such identifications of conceptual antecedents (or 
terminological similarities in other fields) may be useful in analysing the 
historical shaping of the current body of discourse and practice, there is no 
strong argument for bracketing them within it. Thus, while Wheeler (2000) 
suggests that the earliest use of the adjective ‘sustainable’ to refer to patterns of 
human development may have been in the Limits to Growth report (Meadows et 
al., 1972), he concurs with other commentators that the ‘sustainable 
development’ concept only entered mainstream discourse following the 
Brundtland Report and Rio Summit. 
11
   Jacobs (1999) suggests that, despite earlier distinctions made between the terms 
‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable development’ (for example, that the former has 
a narrower environmental meaning – see Lélé (1991) and Dobson (1991)), in 
practice the two terms are used interchangeably (with ‘sustainability’ an 
abbreviation of ‘sustainable development’). Nor does it appear to be generally 
held that the two terms have diverged in meaning since then: Seghezzo (2009) 
comments that sustainability is “considered a synonym” of SD. In this thesis, 





differentiate it from other types of environmental thinking. However, 
it should be noted that the term ‘sustainable city’ is used 
interchangeably with ‘eco-city’ elsewhere in this thesis (and ‘urban 
sustainability’ or ‘sustainable urban development’ interchangeably 
with the ‘eco-city’ when considered as a body of thought and 
practice). All these terms are intended as umbrella labels which cover 
the phenomenon in all its variety.12 The eco-city (or sustainable city) 
in short, is not presented as coterminous with the discourse of SD 
strictly defined. 
 
 ‘Deep ecologists’ have challenged SD’s explicitly anthropocentric 
character (Lee, 2000; Williams & Millington, 2004; Dryzek, 2005; Keil, 
2007) as “continuing the technocratic orientation to nature of 
Western civilisation and of capitalism” (Gare, 1995:86–87). Gare (1995) 
proposes the category of Marxist environmentalism, which aims to 
demonstrate the “virtual impossibility of solving environmental 
problems through the simple devices proposed by the environmental 
economists” (83), since “the creation of environmental problems is a 
product of the dominant mode of production in the world today” 
(Johnston, 1989:199). Elsewhere, SD is characterised as a “spatio-
institutional fix” (While et al., 2004:551) and a “smokescreen” (Jacobs, 
1999:22) serving the interests of business at the expense of the 
environment and global equity, and accused of having ”‘bracketed’ 
the essence of the socio-political order” (Fischer & Hajer, 1999:5).13 
Despite its claim to accommodate cultural pluralism, SD attracts 
criticism as a ‘top down’ imposition by the UN on the global south 
(Kates et al., 2005), which “protect[s] the economic hegemony of the 
industrialised states and assuage[s] the environmental consciences of 
rich customers” (Meadowcroft, 2000). On this view, its 
institutionalisation has been accompanied by a sidelining of issues of 
north-south equity (Jacobs, 1999; Meadowcroft, 2000). These may be 
old debates but, as will be discussed further in Chapter Five in 
                                                          
12
  Other recent research has teased out some of the differences in usage between 
these (and other cognate) labels. Moir et al. (2014) suggest the term ‘eco-city’ has 
a narrower frame of reference, having come to be associated with particular 
types of development in Asia. De Jong et al. (2015) analyse overlaps and 
connections in the academic literature.  
13
   Such arguments display parallels with Myllylä and Kuvaja’s (2005) questioning 
of SD’s technocratic mode of implementation in cities in the developing world  
– but Myllylä and Kuvaja advocate a more place-specific modality of SD; they 
are not promoting a radical alternative to SD and are therefore arguing from 




particular, remain relevant if SD continues to serve the rhetorical 
purpose of pre-empting or deflecting critical debate about resulting 
practices (Adams, 2010). As a “political strategy and technology of 
governance” (Cochrane, 2010:373), it has been reproached for 
smoothing the passage of particular neoliberal agendas 
(Swyngedouw, 2010), since it is “impossible to argue in any 
convincing way for a programme committed to being unsustainable” 
(Cochrane, 2010:372). 
 
Far from being a neutral frame, then, to the extent that it closes 
down the possibility of debate rather than opens up a discursive 
space, SD may be critiqued as closely aligned with what Crouch 
(2004) sees as ‘post-democratic’ tendencies in contemporary societies. 
Its institutional implications are also questioned from the quite 
different perspective of ‘free-market environmentalism’: here, SD’s 
faith in governmental intervention is the target, in that centralised 
bodies are thought poorly placed to resolve such an inherently 
complex problem as the global environment (Anderson & Leal, 2001; 
Pennington, 2008). From a ‘liberal institutionalist’ perspective, SD’s 
reliance on government perpetuates the authoritarian traditions of 
the limits discourse – with arguments being put forward instead for 
polycentric governance networks (Paterson, 2009).   
 
At the same time, SD’s remains unclearly defined by its own 
adherents. Despite agreement over its broad goals, the means of their 
attainment have remained contested (Meadowcroft, 2000), with little 
consensus over how they might best be “structured” or “combined” 
(Joss, 2012:2), or translated into specific societal goals (Connelly, 
2007). This lack of agreement has caused “frustration or irritation” 
for those approaching SD from a ‘policy-technocratic’ standpoint 
(Jacobs, 1999). There are no universally accepted criteria – in the form 
of indicators or standards – for monitoring SD’s progress, either 
generally (Hezri & Dovers, 2006) or for urban sustainability more 
specifically (Maclaren, 1996; Bell & Morse, 1999; Joss, 2012; Joss et al., 
2012); the possibility and utility of such standardisation remains 
questionable (Lyytimäki & Rosenström, 2008; Joss et al., 2015). 
Specific assessment approaches such as ‘ecological footprinting’ 
(Wackernagel & Rees, 1997) may have gained international currency 
(see, for example: WWF, 2005; Global Footprint Network, 2010), and 




schemes now compete for acceptance at local, national, and 
international levels (Joss et al., 2015). However, individual eco-cities 
remain free to set their own targets and publish achievements 
selectively (Joss, 2010). 
 
This definitional looseness (or multiplicity), which also raises 
problems for attempts to survey the eco-city phenomenon, is 
exemplified well by the case of China. Since the State Environmental 
Planning Agency’s landmark policy document in 1996 Guidelines for 
the Building of Eco-Communities 1996-2050, a series of national policies 
have been introduced to encourage eco-city development, often in 
the form of funding competitions (Yip, 2008). However, there is still 
no generally agreed central government guidance as to what 
constitutes an eco-city (Wu, 2012). The Ministry of Environmental 
Protection and the Ministry of Housing and Urban Rural 
Development, for example, use different criteria (World Bank, 2009), 
and have run separate urban sustainability award schemes since the 
late 1990s (Zhao, 2011). These and other factors make it difficult to 
provide a definitive total number of current eco-city projects in 
China; the Survey profiled 25 substantial initiatives which had been 
reported on internationally, but also noted that the Chinese Society 
for Urban Studies had recently identified as many as 259 declaring 
the intention to become eco-cities (Joss et al., 2011:1/footnote 2; see 
also Yu, 2014:78). Elsewhere, Wu (2012) counts “more than 100” 
municipal governments planning to build eco-cities or eco-towns; 
while Ren (2013:112) claims that, as of 2011, “more than 1,000 cities 
and counties had announced plans and timetables to achieve eco-city 
or eco-county status”. 
 
More optimistically, SD’s ambiguity may have enabled “the first 
global discourse-coalition in environmental politics. A coalition that 
shares a way of talking about environmental matters but includes 
members with widely differing social and cognitive commitments” 
(Hajer, 1995:14). Its open-endedness facilitates global dialogue (Kates 
et al., 2005) and, at the micro-policy level, allows potentially 
conflictual political priorities to be negotiated and become 
“assembled around particular concerns without necessarily ever 
being fully integrated into some overarching unified set of 
understandings” (Cochrane, 2010:371–372). Even the suspicion that it 




parts does not refute its agency as a discursive space: “Despite (or 
exactly because of ) the lack of a fixed core meaning, such an “empty” 
concept may become politically and intellectually hegemonic” (Offe, 
2009:561, footnote 23). 
 
Before Rio, as noted earlier, “few sustainability advocates focused 
on cities or patterns of urban development” (Wheeler, 2000:134). 
However, eco-city practices were discursively enabled by 
widespread adoption of the Agenda 21 (UNDESA, 1992) 
implementational programme at local authority level (Joss, 2010). 
Curitiba (Brazil), for example, was internationally lauded in the 
1990s as an example of eco-city thinking. Curitiba had first began 
improving its public transport system in the 1970s (McKibben, 2003; 
Macedo, 2004), while pedestrianising its city centre and constructing 
a series of green parks both as recreational and environmental 
amenities and to mitigate flooding (McKibben, 2003). Its urban 
improvements were driven by local practical needs, such as litter 
collection from unplanned settlements, with a strong overall 
emphasis on social inclusion. Joss also highlights Waitakere in New 
Zealand, which announced itself as an eco-city in 1993 on adopting a 
local Agenda 21 programme. It too prioritised social inclusion, and its 
resource management principles were based on Maori cultural 
values (Laituri, 1996). Additionally, often within local Agenda 21 
programmes, different civil society actors across Austria, Germany 
and Switzerland declared their towns Ökostädte, in order to introduce 
various principles of environmental management and sustainable 
development (Joss et al., 2011; Damm, 2015). Nevertheless, Mitlin and 
Satterthwaite were still able in 1996 to suggest that cities were only 
rarely mentioned in SD-related literature, perhaps since writers on 
environmental issues had “long regarded cities with disdain, even if 
they live in cities” (Mitlin & Satterthwaite, 1996:30). This ongoing 
legacy of anti-urban sentiment was soon to change: 
 
“In the late 1960s and 1970s the word most likely to be 
associated with cities was ‘crisis’, both political and 
economic. From the protests and riots of the 1960s to the 
difficult fiscal states of cities in the late 1970s, cities were 
where society’s ills were most visible. Thus it is hardly 
surprising they were viewed negatively; cities equal 
problems. Go forward a couple of decades and it is all 






Research and policy discourse over (ex-)industrial European cities, 
previously dominated by notions of decline, instead began 
promoting cities as “sites of renewed economic dynamism and 
engines of national prosperity” (Turok & Mykhnenko, 2007:165). 
Urban “attributes of size, density and diversity” were mobilised to 
establish their “credentials as centres of growth and innovation” 
(Docherty et al., 2004:446). The “dearth of strategic thinking about the 
future of cities” in the 1970s and 1980s (Moir et al., 2014:11) gave way 
to a surge of interest in the early 1990s (ibid:13), with cities now 
understood as playing an “extraordinarily important role in the 
reflexive relationship between the global and the local” (Brandtner, 
2011:75). Relatedly, processes of globalisation since the 1970s 
appeared to have “hollowed out” (Jessop, 1994:264) the nation state, 
resulting in the “need for supranational coordination” (ibid) but also 
opening up space for a ‘subnational resurgence’, manifested in a 
“stronger role for regional and local states” (Jessop, 1994:271) and a 
thickening of horizontal transnational links between local authorities 
(ibid). The wealthiest ‘world cities’, at least, came to be likened to city 
states whose networked relations were in many ways effectively 
unmediated by their national settings (Appadurai, 2001). This change 
occurred in tandem with a re-imagining and repackaging of the post-
industrial city as a site of consumption and spectacle (O’Connor & 
Wynne, 1996; Benton-Short & Short, 2008), as reflected in a wide 
range of land-use regeneration schemes internationally, often on ex-
industrial sites such as waterfronts (Brownill et al., 2013), while it had 
become increasingly common for cities to market themselves 
competitively, attempting to construct distinctive identities around 
particular cultural and economic advantages to attract investment 
and tourism (Ashworth & Voogd, 1990; Ward, 1998; Stevenson, 
2003:98–100; Kavaratzis, 2009; Sager, 2011). Thus, strategic urban 
policies variously mobilised instrumentally or encouraged a new-
found civic pride. This repositioning of the city in policy was 
accompanied by increased urban residential growth rates in many 
western countries; many of Britain’s larger cities, for example, began 
in the 1990s to reverse population declines (Champion, 2014), and 
support for urban densification grew internationally. 14  Since the 
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  Since this period, the (variously defined) notion of the ‘compact city’ has 




millennium, many cities across North America and Europe have 
been repopulated (Rae, 2013:95) at least partly because of a new 
common understanding that “urban economic viability is predicated 
upon the existence of dynamic, liveable and populated city 
centres”(ibid). 
 
Echoing the growth of this multifaceted pro-urban discourse (in 
western cities at least), Myllylä and Kuvaja (2005) suggest that the 
1996 UN Habitat II (City Summit) in Istanbul marked the first official 
recognition of the importance of cities for the global environmental 
agenda. Alongside an understanding of cities as problematic sources 
of pollution and sites of environmental degradation, the idea that 
they contained the key to the solution of global environmental 
problems (Mitlin & Satterthwaite, 1996; Whitehead, 2012) slowly 
gained currency. Although only 20 of the 178 eco-cities profiled in 
the Survey were launched – mostly in Europe – during the period 
1992-2000 (Joss et al., 2013), by 2003 the ‘sustainable city’ was 
described as having become a “hegemonic paradigm of metropolitan 
development” (Whitehead, 2003:1187). Layered on top of the spread 
of SD, the growing appeal of city-level implementation beyond 
North America and Europe was evidenced by the appearance of 
various Asian eco-cities in the early 2000s, including Songdo 
International Business District (South Korea), Tajimi (Japan), Rizhao 
(China), Suzhou Industrial Park (China), and Xiamen (China) Guiyang 
(China), and the announcement of six pilot eco-city schemes by the 
Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests (Joss et al., 2013).   
 
If the period between the Rio Summit and the mid-2000s laid the 
foundation for the acceleration of the eco-city phenomenon in more 
recent years, one final set of criticisms directed at SD is worth 
highlighting. Commentators have repeatedly suggested that 
environmental and economic issues tend to be foregrounded in 
                                                                                                                                                   
environmental advantages are contested (Burton, 2000).  Similarly, the ideal of 
‘smart growth’, which claims local and global environmental benefits, as well as 
a better quality of life, has been promoted at national level in the US (USEPA, 
2011). Herschell (2013) sees such ‘smartness’ as a mechanism for reconciling 
potential conflicts at the city-region scale between the rather different agendas, 
institutional dynamics and sectoral spatialities of policies related to economic 
competitiveness and sustainability. These and similar concepts are promoted as 
an alternative to suburban ‘sprawl’ (see, for example: Jenks et al., 1996; Freilich 
& Peshoff, 1997; Handy, 2005; Arku, 2009), while Lees likens the status of urban 





debates and policy-making around SD, leaving its social aspects 
rather less well understood (Littig & Grießler, 2005; Parés & Saurí, 
2007; Wheeler & Beatley, 2009; Cuthill, 2010; Dempsey et al., 2011); 
social sustainability has remained in a state of “conceptual chaos” 
(Vallance et al., 2011). Giddings et al. (2002) suggest that its social 
dimensions have been neglected because they raise difficult 
questions about underlying power structures. Arguably, this 
confusion makes actors less accountable for the social implications of 
their behaviour than for their environmental and economic 
achievements. While, for example, businesses have often claimed to 
engage with goals of social justice under the banner of SD, such 
claims have often remained unmatched by substantive changes of 
behaviour (Redclift, 2005). The undertheorisation of social 
sustainability would appear to be particularly problematic for urban 
sustainability, in that it sits uncomfortably with the tradition of 
sociological enquiry into the city, which has long constituted a 
“primary context for thinking about questions of social justice, 
citizenship, and social cohesion” (Tonkiss, 2002:591). The accelerating 
practical implementation of eco-city ideas in the new millennium has 
generated a growing body of critical scholarship in its wake; many 
eco-cities may be interpreted as essentially “technical experiments 
where the social is an afterthought” (Caprotti, 2015:15).  
 
 
2.3   ‘Ubiquitisation’ (2005 Onwards)  
 
In their study of urban governance responses to climate change, 
Bulkeley and Betsill (2013) characterise the late 1990s and early 2000s 
as a period of pioneering ‘municipal voluntarism’. This consisted of 
initiatives often led by individuals in mainly small- and medium-
sized city authorities originally in North America and Europe, linked 
by international networks such as ICLEI, whose activities were 
“reminiscent of social movements with their focus on gathering 
intentions, knowledge and purpose towards common goals” 
(Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013:139). Global environmental concerns were 
appended to existing policy issues such as air pollution, health and 
congestion (Betsill, 2001). This “piecemeal and opportunistic 
approach” (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013:140) has since been overlaid with 
a ‘strategic urbanism’, exhibiting greater geographical global reach, 




urban agendas” (ibid). The spread of this more integrated urban 
environmental policy-making finds an echo in the Survey’s dataset 
(which only includes schemes operating across multiple policy areas): 
as many as 121 of the 178 initiatives included had been launched 
since the mid-2000s (Joss et al., 2013:11). Again echoing Bulkeley and 
Betsill’s findings, this new wave of eco-cities is increasingly 
international: the continent on which most eco-cities were launched 
during this period is Asia, and a further seven in Africa.  
 
Alongside this ‘globalisation’, the eco-city has been increasingly 
mainstreamed into government policies (Joss, 2011a). Much of the 
acceleration of its growth is accounted for by governmental 
initiatives whereby a block of proposed eco-cities are simultaneously 
announced. Examples include: the UK’s four eco-towns (ODPM, 2005); 
France’s nationwide programme of ÉcoCités proposed within its 
national Urban Sustainability Plan (MEEDDAT, 2008); a series of ‘eco-
friendly’ cities planned along the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2010); and the Japanese government’s selection of 13 
eco-model cities (JETRO, undated). Furthermore, various transnational 
‘umbrella’ initiatives have been launched since 2005, including the 
US-based Clinton Climate Initiative’s Climate Positive Development 
Program, supporting urban development projects across six 
continents (C40-CCI Cities, undated), and the World Bank’s Eco2 
Cities programme: a “broad platform that will provide practical and 
scalable, analytical and operational support for cities in developing 
countries to achieve ecological and economic sustainability” (World 
Bank, 2010a:4). The United Nations has more recently declared that 
“The key to sustainability lies in the concept of ‘green cities’ or ‘eco 
cities’” (UNEP, 2012:vi, cited in Joss, 2015:15). The international 
institutionalisation of what was once a radical idea promoted by 
peripheral non-governmental actors does not, however, imply that 
its contemporary backers have thereby become radicalised. Rather, 
we might expect the converse to be true if Roy is right that  
 
 “the international frontier of planning is saturated with 
power and hegemony such that it is rarely a space of 
counter-hegemonic thought and action. Indeed, the 
globalization of planning at different historical 
moments…has reinforced the most conservative 






Some of the tendencies distinguishing the more recent wave of 
eco-cities from their predecessors are outlined below. Insofar as these 
suggest an increasing alignment with the interests of powerful actors, 
they resonate with the critical perspective that SD has failed to effect 
significant structural change. 
 
Joss et al. (2013) describe a general drift over time towards ‘green 
growth’ policy making, associated with the discourse of ‘ecological 
modernisation’ (EM). EM departs from the ‘three-pillared’ 
conceptualisation of SD in the duality of its main focus on economic 
growth and environmental protection.15 EM advocates argue that, 
given the right policy framework, economic growth and efficiencies 
and innovation achieved through markets facilitate the development 
of cleaner technology (Redclift, 2005), and environmental protection 
is beneficial for business profitability (Dryzek, 2005:161). The ability 
of governments to mandate environmental improvement is 
questioned; a more ‘enabling’ governmental role is promoted, with 
regulatory frameworks developed in partnership with business and 
industrial actors (Davoudi, 2000), in reflection of the broader shift 
towards societal management through ‘governance’ as outlined in 
Chapter One.  
 
Although a ‘strong’ version of ecological modernisation has been 
identified, foregrounding the need for radical institutional change at 
different scales (Christoff, 1996; Mol & Spaargaren, 2000; Barry & 
Paterson, 2004), a weaker ‘techno-corporatist’ approach is more 
widely adopted by policy-makers (Dryzek, 2005), displaying “much 
less concern for equity, justice or human well-being” (Hopwood et al., 
2005). Hence, for example, Haughton and Counsell (2004:55) 
described the UK Labour Party’s policies as an “almost archetypal 
‘ecological modernisation’ approach to sustainable development”. 
Critics argue that EM is unconcerned with intra- or inter-
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  EM is discussed variously as a strand within SD discourse (Davoudi, 2000; 
Redclift, 2005; Hulme, 2009), or as predating it (Weale, 1992; Hajer, 1995; Mol & 
Spaargaren, 2000; Jänicke, 2009); Langhelle (2000) sees EM as a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for SD – arguing against the conflation of the two, 
however, on the grounds that EM has a narrower scope, leading to different 
policy priorities. They have a “family resemblance” for Dryzek (2005:169), in 
that both are acceptable to the political mainstream in their promotion of 





generational social justice (Langhelle, 2000), and the “direct antipode” 
of environmental justice, interpreting it “in its hegemonic form” as “a 
politics of neoliberalization” (Keil, 2007:60). It is positioned as 
indicative of a broader context in which “market 
mechanisms…have…become the policy orthodoxy in relation to 
environmental governance” to “facilitate a particular type of 
capitalist development” (Paterson, 2009:108).  Indicatively, the €1bn 
allocated for the French ÉcoCités scheme is drawn from a large 
investment loan (‘Le grand emprunt’) taken out by the government 
in 2010 (Caisse des Dépôts, 2009). Whatever the ‘eco’ credentials or 
social benefits of the ensuing projects, the initiative is thus 
fundamentally driven by a desire for economic growth; the 
possibility that a more sustainable development path might depend 
on deeper structural or social changes is excluded from the policy 
documentation. Meanwhile, EM’s applicability to developing 
economies has been challenged (Mol & Spaargaren, 2000). Its focus 
on “technological approaches supported by market mechanisms to 
curb carbon emissions” (Romero Lankao, 2007:159) may not resonate 
in southern cities which contribute relatively little to global carbon 
emissions (ibid) or have more pressing economic priorities (Redclift, 
2005:217).  
 
Just as Rapoport (2010) finds evidence of the increasing 
commercialisation of the eco-city since 2005, Joss et al. (2013) observe 
that large international firms now often play significant roles in its 
development and management. This change correlates at least with 
the rise of EM policy discourse, which affords centrality to 
technology companies. And while the technocratic tendencies 
outlined above invite parallels with mid-twentieth century 
modernist planning, their current alliance with the interests of 
private business concerns suggests a contrast, in that modernist 
planning was state-led and underscored by an ideology of equality 
and the ‘public good’ (Graham & Marvin, 2001). This contrast, 
however, is not a straightforward one: governments have retained a 
strong role in eco-city development, and private firms operate within 
regulatory and policy frameworks. More typically, different forms of 
‘hybrid’ public-private partnerships are in evidence (Joss et al., 2013); 
the more general global tendency towards governance for 
environmental sustainability through partnership (Bäckstrand, 




in EM discourse.  Such arrangements may be legitimised through 
their promises of public accountability and private sector efficiency, 
but have been criticised in practice for their lack of transparency 
relative to traditional public agencies, and for their privileging of 
profitability over other policy goals (Bäckstrand, 2010; Book et al., 
2010). Where the goal of such developments is the sustainability of 
an entire city, questions of democratic legitimacy and accountability, 
it might be argued, are all the more pertinent.    
 
Joss et al. (2013) identify a series of further interrelated qualitative 
developments closely associated with the current phase of the eco-
city. They propose that these collectively constitute a ‘ubiquitisation’ 
of the eco-city, even if not all of the tendencies are evident in any 
given initiative. The first of these reinforces an understanding of the 
eco-city as a response to contingent historical conditions: it is 
increasingly promoted as a solution to unprecedently rapid levels of 
urbanisation. The Eco2 Cities programme, for example, takes the 
“massive rate of urbanization” (World Bank, 2010b:1) in developing 
countries as its starting point. The second tendency is also a response 
to a specifically contemporary agenda: related plans and policies 
focus increasingly on ‘climate change’, and particularly the reduction 
of CO2 and other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.16 The Climate 
Positive Development Program mentioned above exemplifies this 
tendency well: it stipulates an overall ‘climate positive’ emissions 
target (C40-CCI Cities, undated), without mandating the means of 
reaching this. Within eco-city thinking, it seems possible that the 
‘carbon agenda’ has become what Hajer calls an ‘emblematic issue’ 
just as the problem of ‘acid rain’ was constructed in the 1980s 
through “all sorts of discursive practices” to render it “manageable 
for the structures of industrial society” (Hajer, 1995:276). Global 
environmental problems more generally have come be 
conceptualised around this agenda, such that: 
 
“The ubiquity of climate change as a discourse ensures 
that it is attached to a range of different projects, from 
flood protection to tree planting schemes, which may 
previously have existed outside of the climate arena” 
(Bulkeley & Castán Broto, 2013:363). 
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  This is reflected in a body of cognate terms (including ‘low carbon, ‘zero carbon, 
‘zero energy’, etc) which have been used in collocation with, or in the place of, 





While et al. suggest that the years 2005/6 represent a “tipping 
point” in the “shift to the new politics of carbon control” (While et al., 
2010:83). GHG emissions are an appealing target for policy-making 
as apparently measurable, and therefore manageable, phenomena 
(While et al., 2010). However, some observers suggest that this 
reduces the conceptualisation of environmental sustainability to a 
narrow set of technical considerations; in casting the ‘problem’ as 
society’s oil-dependence, and the solution as state regulation, this 
approach is agnostic about the need for structural political or 
economic change (ibid). Swyngedouw (2011a:77) interprets the 
growth of carbon discourse as indicative of “a particular process of 
de-politicization” – a “post-political consensus” (ibid) in which 
“politics proper is progressively replaced by expert social 
administration” (Žižek, 2005:117). The growing prominence of the 
carbon agenda is to be welcomed to the extent that it reflects a 
consensus (among scientists and more generally) that the effects of 
climate change are among the most significant threats to the global 
environment and to cities more specifically (Bulkeley, 2012). But this 
tendency may be diminishing the experimental variety of the eco-city 
by crowding out a wider range of ecological concerns and socio-
political questions. 
 
Third, the ‘eco-city’ label is widely used as a form of ‘cultural 
branding’ – building on the existing trend for cities to market 
themselves distinctively, as mentioned earlier – with evidence of 
inter-urban rivalry to appear as the ‘greenest city’. Thus, 
Copenhagen’s Eco-Metropolis 2015 policy document envisions that 
“the environment will be pivotal for Copenhagen’s…identity” as 
“the environmental capital of Europe” (City of Copenhagen, 2007:3). 
For Vancouver, “[t]he race to become the Greenest City in the world 
is both a friendly and fierce competition” (City of Vancouver, 2012:6). 
‘Green’ external branding is one manifestation of more general 
pattern of place marketing, which at least since the 1990s has become 
“an integral part” of city planning in Europe (Gustavsson & Elander, 
2012:773) and North America (Ashworth & Voogd, 1990), and has 
been widely interpreted in the academic literature as indicating a 





Fourth, the role of information technology has become more 
prominent, reflecting the rise of the ‘smart city’ concept. 
Construction began in 2011, for example, on the Neapolis 
development in Cyprus, which its developers hope will become the 
“Prototype ‘Smart EcoCity’ within the EU”, employing a “single 
Intelligence Platform which will accommodate new ‘green 
technologies’, latest digital applications and sustainable town 
infrastructure solutions” (Neapolis, 2012). Living PlanIT, a private 
company working to deliver “technologies and platforms to improve 
efficiencies and accelerate change in cities and urban spaces” (Living 
PlanIT, undated), plans to build a hi-tech eco-city, with backing from 
national government, on a greenfield site near Porto. The company’s 
Executive Vice President Thierry Martens (2011) describes this city as 
the company’s “R&D centre”, a proving ground for a transferable 
“urban operating system”. The discourse of the ‘smart’ “has captured 
the imaginations of governments and industries around the world” 
(Strengers, 2013:1). In the popular literature, smart cities are defined 
as “places where information technology is combined with 
infrastructure, architecture, everyday objects, and even our bodies to 
address social, economic and environmental problems” (Townsend, 
2013:15). While there is no reason to conflate the smart city ideal with 
that of urban sustainability – and the smart city itself has multiple 
definitions (Caprotti, 2015:90; Hollands, 2015) – such visions often 
encompass ecological principles: it at least overlaps with the 
discourse of the eco-city (de Jong et al., 2015), and many smart cities 
can be interpreted as “basically re-iterations of current eco-city 
definitions” (Caprotti, 2015:90).  
 
As well as being promoted primarily by private sector actors, 
smart cities appear to display many of the other tendencies 
highlighted above as characteristic of the latest wave of eco-cities. 
The idea of the ‘smart’, according to Strengers “constitutes a 
distinctive ontology in which smart technologies perform and 
establish a highly rational and rationalising form of social order” 
(ibid:2). He calls this vision a ‘Smart Utopia’, “which resonates with 
and repackages technological utopias and ideals from the past” 
(ibid:2). In addition to being a technocratic, utopian notion, Strengers 
suggests, the discourse tends towards technological determinism: 
indicatively, “[i]n many smart studies, people are entirely absent” 




fail to address the complexity of environmental, political and social 
problems associated with urban areas; their policy scope may be very 
limited (Glasmeier & Christopherson, 2015:6). They echo EM in their 
envisionment of “a world in which social disharmony and 
environmental problems are eradicated through new technology, 
without compromising the current ways of life” (ibid:23), and in 
assuming synergetic environmental improvements and economic 
development (Gabrys, 2014:30–31). In line with the broader move 
towards ‘partnership’ in eco-city development, they entail “modes of 
governance that are not located exclusively within the jurisdiction of 
‘public’ authorities but may also extend to technology companies 
that own, manage and use urban data” (ibid:44).  
 
Söderström et al. (2014) review recent critical literature on smart 
urbanism. This literature has castigated the smart city as urban 
entrepreneurialism (Hollands, 2008), a retreat into high modernism 
(Greenfield, 2013), carrying risks of technocracy and surveillance 
(Kitchin, 2014), and tending to privilege measurable phenomena in 
its conceptualisation of the city (Bell, 2011). They describe smart 
urbanism as an “ideological construct” used to strengthen the market 
position of the corporate actors involved (Söderström et al., 2014:309), 
a type of ‘storytelling’ which “mobilizes and recycles two long-
standing tropes: the city conceived as a system of systems, and a 
utopian discourse exposing urban pathologies and their cure” 
(ibid:308). They challenge the use of systems thinking in urban 
discourse in its implication that “cities are no longer made of 
different – and to a large extent incommensurable – socio-technical 
worlds (education, business, safety and the like) but as data within 
systemic processes” (ibid: 314). The social ‘flatness’ of the utopian 
tendency in urban sustainability thinking more generally, and the 
way that this is constructed ideologically through ‘story telling’ in 
plans and policies, is explored further in Chapter Five.  
 
Finally, a different ‘flattening’ effect might be ascribed to the 
growing association of the eco-city with knowledge transfer of 
different types, between international quasi-governmental bodies, 
NGOs, academics, and private companies. The involvement of 
European firms of various types in eco-city projects in developing 
countries particularly has risen markedly since the mid-2000s (Joss et 




contributes to a privileging of non-place specific practice and 
discourse. This would seem to echo a broader pattern of what has 
been called ‘fast policy transfer’ between cities (Peck & Theodore, 
2001:429), differing from the past in its geographical scope, speed of 
circulation and “technocratic-managerial-entrepreneurial context” 
(Clarke, 2012:25,38). An emerging de facto standardisation of ‘best 
practice’ primarily conceived around universally applicable 
technologies (infrastructure, IT, green-tech and modes of governance) 
carries the risk that local socio-political factors are 
underconceptualised in eco-city ambitions. 
 
 
2.4   Theorising the Eco-City as a Coherent Entity  
 
The historical narrative above has served to identify several 
aggregated long-term changes in the nature of the eco-city, and to 
relate it to a broader, shifting socio-political context. However, these 
changes simultaneously raise questions about the coherence of the 
subject matter – especially since the eco-city also appears to be 
continuous with other phenomena (such as the smart city), overlaps 
with, rather than defines itself against, earlier visions for human 
settlements (ranging from the Garden City to the ‘ecovillage’), and 
employs a wide variety of labels. A case might be made that an 
exercise such as the Survey performatively constructs its own field of 
enquiry, rather than describes a clearly predefinable phenomenon. 
Further work is therefore required at this stage to justify the 
coherence of the eco-city as a field of enquiry. An additional problem 
arises with the aggregative nature of the observed changes; in 
privileging synchronic similarities on the one hand, and diachronic 
differences on the other, the narrative may oversimplify the eco-
city’s variety. In reduced form, the story-line set out above concludes 
with an apparent global convergence of eco-city practices in recent 
years, which may be working to reinforce a ‘neoliberal’ status quo. 
As part of a more satisfactorily coherent theorisation of the eco-city, 
this conclusion needs qualifying in various ways. 
 
Osborne and Rose outline some of the generally accepted 





“downsizing the state, decentralising decisionmaking, 
devolving power to intermediate bodies such as trusts or 
associations, privatising many functions previously part of 
the state machinery and opening them up to commercial 
pressures and business styles of management, [and] 
introducing managerialism and competitive pressures into 
the residual state apparatus” 
(Osborne & Rose, 1999:751). 
 
However, it may be misleading to see the ‘neoliberalisation’ of cities 
more generally as a singular and homogeneous global process. 
Objecting to the “linear, aspatial geography of neoliberalism” 
(Hackworth, 2007:11) evident in some accounts, Hackworth observes 
that neoliberalism is a “highly contingent process that manifests itself, 
and is experienced differently, across space”, which “occurs 
alongside and in combination with many other processes that affect 
urbanisation” (ibid). In analysing particular policy and institutional 
outcomes, the concept of neoliberalism is of limited analytical value 
if it downplays the significance of local context (Sager, 2011:149). In 
each location, this process unfurls across an existing “cluttered and 
contested institutional landscape”, and thus leads to contingent 
“unforeseen and often highly unstable layerings of political 
economic space” (Peck et al., 2009:57); we should therefore expect it 
to be manifested in “incomplete, hybrid modalities” (Brenner et al., 
2010:332) rather than as a fully formed and readily identifiable 
“regulatory whole” (ibid). But nor is there consensus about, or 
consistency in, the specification of neoliberalism at an abstract level 
(Larner, 2004; Peck, 2004; Barnett, 2005). Springer (2012:135) proposes 
that neoliberalism is better understood in discursive terms, as a 
“mutable, inconsistent, and variegated process that circulates 
through the discourses it constructs, justifies and defends”, 
facilitated and reproduced as much by ‘bottom-up’ agency as 
imposed ‘from above’ or as a hegemonic ideology. 
 
Relatedly, the idea of the ‘globalisation’ of the eco-city may 
obscure significant localised inflections. It has been observed that the 
activity of urban planning, for example, does not have a 
homogeneous international professional ‘culture’ to the extent that is 
observable in, for example, the field of civil engineering (Friedmann, 
2005:184). Rapoport (2011) examines the masterplanning of the Gia 




that it can best be understood as the result of interactions between 
global and local agents. Chang and Sheppard (2013:61) relate 
Dongtan and Chongming eco-cities in China to the “global diffusion 
of urban sustainability initiatives”, but equally interpret them as 
“embedded in and layered onto pre-existing socioeconomic 
institutions and cultural contexts”. In becoming locally embedded in 
plans, policy documents or promotional literature, the ‘global’ 
dimensions of eco-city which might be postulated thereby undergo a 
translation. The planned development, furthermore, should be 
distinguished from the actual city space which evolves following or 
during its implementation. Shwayri’s (2013) study of Songdo, for 
example, points to a gradual ‘Koreanization’ of the city over time, 
which departs from its planned ‘westernness’.  
 
Second, the typification of the current phase in terms of ‘ubiquity’ 
(Joss et al., 2013), or ‘masterplanning’ (Cugurullo, 2013b:67) with a 
commercial orientation (Rapoport, 2010), further diverts attention 
away from its actual practical diversity. Based on the Survey data – 
almost four in ten eco-city initiatives launched since 2005 have taken 
the form of ‘retro-fits’ of existing cities, typically directed by local 
authorities rather than private concerns. Both Rapoport (2010) and 
Joss (2010) identify the ‘retro-fit’ as a distinct category of eco-city – 
which Rapoport suggests has intellectual roots in the 1980s.  
 
Finally, contemporary diversity is also observable at the 
conceptual level (Joss, 2011a). The postulation of a dominant 
conceptual discourse does not preclude the existence of other parallel 
discourses: as outlined above, earlier modes of eco-city thinking and 
practice have not simply been displaced, and initiatives launched 
before 2005 (such as those in Freiburg and South London’s BedZed) 
continue to be held up as ‘best practice’ (see, eg: Späth & Rohracher, 
2011; and Rydin, 2011:84 respectively). Rather than treating the eco-
city as an “ontologically pre-given object” (Whitehead, 2003:1187), it 
might be better understood as a process of ongoing “complex 
discursive processes and socio-political struggles” (ibid).  
 
Some of the resulting variety can be illustrated using Dryzek’s 
(2005) framework of environmental discourses. This framework is 
used here heuristically to illustrate the fact of this variety, even if 




has relevance to the current discussion since its historical framing is 
similar to that used in the narrative above (evidence is drawn from 
the beginnings of environmental consciousness in the 1960s and 
1970s although ends in the mid-2000s), and links environmental 
thought to broader social and political trends. He identifies nine 
discursive tendencies, grouped into four main categories, each 
underpinned by a ‘storyline’ as glossed in Table 2.1.   
 
Discourse Key ‘storyline’ 
‘Global Limits’  
• survivalism Continued economic growth is impossible, given finite limits of 
planet’s resources 
• Prometheanism Growth is good; humans, left to their own devices, will generate 
solutions to problems 
‘Problem solving’  
• administrative 
rationalism 
Governments should manage the environment rationally in the 
service of public interest, with the help of expert advice 
• democratic 
pragmatism 
Decentralised, interactive communicative processes are the best 
way to approach public problems like the environment 
• economic 
rationalism 
Smoothly operating markets and well-defined private property 
rights are the solutions to environmental problems 
‘Sustainability’  
•  sustainable 
development 
Economic growth is possible in ways which are environmentally 
benign and socially just 
• ecological 
modernisation 
With some restructuring, the capitalist system will be able to 
deliver both economic development and environmental protection 
‘Green radicalism’  
• green 
consciousness 
Industrial society induces in humans a warped conception of their 
place in the world, so new human sensibilities are required 
• green politics Complex socio-environmental can only be solved through political 
action and structural change  
Table 2.1: discourses of the environment (adapted from Dryzek, 2005) 
 
One example of an ongoing scheme conceptually far removed 
from the dominant EM discourse is provided by the Green City Blue 
Lake Initiative (originally established in 1992 as the Eco City Cleveland 




of ‘green consciousness’, often associated with spirituality rather 
than a desire to engage in institutional politics (Dryzek, 2005). One of 
its posters, for example, expresses a sense of reverence towards, and 
spiritual connection with, the wider region: “This is our home, this 
territory on the shore of a Great Lake where glaciers have come and 
gone. We feel the sacred resonance of this place” (GCBL, undated). 
Auroville (India), similarly, aims to be “a site of material and 
spiritual researches [sic] for a living embodiment of an actual human 
unity”, and advises that “to live in Auroville, one must be a willing 
servitor of the divine consciousness” (Auroville Foundation, 2014). 
Evidence of a variety of discourses can, moreover, be observed 
within individual eco-cities’ documents and policies. This selective 
interweaving does not imply self-contradiction, since “[d]iscourses 
are not closed systems. A discourse draws on elements in other 
dtscourses, binding them into its own network of meanings”, 
potentially “altering or translating” their meanings (Hall, 1992b:292). 
The One Planet Living development framework is promoted by 
Bioregional, a UK-based organisation involved with eco-cities 
internationally. Among its ten organising principles, the prominence 
given to social dimensions alongside environmental and economic 
ones clearly reveals a strong ‘sustainable development’ discursive 
colouring. At the same time, the framework is rooted in ‘ecological 
footprinting’, pointing towards ‘survivalist’ discourse. The new city 
of Sejong in South Korea, discussed in Chapter Seven, exhibits 
‘administrative rationalism’ as a top-down state-led initiative, but is 
also closely tied up with national ‘green growth’ policies which relate 
to EM. Portland, Oregon (USA), as discussed in Chapter Six, has a 
strong focus on ‘equity’ and social issues in its strategic plan, 
suggesting an explicit ‘sustainable development’ discourse, while its 
EcoDistricts initiative provides a good example of a ‘democratic 
pragmatist’ approach. The parallel presence and varying 
combinations of different discourses across contemporary eco-city 
initiatives support Dryzek’s (2005) argument that environmental 
concepts are conceptually fluid over time; there is no clear trajectory 
moving from ignorance towards “environmental enlightenment… 
What we see instead is that these matters are subject to continuing 
dispute between people who think in sharply different ways” (ibid:6). 
  
In relation to urban planning theory, Allmendinger (2002) 




this has not led so much to a series of paradigm shifts as resulted in 
“a cluttered landscape of ideas and theories” (29). The idea of 
cluttering allows for the theorisation of the eco-city as an ongoing 
multiple experimentational process. If we conceptualise the 
phenomenon as a whole as an intended ‘technological transition’ – 
and, more specifically, a ‘sustainability transition’ (Geels, 2011) – it 
potentially fits well into a ‘multi-level perspective’ (MLP) model 
(Geels, 2002a). Caprotti (2015:9) suggests that cities have become key 
sites for transition strategies, as transition theories have been 
spatialised. Thus, eco-cities constitute ‘niches’ or “protected spaces” 
where “special conditions created through subsidies and an 
alignment between various actors” aim to develop new technologies 
(Geels, 2002b:365–367). Technology developed in these niches may or 
may not break through into – and thereby alter – the prevailing 
‘socio-technical regime’. In their study of ‘urban energy and climate 
governance’, Späth and Rohracher (2011:99–100) attribute the success 
of ‘eco-city activities’ in Freiburg and Graz to successful mediation 
between the ‘niche’ and ‘regime’ levels: “much of the work of actors 
within the city consists of embedding and stabilizing these changes 
in a broader regime context by, for example, aligning actors and 
facilitating institutional changes at a province or national level”.  
 
While regimes are constrained and enabled by their broader 
discursive, political and economic ‘landscape’ (Geels, 2002a), changes 
at the regime level may, in certain circumstances, affect the landscape. 
What might elsewhere be called a ‘structural’ transition therefore 
describes changes in the (relatively fixed) landscape. From this 
perspective, the rise of the eco-city is not simply readable as a linear 
diffusion of technical advances, nor in itself as a significant change in 
the landscape. Rather, it describes a proliferation of individual 
practices, each tied up with place-bound structures of knowledge, 
practice, symbolic meaning, and governance (Geels, 2002a). In a 
“(quasi) evolutionary” process of selection (Hegger et al., 2007:730), 
only some of these practices will “break through” (ibid) to affect the 
regimes and landscape in which they are ‘nested’ (ibid). The 
appearance of eco-city discourse within international policy-making 
may reflect the relative alignment of contemporary tendencies in eco-
city practice with the existing landscape more than it suggests a 





To the extent that eco-cities function as protected niches, they may 
alternatively be likened to laboratories where ‘secluded research’ 
takes place (Callon et al., 2009). This seclusion, however, may hamper 
the commonly desired goal of ‘replicability’ (Hodson & Marvin, 
2009b), when attempts are made to ‘translate’ (Callon et al., 2009) 
their achievements back into urban contexts elsewhere. Indeed, the 
goal of replicability may lead actors to downplay the significance of 
place-specific historical, social, political and cultural factors for 
marketing purposes, presenting a “techno-economic paradigm” 
(Rydin, 2011:131) for universal consumption. Within this paradigm, 
the ‘urban’ generally and the characteristics of individual cities may 
become “obscured in a thicket of bio-physical environmental issues 
and concerns” (Vallance et al., 2012:1701), in which human 
inhabitants are barely discernible (Vallance et al., 2011). Hodson & 
Marvin (2009a) suggest that eco-cities are often constructed as 
passive “sites for demonstration and showcasing of technologies” 
(525) in response to “neo-liberal pressures for increased 
‘competitiveness’, ‘entrepreneurialism’ and ‘innovation’” (519). 
There is some evidence, however, that the denial of context may 
undermine their implementability in the first place. In the case of 
China, for example, Pow and Neo (2013:2256) argue that “the lack of 
an ‘actually existing’ or successfully implemented eco-city” indicates 
the “considerable amount of resistance and difficulties (in terms of 
planning, politics, economic costs, etc) that the concept encounters in 
practice”; and that a focus on design and physical form may obscure 
the possibility that the “deeper normative tenets of building an eco-
city are surprisingly ignored”.  
 
Reifying normative visions of an urban future which focus on 
particular experimental technologies may, arguably, be relatively 
simple to achieve in countries with a less open democratic tradition, 
given suitable funding and political will. Nevertheless, questions still 
arise in such cases over the ability of such cities to adapt to ongoing 
technological change in future, and the extent to which such 
technologies will be adopted compliantly by bodies of citizens who 
have little say in their planning (Caprotti, 2015). Meanwhile, in 
countries with a history of public democratic input into the planning 
process, implementational frictions may be more obviously visible. 
The UK’s eco-town initiative, for example, met with widespread local 




activists complain that the political and commercial actors involved 
have ignored public opinion (Bordon Area Action Group, undated), 
describing the scheme as a “bare-faced, politically driven 
process...This local community now positively rejects it, because it 
threatens their values and their way of life” (Bordon Area Action 
Group, 2009). The eco-town initiative was, furthermore, vulnerable to 
a change of government: following national elections in 2010, the 
policy framework was abandoned and the local projects have 
progressed very little (Tomozeiu & Joss, 2014).  
 
The possibility, however, that eco-city development might in fact 
be more efficiently progressed through a ‘technological showcase’ 
approach is not rejected in this thesis (and is explored further in 
Chapter Seven). Rather, a continuum of eco-city initiatives is 
proposed. Those towards the ‘technological showcase’ end of this 
continuum, better understood as proxies for real cities, are aligned 
with Callon’s secluded ‘laboratories’. In extreme cases, these may 
exhibit a modernist ‘assumed consensus’ (Taylor, 1998) of objectives. 
As Evans and Karvonen (2014:416) note, the concept of the urban 
laboratory is “odd because it implies that the real world can function 
as a laboratory”, and, rather than being “hermetically sealed off from 
the world”, cities are “messy, multivariate, open systems”. 
Necessarily, then, the aspects of the city to which they apply must be 
selectively defined. The same authors highlight Hodson and 
Marvin’s (2007) argument that the language of ‘testing’ indicates the 
desire to trial predetermined new technologies, rather than to 
develop new ideas in an open-ended way and learn from these.  This 
clearly predefined focus and bounded scope, however, need not 
mean that the experiments which they enact will not yield useful 
lessons for our collective understanding of urban sustainability. 
Those at the other end of the continuum – typified by emergent 
‘grass roots’ initiatives – are characterised in terms of ‘research in the 
wild’ (Callon et al., 2009). Such research in the wild extends beyond 
the eco-city; it is guided by laypersons rather than technical 
specialists, emerging through and progressing within conditions of 
actual urban complexity.  
 
The experimental nature of different eco-cities does not only relate 
to different types of infrastructural or environmental technology, but 




experimentation’ at urban level (Hoffmann, 2012; Bulkeley & Castán 
Broto, 2013:364). ‘Climate change experiments’ led by municipalities 
very often involve actors outside traditional political institutions 
(Bulkeley, 2005), just as eco-cities are increasingly characterised by 
the involvement of partnerships between different public sector, 
private sector and civil society actors (Joss et al., 2013). When 
governance is taken into account, the EcoDistricts initiative in 
Portland, as described in Chapter Six, may be interpreted as 
appearing to sit closer to the ‘research in the wild’ end of the 
continuum proposed above. While instigated by the city council, it 
aimed to enable the agency of non-state actors at local level, without 
prescribing the precise actions that they would take, or how they 
should govern themselves. The other main case study, Sejong City 
(see Chapter Seven), sits towards the ‘technological showcase’ end of 
the continuum: defined, mandated and delivered ‘from above’. 
 
In an optimistic reading, this variety (cutting across the eco-city’s 
formal and conceptual variety) reinforces the theorisation of the eco-
city as a multiple experimental process, in which individual eco-city 
‘failures’ are to be expected, and from which unpredictable lessons of 
various types might be learnt. Sustainability’s lack of clear definition 
makes it a goal characterised by uncertainty; it is a complex problem 
whose resolution requires its simultaneous definition. If ‘climate 
change’ – which has increasingly moved centre stage in urban 
sustainability policies and practices – is a global problem, it is also a 
diffuse, systemic one (Caprotti, 2015:4). Ostrom argues that a global 
problem of this type calls not for a single global solution, but rather 
that ‘collective action’ is best realised polycentrically: “Polycentric 
approaches facilitate achieving benefits at multiple scales as well as 
experimentation and learning from experience with diverse policies” 
(Ostrom, 2010:550). In the face of uncertainty, Callon et al. (2009) 
similarly argue that a ‘precautionary’ response is required, in the 
form of polycentric, adaptive, pragmatic, reflexive experimentation. 
This would appear to describe well the nature of the eco-city, as a 
body of non-standardised practices tested in widely divergent 
contexts, characterised by knowledge sharing, flexibility over time, 
and unconstrained by a particular centralised governing body.  
 
More sceptically, however, it might be observed that the wider 




through a ‘quasi-evolutionary’ (Hegger et al., 2007:730; Späth & 
Rohracher, 2012:466) lens, which valorises both successes and 
failures primarily in terms of their potential contribution to ‘learning’ 
(Bulkeley & Castán Broto, 2013:366), may pay insufficient attention to 
the “political economy of experimentation” (ibid). Callon 
characterises ‘research in the wild’ as operating at the mercy of the 
“logic of relations of force, [allowing] the reproduction…or the 
exclusion of the weakest” (Callon et al., 2009); even if it is less likely 
to suffer from problems of ‘translation’ when it succeeds, the process 
of research itself may be at a disadvantage when compared with that 
taking place in a well-funded ‘laboratory’.   
 
The field of urban sustainability, then, is not monopolised by the 
eco-city: as Bulkeley and Castán Broto (2013:365) observe, 
experimental niches need not be created by institutional or powerful 
commercial actors; they may equally take the form of ‘bottom-up 
experiments by NGOs or groups of other individuals (Hegger et al., 
2007). But it is reasonable to assume that an evolutionary process 
may be skewed when some species are less well protected than 
others. As discussed in Chapter One, the smallest grassroots 
initiatives may lack the resources to gain visibility, attract support, 
and maintain momentum over time, relative to eco-city schemes 
which may be instigated from the beginning by high-level policy and 
commercial backing. In an MLP framing, furthermore, it is logical 
that those initiatives which already conform to the regime and 
landscape status quo (and are not in fact innovative), or only promise 
to alter it incrementally, should have a better chance of succeeding 
on their own practical terms. If the global institutionalisation of the 
eco-city has also been accompanied by its ‘laboratorisation’, then its 
accelerated proliferation allows us to suppose that the eco-city in its 
(multiple) dominant form has come to constitute a means for the 
reproduction of already powerful institutional and commercial 
actors. This proliferation, though, is no guarantee of its broader 
applicability. In parallel, it remains unclear whether its tendency in 
many cases towards ‘governance’ in the mode of its delivery should 
be understood as constructively catalytic of innovation or, as 
discussed in Chapter One, primarily indicative of a neoliberalisation 





2.5  Conclusions 
 
It is argued above that the history of the eco-city concept has been 
closely linked to broader developments in environmental thinking 
since the 1960s – and in particular to the growth of sustainability 
discourse since the early 1990s, with much recent growth associated 
with EM discourse more specifically and – relatedly – the growing 
involvement of commercial concerns. The eco-city has been 
conceptualised as a multiple process of experimentation which 
collectively addresses itself at a series of contemporary agendas 
related to the long-term future of the planet. From an optimistic 
perspective, its institutionalisation and integration into markets gives 
this experimentation a pragmatic character, allowing us potentially 
to learn lessons about what types of solutions are feasible in the real 
world, and how we might better define the problems themselves. Its 
decentralised nature, in combination with its multiplicity across 
various dimensions, makes it well placed to tackle complex problems 
which are not amenable to ‘top down’ modernist solutions – and of 
which climate change, upon which eco-city plans have increasingly 
come to focus, is a paradigmatic example (Jordan & Huitema, 
2014:716). From a pessimistic perspective, its mainstreaming 
describes a concomitant watering down of its transformative 
potential. The lack of standardisation plays to the advantage of actors 
who are already more powerfully placed, and may thereby tend to 
reproduce structural inequalities. Equally, there may be a tendency 
for the newer wave of mainstreamed eco-cities to take the form of 
‘technological showcases’, primarily serving commercial or 
institutional goals, but whose socio-political dimensions remain 
underconceptualised. This may have negative consequences for their 
implementability in real urban space, and for their replicability. 
 
Some contextual reasons why environmental thinking has come to 
settle on the city as a target for intervention were also outlined above. 
In individual cases, this may respond to the need to resolve specific 
(often localised) problems such as post-industrial decline, poor air 
quality, or housing shortages, or to concerns over long-term resource 
security. In claims to provide a solution to more global sustainability 
concerns, however, the privileging of the city may relate more to 
questions of scale; the involvement of local authorities in particular 




agency in a world where nation states appear unable to resolve 
environmental problems. It may simultaneously relate to the formal 
characteristics of cities: current mainstream environmental thinking 
is clearly pro-urban in its advocacy of dense habitations where 
economies of scale and proximity are understood as having 
environmental, economic and social advantages. We are told on the 
highest authority that cities produce most of the world’s carbon 
emissions (see eg IEA, 2008:180; World Bank, 2010b:15; UN-Habitat, 
2011:16), and that therefore “if a change has to happen, it has to be 
first and foremost an urban change” (Cugurullo, 2013b:67).  
 
But has the city somehow become fetishised in this new way of 
thinking? The spatial framing of the city as the key generative locus 
of these problems, first, has been questioned: “The functioning of 
cities cannot be understood without understanding the multiple 
connections to other people and places in their surrounds and nearby, 
and often to ‘distant elsewheres’” (Satterthwaite, 2008:546). It seems 
possible that the instrumentalisation of the city as a tool (or 
technology, or rhetorical device) for catalysing global sustainability 
may have diverted attention from questions about the nature of the 
envisaged city itself. Where plans aim to build or transform entire 
cities, it would seem potentially problematic that socio-political 
considerations appear in some cases to be bracketed. If the aspiration 
is one of a sustainable future in a world where most humans live in 
some form of city, then it is germane to ask questions about the 
nature of the ‘cityness’ of planned and built eco-cities.  
 
Approaching this question requires a preliminary working 
definition of ‘cityness’. The next chapter therefore draws on a broad 
range of relevant literature to construct a conceptual framework 
within which ‘cityness’ or ‘urbanity’ is more generally theorised.17 
 
 
                                                          
17
  The concepts of ‘the urban’ and ‘the city’ (and derivatives of each) are used 




Chapter Three  




The previous chapter suggested that the institutional and commercial 
goals of much mainstream eco-city development may leave the socio-
political dimensions of urban sustainability relatively unconsidered. 
Relatedly, it was suggested that the ‘city’ itself may have remained 
poorly conceptualised, particularly in initiatives which are intended 
to function more as ‘technological showcases’. But what is a city? 
And how might the ‘city’ envisioned in eco-city plans and policies 
depart from this? This chapter argues that the quality of publicness is 
a particularly important dimension of urbanity, and proposes that 
conceptualising publicness may be enabled or constrained by the 
understanding of city space which underpins it. The argument is 
made with reference to a set of literatures which variously theorise 
the urban, the public, and space. These literatures are thereby linked 
to the urban sustainability ‘problem of planning’, even though their 
primary concerns typically lie elsewhere. The discussion lays the 
groundwork for the analysis of eco-city documentation in Chapter 
Five, where space is shown to be mobilised as a rhetorical device 
which potentially serves to normalise particular agendas rather than 
satisfactorily describe the ‘public city’. Chapters Six and Seven will 
then further explore the significance of publicness for urban 
sustainability, by analysing the publicness of two implemented eco-
city initiatives.  
 
The first section offers a theorisation of the city which draws on 
recent theories of ‘urban assemblage’, so as to avoid bounded, 
territorial ‘scale’ thinking – such as that implied by the ‘urban age’ 
thesis – on the one hand, and non-spatialised abstract notions of 
‘cityness’ on the other. Assemblage theory allows us makes the case 
that a city is a particular type of entity, which is (unevenly) obdurate 
in space, but also incoherent and dynamically constituted as much 
by external relations as by what it ‘contains’. Although the quality of 
‘cityness’ is understood as a tendency rather than as an absolute 




the institutional, the commercial, and the social. These spheres are 
mutually constitutive but relatively autonomous and ontologically 
distinct; their interplay leads to particular, variously durable 
assemblages across city space. Publicness is understood as a 
distinctively urban type of assemblage which results. 
 
The chapter continues by reviewing various of theories of the 
‘public’ to suggest that the social urban sphere has a fragmented, 
hidden aspect (the ‘personal’), but that this may interact with the 
city’s other spheres to form visible assemblages of ‘publicness’. 
Publicness thus assembled is presented as a necessary characteristic 
of urbanity; in this sense, the city is, abstractly, a ‘public space’, and 
the space of actual cities may be conceptualised as unevenly public.  
 
Crucially, this publicness has two modalities: the ‘civic’ and the 
‘emergent’. Partly because of the importance of visibility in the 
theory of publicness advanced here, it is argued that the open spaces 
of a city are particularly important sites for the assemblage of 
publicness. Finally, Lefebvre’s model of ‘socially produced’ space is 
used to illustrate the possibility that the conceptualisation of space 
prevalent in fields such as urban planning, and implicit in the notion 
of the ‘urban scale’, forms an unsatisfactory basis on which to 
conceptualise publicness. Their treatment of space as a neutral 
geometric grid, or ‘container’, denies both the ways in which the 
materiality of the city is dynamically co-produced by publicness, and 
its ongoing role in assembling publicness variously across the city. 
The chapter concludes by outlining some of the implications of this 
discussion for empirical research into the publicness of the eco-city. 
 
 
3.1 What is a City?  
 
The limitations of scale and territory 
 
The justification for intervention at city level, as a means to secure a 
sustainable global future, rests partly on the proposition that we now 
live in the ‘Urban Age’ (Joss, 2015). Brenner and Schmid (2014:731) 
observe that: “[a]cross otherwise diverse discursive, ideological and 
locational contexts, the urban age thesis has become a form of doxic 




global urban condition are framed”. 18 Ongoing urban growth, once 
seen as a barrier to economic growth and social justice, is now 
understood as relatively advantageous in these regards (Balbo, 2014). 
The oft-repeated claim, based on UN estimates and projections, that 
man is for the first time in history predominantly and increasingly an 
urban creature (Figure 3.1), when combined with the understanding 
that pollutants generally and GHGs in particular are produced in 
urban locations (see Chapter Two), form the basis of the evidently 




Figure 3.1: UN estimates and projection of global urban and rural 
populations, 1950-2050 
(Source: UN, 2008:2) 
 
The logic of this line of thought may be appealing. However, it 
relies on a reductive definition of the city as a bounded geographical 
unit: the urban lying within its boundaries; the rural without. The 
                                                          
18  For examples of the range of texts of which the ‘urban age’ idea forms a 
foundational component, see Brenner and Schmid (2014). They comment that 
the urban age “appears…to have become a de rigueur framing device or 
reference point for nearly anyone concerned to justify the importance of cities as 
sites of research, policy intervention, planning/design practice, investment or 
community activism. Much like the notion of modernization in the 1960s and 
that of globalization in the 1980s and 1990s, the thesis of an urban age appears 
to have become such an all-pervasive metanarrative that early twenty-first 
century readers and audiences can only nod in recognition as they are 





UN determines these boundaries by adopting or combining 
geographical units constructed by each country for administrative or 
statistical purposes (for details of the method used, see UN, 2008:13–
61). The criteria used to define the ‘urban’ areas on which the 
calculation is based differ in each country (Brenner & Schmid, 2014); 
they may variously relate to, for example, the presence of 
government institutions, types of economic activity, levels of 
infrastructure, and in many cases – somewhat tautologically – the 
number of inhabitants (see eg UN, 2008:13–61). To the extent that this 
territorial definition fails to conceptualise the city satisfactorily, the 
conclusion that ‘cities’ should be the target for intervention may be 
problematic.  
 
The direct link between population size and the quality of 
‘cityness’ was already implicitly challenged by Aristotle in his 
observation that “a great [polis] and a populous one are not the same” 
(Aristotle, 1992:403). Similarly, in his seminal Urbanism paper, Wirth 
(1938:4) argues that characterising a community as ‘urban’ on the 
basis of quantitative threshold variables is “arbitrary” if only because 
“the city, statistically speaking, is always an administrative concept 
in that the corporate limits play a decisive role in delineating the 
urban area”. Nevertheless, Wirth concedes that “some characteristics 
of cities will be more significant in conditioning the nature of urban 
life than others” (ibid:7), and thus “the fact that the urban community 
is distinguished by a large aggregation and relatively dense 
concentration of population can scarcely be left out of account in a 
definition of the city” (Wirth, 1938:6). Population size, then, at least 
correlates with, and may shape, ‘cityness’, but in itself tells us very 
little about what the city might be. 
 
Other variables have been employed in the production of various 
‘league tables’ of cities in recent years; Kitchin et al. (2015:7) suggest 
that tendency to benchmark and compare cities’ performance on 
various criteria using quantitative indicators has been particularly 
marked since the millennium. 19  These widely publicised ranking 
schemes may frame their concerns in particular ways. Examples 
include the annual survey conducted by international consultancy 
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  Relatedly, the last few years have seen a proliferation of frameworks of 
indicators which variously certify, endorse and compare existing urban areas 
and new developments in terms of urban sustainability; the majority of these 




company Mercer which rates cities on their ‘quality of living’ (see eg: 
Mercer, 2015); the annual Global Green Economy Index conducted by 
consulting company Dual Citizen which most recently compared 70 
cities worldwide (Dual Citizen, 2014); and the regular ‘city rankings’ 
produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit across five categories of 
Economy, Market Opportunities, Labour Market, Infrastructure and 
Environment, which are combined to give an overall ‘liveability’ 
score (for an overview of the methodology, see EIU, undated). Such 
exercises seek to promote the idea that certain types of cities are 
‘leaders’ in various ways – and the leaders are usually large cities in 
the developed world. To take just one example, in the consultancy 
group Arcadis’ (2015) Sustainable Cities Index (whose three broad 
criteria of ‘People’, ‘Planet’, and ‘Profits’ clearly map onto the three 
pillars of sustainability), seven of the ‘top ten’ sustainable cities are to 
be found in Europe, while all of the developing cities assessed 
appear in the bottom half of the league table.  
 
A further set of ranking systems explicitly aim to construct 
hierarchies with ‘global’ or ‘world’ cities at their apex, deemed to 
display particularly urban characteristics across a variety of fields 
(Beaverstock et al., 1999; Magnusson, 2005; Moonen & Clark, 2013). 
These ‘world city’ league tables are derived through algorithms 
using a mixture of ‘hard’ variables (describing, for example, 
economic performance and connectivity) and quantitatively 
categorised assessments of political influence, infrastructure and 
cultural characteristics. Yet it would seem unsatisfactory to turn to 
such indices for a definition of ‘cityness’. The recent move to 
‘decentre’ urban studies away from the paradigm of the large city in 
the western world (see Chapter One) may alert us to the possibility 
that what is being measured here is a particular sense of cityness; 
that a simple hierarchy fails to capture many qualitative differences 
between cities (Hill, 2004); that both the variables selected and their 
mode of combination are arbitrary insofar as they reflect norms 
which may be explicitly declared or go unquestioned. At best, such 
criteria might be understood as selective proxies for the city itself, 
which remains a “messy and elusive object” (Farías, 2010:13). 
 
The idea of a league table nevertheless opens up the possibility of 
thinking about the city as a series of tendencies, rather than in 




“minimal definition” of the city as “a relatively large, dense and 
permanent settlement of heterogeneous individuals” (Wirth, 1938:8, 
italics added). He proposes a continuum of actual cities running 
between two ‘ideal types’ of society: the “urban industrial” and its 
binary opposite, “rural folk” (ibid:3). “[A]ll human settlements tend 
to arrange themselves”, he contends, between these “poles of 
reference” (ibid). Tuan (1978), similarly, defines the city in terms of its 
relative ‘distance from nature’: 
“Cities…may be ranked according to how far they 
depart from farm life...At one end of the scale we have 
the village subordinate to nature; at the other, the city 
that does not know how it is fed, that comes alive in 
winter and slights the daily course of the sun” 
(Tuan, 1978:1). 
 
For Wirth and Tuan, then, rurality is semantically embedded in the 
signifier ‘city’ (as its implied opposite). Williams (1975:9–10) suggests 
the discursive nature of this rural-urban opposition by distinguishing 
between on the one hand the “powerful feelings” which have 
“gathered and been generalised” on “the country” and “the city”, 
and on the other the “real history” in which “both have been 
astonishingly varied” with a contemporary reality consisting of “a 
wide range of settlements between the traditional poles of country 
and city: suburb, dormitory town, shanty town, industrial estate”. He 
suggests that this discursive contrast between country and city “as 
fundamental ways of life, reaches back into classical times” (ibid:9); 
relatedly, Lees (1985) sees an “implicitly critical response to city life” 
in the pastoral tendency in Latin literature and the bucolic poets of 
the Hellenistic world.  
 
Accordingly, a long tradition of writing on cities constructs a wide 
variety of fields with an ‘urban’ and a ‘rural’ pole. These fields 
include: the proximity of people and knowledge (Glaeser, 2011); 
cultural achievement (Hall, 1998); the possession of cultural capital 
(Bourdieu, 1984); significance as a site of religious worship (Moholy-
Nagy, 1969; Lynch, 1981; Short, 2002); and the presence of 
monumental buildings (Childe, 1950; Kostof, 1991). Over a century 
ago, Howard (1902) used a series of postulated ‘town’ versus 
‘country’ binary opposites to define the problem which his Garden 
City was intended to resolve. Again, though, the identification of 




what cityness consists of in itself – beyond the self-referential fact of 
its opposition to a similarly undefined ‘ruralness’. Shields suggests 
that defining the ‘urban’ with reference to the ‘rural’ may exemplify 
Derrida’s notion of ‘différance’: “In this system of meaning, the 
definition of terms and concepts ultimately is circular” (Shields, 
1996:232). A stable definition of cityness itself, in other words, is thus 
always deferred. Magnusson (2005) concludes that: 
“Rather than thinking of the urban spatially (as in the 
distinction between city and countryside) or temporally 
(as in our oft-told stories of an evolution from hunter-
gatherer to agrarian and then to urban-industrial societies), 
we may find it more useful to conceive of it ontologically” 
(Magnusson, 2005:100). 
He challenges us to theorise what Wirth calls ‘urbanism’ as a 
transhistorical “distinctive way of life with characteristic features” 
(Magnusson, 2005:98). Thus, “urbanity – or, in another language, 
‘civilisation’ – [is] an ever-present feature of human life” (Magnusson, 
2005:107). This search for a distinctive urban subjectivity is of use in 
that it moves us away from purely descriptive or material accounts of 
the ‘city’. But such an approach may be just as problematically partial 
as the territorial definition adopted by the UN: in decoupling this 
hypothesised subjectivity from the spatiality of the city, it makes the 
opposite mistake by ignoring the significance of the latter. Even if the 
materiality of a city is contingent, its relationship to a less tangible 
urban ‘way of life’ needs to be accounted for. 
  
Weintraub (1997) provides a useful starting point in thinking 
about this relationship. He mobilises the distinction between the city 
as urbs (the physical city) and as civitas (a collectivity of citizens). On 
this basis, a satisfactory account of a city would encompass its 
properties both as a physical space constituted by an array of 
technologies and other tangible entities, and as a dynamic nexus of 
social relations. Isin uses this same distinction to launch a critique on 
‘scalar thought’ – such as that evident in ‘Urban Age’ eco-city 
discourse – which represents cities and nations  
“as though all exist in actual spaces as such at a given 
scale of representation. Just because these bodies can be 
represented by scale in cartographic terms, the 




they are represented. Scalar thought conceals the 
difference between actual (physical and material) and 
virtual (symbolic, imaginary and ideal) states in which 
bodies politic exist”  
(Isin, 2007:211). 
Isin contends that the urbs-civitas distinction is “as old as the city 
itself”, but refines it such that the urbs describes “actual bodies and 
things”, while the civitas is “virtual in the sense that it is an 
association that exists beyond the actual bodies and things that 
constitute it” (Isin, 2007:212). The civitas thus describes the relations 
between the component parts of the urbs, which exceed the 
materiality of the city. It points to the existence of ‘society’, which 
“does not consist of individuals, but expresses the sum of the 
relations within which individuals stand” (Marx, 1973:265, cited in 
Bhaskar, 1998:26). While an account of the ‘characteristic features’ of 
the city, then, needs to encompass its spatialised material dimensions 
(the city as technology, and the technologies within it), this should 
not amount to a crude fetishisation of the urban scale, which, in 
presenting the social as having no ontological depth, represents a 
depoliticised conceptualisation of the city.  
 
The difficulty of definitively theorising the nature of the 
relationship between the materiality of the city and its social 
dimensions is signalled by the scholarly disagreements about this 
over time. Some of these are outlined below. Nevertheless, in its 
totality, this ongoing debate does outline certain minimal 
‘components’ of the ‘urban way of life’. These are interrelated in a 
more open-ended – and less predictive – way below through a 
consideration of the city in terms of ‘assemblage’. 
 
Urban technology and urban society 
If we are to identify any essential features of the urban, these would 
need to be sufficiently abstract to have relevance across time and 
space to cityness as a tendency, rather than to be induced from 
particular types of cities (such as ‘world cities’) – and yet sufficiently 
specific to distinguish the city from other types of entity. One 
efficient way of establishing a minimal definition of this type may be 
to consider how the historical emergence and subsequent 
development of cities – in contradistinction to earlier villages or 





In earlier theorisations, the urbs tended to be causationally prior to 
the civitas: the first cities were social phenomena driven by 
technological change. Childe was insistent on technology’s effect of 
“moulding and determining social systems and economic 
organization” (Childe, 1966:8), having developed the notion of the 
‘Urban Revolution’ as a process by which settled agricultural 
communities underwent a change in their “economic structure and 
social organisation that caused, or was accompanied by, a dramatic 
increase in the population” during the late fourth millennium BC 
(Childe, 1950:3). Chant (1999) provides evidence of other mid-
century writers on early cities taking a similarly deterministic line, 
including White (1959), who acknowledged the influence of Childe, 
and Wittfogel (1957), who argued that urbanisation in ancient 
Mesopotamia was fundamentally driven by the need to reorganise 
and centrally manage water supplies. For Childe, the distinctively 
urban social world resulted from the adoption of new technologies, 
and differed from its non-urban antecedents particularly in terms of 
social stratification, relating to the specialisation of labour and the 
existence of a ruling class or bureaucracy, and the creation of social 
surpluses used for the importation of produce and artefacts not 
locally available. This new form of social organisation, then, was 
defined by its institutional life and the presence of commerce. 
 
If these two novelties distinguish the city from other types of 
settlement, the linear causality of such explanations, in which the 
social characteristics of urbanity derive from technological changes, 
was increasingly challenged from the 1960s onwards (Chant, 1999). 
Technology has come to be understood as socially shaped to varying 
degrees: “[t]echnologies are fashioned to reflect and extend human 
interests, activities, and social arrangements, which are, in turn, 
conditioned, structured, and transformed by technological systems” 
(Kaplan, 2003:168). Feenburg (1999) reads this shift as a reaction 
originally against the technocratic governance structures of the 1960s. 
He argues against the separation of the ‘social’ and ‘technical’, 
contending that technologies “include their contexts as these are 
embodied in design and social insertion” (ibid:xiii). Feenburg accepts 
Pinch and Bijker’s (1989) broad thesis that technology is adopted not 
because of its intrinsic technical or economic efficiency, but rather 




that influence the design process” (p.79). He tempers this 
constructivist position, however, by insisting that technology should 
not consequently be seen as an outcome of a social process, but 
rather as a “site of social struggle” (p.83).   
 
Other writers refuse to reject the agency of technology entirely. 
Marx and Smith (1994), for example, see technological innovation as 
neither the primary determinant of social change, nor as merely 
socially constructed, but rather as having the status of a “second-
order agent of history” (xiv). Heilbroner (1967) argues that the 
explanatory force of technological determinism varies for different 
historical epochs. Misa (1994) suggests that technological 
determinism makes more sense in macro-level analyses, but is 
typically undermined in micro-level ones. Winner (1999) argues that 
artefacts can be understood as having political agency in two senses. 
In the first of these, the choice of a particular technology represents a 
“way of settling an issue in a particular community” (ibid:29), but the 
implemented technology has ongoing political effects. She 
exemplifies this process with reference to Robert Moses’ road and 
bridge building programme in New York, which had the effect of 
privileging the automobile, and excluding the public transport-using 
poorer social classes. At the macro urban scale, technologies may 
thereby “embody a systematic social inequality, a way of engineering 
relationships among people that, after a time, becomes just another 
part of the landscape” (Winner, 1999:31), and as such have 
ideological force (Cosgrove, 1998). Her second sense in which 
technologies may have political agency is in the case of “man-made 
systems that appear to require, or to be strongly compatible with, 
particular kinds of political relationships” (Winner, 1999:30). Her 
examples include the case of solar energy which, she contends, will 
tend towards technical and political decentralisation compared with 
fossil-fuel and nuclear based energy production. Thus, choosing one 
technology over another has not only environmental and economic 
effects but also “important consequences for the form and quality of 
human associations” (Winner, 1999:34). 
 
Other claims still have been made about the ways in which 
technology can be meaningfully understood as affecting society, but 
which steer clear of determinism. To the extent that it creates ‘path 




may not be predictable, in what Bimber (1994) labels the ‘Unintended 
Consequences’ account of technology, it displays social agency 
which extends beyond that expressed in the human actors’ choice to 
use it. Hughes (1994) similarly promotes the idea of ‘technological 
momentum’, suggesting that younger technological systems are 
more open to sociocultural influences, while mature systems tend to 
be more independent and therefore more deterministic. But if a ‘hard’ 
technological deterministic perspective has been declared untenable 
within academic circles, it may still continue to inform popular 
opinion (Smith & Marx, 1994) as the ‘dominant account’ of 
technology in the mass media (Mackenzie & Wajcman, 1999:3). As 
the dominant popular account, determinism might be expected to 
have some influence on governmental policies affecting the built 
environment in a democracy, or in other relevant documents 
designed to appeal to public opinion. If determinism can in fact be 
detected in policies and key documents relating to eco-cities, it will 
be sensible to question whether their social characteristics have been 
meaningfully articulated: in other words, whether the urbs has been 
prioritised over the civitas. 
 
This debate as a whole leaves us with an understanding that 
technology and society – in the case of cities or more generally – are 
“mutually constitutive” (Mackenzie & Wajcman, 1999:23). Urban 
society, in other words, has a certain autonomy as a field which 
exceeds the materiality of the urbs, even if the two cannot be 
disentangled. At this point, we can bring Childe et al. back into the 
picture, to define this society as urban insofar as it is constituted not 
only by relations between individuals but also by an interrelated 
institutional or regulatory sphere, as well as a commercial one.   
 
The tendency for cities to be characterised by the presence of an 
institutional sphere, such that urbanity has always been associated 
with the existence of bureaucratised regulatory codes (Johns, 1903; 
Childe, 1950), is related to what Short (2002) labels the discourse of 
the ‘Authoritarian City’. In this authoritarian discourse, cities impose 
structures on people; they “have authority embedded in them”, they 
impose a “discipline of space and time”, and are “places of 
compunction” (ibid:18-19). Yet this discourse is not necessarily in 
conflict with the ‘emancipatory’ precept that “cities equal civilization” 




emancipatory as a “form of social contract to protect against the 
excesses of the more powerful” (ibid): it mandates a certain type of 
order which enables as much as it constrains. Short nevertheless 
rejects assumptions of a “hermetically sealed connection between 
order and consent…change does occur and it takes place when 
people interact…and this takes place most palpably in cities” (ibid:21). 
At the same time, the (changeable) ordering function of this 
institutional sphere is potentially problematic as a marker of 
contemporary urbanity. The reach of the modern nation state is such 
that the presence of institutional codification may not help us in 
practice to distinguish the urban from the non-urban; it may allow us 
to distinguish a city from, say, a pond, but no longer marks out the 
‘city’ from a supposedly anarchic hinterland.  
 
Similar considerations apply to the ‘commercial’ sphere of urban 
life. Its identification by Childe as foundational to urbanity, and 
further elaboration by Jane Jacobs (1970), allows us to conceptualise 
it as mutually constitutive of a city’s institutional life, but to be 
defined against this insofar as institutions seek to regulate or enable 
markets. It seems reasonable to propose that, like the institutional 
sphere, commercial dynamics may variously oppress or emancipate 
individuals, and may shape (though not fully determine) 
interpersonal relations; commerce is constrained by, but also shapes, 
the material form of the city. However, it would be perverse to 
suggest that contemporary rural communities operate outside 
market forces; the type of clear-cut distinction evident in, for 
example, medieval western European, between cities wherein 
trading occurred and a rural hinterland operating along feudal lines 
(Pirenne, 1969) no longer obtains – in fact, the clarity of this 
distinction has long been disputed (see eg Ewan, 1990; Nicholas, 
1997). Rather, as discussed below, a more convincingly distinctive 
urban characteristic lies in the tendency for the ‘personal’ sphere 
(which otherwise remains relatively hidden) to become visible: this 
characteristic is one of publicness, and the processes through which it 
becomes visible in particular contexts are here conceptualised as ones 
of variegated ‘assemblage’. 
 
Assemblage theory 
An emerging body of work which theorises the urban in terms of 




conceptualise “a wide range of social entities, from persons to nation-
states” as constructed through “very specific historical processes” 
(DeLanda, 2006:3). The recent use of assemblage theory in urban 
studies has been facilitated by ‘actor-network theory’ in which 
“assemblage refers to the immanent effect of the association of 
heterogeneous elements (humans, organizations, tools, objects, 
technologies, texts, organisms, other cities)” (Jacobs, 2012:416). 
DeLanda distances his ‘realist social ontology’ from social 
constructivism in that “language plays an important but not a 
constitutive role” in the process of assemblage (ibid); discourses are 
understood as real-world phenomena which contribute to 
assemblages. Accordingly, “the city is not socially constructed, but 
enacted into being in networks of bodies, materialities, technologies, 
objects, natures and humans” (Farías, 2010:13).  
 
This focus on enactment suggests the possibility of theorising the 
ways that cities are ‘performed’, but which avoids prescribing any 
particular artefacts or socio-political formations which result as 
necessary markers of cityness. For example, while empirical 
observation might suggest that monumental architecture is clearly 
correlated with cityness; assemblage theory shifts the emphasis onto 
the processes through which such architecture comes to be built in 
varied but particular contexts, and away from the resulting buildings 
themselves. The idea of assemblage is therefore adopted here to 
theorise coherently (rather than describe) what happens in ‘real cities’ 
as opposed to envisioned ones, but without defining the city with 
reference to specific formal outcomes. 
 
Traditional approaches conceiving of the city as somehow a 
“bounded unit and a stable object: a spatial form, an economic-
political entity; a cultural formation” (Farías, 2010:12) are contested 
from an assemblage perspective as implying “a kind of 
homogeneous unity, an implication that contradicts all modern 
urban experience and ignores all its fissures and fractures” (Bender, 
2010:304). While DeLanda does attempt to grasp the city in its 
entirety as an assemblage, Bender refutes the implication that we 
might therefore start with an “assumption that the city is some kind 
of whole, a totality, represented as a bounded or at least an 
identifiable territorial space that gives shape to social relations” (ibid); 




(ibid). Assemblages, in another definition, are “never fully stable and 
well-bounded entities; they do not have an essence, but exist in a state 
of continual transformation and emergence” (Ureta, 2014:232), 
defined as much by the relations between their components as their 
“relations of exteriority” (DeLanda, 2006:10). This non-bounded 
sense of the city chimes with a wide range of other theorisations of 
the city during the last two decades which emphasise their relational 
nature, and understand contemporary cities as increasingly 
“intensely embedded in global networks of connectivity, be they 
economic, cultural or political” (Jacobs, 2012:412). The ontology of 
this ‘space of flows’ (Castells, 1996) is such that questions of “[w]here 
cities end and rurality begins” become redundant (Jacobs, 2012:412). 
Instead, “city effects pulse outwards drawing in rural-based lives 
and spaces, creating hybrid urbanisms and new types of conjoined 
city regions” (ibid). 
 
From this perspective, the notion of urban ‘scale’ which arose in 
geography as a way of linking the city’s internal space to the 
‘national’ and ‘global’ (Latham & McCormack, 2010; Smith, 2010) can 
only be interpreted as a social construction; it has risen to 
prominence partly in response to processes of globalisation (Purcell, 
2008:9). The extent to which scale is a “material thing which can be 
‘seen’ in the landscape” or “an…arbitrary mental device” has been 
hotly debated over the last few decades (Herod & Wright, 2002:5). 
Delaney and Leitner, for example, argue that scale is rhetorically 
“implicated in the constitution of social, economic and political 
processes” (1997:93). Marston interprets scale as both the outcome of 
“everyday life and macro-level social structures” but also having 
material consequences (2000:221). If, as suggested earlier, scale has 
depoliticising effects insofar as it is presented as a “neutral container 
that exists outside politics” (Purcell, 2008:9–10), the ‘urban scale’ 
might be better understood as a strategy which “flow[s] from the 
agendas of the actors empowered by the strategy” (ibid:101). Instead 
of thinking in terms of scale and territory, we are encouraged by 
assemblage theorists to develop a “sense of urban complexity, or the 
unities and disunities, of the stabilities and instabilities, and 
especially the complex and heterogeneous networks of connection 
and association out of which the city as a social and as a physical 




then, “exists only in concrete assemblages and provides no 
encompassing form for its multiple enactments” (Farías, 2010:15). 
 
Rather than privileging either the civitas or the urbs, “assemblage 
distributes agency across the social and the material, and in doing so 
draws attention to the agency of the materials themselves as 
processes within assemblages” (McFarlane, 2011a). But this too may 
be limiting if it leads us back to thinking of the city as too 
ontologically ‘flat’: “This apparent levelling of responsibility in 
an…analysis of causation worries me, for it seems to remove ethics 
and politics from social analysis” (Bender, 2010:305). Just as Allen 
(2011) is concerned that the concept of assemblage may itself fall into 
the trap of generating little more than open-ended and contestable 
description, Bender argues that it fails more specifically to account 
for the importance of institutional power as a definitively urban 
phenomenon. Brenner et al. (2011) express related concerns that by 
rejecting structural explanations in favour of a ‘naïve objectivism’, 
assemblage approaches are impoverished in their ability to account 
for the broader context of capitalism. However, the possibility of 
assemblage theory being used in future to focus more directly on 
hierarchical relations which may be somehow typical of city life – as 
writers such as Childe (1950) and Adams (1966) proposed of the 
earliest cities – is suggested by McFarlane (2011a:222): “As a 
relational process of composition, assemblage signals the emergence, 
labour and sociomateriality of the city, and the ways in which this 
process becomes structured and hierarchical through inequalities of 
power, resource and knowledge”. Meanwhile, the very open-
endedness of the idea of ‘assemblage’ makes it a suitable way of 
conceptualising publicness as theorised in the following section, 
allowing us to posit its precise nature in different contexts as 
variously imagined (or discursive) but also spatialised and having 
concrete effects on the world. 
 
Assemblage thinking does not aim to “separate out the cultural, 
material, political, economic, and ecological” (McFarlane, 2011b:652), 
but rather “seeks to attend to why and how multiple bits-and-pieces 
accrete and align over time to enable particular forms of urbanism 
over others in ways that cut across these domains” (ibid). While these 
‘particular forms’ are subject to “transformation and destruction, 




reassembly through unequal relations of power and resource” 
(McFarlane, 2011b:652), and are contested on a continual basis, the 
ontology thus imagined need not be one of shapeless flux, for two 
reasons. First, the emergent multiplicity of the city, while 
unpredictable, does not imply that the nature of the city is entirely 
open-ended: a forest, or a pond, is similarly composed of shifting 
assemblages, and yet it is unlikely that either would be confused 
with a city. It allows, in other words, for the possibility that certain 
commonalities can be highlighted in the ways that cities – as 
opposed to other phenomena – are ‘assembled’. Based on the 
previous discussion, it is proposed that the process of city 
assemblage describes the interaction of the different ‘spheres’ of 
urban life. The word ‘sphere’ here does not connote a fixed entity, 
but rather a particular ontological dimension of urban life; the 
concrete manifestations of these spheres which are coproduced with 
their contexts, and the interactions between the resulting 
assemblages, will differ from city to city, ‘within’ cities themselves 
(whether or not a territorial boundary is constructed), and over time.  
 
Second, the precise form of urban assemblages may be in 
continual flux, but some will exhibit relative fixity – or obduracy 
(Hommels, 2005; 2010). The material dimensions of the urbs – 
particularly in the form of infrastructure – become relatively fixed 
after being assembled (Hommels, 2010) even if these attract different 
meanings and have different implications for the city over time, as 
they “come to be related to new entities and react to them” (Ureta, 
2014:245). Thus, cities concentrate “stabilised networks” which 
emerge historically as assemblages but – in an echo of some of the 
theories referred to above taking intermediate positions between 
technological determinism and social constructivism – are then also a 
“potential actant in a subsequent phase of urban development” 
(Bender, 2010:310).  
 
The same might be said for specific institutions (which are 
assembled in contingent ways to describe the interaction of the 
institutional sphere with its material environment, economic 
conditions, and social context). Regulatory institutions, in Dewey’s 
(1989:31) formulation, are oriented towards fixity rather than 
flexibility or responsiveness to ongoing change. The commercial 




which are assembled (and often spatially consolidated) over time in 
contingent ways (DeLanda, 2006:32). Assemblages which encompass 
the commercial sphere may achieve obduracy as what Callon (1991) 
calls ‘techno-economic networks’ with ongoing – though shifting – 
implications for the city, though may be threatened or contested over 
time. 
 
We are encouraged by the constructivist objections to Childe et al. 
to conceptualise the civitas as exceeding the institutional and 
commercial life of the city; it is this excess more specifically which is 
henceforth called the social sphere. A specifically urban sense of this 
social sphere is suggested by theorists who evoke a field of collective 
sociability with a negative rural pole. Mitchell (2003), for example, 
follows Lefebvre in contrasting the urban with the rural as a place of 
essentially private, isolated individuals. For Mumford (1938), the city 
can be read as a “related collection of primary groups and purposive 
associations: the first, like family and neighbourhood, are common to 
all communities, while the second are especially characteristic of city 
life” (ibid:480). The city, then, is distinguished from the rural in the 
degree to which it provides “differentiated opportunities for a 
common life and a significant collective drama” (ibid:481). On this 
view, the fragmented domain of domestic, personal and intimate 
(henceforth referred to as ‘personal’) activities and relations, which 
evolve in seclusion, also forms part of urban life, but it is not a 
definitive part of it. At different times, elements of this personal 
domain may emerge into the public sphere, while other visible 
public assemblages may retreat into the ‘hidden’ personal sphere. 
While the two, then, are intimately related, it is more precisely the 
visible ‘public’ aspect of the social sphere which is understood in this 
thesis as associated with urbanity. The following section reviews 
various traditions of conceptualising publicness to define more 
closely the way this label is used in the following chapters. 
 
 
3.2 Rethinking the Public  
 
Weintraub (1997) argues that the notion of ‘public’ can only be 
understood as part of a binary pair with ‘private’.  He suggests that it 




open, revealed and accessible), and collectivity (as opposed to 
individuality). Beyond this, however: 
The public/private distinction is not…unitary, but 
protean. It comprises, not a simple opposition, but a 
complex family of them, neither mutually reducible nor 
wholly unrelated  
(ibid:2). 
 
Similarly, in discussing the definitional complexity of ‘publicness’, 
Newman and Clarke (2009) suggest that the quality of ‘publicness’ is 
“historically and socially variable”, quoting Warner’s (2002:28) 
observation that “almost every cultural change – from Christianity to 
printing to psycho-analysis – has left a new sedimentary layer in the 
meaning of the public and the private”. Nevertheless, Weintraub 
(1997) proposes that the types of public-private distinction mobilised 
in debates over contemporary society fall into four categories, which 
are discussed in turn below:  
1. ‘public’ and ‘private’ used to indicate the state and the market 
economy respectively; 
2. the use of ‘private’ referring to family life, with that of ‘public’ 
indicating a wider economic and social order;  
3. ‘public’ denoting a political community separate from that of 
the market economy, the household, and the administrative 
apparatus of the state; and 
4. ‘public’ evoking an arena of informal, pluralist co-presence.  
 
The first typically appears in policy analysis and everyday 
political debate related to jurisdiction and a normatively liberal sense 
of the demarcation of state authority (Weintraub, 1997). The 
distinction is signalled by the terms ‘public sector’ / ‘private sector’ 
or ‘publicly owned’/’privately owned’ in this thesis. The ‘public’ 
here indicates an “apparatus of rule…that stands above society and 
governs it…on behalf of a society of private…individuals” 
(Weintraub, 1995:291); it closely maps onto the idea of the 
institutional sphere proposed earlier. 
 
Weintraub’s second public:private distinction above is most 
obviously related to the nature of the social sphere proposed above. 
He observes that this distinction has been questioned by cultural 




the binary is a patriarchal construction. 20  It is challenged from a 
political perspective by Scott (1990), who observes that that 
formation of political opinions exceeds the often “calm surface of 
political life” (ibid:17) in the ‘public domain’. Scott uses theatrical 
metaphors to liken the public domain to a stage where the “effects of 
power relations are most manifest” (ibid:4) such that performances 
between different social groups most often follow ‘official 
transcripts’. This appearance, he argues, may belie underlying 
tensions, whose ‘hidden transcripts’ are developed in sequestered, or 
‘private’, places; such tensions may reemerge into the public domain 
at “those rare moments of political electricity when, often for the first 
time in memory, the hidden transcript is spoken directly and 
publicly in the face of power” (ibid:xiii). Dean (2001), similarly, 
suggests that the ‘secret’ is a “generator of the public”, expressing 
discomfort with the idea that ‘publicity’ is often presented 
uncritically within contemporary society as democratically benign, 
and indeed appears to be the “governing concept of the information 
age”, such that “[i]f something isn’t public(ized), it doesn’t seem to 
exist at all”. In acknowledgement of the contingency and ideological 
force of this binary as it is mobilised, this thesis similarly conceives of 
the city’s ‘hidden’ social sphere and its public life as fundamentally 
interconnected; the two remain analytically separate, however, since 
the latter constitutes the visible aspect of the former. 
 
A third, in-between category is proposed by Lofland (1998): the 
‘parochial’ realm, or communal world of acquaintances and 
neighbours, as distinct both from the private (the intimate or 
domestic), and the public (essentially, ‘the world of strangers’). He 
differentiates cities, which “routinely and persistently” (ibid:12) contain 
all three realms, from other settlements, which lack a significant 
public life. In his view, the pre-industrial city was particularly closely 
associated with ‘public’ life, whereas developments in technology – 
particularly of communications and transport – have allowed ever 
more city dwellers to “spend their lives entirely in the private 
and/or parochial realms” (ibid:18). In similar vein, Kohn (2004) 
argues that the rhetoric of ‘community’ is fundamentally anti-urban 
(and more closely associated with suburban gated communities than 
                                                          
20
   As Bondi and Domosh (1998), among others, point out, the “doctrine of 
separate spheres” as developed in western modernity has spatial as well as 
ideological dimensions, with the home gendered as a “woman’s space”  (Bondi 




the ideal of urban public space proper); in promising to “provide the 
pleasures of sociability without the discomforts of the unfamiliar” 
(Kohn, 2004:193), it appeals as a “substitute for public life” (Kohn, 
2011:186). Community thus relates more to an extended type of 
intimacy, related to homogeneous in-groups of neighbours, friends 
and other associates. Neither Lofland nor Kohn therefore disrupt the 
conception of the public in this thesis; their notions of the parochial 
(or ‘community’) are subsumed within the ‘personal’ sphere. 
 
The pseudo-public nature of ‘community’ has further significance 
for this thesis given the role community is increasingly assigned in 
contemporary practices of governance (Rose, 1999:167). Rose 
interprets it as having a paradoxical quality, being valorised as, on 
the one hand, as a “kind of natural, extra-political zone of human 
relations” (ibid:167-168); and, on the other, as “a crucial element in 
particular styles of political government” (ibid:168). In terms of the 
argument that will be developed later (see Chapter Six in particular), 
this might be interpreted as part of a wider endeavour to bring the 
private realm, traditionally marked as ‘outside’ the purview of the 
state, into its formal institutional processes. 
 
The third usage that Weintraub identifies, following Habermas 
(1989) in particular, delineates the ‘public’ as a political community 
separate from that of the market economy, the household, and the 
administrative apparatus of the state; a “distinctive field of action 
that can emerge whenever human beings act and deliberate in 
concert” (Weintraub, 1997:11). Certain definitions of ‘civil society’ are 
closely aligned with this third meaning of the public. Kaldor (2003) 
identifies an ‘activist’ perspective on civil society, which she suggests 
grew out of grass-roots political opposition in 1970s and 1980s 
Central Europe. This is associated with the actions of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs); NGO CIVICUS, for example, 
defines civil society as “the arena, outside of the family, the state, and 
the market where people associate to advance common interests” 
(CIVICUS, undated). In its separation from the formal political 
structures of the state, it may understand itself as “a global public 
sphere – a global space where non-instrumental communication can 
take place” (Kaldor, 2003:8). Crouch explains that “not only in social 
philosophy but also in common parlance, ‘civil society’ usually 




themselves with public affairs, but which operate outside the power 
of both state and firm” (Crouch, 2011:153). Part of Kocka’s definition 
of the term ‘civil society’ – in its current international usage – is that 
of “a social space related to, but distinguished from, government, 
business, and the private sphere” (Kocka, 2004:69).  
 
This ‘civil society’ sense of the public does not describe a singular 
body of people or actions; rather, it is constituted by “plurality and 
tension” (ibid). It thereby points towards Weintraub’s (1997) fourth 
definition, whereby cultural critics in the tradition of, for example, 
Jacobs (1961) and Sennett (1974) portray the public as a realm of 
“fluid and polymorphous” (Weintraub, 1997:xii) informal sociability, 
as a stage where heterogeneous others appear before us. Weintraub 
sees this as a vision of public life as “physical proximity coexisting 
with social distance” (ibid:25); spontaneous intercourse rather than 
self-conscious collective action; an idealisation of the cosmopolis of 
everyday pluralist co-presence and tolerance. Soja (1996), 
correspondingly, sees the idea of ‘Cosmopolis’ as one of the 
dominant discourses about the ‘postmodern city’, relating it to 
broader discourses of the globalisation of capital, labour and culture.  
 
Such theorisations of the public as multiple enrich our 
understanding of the public sphere in the third sense above; rather 
than a ‘single’ sphere, it may display a tendency towards antagonism 
and exclusion (Mouffe, 1999). For Fraser (1990), the ideal of a single 
public sphere compromises that of participatory parity. She valorises 
instead “arrangements that accommodate contestation among a 
plurality of competing publics”, acknowledging the role of subaltern 
counterpublics which “emerge in response to exclusions within 
dominant publics” and serve to “expand discursive space”. We are 
therefore encouraged to consider the relations between “multiple, 
intersecting and heterogeneous publics” (Calhoun, 1997:84). While 
ensuing frictions are customarily thought of in negative terms as 
“features of instability in the urban ‘order’” (Grimaldi & Sulis, 
2009:259), they might thus be reinterpreted as “basic elements that 
can define a public domain”. The physical spaces of cities, 
meanwhile, have always been “infused with complex combinations 
of social, gender, ethnic and geographical inclusion and exclusion” 
(Aurigi & Graham, 1998:57). Similarly, contemporary policy making 




“bounded by formal representation” or politically constituted 
through collective presence and deliberation in a public sphere 
(Chandler, 2014b:145).  Instead, it is “conceived as a plural and fluid 
actor which reveals its associational power through the emergence of 
issues or ‘matters of concern’, usually highlighted by a shocking or 
surprising event” (ibid). 
 
Publicness has, then, come to be understood as variously enacted 
rather than describing a uniform social practice. The emergent, 
multiple quality of this enactment echoes Dewey’s (1989) 
theorisation of the public, which Marres understands as referring to a 
“particular modality of being implicated in inherently dynamic 
formations, which stand out first and foremost for the requirement of 
some kind of collective action upon them” (Marres, 2012:44). The 
Deweyan ‘public’ is, according to Bennett (2010:100), “a contingent 
and temporary formation existing alongside many other publics, 
protopublics, and residual or postpublics. Problems come and go, 
and so, too, do publics: at any given moment, many different publics 
are in the process of crystallizing and dissolving”. ‘Publicness’ in this 
sense describes a problematic mode of engagement or material 
entanglement, but Bennett’s use of the term ‘protopublic’ opens up a 
gap between the conditions of frustrating entanglement and the 
public expression of this frustration. The emergent publicness 
theorised by Dewey and Marres is understood in this thesis as also 
implying visible expression, beyond a personal sense of being 
problematically entangled. Dewey’s concern, conversely, was to 
describe the problem faced by individuals or groups who had no 
means of voicing their frustrations. 
 
Two modalities of assembled publicness 
The ‘emergent’ publicness outlined above is only one of two possible 
modalities. The other, here labelled ‘civic’ publicness, describes 
visible social behaviour assembled in compliance with constraints of 
different types – institutional and other. There may be no explicit 
compulsion for individuals to behave in a civic manner; the relevant 
norms may, rather, have been internalised. Emergent publicness, on 
the other hand, assembles itself as a reaction to material conditions, 
economic circumstances, and/or institutional constraints. It is 




publicness thus reproduces a particular definition of the ‘common 
good’; emergent publicness questions this definition. 
 
Similarly labelled public assemblages may exhibit either modality 
– a point analogically illustrated by Canetti’s (1984) differentiation 
between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ crowds. Canetti characterises an open 
crowd as ‘natural’ and ‘spontaneous’, it forms and disintegrates 
unpredictably, and there are “no limits to its growth” (ibid:16). A 
closed crowd, however, is defined by its boundary, and tends 
towards fixity (ibid:17). Emergent publicness, like the open crowd, is 
self-organising, evanescent, unpredictable, reactive, and unbounded. 
It assembles spatially without deference to, or in spite of, dominant 
norms and constraints, which co-constitute it only in a negative 
relational sense. Civic publicness however, like the closed crowd, is 
regulated, exclusive, bounded, and more oriented towards obduracy.  
 
The visibility fundamental to this model of publicness is 
important in a more subtle sense, relating to the challenge which 
emergent publicness issues to spatial norms. This touches on 
questions of legality: if civic publicness assembles in line with what 
is ‘legal’, emergent publicness does not constitute illegality so much 
as ‘a-legality’ (Lindahl, 2013). If the assemblage is classified as illegal 
by the state, or otherwise deemed worthy of censorship, it may be 
rendered invisible (punished, repressed, or forced into the personal 
sphere). Emergent behaviour is only public, then, up to the point 
where it is excluded. It exists in the grey area between what is 
explicitly permitted or encouraged within institutional or material 
constraints and what must be removed from sight. 
 
The implied distinction here, between the emergent agency of 
social actors and their structural (institutional, commercial, or spatial) 
constraints, becomes less clear when the constrictive role played by 
cultural norms is considered. As suggested in the following section, 
such norms display considerable flexibility, shifting from space to 
space, and from time to time. Again, assemblage theory may be 
illuminating in that it specifically attempts to disrupt the traditional 
‘agency versus structure’ problematic within social theory, reframing 
the problem of how to link the ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ levels of society 
by suggesting that “the terms ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ should not be 




intermediate scales any given assemblage may be ‘micro’ relative to 
some assemblages but ‘macro’ to others (DeLanda, 2006:32). 
Accordingly, cultural norms may have themselves emerged from 
behaviours – it has been argued that the overall “complex order of 
the city” as a ‘superorganism’ is founded on the totality of low level 
interactions (Johnson, 2002:94–96) – but emergent orderings 
themselves come to have a structuring effect on individuals’ 
behaviours. We might also therefore expect different assemblages of 
cultural norms to coexist. They might be analytically distinguished 
from institutional regulation, but are understood here as having a 
volatile status: not only being variously complied with or 
transgressed, but also – in certain places and at certain times – 
themselves being transgressive of a wider frame of norms or 
regulations. 
 
Emergent publicness has been associated thus far with the visible 
expression of problematic entanglement. But it is also possible to 
imagine its assemblage without reference to the ‘problems’ 
predicated by the purpose of theorisations such as Dewey’s, which 
focus on processes of explicit political claim making. In practice, and 
although it constitutes an act of spatial rebellion, emergent 
publicness need not be driven by a conscious desire to effect political 
change. Its assemblage may, alternatively relate, for example, to 
hedonism, or countercultural activities. And even within activities 
with an explicit ‘political agenda’, we might expect to find a range of 
motives, from those relating to a postulated common good through 
to those which assert the preferences of a particular interest group 
with little reference to broader social questions. The commonalities 
running through all this emergent public behaviour are its visibility 
and its subversion of a dominant, relatively obdurate, assemblage of 
spatialised norms. 
 
Nevertheless, there is an important sense in which the emergent 
public life of a city describes the realm of visible everyday ‘politics’, 
as distinguished from institutional political life (Offe, 1985). It is 
precisely the transgressive orientation of emergent publicness that 
distinguishes it from its civic modality, which does not challenge the 
status quo. Some of the problems associated with urban policies 
promoting civic publicness at the expense of the ‘political’ city are 




of ‘civility’ with that of the city as aesthetic spectacle, arguing that 
both have negative implications for justice and the public sphere: he 
is uncomfortable that the removal of homeless people from the 
streets of US cities is indicative of “a highly sanitized city and a fully 
deracinated politics – a politics that elevates the importance of 
aesthetics over the needs of some people simply to survive” (ibid:9).  
 
Plans which conceptualise the city’s public life only in civic terms 
thus ignore the possibility of public dissent, effectively equating the 
political life of the city with its institutions, as “something that takes 
place, safely, within the formal planning process” (Roy, 2009:9).This 
outcome may be an inevitable result of planning having remained an 
essentially ‘liberal’ project, whose conceptualisation of the ‘public 
interest’ “has been for the most part a moral, rather than political, 
exercise”, a restraining set of “moral guides for dialogue and process” 
(Roy, 2008:97). In its crudest form, this may result in the creation and 
protection of a “bounded [civic] public sphere, what we might 
interpret as ‘bourgeois governmentality’” (ibid:95). Roy calls for the 
injection of a ‘post-liberal’ form of critical theory and radical practice 
which recognises the “surplus of meaning, that which cannot be 
contained by the logic of liberalism and that which contradicts and 
fragments liberalism from within” (ibid). Recognising the significance 
of emergent publicness as a defining aspect of urban life, on this 
view, would highlight “the ‘radical impossibility’ of liberal planning, 
the surplus within liberalism that must be unearthed and 
acknowledged” (ibid:97). The question, however, of precisely how 
current practices of urban planning might be adapted to embrace 
emergent publicness remains unanswered. 
 
 
3.3  The Publicness of Open Spaces 
 
One possible reason why plans for cities may fail to account fully for 
publicness is the more general undertheorisation of the relationship 
between a city’s publicness and its space (Staeheli & Mitchell, 
2004:152; Low & Smith, 2006:7). Democratic theories, first, tend to 
lack a “spatial imagination” such that “democratic politics are 
imagined to take place in an abstract terrain” (Purcell, 2008:76). In 
one tradition, public ‘space’ has metaphorical meaning only; it 




derive its definition from any physical locations – though these may 
become associated with it in practice. Taylor (2011) conceptualises 
the public sphere as a collectively imagined “space of discussion”; 
following Habermas (1989), he understands this as forged as much 
through mediated communication (in the 18th century, taking the 
form of printed pamphlets, books and newspapers) as by proximate 
interpersonal exchanges. Although Hénaff and Strong (2001:35) 
suggest that 
“In the tradition of Western thought, the very idea of 
democracy is inseparable from that of public space. Public 
space is citizen and civic space of the common good; it 
stands in opposition to private space of special interests”, 
they contrast its literal meaning, derived from the ancient Greek 
agora, with the contemporary absence of “a single and privileged 
stage specific to the political realm” (ibid:23). Staeheli (1996, cited in 
Staeheli & Mitchell, 2004:152), similarly, contends that “public and 
private spaces should not be conflated with public and private 
actions”. Based on an argument similar to those of Scott (1998) and 
Dean (2001), as described earlier, that political life does not only 
takes place ‘publicly’, Kilian (1998) argues that particular spaces 
should not be reified as “public” or “private” since “publicity and 
privacy are not characteristics of space…Rather, they are expressions 
of power relationships in space and, hence, both exist in every space” 
(ibid:115-6). Such perspectives are categorisable as ‘performative’ 
definitions of ‘public space’, as distinct from ‘topographical’ 
approaches focusing on formal characteristics (Iveson, 2007). Their 
rejection of spatialisation is problematic, however, if we accept 
Purcell’s (2008:76) argument that “spatial relations are deeply and 
inescapably intertwined with political, social and economic 
relations”, and therefore “[a]ny project to democratize cities must 
take account of the importance of democracy’s spatial and urban 
dimensions”. They fail if nothing else to account for the observable 
fact that “material spaces are often recurrent: the same spaces are 
used for different political activities through time” (Leontidou, 
2012:303). 
 
Equally, it may be the case that “the main seat of the spatial 
consciousness in western culture today still lies in the plastic arts”, 




1973:24). Parkinson (2012) more recently suggests that urban 
practitioners’ and theorists’ interest in questions of inclusion and 
equity falls far short of a sophisticated understanding of the 
relationship between the materiality of different city spaces and the 
democratic process. In a more sympathetic reading, it is not 
unreasonable that different disciplines should “tend to focus only on 
one aspect of public value at a time” (Barnett, 2013:449), but there is 
at least a risk that urban development policy-making and practice is 
compromised to the extent that its social and political theoretical 
underpinning is weak. The “larger field of urban design” has, 
accordingly, been criticised as thereby furthering the status quo 
rather than offering the possibility of radical societal transformation: 
“a tool of neoliberalism, a movement without social 
content, …value free, …even the hand-maiden of global 
capitalism. This for a discipline that…aims at the creation 
of useful, attractive, safe, environmentally sustainable, 
economically successful and socially equitable places”  
(Carmona, 2014:2). 
 
While a full theorisation of the spatiality of publicness is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, it is proposed that open urban spaces – streets, 
squares and parks – represent particularly importance sites where 
publicness is assembled. The common understanding that such 
spaces are the ‘physical manifestation’ of the public sphere (Mehta, 
2014:53) – as reflected in the default tendency, in English at least, to 
refer to open urban space as ‘public space’ – need not imply that 
publicness is only assembled in the open air. Nor should it lead us to 
privilege open gathering-spaces simplistically as ‘public’ (Iveson, 
2007). Thinking exclusively in terms of physical spaces, furthermore, 
limits our imagination of the wider range of practices and media 
through which publics come about (Sheller & Urry, 2003; Barnett, 
2004). Nevertheless, it is significant that open spaces are assigned a 
“cherished place in the lexicon of urbanism” (Keith, 1995:297) 
generally. In a broad sense, they are understood to play a key role in 
the ‘cityness’ of places. Jane Jacobs was famously interested in the 
significance of street-life in shaping perceptions of a city as a whole: 
 
“Think of a city and what comes to mind?  Its streets.  If a 
city’s streets look interesting, the city looks interesting; if 




safe from barbarism and fear, the city is thereby tolerably 
safe from barbarism and fear” 
(Jacobs, 1961:39). 
 
More recently, UN-Habitat Executive Director Joan Clos has 
recognised the significance of streets as the most important ‘public 
spaces’ of a city (UN-Habitat, 2013:3), claiming that public spaces are 
“[w]hat defines a character of a city” (ibid:10). Normative treatments 
of ‘streetlife’ are often infused with an approach to publicness 
captured in Weintraub’s (1997) fourth sense of the public – the 
‘cosmopolis’ of spontaneous social interaction and unpredictable 
diversity, which contributes significantly to the “fulfilling gregarious 
life” promised by cities (Jacobs, 1995:314), with a uniquely urban 
type of cooperative, patterned interaction with strangers (Lofland, 
1998). Fyfe (1998:1) suggests this widespread interest reflects an 
understanding that city streets “manifest broader social and cultural 
processes”, illuminating discussions about “wide theoretical 
questions about the interplay between society and space”.  
 
A well-established body of literature laments both the piecemeal 
erosion of publicly owned space in western cities (eg Davies, 1990; 
Loukaitou-Sideris & Banerjee, 1998; Mitchell, 2003; Mean & Tims, 
2005) and the global proliferation of privately owned gated enclaves 
(Blakely & Snyder, 1997; Atkinson & Blandy, 2010). Such literature 
seeks to outline various negative implications of a move away from 
public ownership of the parts of the city lying between its privately 
owned buildings. Privatisation, it is argued, may lead to restrictions 
on access and behaviour, with urban ‘securitisation’ implicated in a 
process of neoliberalisation, and the resulting exclusionary character 
of open urban spaces having profound consequences for social 
cohesion and the quality of democracy. Parkinson (2012:67) argues 
that physical spaces “in which one can encounter the demos in all its 
variety have an important democratic function – they help us see and 
recognize others and make us more willing to take their right to 
make claims on us seriously when we encounter them in political 
debate”. The underpinnings of this line of argument are not new: 
John Stuart Mill deemed it  
“hardly possible to overrate the value…of placing human 
beings in contact with persons dissimilar to themselves, 




which they are familiar…Such communication has always 
been…one of the primary sources of progress” 
(Mill, 2004:174). 
 
Thus, there is little disagreement that the collective spaces of the 
city are variously important for the well-being of the citizenry. And 
yet their definition as ‘public’ based on ownership may be 
unenlightening. Viewed through Weintraub’s (1997) framework, 
this amounts to a privileging of one sense of publicness only (the 
first of his four). The significance of ownership as an analytical 
category of space is questionable, in that it does not necessarily 
determine access (Light & Smith, 1998): the general public is 
excluded from some publicly-owned space (such as military 
encampments), but has effectively free access to other private-sector 
owned spaces (Kohn, 2004; Parkinson, 2012:58). While Chiodelli and 
Moroni (2014) argue that ownership is of central importance in 
discussing the uses made of space, they reject a simple ‘private 
property’ and ‘public property’ binary which makes no further 
distinctions. In their proposed typology, the defining analytical 
variables relate to use and access; ownership itself plays a 
background, explanatory role. 21  Luk (2009) highlights the legal 
concept of ‘Privately Owned Public Space’, introduced in New York 
in the 1960s, to describe land owned by private parties who grant 
access to the public; the land is therefore understood as ‘public 
space’ insofar as the public have access to it (dependent though this 
may be on the private owner’s permission), even if it remains 
‘private property’. The assumption that privately owned space 
necessarily leads to diminished social interactions or an 
impoverished civic life has been directly questioned by Kirby (2008), 
who notes that the social benefits of private spaces are commonly 
overlooked in the literature. Chiodelli and Moroni (2015:3) question 
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  Chiodelli and Moroni (2014:169) propose six categories: ‘simple private spaces’ 
(usually for individual/domestic activity); ‘complex private spaces’ (used by, 
for example, associations and clubs); ‘privately owned collective spaces’ 
(including, for example, restaurants, cinemas, and shopping centres); ‘privately 
run public spaces’ (which are publicly owned but leased to private individuals, 
for example street markets); ‘special public spaces’ (publicly owned but 
assigned a special use function, including hospitals, libraries, schools and 
cemeteries); and ‘stricto sensu public spaces’ (for general use, usually 
connective and open, including streets and public squares).  Ownership (or 
change of ownership), then, has significant implications for access to, and uses 
made of, a space; but it is to these implications, rather than ownership itself, 




the conceptualisation of “publicity” as a zero-sum game which, 
given certain privatisation processes that take place in 
contemporary cities, is necessarily equated with a progressive 
decline in publicness”. Privately owned commercial centres, they 
argue, do not necessarily replace publicly owned ones, and may 
engender certain types of public interaction as part of a broader 
mosaic of types of space in a city (ibid). They observe that 
“[s]hopping malls probably have one of the highest levels of 
openness among all private spaces”, and that “this level of openness 
is also higher than that of some public spaces” (ibid:6). Others have 
found, accordingly, that the securitised nature of some privately 
owned space may even make it more attractive for certain groups 
who feel excluded from other ‘public’ spaces for safety reasons; this 
quality of shopping malls, for example, adds to their appeal for 
teenage girls in the UK (Pearce, 1996; Watt & Stenson, 1998; 
Matthews et al., 2000).  
 
The expectation that urban space can be neatly divided into that 
which is privately and municipally owned, furthermore, has been 
interpreted as historically and geographically anomalous, associated 
with the emergence of the representative bourgeois state (Low & 
Smith, 2006) and twentieth-century western cities more particularly 
(Body-Gendrot et al., 2008). Hogan et al. (2012) warn against the 
tendency towards a ‘dystopianism’ which fails to question an 
assumption that urban space is somehow a priori ‘public’ until it is 
colonised. Rather, they observe that 
The periods during which conceptions of public space 
were normalized to western liberal contexts are 
historically specific, notably in the form of the Keynesian 
national welfare state of the 1960s… [They] were actively 
produced as a collective historical achievement that is 
subject to renegotiation and deconstruction  
(Hogan et al., 2012:61). 
 
This recognition is of particular significance for the study of non-
western cities: “In much of urban Asia, there has often not been 
anything public to undergo privatization through neoliberalization” 
(Hogan et al., 2012:61). Drawing on Pow’s (2007) discussion of 
Shanghai’s gated developments, they suggest that new private 
housing markets might be understood more positively as enclaves 




control. The ‘privacy’ against which publicness is constructed may 
have entirely different meanings in traditional Asian societies 
(Hogan et al., 2012). Hou observes that in many Asian cities, ‘public’ 
spaces are “synonymous with spaces that are representing and 
controlled by the state. In contrast, the everyday and more vibrant 
urban life tends to occur in the back streets and alleyways, away 
from the official public domain” (Hou, 2010:2). Questions of 
ownership, in other words, might usefully form part of an account of 
the publicness of urban space (Parkinson, 2012) – but there is no 
compelling case for this to be a primary analytical variable, and its 
significance may vary across time and space.  
 
In a more precise formulation, then, open spaces are important 
sites for the assemblage of publicness insofar as access to them is 
unrestricted. But whether or not the ‘laments’ referred to earlier are 
misguided in focusing on questions of ownership, Parkinson takes 
issue with them for focusing overly on “sociological” questions of 
inclusion, sociability and “unscripted encounters with strangers” 
(Parkinson, 2012:299). Although ‘cosmopolitan’ approaches position 
streetlife as a precondition of healthy democracy, Parkinson (2012) 
calls for a more nuanced analysis of the more precise mechanisms 
whereby different open spaces allow different types of political 
claim-making to occur.  In the terms of this thesis, then, he is calling 
both for a stronger focus on the emergent modality of publicness, 
and for a sensibility of the way that the physical space is a co-
constitutive element of the assemblage of publicness. 
 
Accounts of open space which more explicitly frame it as a 
“staging ground” for politics (Staeheli & Mitchell, 2004:149) – in line 
with Weintraub’s (1987) third sense of the public as a relatively 
autonomous realm of visible self-expression – may only refer to this 
space in a generic sense. Nevertheless, such approaches clearly 
contrast with more ‘sociological’ ones in their clearer 
conceptualisation of the emergent modality of publicness and 
emphasis on the unusual importance of open spaces in this respect. 
For Kohn (2004:4), the face-to-face interaction which they facilitate 
differentiates them from interactions via email or the mass media, 
and, crucially “the politics of public space requires few resources and 
therefore allows marginal viewpoints to be expressed, debated, and, 




relatively accessible sites of political interaction and civilian 
collectivity, are “practically the only remaining sites for unscripted 
political activity” (ibid). Short (2002) observes that in a city’s most 
dramatic moments, its open spaces are among the key arenas where 
the process of reframing the parameters of political debate – or re-
politicization – literally ‘takes place’. There is no reason, furthermore, 
to suppose that their function as an arena of political contestation is 
limited to western cities. Significant institutional changes have been 
achieved or intended through street protests in recent years in the 
Arab spring and by the ‘Occupy’ movement. In the case of South 
Korea, explored further in Chapter Seven, street protests have long 
been a dominant mode of political expression (Kim, 2009:3).  
 
When considered as sites of political contestation, occupation, and 
visibility expressed dissent, urban open spaces are often referred to 
synecdochally as ‘the street(s)’. Thus, Swyngedouw (2011b) 
comments on the “retaking of the streets” during 2011 in 
demonstrations across European and North African cities. Purcell 
(2008) describes the protests against the third Ministerial conference 
of the World Trade Organisation in Seattle in 1999, in which activists 
succeeded in breaching a ‘no protest zone’ declared by the City of 
Seattle. He interprets their cries during their ensuing detention of 
“[t]his is what democracy looks like” as an assertion that democracy 
is partly constituted through:  
political struggle in the streets of the city.  It demands a 
right to be present in the city, to inhabit it, to occupy it, 
and to use it as a political forum. From their perspective, 
nothing is more anti-democratic than a no-protest zone in 
the heart of the city  
(Purcell, 2008:75–76). 
 
Thus, the virtual – emergent – ‘street’ serves an enabling political 







Figure 3.2: political posters from 2011 evoking the emergent ‘street’  
 
For Kallianos, “there is a non-material notion of the street…In this 
idea, the street is connected with public space as an active political 
agent” (Kallianos, 2013:549). In his discussion of political protests in 
Athens, he describes the street as not only a “carrier of history” but 
also “an active determiner of political practice which greatly shapes 
the regular daily pathways and routes in Athens since they have 
been predominantly charged with memories of collective action” 
(ibid). Thus, out of the regulated civic streets of everyday practice are 
produced ‘streets’ of counter-institutional political activity, and this 
subversive transformation is facilitated by the space, partly due to 
the memories it ‘holds’: the streets are understood by Athenians as, 
historically, an arena giving visibility to political claims which 
contest the status quo. In the transformation to which Kallianos 
refers, particular spaces appear to display different public modalities 
at different times, or simultaneously; their space becomes differently 
enfolded into different assemblages of publicness. 
 
As was argued earlier, however, emergent publicness need not be 
equated exclusively with political claim-making. Although 
Parkinson’s stated interests lie in the latter, he effectively 
acknowledges that emergent publicness has a broader scope by 
accepting Stevens’ (2007) contention that “the purposes of public 
space are not just political” (Parkinson, 2012:86).  For Stevens (2007), 
more ‘ludic’ activities may also constitute a challenge to the status 




“Urban skateboarders and picknicking immigrant 
housekeepers in Hong Kong also…constitute publics and 
sites of publicness, by expressively performing social 
differences, and negotiating their inclusion through 
practice, rather than through discussion and policy”  
(Stevens, 2013:453). 
 
Arguing that spaces become ‘public’ when particular groups act 
consciously for purposes of visibility or political representation, then, 
privileges only one register of the emergent modality of publicness 
(and implies that more ‘civic’ spaces are somehow less public). Lees 
(2008:237) argues that emphasising the emancipatory possibilities of 
the street as the “site and symbol of democratic protest and politics” 
carries the risk of romanticism. Rather, acts of conscious public 
rebellion may be relatively rare. Lefebvre makes this point with 
reference to the street life of Mediterranean cities: “In the city, public 
life organises itself around all kinds of exchange: material and non-
material, objects and words, signs and products…it seems that the 
life of the city seldom has a political objective – except in times of 
revolt” (Lefebvre & Régulier, 2004:92). There is a more general sense, 
then, in which public spaces “are also spaces for social and cultural 
discourses in which the community’s diversity may manifest itself in 
an open way” (Parés & Saurí, 2007:170). A wide variety of activities 
taking place in open space are neither instrumental nor transgressive. 
With the exception of ‘political expression’, the examples of such 
behaviour which Franck and Stevens’ (2006) provide to explain their 
notion of ‘loose space’ may exceed, but do not amount to a challenge 
to, the official coding of space: 
“Many of the activities that generate loose space are 
neither productive (like traveling to work) nor 
reproductive (like buying necessities), being instead a 
matter of entertainment, self-expression or political 
expression, reflection and social interaction – all outside 
the daily routine and the world of fixed functions and 
schedules”  
(Franck & Stevens, 2006:3). 
In analysing assembled publicness, however, this thesis adopts a 
narrower conception of ‘loose space’ (in Chapters Six and Seven) to 
describe non-instrumental activities which nevertheless accord with 




modality. Activities which issue a challenge to the civic norms of the 
space are classified instead as emergent. 
 
The expectation is that publicness will be assembled differently in 
different locations within a city. Lees (1998:251) argues that “public 
space is not a homogeneous entity. Public spaces differ depending on 
their social, cultural, economic and symbolic functions, and perhaps 
more importantly, depending on the meanings, contested and 
negotiated though they are, that different publics bring to them”. The 
nature of any assemblage of publicness therefore describes the result 
of contingent interactions between the materiality of space and the 
institutional, commercial and personal spheres of the city. 
Furthermore, reflecting scholarly agreement that “an unconditional 
universal access to public space is almost impossible” (Mehta, 
2014:54), and that space may be differently exclusive for different 
social groups and by time of day or night (Valentine, 1990; Watson, 
2002; Williams, 2008), we should expect the way that publicness is 
assembled to vary at different times.  
 
Being alert to the varying publicness of such assemblages does not 
imply an abandonment of an ideal of the ‘open city’ where “open 
public space is accessible to all” (Caldeira, 1999:126) – the promise 
often made by the sustainable city (as discussed in Chapter Five). 
Rather, it repositions this ideal as analogous with the “fiction of a 
social contract among equal and free people” in the “modern liberal-
democratic polity”, in that both represent a “promise of 
incorporation” (ibid). Both offer a promise radically opposed to 
previous hierarchical and feudal urban orderings – but both have 
only ever remained an ideal. Similarly, Deutsche (1996) suggests that 
narratives of loss lamenting the fragmented contemporary city of 
exclusive spaces construct a dubious ‘golden age’ of inclusive 
publicness; she argues instead that urban space has always been “the 
product of conflict”: it results from ongoing negotiations between 
different social groups; it is not simply ‘designed’ by the authorities, 
but shaped by multiple everyday practices (Deutsche, 1996:278).  In 
real cities, the publicness of space, in other words, describes its 
multiplicity, and the frictions and emergent possibilities that these 





Acknowledging the unpredictability of open spaces may sit 
uncomfortably with the goals of planning, since it marks a 
recognition of “public space as uncontrolled space, as a space in 
which civilization is exceptionally fragile” (Mitchell, 2003:13). 
Mitchell (2003) suggests that such discomfort has been amplified (in 
US cities) following the 2001 terrorist attacks, and is concerned that 
bourgeois notions of ‘order’ and ‘civility’ have tended to trump the 
notion of the right of access to publicly owned space in the modern 
city, and that debates about urban injustices and inequalities are 
being increasingly displaced. He argues that city life should 
“necessarily retain some tolerance for risk and danger. It must be 
taken for granted that at least some level of “fear” will always be 
present” (Mitchell, 2003:5).  
 
The envisionment of ‘civil’ behaviour to which Mitchell refers is 
also itself problematic insofar as its focus on the appearance of 
harmonious coexistence may ignore the underlying frustrations and 
tensions which remain hidden in the personal sphere. In fact, “those 
who hold prejudiced views and values can nonetheless willingly 
exchange civilities in public space with individuals who are members 
of groups for whom they have negative feelings” (Valentine & 
Sadgrove, 2012:2050). Civility, Bannister and Kearns argue, is how 
‘tolerance’ is performed: it enables us to “negotiate encounters with 
difference”, thus allowing for “peaceful co-existence in space” 
(Bannister and Kearns, 2013:2706). Tolerance, in turn, constitutes a 
“deliberate choice not to interfere with conduct or beliefs with which 
one disapproves” (Hancock & Matthews, 2001:99), and “occurs when 
dislike and disapproval are overcome in the name of some other 
reasons that are recognized as stronger” (Chiodelli & Moroni, 
2014b:167). In other words, civility is an act of suppression. If there is 
no disapproval, there is no need to choose to be tolerant. Thus, the 
tolerance underlying civility in fact indicates an unwilling acceptance 
of “relative powerlessness” (Bannister and Kearns, 2013:2708). 
 
In practice, then, there is a thin line between civic and emergent 
publicness; even while the former is assembled in line with the 
dominant coding of urban space, it may contain the seeds of 
emergent rebellion. Planning for space simply to be fully inclusive 
and harmonious is utopian; the static, apolitical vision thus imposed 




publicness even in a civic sense. Its rhetorical appeal conceals the 
possibility that it serves to naturalise a particular ordering of space. 
In this sense, it may be considered an act of ‘appropriation’ (Lefort, 
1986:279) potentially at odds with the ways in which publicness is 
assembled in the real city. This chapter’s final section suggests that 
this attempted ‘appropriation’ of publicness derives partly from the 
(perhaps necessarily) limited conceptualisation of space itself in the 
liberal tradition of planning and policy-making.   
 
 
3.4  The Significance of Space  
 
Thinking about publicness as a spatial assemblage, rather than as 
either a quality of space itself, or as a performance whose setting is 
incidental, implies that space is not a neutral backdrop to publicness 
(or city life more generally) so much as a quasi-agentive property of 
the city, itself in its turn shaped and given meaning through 
assemblage. The implications of such an understanding of space may 
be better grasped if we refer to Lefebvre’s (1991) ideas about space 
being ‘socially produced’. 22 Lefebvre’s model is usefully aligned with 
an assemblage in that the latter focuses our attention on “what it 
means to consider the city as a place that is not just inhabited but 
which is produced through that inhabiting” (McFarlane, 2011b:651). 
Lefebvre provides a framework in which space is understood as 
having three simultaneous dimensions, which he labels 
‘representations of space’ (or the ‘conceived’), ‘spatial practice’ (the 
‘perceived’), and ‘representational space’ (the ‘lived’). Each of these 
in discussed in turn below. 
Representations of space (conceived) 
Lefebvre took issue with the intellectual construction of ‘space’ as a 
geometric grid, “generally accompanied by some such epithet as 
‘Euclidean’, ‘isotropic’, or ‘infinite’” (Lefebvre, 1991:1), understood in 
terms of “relations of proximity between points or elements” 
(Foucault, 1986:23). Cartographers’ attempts to represent space as a 
grid have, further, reflected a parallel tradition in which space is 
understood as the opposite of time. Massey (2005:37) sees 
structuralism as exhibiting a similar foundation, such that 
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“[s]tructure and process were read as space and time. Space was 
conceived…to be the absolute negation of time”; the aim was to 
represent society as a synchronic structure forming a “totally 
interconnected closed system” (ibid:41). Drawing on Laclau (1990), 
Massey argues that the exclusion of temporality from this 
representation constitutes a form of ideological closure denying the 
existence of social processes and uneven change; society cannot be 
adequately represented by models that construct an institutional 
stasis which excludes ‘politics’, which Laclau understands in terms 
of ‘moments of dislocation’, where “dislocation is the source of 
freedom” (Laclau, 1990:60). Massey interprets what Laclau calls the 
‘crisis of all spatiality’ (Laclau, 1990:78) as describing the 
impossibility of representing the social world, precisely because 
“traces of temporality corrupt all space” (Massey, 2005:45). A 
representation of space can only ever be utopian in character since it 
necessarily “involves a ‘suspension of the political’” (Stavrakakis, 
2007:149).23  
 
The case that representation is necessarily ideological is made by 
Fowler:  
Events and ideas are not communicated neutrally, in their 
natural structure, as it were. They could not be, because 
they have to be transmitted through some medium with 
its own structural features, and these structural features 
are already impregnated with social values which make 
up a potential perspective on events 
(Fowler, 1991:25). 
Accordingly, “representation must be recognised as constitutive 
rather than mimetic; the space of the world, far from being 
equivalent to representation, must be unrepresentable in that latter, 
mimetic sense” (Massey, 2005:28). Like Massey, Lefebvre (1991) 
argues that ‘scientific’ representation has dominated traditional 
understandings of space, and that the various social aspects of space 
– its production through, and role in reproducing, social actions – are 
suppressed through the imagination of space as an atemporal grid. 
More precisely, he argues that the Euclidean sense of space has been 
informed by two influences, which in combination promote the 
conflation of the representation of space with space itself, and serve 
to obscure its social dimensions. First, while space is commonly 
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understood to have physical dimensions, it appears as an “empty 
vessel existing prior to the matter that fills it” (Butler, 2012:38).  
Simultaneously, it is reduced to an “abstract, mental construction” 
(Butler, 2012:38).  
 
Such apparently neutral ‘representations of space’, however, have 
generative force. Their “conceptualized space” is “the space of 
scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social 
engineers” (Lefebvre, 1991:38). The privileging of this ‘conceived’ 
space in contemporary capitalist society “with its rational-technical 
reduction of space to a Cartesian grid…facilitates the marketization 
of space, the reduction of space to a measurable entity to be valued 
as property” (Purcell, 2008:93). Thus, as McCann (1999:164) puts it, 
this is a view of space promoted by “elite social groups as 
homogeneous, instrumental and ahistorical in order to facilitate the 
exercise of state power and the free flow of capital”. Poovey (1995, 
cited in Rose, 1999:37-38) suggests that a formal, isotropic view of 
space as a grid of “reproducible products; interchangeable places, 
behaviors and activities” became common from the seventeenth 
century onwards”. These types of imagined space are “dominated by 
visuality”, and come to “stand in, in thought, for that which they 
realize” (ibid). If this was associated with the rise of cartography, it 
reflects a realisation that “[t]o govern, it is necessary to render visible 
the space over which government is to be exercised” (Rose, 1999:36). 
The technologies developed in early urban planning practices which 
allowed planners to ‘see’ the city as a collective whole effectively 
served to ‘tame’ space, as a topographical backdrop and 
downplaying its emergent qualities (Murdoch, 2006:136); the focus 
on geometry prioritised the physical over the social dimensions of 
the city (ibid). And while any conceptualisation of space within 
institutional attempts to govern city land use generates its own 
“truths about the city” (Osborne & Rose, 1999:739), it also has 
tangible effects as it attempts to enact these truths into physical space 
(Law & Urry, 2004). 
 
The “pronounced visual character” (Lefebvre, 1991:75) of space as 
a representation – as is evident, for example, in masterplanning 
documents – works to create an “illusion of transparency” (Lefebvre, 
1991:27), which is further instrumental in obscuring its social 




and Healey (1999:627) argue that urban planning has continued to 
treat space as an “immovable frame of reference inside which events 
and places occur”, rather than as “effectively produced and created 
through social actions within and between places”. Rather than seeking to 
highlight the relational nature of space, urban plans purport  
 
to offer single, objective, representations of urban space in 
Euclidean terms. The city is thus depicted as a ‘jigsaw’ of 
adjacent, contiguous land use parcels, tied together with 
infrastructure networks and laid out within a bounded, 
Euclidean, gridded plain 
(Graham & Healey, 1999:626). 
 
Shields argues that representations of a city in planning 
documents can tend to “replace or stand in for the city”, describing 
them as “treacherous metaphors, summarizing the complexity of the 
city in an elegant model” (Shields, 1996:229).  Lefebvre argues instead 
for a more relational understanding of space as also  
“bound up together with everyday life, with social 
relations, and with political struggle…Producing and 
reproducing urban space, for Lefebvre, necessarily 
involves reproducing the social relations that are bound 
up in it. The production of urban space therefore entails 
much more than just planning and developing the 
material space of the city. It involves producing (and 
reproducing) all aspects of urban life” 
(Purcell, 2008:93). 
Spatial practice (perceived) 
Lefebvre distinguishes representations of space from what he labels 
‘spatial practice’, which relates to space as perceived by its inhabitants. 
Harvey clarifies the difference between the two by aligning spatial 
practice with the “world of tactile and sensual interaction with 
matter, it is the space of experience. How we represent this world is 
an entirely different matter” (Harvey, 2006a:131). This perceived, 
experiential dimension of space is constituted by a multiplicity of 
unpredictable and often conflicting events and processes, which are 
acted out in space, and therefore produce it. This aspect of (social) 
space is far from a ‘flat’ Euclidean grid, or a static closed system. 
Rather, our attention is drawn to the fact that spatial practice makes 
the political possible. Massey makes a similar point in her argument 




 “its juxtaposition, its happenstance arrangement-in-
relation-to-each-other, of previously unconnected 
narratives/temporalities; its openness and its condition of 
always being made. It is this crucial characteristic of ‘the 
spatial’ which constitutes it as one of the vital moments in 
the production of those dislocations which are necessary 
to the existence of the political” 
(Massey, 2005:39). 
 
This thesis understands ‘place’ as constituted by spatial practice: 
the perceived materiality of space, which is fundamentally dynamic. 
By extension, place does not relate to boundaries or permanence 
(Cresswell, 2004:39); it is produced – or assembled – partly through 
the interaction of unpredictable influences from ‘elsewhere’. This 
unpredictability does not, however, mean that a given place is 
entirely unstable; rather, the idea that place is assembled predicts 
that some of its characteristics will be obdurate over time. 
Collectively, we will perceive the materiality of a place in a similar 
way, and in this it will meaningfully differ from other places. 
 
This notion of place departs from the one developed by humanist 
geographers in the 1970s as a reaction to the spatial preoccupations of 
‘scientific’ geography (Cresswell, 2004). Writers such as Tuan (1974) 
and Relph (1976) asserted that ‘place’ has positive significance in that 
it describes our emotional and perceptual relationship with the world; 
we construct and are conscious of ‘places in the world’, while space is 
“amorphous and intangible and not an entity that can be directly 
described and analysed” (Relph, 1976:8). For Relph, space is an 
abstraction which “provides the context for places but derives its 
meaning from particular places” (ibid). More recently, the notion of 
place has come to have increasing “totemic resonance” (Massey, 
2005:5) and is “endlessly mobilised in political argument” (ibid). It 
appears variously as “the sphere of the everyday, of real and valued 
practices, the geographical source of meaning, vital to hold on to as 
‘the global’ spins its ever more powerful and alienating webs” (ibid). 
Activists may therefore advocate a ’retreat to place’ in the face of 
environmental or economic threats; such calls to action might be 
likened to “a protective pulling-up of drawbridges and a building of 






Representational space (lived) 
Lefebvre identifies a third aspect of space, which he calls 
‘representational space’. This reflects the fact that “we do not live as 
material atoms floating around in a materialist world; we also have 
imaginations, fears, emotions, psychologies, fantasies and dreams” 
(Harvey, 2006a:131). Representational space, then, is produced 
through individuals’ interpretations and schematisations of the 
complexities of spatial practice. Lefebvre refers to it as ‘lived’ space: 
those aspects of space whose reality consists in our subjective 
interpretation of it, and the ways in which space is shaped – in other 
words, assembled – partly through the interplay of subjectivities.  
 
In a broader sense, this is to say that “[c]ities are imaginary as well 
as real spaces; they are constituted by dreams and desires, conscious 
and unconscious longings and fears, along with material 
developments and practices” (Pinder, 2002:233). If the physicality of 
space, and the cumulative activities which produce physical space, 
relate to ‘spatial practice’, then ‘representational space’ points to the 
less tangible, subjective dimensions of space as “directly lived, 
occupied and transformed” during its inhabitation (Cenzatti, 
2008:80). This subjectivity is not posterior to ‘objective’ space, but 
may be assembled with it into an ‘urban imaginary’ (Bender, 
2010:318); in this sense, “[u]rban assemblages encompass different 
ways of imagining the city – alternative possibilities for how it has 
been and will be” (McFarlane, 2011a; 2011b).  
 
However, since this imagined city is subjective, it is alternately 
sustained and disrupted by unfolding experiences (Bender, 2010:319). 
This ‘instability’ means that there is always potential for innovation, 
an eventful differentiation” (Jacobs, 2012:416). It describes the way 
that the city is subjectively assembled in multiple ways which are 
“never fixed or stable, but always in a process of making or 
unmaking” (ibid). Tensions between space thus imagined and the 
unfolding experience of space may be generative, it follows, of 
assemblages of unpredictable emergent publicness. The alignment of 
representational space with emergent publicness is implied by 
Lefebvre’s definition of “the urban as a place where conflicts are 
expressed” (Lefebvre, 2003:175) in opposition to a ‘civic’ conception 
where “expression disappears,…silence reigns, [and] the signs of 




Insofar as it therefore incorporates the idea of individual 
meanings being attached to locations, representational space is 
aligned with the humanist geographers’ (and ‘activist’) notion of the 
affective sense of ‘place’ outlined above. Lefebvre further associates 
this type of space with the “clandestine or underground” (1991:33) 
and those types of artistic work which disrupt dominant 
‘representations of space’. Harvey comments that “[w]e may also 
seek to represent the way [representational] space is emotively and 
affectively as well as materially lived by means of poetic images, 
photographic compositions, artistic reconstructions” (Harvey, 
2006a:131).24 Thus, representational spaces  
 
“form part of the social imaginary of ‘inhabitants and 
users’ of space, in which complex symbols are linked to 
non-hegemonic forms of creative practice and social 
resistance…They are the sites of resistance and counter-
discourses that have escaped the purview of bureaucratic 
power or manifest a refusal to acknowledge its authority”  
(Butler, 2012:41). 
 
If representational space describes the way we variously interpret 
spatial practice, or the “imaginary geographies of the city” which are 
“central to the continuing production of and struggle over the public 
spaces of the city” (McCann, 1999:177), it is, accordingly, a radically 
open space of political contestation. To ignore representational space 
in plans for urban development, it would seem, is to ignore – or even 
attempt to suppress – the emergent dimensions of the urban. 
 
The representational dimensions of a space may be inscribed on its 
materiality by individuals or countercultural collectivities who 
appropriate it in different ways. Graffiti, for example, seems 
particularly significant in this respect. As Stewart (1987:168) contends, 
“graffiti is considered a threat to the surface on which it applied; it is 
considered a threat to the entire system of meanings by which such 
surfaces acquire value, integrity and significance”. She notes, further, 
that in typically targetting institutionally owned property, graffiti 
writers “espouse an anti-monumental politics, contrasting to the 
monument’s abstraction and stasis the signature’s personality, 
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   Harvey translates Lefebvre’s term ‘l'espace de représentation’ as ‘spaces of 
representation’, rather than as ‘representational spaces’ (the term which appears 
in Nicholson-Smith’s standard translation of the work (Lefebvre, 1991)). Here, 




mobility, and vernacular, localized audience” (Stewart, 1987:169). 
Graffiti writing has been interpreted as a visible challenge to imposed 
order, in tension with a supposed ‘militarisation’ of urban space 
(Iveson, 2010): graffiti writers have been likened by authorities to 
terrorists (Iveson, 2010); and described by authorities as ‘anti-social’ 
(Halsey & Young, 2006:276); it asserts its own geographies of 
meaning (Iveson, 2010). Its construction within legislation as 
disrupting the order of ‘clean’ or ‘blank’ spaces (Halsey & Young, 
2006:299) serves to deny the existing ideological content of those 
spaces, and their representational status as sites of contested 
meanings. The recent rise in ‘DIY urbanism’ and ‘guerilla urbanism’ 
(Hou, 2010; Lydon, 2011; Deslandes, 2013; Iveson, 2013; Finn, 2014; 
Talen, 2015) might similarly be interpreted as making the 
representational dimension of urban spaces visible. And yet this does 
not simply represent an assertion of agency over space; rather, the 
results are co-assembled by individuals and the space: “the 
characteristics of the physical space give shape and even impose 
limits on what kind of [representational spaces] can be produced there” 





As discussed in Chapter One, the question of whether a city can ever 
fully be planned is not a new one. It may be the case that design of 
the built environment necessarily “militates against an autonomous 
public life” (Scott, 1998:127), since “[d]esigned or planned social 
order is necessarily schematic; it always ignores essential features of 
any real, functioning social order” (Scott, 1998:6). Criticisms have 
been made of the modernist ‘imaginary’ of urban planning as an 
instrument of social change, specifically because it attempts to plan 
“without contradiction, without conflict…It fails to include as 
constituent elements of planning the conflict, ambiguity and 
indeterminacy characteristic of actual social life” (Holston, 1999:165). 
Put more simply, “the idea of a ‘plan’ and the reality of ‘pluralism’” 
are “diametrically opposed” (Talen, 2006:234), and actual 
assemblages of publicness will always exceed the institutional plan.  
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  Cenzatti (2008) also uses Harvey’s term ‘space of representation’ to refer to 




Calls for a possible ‘post-modernist’ mode of planning – some of 
which are discussed at the end of Chapter Five – have not coalesced 
into a coherent alternative. If Lefebvre’s tripartite model presaged a 
wider body of more recent social theory which has moved away 
from positivist understandings of space, this has not been embraced 
or operationalised by urban planning professionals (Graham & 
Healey, 1999). If accordingly, eco-city plans fail to account for 
emergent publicness, and are predicated on a modernist approach to 
space as a depoliticised ‘container’ or ‘backdrop’ to the social and the 
political, as is implied by the replicable notion of the ‘urban scale’, 
then perhaps they are little more than metaphors for the real city. 
Rather than convincingly heralding a radically transformed urban 
future, the alluring ‘sustainable city’ may have rhetorical force which 
obscures the fact of its more limited objectives in each case, which 
relate to the application of a contingent set of political agendas 
within a particular socio-material context.  
 
A critique of the eco-city launched on the basis of this argument 
would first require the case to be made that its planned cityness does 
not in fact escape a modernist imaginary of urban space. Following 
on from this, it would seem constructive to identify the more limited 
specific agendas of individual initiatives – precisely because these 
may be partially obscured – and particularly if these appear to be 
more aligned with ‘business as usual’ than with significant 
transformation in the direction of sustainability. And yet the fact of 
these particular agendas being rhetorically ‘obscured’ should not 
simply be asserted: moving from speculative critique to a more 
specific diagnosis will involve a close exploration of whether and 
precisely how this obscuring is enabled in actual eco-city planning 
and policy documents. 
 
 Perhaps even more importantly, the significance of the findings 
from such an investigation will be far from straightforward. 
Equating a plan with its promised outcome only makes sense from 
within the linear logic of a plan itself; but rejecting this equivalence is 
not the same as denying the causal entanglement of plans with the 
external reality which they represent and seek to alter. The status of 
eco-city plans in the world, in other words, is contestable: it seems 
important to understand how they have come about in particular 




if at all, this might be problematic for urban sustainability. 
Meanwhile, if the goal is to resolve the urban sustainability ‘problem 
of planning’ (as outlined in Chapter One) through the creation of a 
new type of planning, which goes beyond static representation to 
encompass the city’s emergent as well as civic qualities, it is far from 
clear whether or how this will be achievable. Thinking all this 
through will entail questioning not only the publicness constructed 
within plans and policies, but also the relationship between this and 
the actual assemblages of publicness in the urban space which results. 
The empirical methods used to approach these questions are 









The previous chapter raised the possibility that contemporary plans 
and policies aimed at furthering the goal of sustainability in the 
urban age may be flawed since they do not – or perhaps cannot – 
properly account for the urban. The civic norms of traditional 
modernist planning, at least, would appear to be normatively 
incompatible with the emergent assemblages of publicness 
characteristic of real urban space. The argument might be made that 
if, indeed, plans cannot encompass emergent publicness, then 
perhaps they should not try to. This being the case, however, the 
stated ambition of urban transformation might be seen as in some 
ways misguided. The alluring promise of the ‘sustainable city’ may 
divert our attention away from the more concrete agendas 
underpinning particular initiatives; these agendas may sometimes be 
narrow in their scope, and only questionably aligned with the goal of 
furthering sustainability. In promoting development based on a 
limited conceptualisation of the public city, furthermore, they may 
work actively against cityness itself. 
  
None of these possibilities can simply be assumed to be the case; 
the status of eco-city plans and policies in the world merits closer 
investigation. The aim should be to understand better not only the 
nature of the publicness promoted within official eco-city plans and 
policies, and that of the publicness which assembles in the actual city 
space which results, but also the relationship between the two. It is 
hoped that studying this relationship will hold some clues for how 
the ‘problem of planning’ for urban sustainability might be more 
constructively addressed. This chapter outlines the ways in which 
the current research attempted to address these aims, through 
documentary analysis and in-situ fieldwork, guided by the following 
overall research question: 




4.1  Analysis of Eco-City Documentation 
As discussed in Chapter Two, one defining feature of the eco-city 
phenomenon is its globalised nature: its geographical spread; the 
increasing involvement of international practitioners and policy-
makers; and the claimed global relevance of individual initiatives for 
mankind’s future. While limiting the investigation to any particular 
country or region would therefore compromise its value, the variety 
of practical and policy approaches encompassed by the eco-city also 
prompts the inclusion of a wide range of initiatives. As will be 
further explained in section 4.2, the decision was made to choose two 
‘paradigmatic’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006) cases for in-depth analysis, which 
appeared to represent different ends of a spectrum from modernist 
‘technological showcase’ to governance-based ‘research in the wild’ 
approaches to eco-city planning, and which had been implemented 
in disparate geographical locations. The aim was not to provide a 
comprehensive picture of the eco-city’s current manifestations; given 
further time and budget, the findings might be further enriched 
through replication of the approach elsewhere. Rather, it was hoped 
that the analysis and comparison of two extreme cases might allow 
for better understanding of the limits of the conceptualisation of 
publicness in the contemporary eco-city, and its relationship with the 
assemblage of publicness in the actual city space to which plans 
relate. Nevertheless, to counter at least partially the concern that any 
conclusions thereby drawn would have limited resonance, 
preliminary desk-based analysis was also conducted of published 
documents relating to a wider cross-section of eco-city initiatives. 
This broader preliminary exercise aimed to test the grounded 
assumption that:  
in many cases, the ‘public’ is poorly conceptualised in official 
documents related to the planning and description of eco-city 
initiatives. 
 
This sample of documents was not analysed in lieu of a study of 
real eco-city spaces; as discussed in the previous chapter, no 
equivalence should be drawn between what is envisaged in and 
results from a plan. Nor, as will be discussed further below, was it 
assumed that official published documents constitute reliable 
representations of the full breadth of opinion held by those involved 




are forged. Nevertheless, such documentation was still deemed a 
worthwhile object of study, precisely because it is institutionally 
ratified, and therefore potentially backed by significant financial 
and/or political resources. It would seem uncontroversial to contend 
that the discursive framings and concrete prescriptions of such 
documents play significant roles in shaping practical eco-city 
development internationally.  
 
The selection method for the sample of documents, and the 
analytical approach taken, are outlined below, followed by a 
summary of methods adopted for the two in-depth case studies. 
 
Sample selection 
Twelve examples of eco-city initiatives from around the world were 
selected for preliminary documentary analysis. No claims are made 
about the final sample’s statistical representativeness of the 
phenomenon as a whole; such a claim would be spurious since, 
given the lack of an agreed definition, the sampling criteria applied 
would be arbitrary. The guiding principle behind the selection 
method was, rather, to facilitate the inclusion of a wide variety of 
practices, policies, and contexts.  
 
It was decided that a total of 12 cases would allow for extensive 
geographical coverage, and for the inclusion of more than one 
example of each eco-city ‘type’ identified in the Survey (Joss et al., 
2011) referred to in Chapter Two. As the most complete general 
reference document of current significant eco-city initiatives around 
the world, the Survey was used as the basis for sampling. 
Additionally, to ensure fuller coverage of the broader body of eco-
city thinking, it was decided that the sample should encompass a 
small number of international frameworks, which are excluded from 
the Survey due to their scale.26 
 
While the sample was not, then, intended to be quantitatively 
representative of the phenomenon as a whole, there was some risk of 
the transferability of the findings being undermined if the sample 
was recognisably skewed in any particular direction. To mitigate 
against this risk, quotas based on geography and – following the 
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Survey typology – ‘development type’ were set, to reflect the 
distribution of the 178 Survey cases. These were first divided up 
geographically, giving the following totals: 73 in Europe; 70 in 
Asia/Australasia; 35 elsewhere. Similarly, they were categorised by 
development type (24 ‘new builds’; 76 ‘urban expansions/in-fills’; 78 
‘retro-fits’). Based loosely on these totals, quotas were set as shown 
in Table 4.1. 
 
1. to reflect actual 
geographical spread 
2. to reflect type 
• 4 in Europe  
• 4 in Asia/Australasia 
• 2 elsewhere 
• (and 2 ‘international’ 
schemes) 
• 1-3 ‘new builds’ 
• 3-5 ‘urban expansions’ 
• 3-5 ‘retro-fits’ 
• (and 2 ‘international’ 
schemes) 
Table 4.1: quotas for documentation analysis sample 
 
Within each geographical area, individual initiatives were chosen 
at random, and accepted or rejected based on whether the quota for 
its ‘type’ was already filled, and following preliminary assessment of 
their publicly available documentation, which aimed to ensure that 
this was sufficiently substantial to allow close relevant textual 
analysis. While this required subjective judgment, a minimum 
criterion was that one document should be available outlining plans 
for, or describing retrospectively, the development of the initiative 
across various sectors. Additionally, cases were excluded whose 
content been produced by third parties (for example, journalists or 
academics), since the aim was to analyse the conceptualisation of 
urban sustainability promoted by key actors within the process, 
rather than to understand reactions to the documents or their 
implementation. 
 
Finally, documentation was excluded where the foreign language 
posed too great a barrier for a sensitive analysis to be conducted. In 
all but one case, English language texts were selected. While this 
potentially limits the wider relevance of the findings by omitting 
substantial schemes which have only been locally reported, the 




significant distinctive trends in urban sustainability being ignored in 
English-language documentation. Extra research would be required 
to justify this assumption; radically different approaches may well 
find a more natural home in relatively unpublicised local or 
‘countercultural’ initiatives. Neverthless, as explained in Chapter 
One, the current research deliberately focuses on mainstream 
initiatives, since that mainstreaming might be expected to reflect and 
facilitate a greater degree of practical influence on urban 
development.  
 
This process was repeated until the quotas were filled, yielding 
the final sample of initiatives for documentary analysis shown in 
Table 4.2. The twelve cases selected display considerable 
geographical and practical variety, thus realising the overall goal of 
the sampling approach. 
 New build Urban expansion/ 
in-fill 
Retro-fit Total 
Europe   Almere 
(Netherlands) 








Asia/Australasia  Sejong  
 (South Korea) 
 Auroville 
(India) 





Elsewhere  Greensburg 
Green Town 
(USA) 




Total: 3 3 4 10 
International  OECD Green Cities  
 Eco2 Cities (World Bank) 
2 
Grand total: 12 
Table 4.2: case studies selected for documentary analysis 
 
Documents consulted 
The precise documentation consulted in each case appears in Table 
4.3. The nature and status of these documents necessarily varied, 
given their divergent functions and scalar coverage. More positively, 




would actively contribute to the overall goal of capturing the variety 
of eco-city conceptualisation.  
Name of 
Initiative 
(as referred to 
in thesis text) 
Type of Document Title of Document Reference 
Almere Draft ‘Vision’ statement to guide the 
expansion of the city, published by 
city authorities (46 pages) 
Summary, Draft Structural 
Vision Almere 2.0 
(Almere, 2009) 
Auroville Masterplan looking forwards to 2025, 
to guide the expansion of the city, 
approved by central government (39 
online pages) 
The Auroville Universal 





Eco2 Cities Book published by the World Bank 
describing the principles and practical 
implementation of the framework, 
with a focus on the developing world 
(382 pages) 
Eco2 Cities: Ecological Cities 
as Economic Cities 
(Suzuki et al., 
2010) 
Valdespartera Book describing the history of the 
Valdespartera urban expansion, with 
different sections written by key 
actors in the developmental process 
(415 pages) 
Urbanismo y desarollo 




Freiburg Charter outlining guiding principles of 
sustainable urbanism based on 
Freiburg’s experience, produced in 
collaboration with Freiburg 
authorities (35 pages) 





Greensburg  Masterplan to guide reconstruction of 
city over 20 year period, approved by 




Huaibei Masterplan to retrofit city, developed 
by architects in conjunction with local 
authorities (90 pages) 
Huaibei Eco-City Masterplan 
& Huaibei Mining Subsided 




OECD  Working Paper published by OECD, 
building the case for a programme of 
initiatives, outlining key challenges, 
policy tools and research questions 
(141 pages) 
Cities and Green Growth: A 
Conceptual Framework 
(Hammer et al., 
2011) 
Portland  Framework outlining principles and 
objectives of initiative to guide 
development of growing network of 
local projects in Portland Metro area 
(17 pages) 
The Portland Metro 
EcoDistricts Initiative: 
Integrating Environmental 
Performance and District 
Scale Development 
(PoSI, 2009) 
Sejong Brochure published by Agency 
responsible for construction of new 
city, summarising progress to date 
and looking forwards to 2030 (37 
pages). 
Happy City Sejong (MACCA, 2007) 
Sydney ‘Vision’ of Sydney in 2030, published 
by city authorities (215 pages) 
Sustainable Sydney 2030: 
The Vision 




Masterplan for urban expansion 
published by multi-stakeholder 
Delivery Board (158 pages) 
Whitehill & Bordon Eco-town 
Masterplan (Revised May 
2010) 
(W&B, 2012) 




Thus, the sample includes seven planning documents 
(masterplans and ‘visions’) relating to specific initiatives, four 
framework documents, and one retrospective description, published 
by a variety of types of actors involved in planning and 
implementing urban sustainability. Their geographical scope ranged 
from local to global. The specific developments covered include a 
mixture of new-build projects, retro-fits, and urban expansions, and 
encompass a wide range of international locations. They include not 
only metropolitan initiatives such as Sydney, but also suburban 
developments such as Valdespartera, and the “rural town” of 
Greensburg (BNIM, 2008). A brief description of each initiative 
appears in Appendix A. 
 
Rationale for including a variety of text types 
The implications of including a disparate collection of text types 
require further discussion. These documents were created by various 
types of actors, for different purposes. The identification of any 
commonalities, through the process of analysis, does not in itself 
justify their being grouped together as a coherent target for analysis. 
However, Fairclough’s (1989) framework for analysing discourse 
provides one rationale for doing so. He uses Foucault’s (1971) notion 
of ‘orders of discourse’ to distinguish between those evident ‘in’ a 
text and those ‘behind’ it. He understands texts – spoken and written 
language, and associated visual imagery – as a “form of action” 
(Fairclough, 1989:9), such that discourse is one form of ‘social 
practice’, shaped in turn by broader ‘social structures’: “[t]he whole 
is society, and language is one strand of the social” (ibid:23).  
 
Any actual practice can, on this view, be typologised and 
understood as partially determined by, but also constituting, higher 
‘social orders’ – and finally an overall societal order. Thus, 
Fairclough uses the term ‘social order’ to “refer to…a structuring of a 
particular social ‘space’ into various domains associated with various 
types of practice” (ibid:29). Accordingly, the notion of an ‘order of 
discourse’ relates to the structuring of social space into different 
‘types’ of discourse (ibid). Any ‘actual discourse’ – an actual text – 
can therefore potentially be understood as exemplifying a ‘type’. The 
differing natures of these ‘types’ are structured by the higher orders 
of discourse. In relation to the eco-city, Fairclough’s framework 




Social Practice Discourse Eco-city Documentation 
Social order Order of discourse ‘Eco-city order of discourse’ 
Types of practice Types of discourse Specific genres of related documents 
(eg masterplans, global frameworks, 
local policies) 
Actual practices Actual discourses (texts) Individual documents 
Table 4.4: discursive framework of eco-city documentation (adapted from 
Fairclough, 1989). 
 
Fairclough does not define, or problematise the coherence of, the 
notion of ‘a society’. Nor does he discuss the possibility that ‘orders’ 
of practice and discourse within one ‘society’ might be influenced by 
those of another, or whether a higher level social order need coincide 
with a national order. The social practice of eco-city development, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, is characterised increasingly by cross-
country cooperative learning, and may be shaped by horizontal 
networks of local actors in spite of, or in the absence of, national 
direction. There is a case, then, to interpret Fairclough’s model as 
potentially facilitating the notion of an international social order of 
practice and discourse. Within this, more specific social orders might 
be posited – including those appearing at the ‘national’ and ‘regional’ 
level (differentiated by, for example, legal and political frameworks) 
– though no attempt is made here to define these or identify their 
structuring effects on ‘lower’ orders in relation to the cases studied. 
Rather, it is accepted that a wide variety of ‘social orders of eco-city 
discourse’ might potentially be constructed, with different 
geographies, but the fact of their mutual influence allows us at least 
to hypothesise a collective ‘international social order of eco-city 
discourse’ shaping the conceptualisation of urban sustainability 
across a wide variety of text types and geographical locations. The 
hypothetical construction of this international order of discourse is 
justified to the extent that the international phenomenon of eco-city 
social practice displays coherence, as outlined in Chapter Two. 
 
Fairclough’s (1989) framework also predicts horizontal variety, as 
much as it assumes consistency, across texts within a given social 
order; higher orders of discourse constrain lower orders but do not 
fully determine them. A ‘discourse type’ (for example a ‘masterplan’) 
may reproduce itself through a set of fixed rules governing its 
practice. However, these constraints are generative, since “[t]he 




to act within” (ibid:28). Thus, constraints are not so much 
proscriptions as “precondition[s] for being enabled” (ibid:39); the 
creativity of action is defined with reference to its constraints. 
Fairclough prefers to see discourse types as a “resource for subjects”, 
such that “the activity of combining them in ways that meet the ever-
changing demands and contradictions of real social situations is a 
creative one” (ibid). The postulation of a common higher order of 
discourse is therefore justified, even if it is inconsistently realised in 
actual texts since these constitute acts of creativity within contingent 
social contexts. 
 
An order of discourse is characterisable in terms of an ‘underlying 
storyline’ manifested across individual texts (Hajer, 1995; Dryzek, 
2005). Fischer (2009:192) comments on the value of examining 
storylines in official documentation: 
“When we examine communications in the everyday 
realm of politics and policymaking, we find people largely 
explaining things by telling stories. This is not to say that 
policies are simply storylines; they are presented more 
formally as rules and regulations. But the rules and 
regulations rest on narrative explanations. They reflect 
particular narrative stories about how the society works, 
and what sort of measures are needed to make it work 
that way.” 
 
Even if planners are not consciously engaging in storytelling, their 
documentation may nevertheless “act as part of some larger story” 
(Throgmorton, 2003:129). The inference of discursive commonalities 
across planning documents, however, need not mean that the 
aggregated storyline is a fixed one. Rather, the process of ongoing 
multiple story-telling is itself “a process of innovation” (van Hulst, 
2012:136), whereby “new stories are built on top of older ones and 
new understandings emerge along the way” (ibid: 299). In this sense, 
the eco-city storyline forms part of its broader ‘experimental’ 
character.   
 
The potential ideological force of such storylines is discussed 
below. However, the presence of a discursive storyline, either within 
given text, or in broader discourse ‘types’ or ‘orders’ (Fairclough, 
1989), does not imply that audiences will necessarily accept their 




with an idealised ‘implied’ one (Iser, 1974). What Stuart Hall calls the 
‘encoding’ of reality into a particular discursive representation does 
not determine the way it is ‘decoded’ by an audience (Hall, 1992a); 
‘meaning’ also lies in “what the various readers bring to the texts” 
(Throgmorton, 2003:129). Storytelling is “typically facilitated by the 
fact that people share a wide range of commonly accepted 
assumptions that seldom have to be called into question” (Fischer, 
2009:201), but credibility may be undermined by contradictions with 
accepted norms or empirical facts, and by internal incoherence 
(ibid:198). The imagined reception of an official document by its 
audiences – within and outside the organisation – may affect the 
choices shaping the contents (Freeman & Maybin, 2011:163–164). 
Building consensus for action therefore hinges on the intended 
persuasiveness of the storytelling (Throgmorton, 2003:130; van Hulst, 
2012:310), and it should not be assumed that authors are blind to 
documents’ discursive nature (Dryzek, 2005). Particular storylines 
may, indeed, be consciously chosen to further particular agendas. 
 
The identification of a discourse, then, does not necessarily 
demonstrate its deterministic ideological power to affect behaviour 
and thought. Nonetheless, it remains possible to characterise certain 
discourses as more ideologically powerful than others if we accept an 
understanding of the ‘power’ of ideology as “determined by the 
number and nature of its subscription base as much as by some 
notion of ‘explanatory force’” (Locke, 1984:33). Evidence, then, of a 
discourse’s wide reproduction in society – and, particularly, when 
the agents of its reproduction have significant influence and 
resources – may indicate the ideological power of its underlying 
agendas to shape thoughts and social actions. To the extent that the 
eco-city phenomenon represents a coherent body of internationally 
mainstreamed social practice, the identification of an underlying 
storyline would therefore suggest that as a body of discourse it has 
had considerable ideological effects. 
 
Discursive storylines: actants and causality  
Dryzek (2005:17) suggests that reconstructing a storyline should 
involve identifying the text’s ‘ontology’, defined as the basic actors or 
agents recognised or constructed, and, by extension, which are 
absent. Such actors may be individuals or collectivities. Dryzek’s 




non-human entities (including, for example, natural forces, flows of 
commerce and information, physical man-made structures, or 
geological formations) playing active roles in the plot. To indicate the 
possibility that agency within a storyline may extend beyond the 
human, the term ‘actant’ is borrowed here from Latour (2004), to 
indicate that “an actant can be human or not, or…a combination of 
both” (Bennett, 2010:9).  
 
Crucially, however, the nature of the agency ascribed to a 
‘narrated’ actant might be expected to differ from that of an actant 
identified within a Latourian actor-network analysis. Bennett 
describes Latour’s actant as: 
 “neither an object nor a subject but an ‘intervener’, akin to 
the Deleuzean ‘quasi-causal operator’. An operator is that 
which, by virtue of its particular location in an assemblage 
and the fortuity of being in the right place at the right time, 
makes the difference, makes things happen, becomes the 
decisive force catalyzing an event”  
(Bennett, 2010:9). 
 
A narrated ‘world’, however, is necessarily more delineated than 
the ‘real’ world, with only some of its internal connectivity 
foregrounded for the purpose of plot; rather than revealing an open-
ended network of quasi-operants, it defines its own frame of 
causality. Fischer comments that: 
 
“Connecting actions and events into understandable 
patterns, the narrative is a cognitive scheme…Like the 
scientific mode of knowing, the narrative has its own 
distinctive ways of ordering experience and constructing 
reality. Instead of focusing on empirically based causal 
connections between events, the narrative form orders 
experience in terms of social purposes, human values, and 
the intentions and motivations of the participants”  
(Fischer, 2009:194) 
 
Relatedly, Abbott argues that humans “are made in such a way that 
we continually look for the causes of things. The inevitable linearity 
of story makes narrative a powerful means of gratifying this need” 
(Abbott, 2008:41). The storyline in an explicitly fictional text might be 
likened to a controlled scientific experiment, constructing a 




tested. Just as “[n]ovels, plays, and films from classical tragedy to 
comics provide a vast playground to rehearse accounts of what 
makes us act” (Latour, 2005:55), it has been argued that “scientists, 
conducting their experiments, are trying to write narratives that are 
so uncluttered by competing elements that cause and effect are 
genuinely demonstrable in the stories they tell” (Abbott, 2008:43–44). 
However, whether or not a “’real’ causal sequence” coincides with a 
narrated one, the two should not be conflated: the order of the latter 
is “the product of discursive forces, but we treat it as a given, as the 
true order” (Culler, 1981:183). Thus, the “impression of causation” 
(Abbott, 2008:40) is rhetorical in its effect; it is one aspect of the 
‘narrative coherence’ which normalises certain representations of the 
empirical world; in gratifying “our need for order” (ibid:42), it has 
ideological power. A storyline, then, understood as lending 
coherence to a text, is itself rhetorical; the representation of reality 
which it supports is inherently normative rather than mimetic.  
 
As well as identifying the key ‘actants’ populating storylines, it is 
important to consider the causal agency assigned to those actants; a 
narrated actant may be positioned as having agency within itself. 
While it may map onto, and be offered as objectively representing, an 
actant in the external world, the factors causing its real-world 
counterpart to ‘catalyse’ events – placing it in the “right place at the 
right time” (Bennett, 2010:9) – may be left undiscussed, 
unquestioningly absent, or even deliberately excluded from, the 
ontology. Such positioning may serve to ‘fetishise’ the actant – in 
Swyngedouw’s (2010:220) sense of the “reification of complex 
processes to a thing-like object-cause”. The need – or conscious 
attempt – to divert the reader’s attention from complex contextual 
factors, for the purposes of narrating a coherent story, may 
simultaneously obfuscate these factors.  
 
The differing ‘motives’ explicitly assigned to narrated actants 
within a plot (Dryzek, 2005) serve to reinforce this predefined chain 
of causality. These motivations enjoin the reader to adopt what 
Davies and Harré (1990) call a ‘subject position’ with reference to 
these actants. Thus, for example, “[i]n one discourse we may find 
benign and public-spirited expert administrators. Another discourse 
might portray the same people as selfish bureaucrats” (Dryzek, 




storyline should therefore include the identification of explicit or 
implicit evaluations made of these actants. 
 
The ideological effect of metaphor in discursive storylines 
The necessary simplification of reality for the purpose of discursive 
storytelling is achieved partly, then, through selectivity in the choice 
of actants, authorial evaluation of their actions, and the predefinition 
of their causal interrelations. Yet the fact of this selectivity is 
concealed through various rhetorical tactics – and particularly 
through metaphorical imagery (Dryzek, 2005). Metaphor is widely 
theorised as a key element of rhetoric (Culler, 1981), and no longer 
simplistically understood as “the substitution of a literal term for a 
concept with a non-literal one” (Semino, 2008:9). Older ‘substitution’ 
theory emphasised the creative uses of metaphor in particular 
oratorial and literary contexts (Croft & Cruse, 2004; Chilton, 2004). 
More recently, however, linguists have argued that metaphor has 
much wider significance in everyday cognitive processes allowing 
humans to “consolidate and extend their ideas about themselves, 
their relationships and their knowledge of the world” (Cameron & 
Low, 1999:xii), such that our “ordinary conceptual system, in terms 
of which we think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980:3). 
  
When a substituted, literal term relates to an “abstract, complex, 
subjective and/or poorly delineated [area] of experience”, its 
metaphorical replacement will typically relate to “concrete, simpler, 
physical and/or better delineated areas of experience” (Semino, 
2008:30). Metaphorical processes thereby have the effect of “making 
confusing issues more intelligible” (Charteris-Black, 2006:565). 
Consequently, metaphors have rhetorical force, in their ability to 
“persuade, reason, evaluate, explain, theorize, offer new 
conceptualizations of reality and so on” (Semino, 2008:31). Their 
widespread use in plans, policies, and diagnoses of social problems 
(and in the political domain more widely) serves to delineate 
domains of reality which would otherwise remain highly complex or 
abstract (Semino, 2008:91). Thus, they rhetorically reinforce various 
‘calls for action’; they are “deployed to convince listeners or readers 
by putting a situation in a particular light” (Dryzek, 2005:18). 
In doing so, however, they also necessarily obscure other aspects 




(1997:113) describes metaphor as having a “hiding-as-it-reveals 
quality”, quoting Paivio’s likening of it to "a solar eclipse. It hides the 
object of study and at the same time reveals some of its most salient 
and interesting characteristics when viewed through the right 
telescope" (Paivio et al., 1993:150). If, furthermore, “particular uses of 
metaphor become the dominant way of talking about a particular 
aspect of reality within a particular discourse” (Semino, 2008:33), 
these metaphors may come to “represent the ‘commonsense’ or 
‘natural’ view of things” (ibid.) within a particular social group. The 
naturalisation of a wide variety of ‘conventional metaphors’ in 
everyday language renders users unaware of their ‘metaphoricity’ 
(Semino, 2008). 
 
This naturalisation may be further enabled by the ability of certain 
metaphors to “resonate with latent symbolic representations residing 
at the unconscious level” (Mio, 1997:130), and thus bypass logical 
thinking (Charteris-Black, 2006:565). Dryzek gives the example of the 
metaphor of the ‘tragedy of the commons’, which in evoking the 
“grazing commons of a medieval village” (2005:18) may appeal to 
“deeper pasts, such as pastoral…idylls, as a way to criticize the 
industrial present” (ibid:19). Metaphors, then, have ideological force, 
insofar as they naturalise particular presuppositions which “frame 
the dominant terrain for social action”, serving as “reference points 
for what is politically and socially ‘possible’” (Bartling, 2008:99).  
 
The ideological effects of metaphor become more apparent when 
it is recognised that metaphors do not typically exist in isolation but 
form discernible patterns (Semino, 2008). Lakoff & Johnson (1980) 
suggest that groups of related ‘systematically’ used conventional 
metaphors point to underlying ‘conceptual metaphors’, with a 
‘source domain’ and a ‘target domain’. In the case of the conceptual 
metaphor ‘time is money’, for example, ‘time’ is the target domain, 
onto which the source domain ‘money’ is ‘mapped’ (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980:9). This conceptual metaphor is realised in a wide 
variety of expressions such as ‘spend time’, or ‘invest time’ – yet the 
conceptual metaphor ‘time is money’ does not exist in all cultures. 
Thus, “the most fundamental values in a culture will be coherent 
with the metaphorical structure of the most fundamental concepts in 
the culture” (ibid:22). The systematic presence of conceptual 




conceptualising reality in a given cultural, or subcultural, group. The 
users of these metaphors, furthermore, may not be conscious of their 
metaphoricity; their conventionality indicates their naturalisation.27 
 
This systematic patterning of metaphor may lend coherence to an 
individual text (where related expressions deriving from the same 
‘source’ domain are used in relation to a particular ‘target’ domain), 
or may be observable at an intertextual level (Semino, 2008). The 
recognisably similar metaphorical mobilisation of source domains 
across different texts, it is argued, points to a commonality of 
perspective – and when a given metaphorical system becomes 
dominant in a given field, the particularity of its conceptual 
perspective will tend to be obscured through naturalisation. 
Metaphor, then, “can provide a conceptual structure for a 
systematized ideology” (Chilton & Schäffner, 2002:29).  
 
Accordingly, it might be expected that particular ‘orders’ 
(Fairclough, 1989) of discourse will be characterised by the consistent 
use of distinctive types and combinations of metaphorical imagery 
(Dryzek, 2005) across texts with a related ‘target domain’. Cameron 
(1999) develops this idea by identifying three levels of metaphoric 
‘systematicity’. He distinguishes the recurrence of particular source 
domains in an individual text (which he calls ‘local systematicity’) 
from ‘discourse systematicity’, where the intertextual use of 
particular metaphors characterises the language used by “specific 
                                                          
27
   While it may be easy to recognise the metaphoricity of a “freshly coined 
metaphor” (Croft & Cruse, 2004:205), over time a “process of semantic drift” 
may occur, such that the expression may eventually become “no different from 
a literal expression” (ibid). It may be the case, furthermore, that the usage of the 
word to refer to the source domain becomes obsolete. Semino (2008) gives the 
example of ‘progress’, where the source domain (the concept of physically 
moving forwards) is mapped onto various target domains of experience to 
indicate ‘positive change’. However, the use of the word ‘progress’ to indicate 
literal forward movement has become relatively rare, usually associated only 
with more elevated textual styles; over time, the notion of ‘positive change’ has 
become the main (and therefore literal) meaning of ‘progress’. It might be 
observed that the noun ‘sustainability’ represents a more extreme case, when 
used in expressions such as ‘urban sustainability’. Here the word ‘sustainability’ 
is derived from the verb ‘sustain’, which conveys the meaning “cause to 
continue in a certain state; maintain at the proper level or standard” (New 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1993:3163). Since the more literal, physical 
sense of “hold upright or in position” became obsolete in the mid-eighteenth 
century (ibid.), the extent to which this contemporary use of ‘sustainability’ 





discourse communities” (ibid:16) – in other words, associated with a 
particular type of social practice. The particular metaphors 
characterising a given discourse system need not be exclusive to that 
discourse community; they may appear in a wider range of genres 
and discourses, and indeed form part of the conventional use of a 
language (which constitutes Cameron’s third level, of ‘global 
systematicity’). Yet the choice and combination of particular types of 
metaphors from within this wider ‘global’ system distinguishes one 
discourse community from another.  
 
If, then, it is possible to conceptualise the ‘eco-city’ as a coherent 
phenomenon and, accordingly, to postulate an ‘international ‘order’ 
of eco-city discourse, then a degree of ‘discourse systematicity’ 
should be evident in the uses of metaphor across individual 
documents through which initiatives are conceptualised and planned. 
The ‘generative’ effects (Schön, 1993) of this system, it might be 
concluded, would be to frame the problematic of urban sustainability 
in a particular way. The analysis of the documentation conducted 
here therefore sought to identify intra-textual and inter-textual 
patterning, using these data to construct the overall storyline which 
characterises this order of discourse. The dominance of particular 
metaphorical ‘source domains’ in the storyline’s various realisations 
might thus be interpreted as indicative of its ideological force, 
enabling the presentation of particular solutions as inevitable and 
uncontroversial, while obscuring the partiality of their exposition. 
 
Spatial metaphors 
Special attention was paid to the spatial metaphors mobilised within 
eco-city documentation, since they stood out as particularly common. 
This eventuality is predicted by Stavrakakis’ contention that “space 
has been and still is the fundamental metaphor in socio-political 
thought and practice” (Stavrakakis, 2007:148). Chilton similarly 
suggests that close attention should be paid to the metaphorical 
presentation of space within political discourse: “Spatial 
representations, including metaphorical ones, take on an important 
aspect in political discourse. If politics is about cooperation and 
conflict over allocation of resources, such resources are frequently of 
a spatial, that is, geographical or territorial, kind” (Chilton, 2004:57). 
It is unsurprising, then, if texts such as policy and planning 




aiming to describe or promote particular forms of urban 
development, which rely significantly on textual or diagrammatic 
representations of spatial order. We should be alerted to the 
possibility that these constructions of space have rhetorical force 
exceeding their explanatory value. 
 
Summary of analytical approach 
The analysis proceeded in two stages. First, a descriptive analysis of 
each document was undertaken, to identify the key actants, the 
chains of causality between them, the motives ascribed to them, and 
the key metaphorical imagery employed. This information was used 
to reconstruct an underlying ‘storyline’ in each case. Within this, and 
reflecting the grounded assumption (that the public is 
unsatisfactorily conceptualised in such documents), special attention 
was paid to: the role – or absence – of the ‘public’ within the storyline; 
the ways in which this public was conceptualised; and the envisaged 
‘publicness’ of the city’s open spaces. Second, a transversal 
comparison was made, to identify commonalities across these 
preliminary findings. While significant inter-textual differences in 
this respect are highlighted in the next chapter, the main aim was to 
identify, if possible, commonalities in the conceptualisation of the 
public. 
 
Presentation of the findings 
The prevalence of spatial metaphors was such that they were used to 
develop an overall conceptual framework, described in Chapter Five, 
which served as an organisational structure for the presentation of 
the detailed findings. The approach was therefore partially 
‘grounded’, since the spatial framework emerged only after the 
preliminary analysis of the documentation. The preliminary 
descriptive analysis, however, was directed by Dryzek’s (2005) 
categories of textual markers whose identification allows for a 
discursive storyline to be reconstructed, as discussed above. 
 
The key discussion points are evidenced with reference to the 
documents. For the sake of brevity, each document is referenced 
using the label in column one of Table 4.3, with page numbers 
referring to the documents listed in column three. Where the analysis 





The selection of verbatim comments is not intended as an 
exhaustive list of occasions on which a particular textual 
phenomenon occurs; systematic quantitative content analysis to 
identify, for example, the frequency with which different expressions 
appear, was not conducted since the aims of the analysis were 
qualitative in nature. It is acknowledged that this approach 
potentially lays the research open to the accusation of ‘self-
determination’; that selective evidence was used to bolster a pre-
existing argument, while counter-evidence was overlooked. To 
counter this risk, efforts were made to highlight not only intertextual 
commonalities, but also significant exceptions to these. Additionally, 
the imposition of specific selection criteria (as discussed above), it 
was hoped, would mitigate the risk of sample selection bias towards 
cases appearing to lend weight to a desired conclusion. The 
identification of commonalities does not imply a quantitative claim 
about the entirety of the eco-city phenomenon, then, but is intended 
as a strong indication of the possibility that certain consistent 
tendencies are apparent across its different manifestations. 
 
In many of the documents consulted, the main text is 
accompanied by quotations from different actors involved with the 
plans, or from a wider body of writers and thinkers. Various 
conventions are used to distinguish these quotations from the main 
text: they may appear in separate text boxes, often accompanying 
speakers’ photographs; within quotation marks; or as stand-alone 
sections. These interventions serve the purpose of legitimation: some 
plans are preceded by endorsements from higher authorities (such as 
the mayor), or from ‘experts’ of different kinds. Equally, they may 
facilitate the appearance of alignment with the desires of local 
residents or other interest groups. Additionally, they may evoke a 
process of polyphonic, inclusive democratic debate. It was assumed, 
however, that such comments would have been carefully selected 
and edited for inclusion, so as to reinforce the ‘call to action’. Indeed, 
it was empirically observed during the process of analysis that the 
comments thus presented did not significantly disrupt the normative 
thrust of any of the documents. The fact of mediation through the 
editorial process, in short, justifies the treatment of such quotations 
as integral to the rhetorical construction of the storyline, rather than 




matter. For analytical purposes, they were not distinguished from the 
main body of text, and their provenance (beyond the page number 
on which they appear) is therefore not discussed in the findings.   
 
Finally, some reference is made to the visual imagery 
(photographs, diagrams, architects’ impressions) in the documents. 
However, no systematic analysis was made of this imagery per se, 
again on the basis of the grounded assumption that its inclusion was 
intended to support, rather than to call into question, the ontology 
and storyline of the discourse. While further research might usefully 
focus specifically on differences between visual and textual imagery 
in terms of their rhetorical function in eco-city documentation, this 
was not an aim of the present research.  
 
 
4.2  In-Depth Case Studies  
 
As discussed above, while plans, visions and policies may provide 
clues to the nature of a postulated international ‘order’ of eco-city 
discourse, and be of importance in directing what is enacted, it is 
problematic to reduce any given eco-city initiative to its official 
documentation. Rather than reifying documents, we might more 
profitably understand them as assembled in particular ways which 
“embody the political processes by which they are produced” 
(Freeman & Maybin, 2011:164–165), and therefore as having exterior 
relationality, and potentially “excluding the unwanted and complex 
demands of an unruly public” (Abram, 2002, quoted in Freeman & 
Maybin, 2011:165). Their smooth surfaces, and appearance as “inert 
extra-temporal blobs of meaning” (Smith, 1993:3), then, may belie a 
complex process of emergent publicness in their development, even 
while they provide a “point of entry and orientation for investigation” 
(Freeman & Maybin, 2011:165) of this emergence. 
 
Importantly, documents may also have an ongoing “dynamic 
property” which “cannot be grasped by a focus on attributes, or 
content alone” (Prior, 2008:832). Insofar as they constitute a “means 
to make and maintain social groups, not just the means to deliver 
information” (Brown & Duguid, 1996), they carry an intention to 
construct publicness, yet they may simultaneously be subjected to 




further documents (Freeman & Maybin, 2011:161). A policy 
document does not, then, merely subsume public agency through an 
act of neutral representation which is fully predictive of practice; 
rather, its ‘public life’ extends beyond content into ongoing context – 
a point which may be missed in a discourse analysis which itself 
might be understood as a sort of (text-bound) story-telling which 
“strip[s] the document of the practices surrounding it” (Freeman & 
Maybin, 2011:159).  
 
So as to look beyond the documentation, two of the twelve cases 
examined in Chapter Five were selected for more in-depth analysis: 
the EcoDistricts initiative in Portland, Oregon (USA), and Sejong 
City (South Korea). Portland is an existing city; Sejong is partly 
inhabited, although its development is ongoing. In both cases, urban 
sustainability goals are orchestrated by institutional policies, 
reflecting the main thesis concerns. Based on the desk research for 
Chapter Five, each potentially represented a ‘paradigmatic’ case 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006) at either end of the spectrum of planned eco-city 
development proposed in Chapter Two. Sejong appeared to fit into 
the ‘technological showcase’ category, as a ‘top-down’, technocratic 
exercise, enabled and heavily protected by state policies and 
funding, and aiming to broadcast messages to various audiences 
internally and internationally. Portland, however, was closer to the 
‘research in the wild’ end of the spectrum, while still being shaped 
by institutional policy: the EcoDistricts initiative in particular had 
the appearance of a guided ‘bottom-up’ approach to urban 
sustainability, potentially paradigmatic of a decentred, unbounded, 
pragmatic approach to governance.  
 
While Portland arguably represents the typical European and 
North American model of intervention within, or extension of, 
existing cities, Sejong exemplifies the contemporary wave of ‘new 
build’ large-scale developments in Asia. Examined through 
Dryzek’s (2005) framework of environmental discourses, Portland’s 
strategic plan displays, on preliminary inspection, a ‘three-pillared’ 
approach to sustainability, organised around the concept of ‘equity’ 
(see Chapter Six), while Sejong is explicitly tied into national ‘green 
growth’ policies. Additionally, both cases operate within a very 
different cultural context. The selection of these cases was based, 




‘experimental’ comparative case study (Lijphart, 1971; Burnham et 
al., 2004:59–62) in which secondary variables are controlled or held 
constant. By deliberately choosing two such disparate cases, it was 
hoped that something approaching the full extent of mainstream 
urban sustainability could be captured: if the findings regarding 
‘publicness’ were similar in both cases, there would be some reason 
to suppose they might also hold true elsewhere. Given the degree to 
which the contemporary eco-city is increasingly marked by 
international knowledge sharing (see Chapter Two), there were 
good grounds to expect some commonalities to emerge. 
 
As Flyvbjerg (2006) observes, the successful choice of 
paradigmatic cases can never be guaranteed in advance of the study 
itself. There was no assumption, therefore, that each case would, on 
closer examination, reveal itself to be truly paradigmatic; rather 
than force a categorisation on each case through which to interpret 
the findings, a more grounded approach was adopted, whereby 
each city was expected to be uniquely shaped by its particular 
context. Thus, the significance of their contextual circumstances is 
explored in some detail. Overall, the intention was to use each as a 
‘spatial frame’ through which, individually and cross-comparatively, 
some of the nuances of publicness might be further explored with 
reference to, rather than in denial of, contingent context (since the 
assemblage of publicness is understood as including context of 
various kinds), and the broader implications of this for urban 
sustainability planning might be drawn out. 
 
One further crucial reason for choosing these two cases was that 
each appeared to represent what Flyvbjerg (2006) calls a ‘critical 
case’. EcoDistricts, as will be discussed in Chapter Six, represents an 
extreme case of active institutional willingness to facilitate emergent 
publicness; it might be interpreted as an experiment which attempts 
to go beyond liberal-modernist planning. It is critical in that its 
demonstrable failure to do so would leave the dilemma of planning 
‘cityness’ intact. We might therefore reasonably ask what is in fact 
being planned, if this is not the city itself. Sejong, on the other hand, 
represents an extreme case of meticulous top-down planning in the 
modernist tradition. It is therefore a critical test of whether 
emergent publicness will occur irrespectively. If it does not, then the 




by plans remains unchallenged. But if the publicness of Sejong does 
in fact display a strong emergent modality, despite – or as a reaction 
to – top down planning, then we might conclude that the partial 
conceptualisation of cityness in eco-city plans is not necessarily 
problematic: that there is no reason why a technological showcase 
might not also become a fully public space. 
 
The key research questions guiding this phase of the research are 
stated below. These questions are discussed in more detail in the 
conclusions section of Chapter Five, in the light of the preliminary 
documentary analysis. 
 
1. how does the assemblage of publicness in the eco-city differ from its 
conceptualisation in official documentation? 
2. Is the eco-city currently serving to reproduce the ‘neoliberal’ 
status quo? 
 
The approach included three key elements: 
 
 desk research into the broader social and political context of 
each case  
 interviews with residents and key stakeholders in the 
planning or implementation of the initiative  
 observational research in open spaces 
 
The local interviews and the observational element in particular 
required an in situ approach. As mentioned above, project timings 
and budgetary considerations meant that it was only possible to 
cover two cases in depth. While repeating the research in a wider set 
of locations would no doubt enrich the findings, the aspiration, as in 
the preliminary documentational analysis, was not to make 
definitive claims about the eco-city phenomenon as a whole so 
much as to identify potential pitfalls in its conceived and actual 
publicness. 
 
Qualitative interviews  
In-depth qualitative interviews were conducted with a range of 
actors involved in developing and/or implementing each initiative. 
Potential respondents were identified initially through 




author met during preliminary visits to Portland in October 2013 and 
to Sejong in November 2014, or those connected with the University 
of Westminster International Eco-Cities Initiative), or through 
recommendations from other research participants. All were 
approached first by email, with a brief description of the nature of 
the research. Following their agreement to participate, further 
information was provided in advance of the interview. This gave 
reassurances that any verbatim comments or other findings 
appearing in the thesis or related publications would not be 
personally attributable to the respondents, along with a consent form, 
and a list of possible areas to be covered in the interview. Copies of 
this information, meeting the requirements of the University of 
Westminster’s (2013) ethical regulations are provided in Appendix B. 
Interviews were audio recorded with each respondent’s written 
consent. These recordings were then transcribed for analysis 
purposes. The author has retained copies of all correspondence and 
signed consent forms. 
 
Portland 
The sample was designed to yield a variety of perspectives on the 
EcoDistricts initiative as a whole, and its context within Portland’s 
broader sustainability planning. It includes policy makers in both the 
city’s Bureau of Sustainability and Planning and the regional Metro 
organisation, as well as relevant project managers at the Portland 
Development Commission (PDC, the city’s urban renewal agency), 
and staff at Portland Sustainability Initiative (PoSI), which was 
funded by PDC to steer the pilot scheme (see Chapter Six). To 
provide wider perspective on the city’s sustainability agendas, 
interviews were also conducted with an academic working in the 
field of sustainability planning, two staff members of Portland State 
University with close knowledge of the EcoDistricts initiative, an 
economic development officer working in the Portland Metro area, 
and a key downtown property developer involved in sustainable 
development projects. An interview with the Mayor of Portland was 
also sought, but he was unavailable during the fieldwork period.  
 
The number of actors involved directly or indirectly with the 
EcoDistricts initiative is large, and examining all its local activities 
across the city would have been impractical. It was decided to focus 




was selected (see Figure 4.1), partly because, along with the Foster 
Green28  scheme (see Chapter Six), its immediate goals were more 
obviously social in nature rather than technical, and – unlike the 
three pilot schemes in inner Portland – it is primarily dependent on 
local engagement and volunteering rather than capital investment 
from businesses and large property developers. In other words, it 
appeared to be far removed from a ‘top down’ initiative; closer to the 
‘research in the wild’ end of the spectrum proposed in Chapter Two 
– though still guided by institutional policy. Gateway was also of 
particular interest since open spaces featured strongly in its planned 
projects, and because city policies are oriented in different ways 
towards greater ‘urbanisation’ of this area (see Chapter Six). It was 
potentially interesting to explore the conceptualisation of ‘urbanity’ 
in the goals of the Gateway EcoDistrict, and the extent to which this 
might be compromised by the aspirations of its current suburban 
residents. As discussed in Chapter Six, the ‘urbanisation’ of Gateway 
is not necessarily welcomed by all of its residents. 
 
A formal interview was conducted with only one local resident 
from the Gateway area, but this was complemented with a wider 
quantitative on-street survey of local residents (see below). Since the 
possible future gentrification of the Gateway area was discussed in 
several interviews, it was decided to conduct a further interview 
with a resident of the gentrified Concordia area in North East 
Portland. This interviewee had herself moved from the Gateway area 
in 1997, and remained knowledgeable about it. She was one of the 
original wave of gentrifiers in Concordia, works in the creative 
industries, has long been active in local politics, and has a close 
knowledge of politics generally in the Portland area.29 
                                                          
28
   Foster Green EcoDistrict was originally known as Lents. 
29
  The author’s background knowledge was further enriched by informal 
discussions with: Kathryn Harrington, Metro Councillor; Ric Stephens, urban 
planner in the Portland area and lecturer at the University of Oregon; and Jim 
Murphy, Head of the Rosepark Neighbourhood Association in the Gateway 
area. The author attended the Portland State University’s 2013 Annual 
Sustainability Celebration, at which Mayor Charlie Hayles delivered a speech, 
and various students presented work on the various EcoDistricts. Additionally, 
the author was present at a meeting between several of the Growing Gateway 
Board members and a representative from the Portland Development 
Commission, and at a neighbourhood meeting in the Foster Green area, where 
the public was invited to comment on various plans for the area related to the 





Figure 4.1: location of Gateway relative to the other pilot 
EcoDistricts in Portland 
(Source: DistrictLab, 2010:1) 
 
All interviews were conducted face-to-face between 23 May and 7 
June 2013, except for the representative from PoSI/EcoDistricts, who 
was interviewed by telephone the following week. Interview lengths 
ranged from 40-133 minutes. While most interviews were conducted 
on a one-to-one basis, 2 were conducted in pairs (L2 & L3; C5 & C6), 
and 2 as a triad (C8, P2, & P3; C2, C3 & C4), thus giving a total of 17 





Perspective Details of respondents In-text 
reference 
Regional level Long-term Planner at Metro (regional government)  R1 
Economic Development Officer at neighbouring city in Metro area (with 
experience of economic issues facing Metro area as a whole) 
R2 
City level Policy Manager at Portland Development Commission with close 
knowledge of Growing Gateway EcoDistrict  
C1 
Senior Project Manager at Portland Development Commission, closely 
involved with South Waterfront EcoDistrict 
C2 
Senior Project Manager at Portland Development Commission, closely 
involved with Lloyd EcoDistrict 
C3 
Director, Central City Division at Portland Development Commission C4 
Green Building Manager at City of Portland Bureau of Sustainability and 
Planning involved with EcoDistricts  
C5 
Senior Sustainability Manager at City of Portland Bureau of Planning and 
Sustainability 
C6 
Principal Planner at City of Portland Bureau of Planning and Sustainability C7 





Faculty member of Portland State University’s (PSU) School of Urban 
Studies and Planning with close knowledge of EcoDistricts  
P1 
Assistant Director for Real Estate Services at PSU P2 
PSU SoMa EcoDistrict Project Coordinator – PSU Institute of Sustainable 
Solutions 
P3 
Programme Manager at Portland Sustainability Institute (PoSI) P4 
Local level Local Co-Chair of the Foster Green EcoDistrict L1 
Local Co-Chair of the Growing Gateway EcoDistrict L2 
2 Growing Gateway volunteers/Board Members L3, L4 
2 Growing Gateway Board Members/local property developers  L5, L6 
1 Growing Gateway Board Member/Director of NGO in Gateway L7 
1 local resident in Gateway area L8 
1 local resident in (gentrified) Concordia area in Inner North East Portland, 
who had previously lived in Gateway 
L9 




As was the case in Portland, a ‘nodal’ approach was adopted 
whereby key groups of actors were identified, with at least one from 
each group to be interviewed. The groups chosen were: planners 
from City Hall; staff at the government agency – the Multifunctional 
Administrative City Construction Agency (MACCA) – responsible 
for the delivery of the project; academics in South Korea with a 
knowledge of Sejong; local teachers (given the importance of 
educational choices in Korean parents’ decision to live in certain 
places, as discussed in Chapter Seven); commercial actors in the 




also approached through a local contact, but was unavailable for 
interview. The state-owned construction company Korea Land & 
Housing Corporation offered an interview in Korean, but this was 
received too late in the fieldwork period to arrange. Approaches 
were made either directly by email to suitable participants, or 
through ‘snowballing’ before or during the main fieldwork trip. 
 
In total, 16 interviews were achieved (Table 4.6), all conducted 
face-to-face, in English, on a one-to-one basis. The interviews lasted 
between 35 and 95 minutes, and took place between 3-16 June 2014 
in Sejong (interviews SM1-4; SP1; SE1; SR1-2; SR4-5), JoChiWon 
(SC1; SA3; SR3), Daejeon (SA1; SA2), and Seoul (SA4), at venues 
chosen by each respondent. All agreed to have audio recordings 
made of their interviews, and these were later transcribed for 
analysis.   
 
Type Details of respondent In-text 
reference 
City Hall Strategic Planner SC1 
MACCA Investment Promotion Team SM1 
Green Urban Environment Division SM2 
Spokesperson’s Office SM3 
Investment Promotion Team SM4 
Academic Professor at KAIST SA1 
Associate Professor at KAIST SA2 
Professor at Korea University SA3 
Professor at Soongsil University SA4 
Commercial Property Owner of local estate agency SP1 
Education Headmaster of local ‘smart’ elementary school SE1 
Residents Civil servant, male, in late 40s, married with 3 children SR1 
Civil servant, female, in early 30s, unmarried, no children SR2 
Community organiser, male, married with 2 children SR3 
Housewife, in 40s, married with 3 children SR4 
University student, male, early 20s, unmarried, no children SR5 
Table 4.6: summary of qualitative interviews conducted in South Korea 
An interpreter was present in four cases (SC1; SM1; SM2; and 
SM3), either to translate the whole interview, or to help in case of 
particular difficulties. It is acknowledged therefore that the sample 
is biased towards English speakers, who may possibly have had 
different perspectives on the city to monolingual participants – the 




assess. Since a professionally qualified interpreter was used, it was 
assumed that interviewees’ original comments were faithfully 
translated into English. 
 
As was the case in Portland, all participants received a guarantee 
that their names would not be used in any publication relating to the 
research. All agreed, however, to anonymised verbatim quotations 
being used as part of the research findings. Grammatical and 
vocabulary errors in respondents’ English have been left uncorrected 
in the comments quoted in Chapter Seven. 
 
Assessing the publicness of open spaces 
A series of observations of open spaces was also conducted. In each 
case, a variety of types of urban space was chosen, partly in the light 
of Parkinson’s (2012) concern to explore the roles of different forms 
of urban space in shaping different aspects of a city’s public life. The 
aim was to understand the publicness of these spaces, based on a 
mixture of objective and subjective criteria as described later in this 
section. In addition, the wider contexts of the spaces were considered 
(using relevant published information, the research interviewee’s 
observations, and the author’s own impressions). In Portland, three 
locations in Gateway were selected along with ten comparator 
locations elsewhere in the city; in Sejong, four locations were chosen, 
and compared with five locations in Seoul.  
 
Choice of observation locations – Portland 
Drawing on the first depth interviews, along with analysis of GG 
documentation and local maps, three specific observation locations 
in Gateway were chosen on the basis that they were earmarked for 
improvements within the GG initiative: Halsey Street (the main retail 
thoroughfare near the transit station); a patch of parkland adjacent to 
Halsey Street, here referred to as ‘PDC park’ since the land is owned 
by PDC; and the pedestrian path forming the main access to the 
transit station from the Gateway retail centre and its car parks 
(referred to here as ‘Oregon Clinic’, after the building which it runs 
beside). GG were keen for improvements to be made to Halsey’s 
retail and entertainment establishments, and pedestrian environment, 
to encourage more street life. While the redevelopment of PDC park 




it is essentially waste land at present – although it has hosted 
occasional community events (with GG’s involvement). The area in 
the vicinity of the transit station is currently perceived as forbidding 
in the evening (when the large adjoining car parks are no longer in 
use), and GG hoped to introduce signage to welcome visitors, among 
other environmental improvements. 
 
To contextualise the Gateway findings, several comparator 
locations were chosen elsewhere in Portland. The choice of these was 
to some extent arbitrary, although they were clustered into a small 
number of study areas, and the choice was informed by the urban 
design typology underlying the Portland Plan (Figure 4.2). This 
divides the city into the ‘Central City’, ‘Western Neighbourhoods’, 
‘Inner Neighbourhoods’, ‘Eastern Neighbourhoods’ (which includes 
Gateway), and ‘Industrial Districts’ (City of Portland, undated).  
 
Figure 4.2: urban design typology used in Portland Plan; Gateway 
lies to the east of the I-205 freeway which marks the boundary 
between the ‘Inner’ and ‘Eastern’ neighbourhoods 
(Source: City of Portland (undated)) 
 
However, this typology was modified in two ways. First, 
‘Industrial Districts’ were excluded as less directly relevant to the 




within the city limits, contextual reference is made in the analysis to 
‘Highland Heights’ a residential district in the city of Beaverton (to 
the immediate west of Portland, but within the Metro area), where 
the author spent two days at the beginning of the fieldwork period. 
In the analysis in Chapter Six, this is categorised as an ‘Outer Suburb’: 
an ‘ideal type’ defined by a lack of publicness, and therefore no 
observations were conducted here. Concordia was selected as a 
typifying a (gentrified) ‘Inner Neighbourhood’ following preliminary 
enquiries among research interviewees. 
 
On this basis, a series of thoroughfares, open spaces closely 
connected to transit hubs, and local parks were chosen as follows: 
 
Study area Area type Type of space 








• Halsey St • Oregon 
Clinic 
• PDC Park 
































n/a n/a n/a 
Table 4.7: summary of Portland study areas and observation locations 
† also part of SoMa ED area 





Figure 4.3: location of observation study areas in Portland 
(Author’s own map: adapted from Stamen) 
 
Further contextual information about each location, along with the 
dates on which observations took place, and the precise vantage 
point from which pedestrians were counted, is provided in 
Appendix C.  
 
Choice of observation locations – Sejong and Seoul 
Four observation locations were selected in Sejong: a pedestrianised 
thoroughfare adjacent to the built-up Hansol neighbourhood’s 
central park, and near the main transport terminus; a section of its 
main shopping street (Noeul Sam-ro); a communal area with seating 
and children’s play facilities located between residential blocks (at its 
south-western edge); and a walkway beside the Sejong branch of the 
National Library, which links the library entrance and parking 
facilities with the park and lake behind. Because the first three are 
located in the fully built and inhabited Hansol district, there is good 
reason to suppose they will not become significantly busier in future. 
They were chosen following preliminary exploration because they 
appeared to be fairly typical for the open spaces in the 
neighbourhood. The library, however, located near the government 
complex, will serve a considerably larger population when Sejong is 
fully developed. This location was included because the library and 




the great successes of the city so far; in this sense, it may serve to 
indicate the type of cityness to which residents aspire. 
 
To contextualise the publicness of Sejong as a South Korean city, 
and because its development is so closely connected to the goal of 
decongesting Seoul, a series of comparator locations were selected in 
Seoul, following preliminary explorations. One was on Jongno Sa-ga, 
selected as a fairly representative city centre thoroughfare, neither 
particularly busy nor particularly unused by pedestrians. A 
pedestrianised street in Myeongdong, one of Seoul’s main retail 
areas, was also chosen as a contrasting example of congested Seoul 
space. A communal area in the centre of Hwigyeongdong, a middle 
income residential complex in the Gangbuk area west of the city 
centre, provided a comparator for the residential communal space in 
Sejong.  Just as Sejong residents are particularly proud of the library 
and lake park as ‘public spaces’ in Sejong, the Cheonggyecheon30 
river park was selected in Seoul as a ‘showpiece’ open space. This 
river was artificially reconstructed following the removal of a main 
road, is flanked by pedestrian paths, and is internationally celebrated 
as a ‘best practice’ example of urban regeneration. Finally, the 
‘alternative’ area of Hongdae was selected since it displayed very 
representational characteristics on a preliminary visit. While 
untypical of Seoul, it was intended to exemplify emergent publicness 
possible in a Korean context.  
 
The observation locations chosen are summarised in Table 4.8. 
Further contextual information about each of these locations, along 
with the dates on which each observation took place, and the precise 
vantage point from which pedestrians were counted in each location, 
is provided in Appendix C.  
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City Type of Space 
 





Sejong • Noeul Sam-
ro 















Table 4.8: summary of observation locations in Sejong and Seoul 
 
The locations of the chosen areas in Sejong and Seoul are indicated in 




Figure 4.4: overview of observation locations in Sejong  




Figure 4.5: overview of observation locations in Seoul 
(Map based on OpenStreetMap under Open Database Licence, 
 © OpenStreetMap contributors) 
 
Criteria for observations 
It was argued in Chapter Three that publicness might usefully be 
understood as a type of assemblage closely associated with the urban. 
The notion of assemblage moves away from either a ‘topographical’ 
account of the publicness of space (which focuses on the formal 
qualities of a space) or a ‘performative’ one (in which space itself is 
incidental). Instead, publicness is understood as an outcome co-
constituted by space, subjectivity, and other regulatory, economic 
and social factors. In the civic modality of publicness, dominant 
codings of space are incorporated positively into, and reproduced by, 
this assemblage. In its emergent modality, dominant codings are 
incorporated negatively, as the status quo against which the 
publicness defines itself. 
 
If, as proposed in Chapter Three, publicness also entails visibility, 
it should be possible to observe its manifestation. Ideally, an 
exhaustive analysis of any particular assemblage of publicness in a 
given space would also encompass detailed information about the 




regulations, the role of commercial activity, and relation to 
surrounding spaces), as well as the observable behaviour of people 
in that space. However, this would potentially result in a highly 
complex and open-ended analysis – and, as Allen (2011) warns, one 
where the actual processes of assemblage remained obscure since not 
all the components of the assemblage could readily be identified, and 
the varied subjectivities which form part of its composition are not 
directly ‘visible’. What was attempted here, instead, was the 
identification of certain key indicators of emergent publicness. 
Although in Chapters Six and Seven the publicness thus observed is 
related back to the formal qualities of the spaces, and comparisons 
are made with other urban spaces, the final goal of the analysis was 
not to understand the qualities of these specific spaces (since, 
necessarily, the choice of these spaces is to some extent arbitrary and 
it would be impractical to analyse the publicness of all open space in 
a city), but rather to draw out broader implications for the nature of 
publicness in each eco-city initiative. 
 
Procedurally, the method of assessment was influenced by 
Mehta’s (2014) approach to evaluating public space, which mixes 
counts, observations of material qualities, and subjective judgments. 
The criteria used to assess the publicness of different spaces were as 
follows. First, as Lofland (1998:150) argues, it is only possible to talk 
of physical spaces containing ‘realms’ (public or otherwise) if people 
are present in them. If publicness draws partly on unpredictable 
intersubjectivity, moreover, it is understood as an urban 
phenomenon precisely because it depends on the propinquity of a 
large mass of people (Gehl, 2001). Counts were therefore made of the 
volume of pedestrian users of each space. However, since de jure 
open accessibility does not guarantee de facto inclusivity, an attempt 
was also made to record the actual social diversity among users, 
based on gender and approximate age. (Apparent ethnicity was also 
recorded in the first observation shifts, but this proved impractical in 
Portland, where ethnicity was not immediately obvious to the author 
in many cases, and irrelevant in Korea, where almost no users of any 
space observed had a non-East Asian appearance.)31 
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  Although immigration from other Asian nations has grown in recent years 
(Hwang, 2010:277; Kim & Han, 2012) and ethnic diversity in South Korea is 
increasing (Kim, 2010), the number of registered foreigners in the country 





In parallel, a subjective rating for observable ‘emergent publicness’ 
was recorded.  This described a challenge of some sort made to the 
dominant coding of the space. Such challenges included evidence of 
non-mainstream or countercultural activities taking place during the 
observation period or at other times during the fieldwork period 
(including, for example, busking, examples of unsanctioned, bottom-
up ‘guerilla’, ‘DIY’ or ‘tactical’ urban interventions (see Section 3.4 in 
Chapter Three) serving an artistic or functional purpose, evidence of 
recent political protest, or other types of ‘occupation’ where the 
intended use of the space has been subverted). This was often 
revealed in alterations to the fabric of the space (thus effectively 
issuing a challenge to its intended physicality) – including the 
presence of graffiti, fly posters, stickers, litter etc. Such alterations 
were treated as disruptive signifiers of the ‘representational’ 
(Lefebvre, 1991) dimensions of the space, whereby the 
reappropriation of space “may leave traces in the built environment 
and change the physical space. The traces can then be as light as a 
few pieces of paper or some placards on the ground, or increasingly 
permanent, such as a traffic diversion at certain times, fixed stalls, or 
tags on walls, if the spatial appropriation becomes repetitive or 
permanent” (Cenzatti, 2008:81). In the absence of emergent 
publicness, the space was understood to be characterised by civic 
(compliant) publicness.   
 
Second, the occurrence of ‘loose space’ activity (Franck & Stevens, 
2006) was also noted, to describe behaviour not directly subservient 
to the functional, economic, ‘official’ life of the city. This might 
include, for example, everyday conversation, romantic behaviour, 
skateboarding, dog-walking, street chess, or children’s games. The 
notion of loose space is closely related to what Walzer (1995) calls 
‘open-minded’ space, which he contrasts with ‘single-minded space’, 
these two qualities being epitomised by ‘hurrying’ and ‘loitering’ 
respectively: “[t]he square or piazza is the epitome of open-
mindedness” (ibid:323).  While Franck and Stevens (2006) align loose 
space activity with Lefebvre’s ‘representationality’, loose space is 
here understood as more characterised by leisure activity and often 
associated with consumption (for example, in the case of people 
conversing informally at a café). While civic in nature, this was 
recorded in case it appeared to be linked to emergent publicness 




Third, since the challenging, and boundary-blurring character of 
emergent behaviour serves to disrupt the dominant sense of order, a 
subjective rating was recorded to describe the author’s own sense of 
security in the space. The aim here was – impressionistically – to 
capture whether the space was characterised by ‘edginess’. This was 
used as an indicator of ‘friction’ in the generative sense outlined by 
Byerley and Bylund (2012) as a significant component of public life: 
“Finding ways to deal with friction zones in public spaces…is highly 
pertinent for both urban democracy and urban sustainability. Some 
friction is central to genuine democracy, whereas too little or too 
much is not”. Simultaneously, a sense of insecurity may have an 
excluding effect, serving to close down the possibility of civic 
publicness, if we agree with Parkinson that “[f]or public space to be 
genuinely accessible to all, there must be rules that regulate 
interactions between individuals, a freedom for each consistent with 
a like freedom for all…not individualistic anarchy” (Parkinson, 
2012:26). While assessing the sense of security was problematic as a 
variable constructed on the basis of the author’s own subjectivity 
within the assemblage itself, it was hoped that nevertheless some 
meaningful comparisons might be made between the spaces since 
the observer was the same person in each case. 
 
The analysis also refers in places to the intended uses of the spaces 
using Jones’ et al. (2007) distinction between ‘links’ and ‘places’ 
(closely echoing Gehl’s et al. (2006) distinction between ‘movement 
spaces’ and ‘staying spaces’). For Jones, space works primarily as a 
‘link’ when people use it simply to get from one place to another; a 
‘place’ also works as a destination in itself. Questions of rights of 
access (see Chapter Three) did not inform the analysis, since the 
observation locations were chosen as open spaces which did not 
operate a de jure exclusionary entrance policy. 
 
Ratings scales used during observations 
User Volume 
Based on the observation counts, a simple arithmetical scale was 






5 =  more than 100 people 
4 =  76-100 
3 =  51-75 
2 =  26-50 
1 =  0-25 
 
Social Diversity 
For each user of the space, gender and approximate age was 
recorded. The following age bands were used: over 65; 50-65; 30-49; 
18-29; 12-17; under 12; with a note also made of whether under 18s 
were accompanied by adults. 
 
Loose Space 
The 22 cases were subjectively assessed relative to each other, and 
rated such that 5 = abundant loose space activity, and 1 = 
instrumental activity only. 
 
Emergent Publicness 
The 22 cases were subjectively assessed relative to each other, and 
rated on a 5-point scale such that 5 = abundant evidence of 
representational space, and 1 = no obvious ‘DIY’ challenges to the 
physical environment. 
 
Sense of Security 
The 22 cases were subjectively assessed relative to each other, and 
rated on a 5-point scale such that that 5 = no evidence of anti-social 
behaviour or sense of threat, and 1 = clear evidence of potentially 
intimidating behaviour and a sense of threat. 
 
Counting method 
In most locations, during two separate 15-minute periods, the author 
recorded the number of people crossing an imaginary line, along 
with the gender and approximate age of each passer-by. An 
observation point was chosen in clear sight of this line, ideally such 




spaces such as squares with several entrance points, the ‘imaginary 
line’ method was not used, since it would have failed to capture the 
total number of people entering the space. In quieter locations, 
therefore, the space as a whole was observed; in busier locations, the 
total using one of the entrances was multiplied by the number of 
entrances to estimate the overall total entering the space. (Appendix 
C contains the precise details of the procedure for each location.) In 
busier locations, it also proved impractical simultaneously to record 
the volume of users as well as their age and gender. In such cases, 
records were made in subsequent separate exercises where every 
third or fourth passer-by was observed.  A copy of the sheets used 
for the counts and demographic profiling is provided in Appendix D.  
 
In each case, a count was made on two separate days: once during 
the week, and once on a Saturday (all between 24 May and 8 June 
2013 in Portland; and 31 May and 21 June 2014 in Korea). The 
weather was similar for all observational shifts (typically between 20 
and 25 centigrade, with no shifts taking place on rainy days), to make 
comparisons between locations more reliable. Since the temperature 
earlier in the afternoon in Korea was higher and may have deterred 
people from using the space in certain ways, to allow for a fairer 
comparison, in Portland, all shifts took place between 12pm and 3pm; 
in Korea between 4pm and 7pm. The precise dates of each 
observation shift are included in Appendix C. 
 
Several weaknesses of this approach are acknowledged. First, that 
limited time and resources meant that it was only practical to 
conduct two counts in each location. Second, that the total numbers 
of pedestrians counted, and their characteristics, may have differed if 
slightly different times were chosen. Third, estimating people’s age, 
and in some cases their gender, was often challenging – especially 
when pedestrians were passing by hurriedly. The count findings are 
therefore presented only as indicative in absolute terms, but still 
gathered with sufficient consistency (and by the same investigator) 
for meaningful comparisons and contrasts between different 
locations to remain possible.   
Presentation of findings 
The key observational data are summarised graphically, and 




published documents, along with photographs32, to provide a fuller 
picture of each space and study area. Although using different types 
of data and method provided a degree of valuable ‘methodological 
triangulation’ (Guion, 2002), it is acknowledged that analysis 
required a degree of subjective judgement on the author’s part 
(raising questions about its replicability). The approach would 
ideally have been improved through ‘investigator triangulation’, 
with validity more firmly established through the concordance of 
findings arrived at by different evaluators (ibid).  
 
On-street survey of residents in Gateway area 
A short survey of 50 Gateway residents was conducted on Saturday 
1 June 2013 between 11am and 5pm. All interviews were with 
pedestrians on Halsey Street, the area’s main retail thoroughfare. 
Loose quotas were set on age, gender and ethnicity to match 
aggregated demographic data from the 2010 US Census for the 
following tracts: Multnomah 80.1, Multnomah 81, and Multnomah 
82.01. Table 4.9 compares the composition of the achieved sample 
with the quotas set. The very small number of pedestrians using 
Halsey Street (see observational findings in Chapter Six) meant that 
it was possible to invite every passer-by to participate.  
The survey covered perceived problems with the local area, and 
awareness of GG. The questions asked were as follows (a copy of the 
questionnaire appears in Appendix E): 
 Which two or three things would you most liked to see 
improved in the Gateway area? (unprompted) 
 Are you aware of any local initiatives or schemes which aim to 
improve the area? 
 (If ‘yes’): which are these? 
 Have you heard of the Growing Gateway EcoDistrict initiative? 
 
Gender, age and ethnicity were recorded (based on the author’s 
subjective judgement) but not asked. Respondents were given an 
information slip following the interview, which outlined the nature 
of the research (see Appendix F). 
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Gender Male 48.7 23-27 25 50 
Female 51.3 23-27 25 50 
Age† 18-24 11.5 4-8 7 14 
25-44 31.1 12-16 16 32 
45-64 35.0 15-20 21 42 
65+ 22.4 9-13 6 12 
Ethnicity** White 70.0 33-37 33 66 
Other 30.0 13-17 17 34 
(Total) (100) (50) (50) (100) 
Table 4.9: structure of achieved street interview sample compared 
with actual Gateway population profile 
 
*  Source: 2010 US Census (aggregated data from Multnomah 80.1, 
Multnomah 81, and Multnomah 82.01 tracts) 
†  for reasons of research ethics, under 18s were excluded from the 
survey and Census data used (in reality, under 18s represent 21.1% of 
the population) 
** ‘White’ in the Census data was taken from the ‘white alone’ Census 
category. 
 
Several methodological shortcomings should be acknowledged. 
First, Gateway’s domination by car use (and low pedestrian footfall – 
see Chapter Six) may mean the views of pedestrians alone are 
unrepresentative of typical local residents’ views. Second, elderly 
respondents were underrepresented in the sample, since very few 
were present in the interviewing location – perhaps confirming 
PoSI’s observation that “[w]alking can be particularly dangerous for 
the older adults in and around Gateway” (DistrictLab, 2010:19). 
Third, the validity of the results is also compromised by the small 
sample size (due to time and budget restrictions), and the use of only 
one sampling point. The findings are nevertheless included as 
broadly indicative if not scientifically representative of local opinion. 
The exercise also allowed the author to talk informally with a wide 





Because the author did not speak Korean, the exercise was not 
replicated in Sejong (in any case, the main goal of testing awareness 
of the local EcoDistrict was specific to the Portland case). 
Nevertheless, the author was concerned that speaking to such a large 
number of local residents in one case study only (during the formal 
interview itself and informal conversation afterwards in many cases) 
might lead to them having undue influence on his impressions of 
Gateway, when compared with those of Sejong. In the hope of 
compensating to some extent for any such possible ensuing 
imbalance, a larger number of residents were interviewed in the 




Chapter Five  




In Chapter Three, it was argued that planning approaches which 
follow in the modernist tradition may necessarily mobilise a limited 
conceptualisation of the city as a public space. It was proposed that 
to develop more effective modes of governing for urban 
sustainability in future, we may need to understand better the 
relationship between eco-city plans and the real city in which they 
are causally implicated. To provide a basis for the exploration of this 
relationship in the remainder of the thesis, the current chapter 
examines a sample of documents which conceptualise different types 
of eco-cities, following the approach outlined in Chapter Four. The 
analysis aims to test the grounded assumption that: 
 
in many cases, the ‘public’ is poorly conceptualised in official 
documents related to the planning and description of eco-city 
initiatives. 
 
It is argued that a recognisably similar discursive ‘storyline’ is 
constructed across the sample of documents. This storyline is given 
coherence through the rhetorical use of metaphor, which produces 
particular types of narrative space. This constructed space, in line 
with the tendency within traditional modernist planning, excludes 
the city’s emergent public dimensions. These rhetorical mobilisations 
of space also have ideological effects in serving to ‘naturalise’ more 
specific underlying agendas. In at least some cases, these agendas 
appear to be aligned with wider trends related to what has been 
described as the ‘neoliberalisation’ of the city.  
 
The chapter ends by considering some of the implications of these 
findings for the case studies of implemented eco-city initiatives in the 




5.1    The Space of the Eco-City Storyline 
 
Since, as discussed in Chapter Three, static texts can only ever 
represent space in particular ways, these documents were not read in 
the expectation that they would somehow contain ‘full’ descriptions 
of urban space. At the same time, the analysis did not close off the 
possibility ab initio that evidence would be found of the documents 
having escaped the modernist frame of traditional planning. The 
main aims were to identify more precisely the ways in which the 
public city may remain uncaptured, and the rhetorical means by 
which this partiality is obscured. 
 
To this end, Henri Lefebvre’s (1991) ‘trialectic’ model of space – as 
discussed in Chapter Three – was used as a foil to highlight the 
partial, metaphorical nature of the space discursively constructed in 
the documents. To recap, Lefebvre’s model has three dimensions. 
First, ‘representations of space’, which relate to a socially flat, 
abstract notion of spatiality which he saw as dominant in 
contemporary (or ‘neo-capitalist’) society. Second, ‘spatial practice’, 
pertaining to the material perceived aspects of space. Spatial practice 
is here aligned with the peculiarity of ‘place’: the tangible qualities of 
space dynamically produced through and shaping social practices. 
Third, ‘representational space’, here interpreted as realised through 
the subjective interpretation of space by individuals, whereby a 
multiplicity of perspectives, claims and challenges emerge and in 
turn fashion space unpredictably. Representational space is therefore 
a radically open space of political contestation, and closely connected 
to the assemblage of emergent publicness in the city. 
 
The argument develops the original concept of ‘trajective space’ to 
describe the narrated reconstruction of representational space within 
eco-city documentation. Trajective space superficially mimics 
interactions between different actants in space, but denies the 
emergent dimensions of these interactions. It is not a political space 
produced through or giving rise to unpredictable interplay between 
heterogeneous opinions and interpretations. Rather, it is an 
imaginary space where a finite set of actants are ascribed particular 
motives and different degrees of agency within a singular and 




In place of the potential for radical political heterogeneity between 
the various actants, trajective space is characterised by what Boundas 
(1996:21) calls “discrete differences” which describe “distinct 
entities”. In this simulated heterogeneity, differences are presented in 
terms of various identifiable ‘types of stakeholder’ or ‘demographic 
groups’ – with ‘the public’ or ‘the community’ often appearing as a 
univocal collectivity. While plans may not explicitly refute the 
possibility of dissent within such collectivity, the ontology of the 
storyline serves to delimit the variety, complexity and implications of 
such dissent – typically taking the need for, and possibility of, 
‘consensus’ as its starting point; and this consensus is reductively 
equated with universal agreement. The rhetorical representation of 
the city’s ‘lived’ (Lefebvre, 1991) space in these trajective terms 
obscures the possibility that space might be shaped otherwise in 
future.  
 
It is further suggested that discursive storylines in visions of 
urban sustainability tend to ‘set the scene’ through a 
conceptualisation of particular urban locations as ‘defensible space’. 
Certain types of fetishised (and typically nominalised) ‘threats’ to a 
bounded ‘place’ are identified, while a unanimous desire on the part 
of ‘the citizens’ to be defended from these is asserted. The ‘hero’ of 
the story (in the form, for example, of the city authorities, or a private 
developer) is therefore presented as acting in accordance with the 
wishes of ‘the community’ – facilitating the realisation of these 
wishes. Flowing logically from this portrayal of defensible space, a 
trajectory is envisaged in which various actants (presented as 
definable demographic and stakeholder groups, institutional 
authorities, and various technological aspects of the physical city) 
will develop the ‘plot’ in a particular fashion.  
 
The goal of this predetermined trajectory, whose inevitability 
results from the characteristics of the defensible space, is the creation 
of a ‘utopian space’. This utopian space is a particular type of 
‘representation of space’. It is an apparently mimetic description of 
the future (the illusion of transparency furthered by the visual 
diagrams with which it is typically accompanied – in the form of 
masterplans and architects’ impression), but which actually conceals 
a particular normative vision of a static, utopian, closed system, 




As a social space, this utopia is metaphorically flat, characterised by 
unrestricted flows and equality of access to its abundant resources. It 
contains no radical dissent or social exclusion; as a spatial outcome it 
is presented as the logical result of actions driven by consensus 
decisions, rather than derived from the public interplay of actants 
positioned differently in various hierarchies of power; in this sense it 
promotes a non-political – even fundamentally non-urban – vision of 
sustainability. 
 
The characteristics of the spaces of the eco-city storyline are 
described in more detail in the next section. Table 5.1 summarises 
and contrasts these with Lefebvre’s model of social space. 
 
Type of space Lefebvrian social space Space as typically mobilised 




Spatial Practice (Perceived) 
dynamically constituted by and constituting 
the interrelations and unpredictable 
interactions between multiple actants, but 
varyingly obdurate 
mundane, complex rhythms of everyday life 
as perceived by inhabitants 
Defensible Space 
bounded locations with a singular 
‘meaning’ which is determined by 
the author; ‘the local’ to be 





Representational Space (Lived) 
the space produced by the interplay 
between heterogeneous 
subjective/discursive constructions of the 
significance and structures of spatial 
practice  
fluid, multiple, and open 
the space of political contestation and 
countercultural art 
potential for emergent publicness 
Trajective Space 
the space produced by a singular, 
predetermined ‘plot’ in which a 
finite set of fetishised actants are 
ascribed particular motives and 
different degrees of agency 
human actants as definable 
groups (often demographically 
delineated, or spatialised as 
belonging to certain parts of the 
city) 
civic publicness only 
↓ 
Flat Space Representations of Space (Conceived) 
an intellectual construct of space as an 
‘empty vessel’ allowing concrete forms and 
flows to be taxonomised (‘located’ and 
formally specified relative to one another) 
‘bird’s eye’ representation, with emphasis 
on form and aesthetics 
Utopian Space 
an apparently mimetic 
description of the future which 
conceals a normative vision of a 
static, utopian, closed system 
flat space of equity (and, in some 
cases, of an unfettered free 
market) 





 ‘Place’ as defensible space rather than spatial practice 
The threat 
 
A series of threats to the city in question (or to cities generally) are 
typically identified. These threats, usually emanating from 
‘elsewhere’, constitute one of the key types of narrated actant. 
Greensburg33, already flattened by a tornado, is further threatened by 
rising fuel prices, and the possible effects of climate change on 
agricultural capacity. Freiburg was historically imperilled by the oil 
crisis and planned imposition of a nuclear power plant on the region 
in the 1970s, and the effects of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. 
Almere’s plans respond to the government’s decision to expand its 
population; Whitehill & Bordon’s threat similarly emanates from 
central government, in the shape of the Ministry of Defence’s 
decision to decommission the local army barracks: “when the army 
leaves there will be a dip in the local economy and a loss of jobs” (22), 
potentially exposing it to “piecemeal” (8) development, which has 
historically resulted in a lack of “adequate facilities and 
infrastructure” (20). 
 
It is significant that, in many cases, these threats are nominalised. 
Through nominalisation, “a process is expressed as a noun, as if it 
were an entity”, and thus “causality is unspecified” (Fairclough, 
1989:51). More formally, nominalisation is “a transformation which 
reduces a whole clause to its nucleus, the verb, and turns that into a 
noun” (Fowler et al., 1979:39, in Billig, 2008). Fowler sees this 
transformation as “inherently, potentially mystificatory” (Fowler, 
1991:80): it is similar to passivisation in its effect of “(i) deleting 
agency; (ii) reifying; (iii) positing reified concepts as agents; and (iv) 
maintaining unequal power relations” when used in formal, 
scientific or technical language (Billig, 2008:785).  Nominalisation and 
the passive voice “especially when used by official speakers/writers, 
len[d] themselves to ideological uses” (Billig, 2008:786). Thus, OECD 
paints a picture of ‘the global recession’ (8), ‘the global crisis’ (11), 
‘climate change’ (8), ‘urbanisation rates’ (66), and risks of ‘coastal 
flooding’ (27). Sydney confronts “a host of challenges generated by 
external forces – from economic globalisation to climate change, from 
petrol price fluctuations to competition for enterprises and creative 
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talent” (11). Eco2 Cities is concerned with “urbanization’s effects of 
climate change, pollution, congestion, and the rapid growth of cities” 
(xv); “an increasingly global context characterised by many new 
fluctuating, interlinked and uncontrollable variables” (1). Freiburg 
faced an “invasion” of motor cars (6). Portland points to “[g]lobal 
challenges like climate change, resource scarcity and urbanization 
threaten the stability of life in metropolitan regions” (2). The case of 
Sejong, as a greenfield development, is somewhat different. Here, it 
is Seoul which faces an external nominalised threat in the form of 
“excessive concentration in the capital” (8), causing various social 
problems and undermining national competitiveness. In Huaibei’s 
case, a threat is identified, but it is an internal one related to its 
legacy of coal mining: the city is sinking, and its water supply has 
become contaminated. 
 
The ‘threat’ is not always a key actant in the plot. It does not 
appear in Auroville – except perhaps in the urgency of the call to 
action: “Now that a critical mass has been achieved, the population is 
expected to expand rapidly” (1.6.4), and in the more general 
reflection that “Sri Aurobindo and the Mother have diagnosed the 
contemporary crisis of humanity as an evolutionary crisis” (Preface). 
In Valdespartera (perhaps since the document is not a ‘call to action’), 
defensible space generally is not strongly evoked – except possibly 
through the threats posed by the historic lack of affordable housing, 
and climate change, implied by references to the Kyoto protocol. 
 
Place bounded by inherent meaning 
 
The presence of an external threat evokes a sense of the city as a 
place with an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’. This boundedness is 
reinforced by the assumption that the place has (or can be given) a 
singular ‘meaning’ or ‘identity’. Almere therefore desires to 
“preserve and reinforce the original qualities” (2) of the city as it 
grows. Greensburg is proud of its “rural quality” (6), and postulates 
the existence of “common Kansas values” at “[t]he root of 
sustainability” (10). Huaibei suggests that “[t[he first step in Eco-City 
Design is always to look, explore and listen deeply to the place” (2); 
the city is now “undertaking a powerful transformation, and one that 
embraces its history, its culture, its truth” (2). In contending that it 
will “find its unique artistic voice and its song will be beautiful” (29), 




Huaibei explicitly aligns its inherent ‘identity’ with that which is 
‘inside’: it has “defined urban growth boundaries” (6:9) in order to 
realise the “natural, cultural, creative and economic benefits of a 
Place” (6:9). 
 
The value of identifying this ‘inherent meaning’ is also evident in 
Eco2 Cities’ aims to “emphasize the importance of the incorporation 
of the unique aspects of place” (3). For Freiburg, “[t]he protection of 
a city’s identity is a precondition for sustainable urban planning and 
development” (12) – ‘identity’ thereby being presented not only as 
singular and pre-existing, but also definable and preservable. Such 
assertions, paradoxically, may highlight the constructed nature of 
this meaning, in that it needs to be defined and fixed. Greensburg 
aims to take an “inventory of the cultural qualities that made the 
town special” (13). Sejong feels the need to establish a foundation to 
encourage “cultural protection and realizing a historic identity of the 
city” (30). Huaibei’s reason for “understand[ing] the inherent 
character” (17) of the city is to achieve “branding for Huaibei as a 
whole” (17) and thereby attract new residents. Each of Huaibei’s 
villages, similarly, “must be encouraged to have its own identity, 
famous for a particular spa, farm, park, hiking trail…food type of 
other unique service” (81). Portland hopes in each EcoDistrict that 
“branding for the community will be achieved” (14).  
 
In such cases, ‘branding’ describes the external projection of an 
imposed meaning. The purpose of this projection is explicitly one of 
economic competitiveness. For OECD, the ‘place’ quality of cities is 
considered purely in economic terms; economic growth “does not 
occur in the abstract; it is a place-based phenomenon” (18). OECD’s 
discussion of the distinctive qualities of cities relates to their 
advantageous economic “agglomeration effects” (18) – advantages, 
however, which may be undermined by negative externalities 
including suburban sprawl, whose implications include traffic 
congestion, lower productivity, and health costs (20). Significantly, 
the city’s ‘placeness’ is thus constructed as threatened when its 






Metaphors of rebirth 
 
The case for defending this bounded, identifiable space is often 
reinforced through a secondary set of metaphors which relate to 
‘rebirth’. This source domain may have a particular ability to 
“resonate with latent symbolic representations residing at the 
unconscious level” (Mio, 1997:130), given Furbey’s (1999) 
observation that the idea of ‘regeneration’ resonates with many 
religious and spiritual traditions as a “signifier of profound change” 
(Furbey, 1999:419). Lees (2003) discusses Furbey’s observation with 
reference to UK national urban policies, pointing to the conceptual 
interchangeability of ‘urban sustainability’ with ‘urban renaissance’ 
and ‘urban regeneration’ within these.  
 
The ‘rebirth’ source domain is ‘extended’ (Semino, 2008) in the 
documents analysed here, such that images of ailing and recovering 
bodies, or related to springtime and regrowth, are mapped onto the 
target domain of the city. In Huaibei, even “technologies and service 
industries will blossom” (30). Sydney in particular has a focus on the 
‘rebirth’ of open space. Currently, its “heart is congested, choking on 
the noise and fumes of the internal combustion engine” (15), and 
“[h]ealing Sydney’s scars” by reclaiming spaces for pedestrians (23) 
is a priority. The Western Distributor road currently “throttles 
Darling Harbour and cuts it off from the life blood of the City” (15), 
but “[f]reed from its constrictive bands, the City Centre will breathe 
again” (16). Whitehill & Bordon uses similar circulatory metaphors: 
“[t]he movement of people to, through, and within towns provides a 
life blood for successful and vibrant places” (108); it needs “a new 
town centre or ‘heart’” (78). Greensburg asserts that a “community is 
like an organism and all the parts must work together in order to 
sustain the City’s future” (3).  
 
Almere’s central image extends the ‘rebirth’ source domain, while 
also drawing on the conventional conceptual metaphor ‘Life is a 
Journey’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980): the city is described as being on a 
‘journey to adulthood’. It has the overall aim of “expanding to a 
mature city” (9), and the vision document “provides a sound basis 
for developing a mature, healthy and sustainable city” (2). The 
resonance of the repeated rebirth metaphor in the Huaibei document 
is reinforced through explicit reference to mythology: “Huaibei 




Fenghuang, the mythical Phoenix, in union with the Dragon, thus 
rediscovering the potency of living in harmony, an Ecopolis in the 
making” (2). The concept of the ‘phoenix’ may also have been 
deliberately mapped onto the literal ‘ashes’ of the declining mining 
industry: Huaibei seeks to transform itself from a ‘Mining City’ into a 
“beautiful “Water City”” (27). 
 
According to DeLanda (2006:8–9), the metaphorical description of 
social entities in terms of “bodily organs that work together for the 
organism as a whole” is centuries old, and problematically 
conceptualises wholes as possessing “an inextricable unity in which 
there is a strict reciprocal determination between parts”. In other 
words, it promotes a norm of a bounded whole dependent on 
harmonious interrelations. Tensions and conflicts, conversely, and 
disruptions due to networks of relations to elsewhere, are positioned 
as divergences from this norm rather than descriptive characteristics 
of city life. The ‘sick city’ (Söderström et al., 2014:315), is an example 
of the use of medical metaphor, which, according to Choay 
“articulates a discourse that expounds scientific intentions…with a 
set of utopian features” (Choay, 1997:261). The prescriptions of 
strategic planning more generally are often rhetorically justified 
through the metaphor of the sick city which needs to be healed 
(Gunder & Hillier, 2007). Utopian thinking has, since Thomas More’s 
Utopia, begun with a diagnosis of urban problems; against this 
‘corrupt past’, a set of universally valid solutions is proposed. Such 
‘utopian storytelling’ works to normalise particular models of society 
as “ideal and universally valid” and “constituted by rational spatial 
form” (Söderström et al., 2014:315). 
 
Publicness: trajective space rather than representational space 
Time metaphorically constructed as linear space 
 
The label ‘trajective space’ is used here to describe the 
conceptualisation of change in city space as predictable rather than 
shaped by contestation. Most fundamentally, trajective space is 
constructed through metaphors presenting future time as a 
movement through space. ‘Time as space’ has been labelled a 
“globally systematic” conventional metaphor in the English language 
(Semino, 2008). Chilton suggests that “[p]olitical concepts involving 




movement or journey metaphors”, such as “coming to a crossroads, 
moving ahead towards a better future, overcoming obstacles on the way, not 
deviating from its plans, and so forth” (Chilton, 2004:52). Sydney, for 
example, describes itself as “forward-looking” (10). Freiburg 
advocates “consistent planning as a unifying vision that refers back 
to the city’s past and projects forwards several decades” (27). 
Freiburg has “maintain[ed] its momentum to become an extremely 
liveable environment” (2), and Whitehill & Bordon will “build on the 
momentum developed through the masterplan engagement process” 
(135).  
 
The force of these metaphors is to construct a singular, linear view 
of history; the ‘correct’ and inevitable path to the city’s future rebirth. 
Auroville tells of how “the entire area was identified as a backward 
area” (1.3.2); the development of the town has therefore allowed it to 
move ‘forwards’. (Mythological references here further reinforce this 
sense of inevitability, in the shape of the legend of Kaluveli Siddhar’s 
prophecy that “the region would become green and prosper some 
time in the future” (1.4.4).) In a more recent brochure, Sejong argues 
that “advanced” (MACCA, 2010a:6) countries are often characterised 
by successful decentralisation. Elsewhere, proposed interventions are 
located within a historical ‘grand narrative’. Sydney asserts that “just 
as the Industrial revolution transformed the world in the 19th century, 
a new revolution is set to transform the 21st century” (10). Freiburg 
presents the history of cities generally, marked by a shift from 
“agrarian life” during the industrial revolution, and followed by the 
‘invasion’ of motor vehicles (6). Auroville is “a testing ground…for 
the next step in human evolution” (1.2.5). 
 
Change as continuity 
 
The notion of ‘continuity’ plays a central justificatory role in the 
construction of this trajectory, flowing logically from the idea that 
space has a particular ‘meaning’. Sejong pledges a “living historical 
environment” (37); Huaibei’s “renovated and renewed historic 
district around Shi Ban Je will articulate the distinctive character and 
history of Huaibei” (20), and “a special form of recycling that honors 
past, present and posterity” (29). Freiburg explicitly asserts “the 
importance of continuity” (5), without problematizing the question 




future is partially justified by the metaphor of the city’s “path to 
adulthood” (2), as discussed above. Specific proposed spatial 
changes are explicitly framed as continuations of its history: “There 
is a good reason why we want to make this leap in scale. There is a 
fundamental coherent vision on…the existing city and the past, 
present and future” (8); “When it comes to the design of Almere, 
results achieved in the past and present will provide guarantees for 
the future” (11). Huaibei uses the spatial metaphor of a river to 
illustrate the inevitable success of its proposals: “Huaibei will be a 
beautiful “Water City” that, at its critical moment flowed with the 
Current of Change and moved gracefully into the future with the 
power of the entire River” (27). 
 
Having thus communicated the inevitability of these projections, 
several of the documents include ‘timelines’ for action. Indicatively, 
these too are described in spatial terms in the cases of Portland’s 
“robust roadmap” (3) and Whitehill & Bordon’s “next steps” (126). 
Huaibei feels able to end its masterplan with a series of detailed 
timelines, despite its earlier claim that analysis of the ‘place’ opened 
up “an infinite spectrum of potentialities” (2). 
 
The role of ‘culture’  
 
This ‘trajective’ perspective on the production of space is, then, 
fundamentally not one in which space is produced through (political) 
negotiation and dissent involving ongoing emergent publicness. Its 
production follows the path of a singular history and destiny (which 
often defines the ‘culture’ of the space), rather than the interaction 
between differently empowered actants. The idea of countercultural 
dissent is accordingly absent. Valdespartera comes closest to a 
Lefebvrian idea of representational space in this respect: it claims to 
privilege “a public urbanism, ownership of the urban space by the 
new residents, without which this venture would not only not make 
sense but the ecocity would be devoid of spirit” (10); “In constructing 
the ecocity, we paid attention as much to its physical 
construction…as to its social construction based on the concepts of 
appropriation, identification and the use of public space” (11). It even 
refers to Lefebvre (211), and one of the four chapters is entitled 
“Urban Rights”, possibly in a conscious echo of Lefebvre’s (1968) 
influential idea of the ‘Right to the City’. And yet these claims are not 




dimensions of the space are described in terms of open-air sculptures 
and a thematic emphasis on Spanish cinema: civic art provided by 
the establishment rather a source of resistance to it. 
 
Instead, cultural activity serves two trajective purposes. The first 
of these subsumes this activity into the ‘creative industries’, which 
facilitate economic competitiveness. This is most clearly evident in 
the plans for Sydney: 
 
“As cities all over the world are recognising the 
importance of the role of culture, what should Sydney do 
to secure a distinctive place as one of the world’s great 
cities in 2030? The creative aspect of the city will be 
fundamental to the prosperity of Sydney in 2030” (25) 
“A city that fosters creative learning and involves artists at 
the core of its activities is a city that looks to the future. 
And who knows, by 2030, we may just have the edge over 
London” (25) 
 
One comment in the Sydney document stands out as uniquely 
disconnected to the conceptualisation of artistic culture elsewhere in 
the text. A member of the public is quoted as wanting a Sydney 
which is “creative, edgy and gritty” (119). However, the reasons why 
‘edginess’ and ‘grittiness’ might be desirable remain unexplored.   
 
Second, cultural activity is often valued for its ‘improving’ 
qualities, or has a formal institutional presence (with no reference to 
it having an ‘underground’ existence). Sejong, for example, will 
“[d]evelop cultural environment which enriches and improves life” 
(12), with “dignified and abundant cultural facilities” (26), and “first-
class cultural activities….museums, theatres and libraries” (26). For 
Huaibei, “[a] liveable city has quality culture (entertainment, 
speeches, arts, etc) and a high quality university” (12). The Sri 
Aurobinto Auditorium in Auroville offers “[w]orkshops and recitals 
of both traditional and modern dance, drama and music…cultural 
events based on community and environmental awareness 
programmes” (1.9.17). Whitehill & Bordon makes one claim which 
hints at the representational dimensions of the production of space: 
“Art and culture needs to have a prominent role in shaping the 
future regeneration of the town” (85) – and yet proposes that this 




a new ‘heritage centre’. Rather than being a source of productive 
tension, then, art is merely the source of well-being and harmony; in 
Auroville: “[a]rtistic beauty in all its forms, painting, sculpture, 
music, literature will be equally available to all” (1.2.3). 
 
Key actants in the trajective plot 
 
The key actants within the eco-city plot might be summarised as 
follows: on one side, the external threat (as discussed earlier); on the 
other, different forms of technology, and the ‘community’, the whole 
of which is comprised of different ‘stakeholder groups’, including 
the ‘leadership’ and ‘public’. This community in its totality, which 
will defeat the external threat as it forges the trajective space, is 
populated by various co-operative factions sharing a common 
ambition. Freiburg argues for “the creation of long-term partnerships 
between the community and the public and private sectors” (7), and 
that “[c]ommunities must work continuously on their collective 
vision” (28). In Huaibei, “we are all stakeholders and share a 
common goal for Huaibei’s success” (2). Portland defines its 
EcoDistricts fundamentally as “communities of shared interest” (6).  
 
This conceptualisation illustrates Swyngedouw’s contention that 
much sustainability-related policy-making is characterised by 
“populist tactics” which “do not identify a privileged subject of 
change (like the proletariat for Marx, women for feminists…), but 
instead invoke…the need for common action, mutual collaboration 
and co-operation. There are no internal social tensions or generative 
internal conflicts” (Swyngedouw, 2011a:79). This populism 
normatively assumes a political process in which  
“‘the people know best’ (although the latter category 
remains often empty, unnamed), supported by an 
assumedly neutral scientific technocracy, and it advocates 
a direct relationship between people and political 
participation. It is assumed that this will lead to a good, if 
not optimal solution” 
 (ibid). 
 
Simultaneously, this populist approach reinforces existing power 
structures; it “calls on the elites to undertake action such that nothing 
has to change” (Swyngedouw, 2011a:80). Accordingly, within the 




authorities, for example, or the masterplanning team. These 
unquestioned representatives take their cue from, and enable 
collective action based on, the citizenry’s wishes. The Mayor of 
Portland has created a Sustainability Institute (with responsibility for 
developing the EcoDistrict programme) which “responds to growing 
public awareness and broad government and business engagement” 
(3). Sejong’s masterplan “has been established by collecting opinions 
from the nation” (7). For Freiburg, “[a] citywide concept, with 
principles of consensus, creates the proper environment within 
which all the participants in urban development can act with equal 
rights” (31). As saviours of the city, meanwhile, these actants are 
sometimes evaluated in a heroic light. In Whitehill & Bordon, “there 
is…a danger of decline and decay if the task of regeneration is not 
handled with skill and determination” (3). Almere claims to be 
following in the footsteps of its “first inhabitants – real pioneers” and 
“founding fathers” (2). Huaibei refers to the “wisdom of the Huaibei 
leadership” (2) generally, and in particular to Mayor Yu Chongxin 
“for his vision and commitment to the project…Persevering through 
project challenges, he offered clear instructions” (ii). 
 
In guiding the community as a whole to its consensual goals, these 
‘heroes’ will arm the community with various technologies to 
counter the external threat. These include, variously: specific green 
technology; transport and other infrastructure; urban design; the 
open spaces which result from urban design; and various regulatory 
and procedural ‘technologies of government’ (Rose, 1999:52; Rose, 
2000). OECD includes a 17-page section (72-88) on possible ‘policy 
instruments’, and a 25-page section (47-71) outlining the economic, 
environmental, and social benefits which different technologies have 
brought to various cities. The primary agency given to technology 
here points towards a conceptualisation of the city which 
underemphasises the importance of the civitas, and may tend 
towards technological determinism – a risk identified by Joss et al. 
(2013) in their review of recent eco-city developments around the 
world. 
 
The value of these technological interventions is reinforced further 
through the metaphorical mapping of various ‘model’ or ‘laboratory’ 
concepts onto the city. The function of narrative as a type of 




this particular mapping; the full complexity of the real-life context 
being suppressed for the purpose of the experiment. The possibility 
of ‘replicating’ the model elsewhere (whether for the general good of 
mankind, or for economic gain) is often invoked, with little 
discussion of the possibility that contingent place-specific factors 
may undermine its replication. Thus, Huaibei will be “a model of a 
livable, sustainable green city” (21). Freiburg is already “a model for 
cities and communities across the globe” (12); Auroville is “a good 
model for emulation in other towns and cities” (Foreword) and “a 
testing ground and laboratory for the next step in human evolution” 
(1.2.5). Almere is set to become a “national experimental laboratory 
in the area of sustainability” (8); Greensburg both a “Replicable 
Model” and a “laboratory for research on sustainable design and 
community development” (13); and Valdespartera “a grand scale 
laboratory to investigate and perfect models of construction which 
respect the environment” (13). The result is sometimes described as a 
‘showcase’: Portland aims for its EcoDistricts to “showcase new 
strategies…Through their success, such projects can be replicated 
with less research, risk and hesitation” (12). Huaibei’s ‘Innovation 
Park’ areas will “provide a showcase to potential investors” (55), and 
its new Huajia Lake Eco-Community will “showcase proper land use, 
future-focused planning, environmental standards and provide 
sustainable education opportunities and training” (67), while a new 
Biomass Power Plant “showcases the commitment of Huaibei to a 
green and sustainable future” (80). 
 
The eco-city storyline as archetypal plot 
 
The notion of ‘threatened’ urban space is not peculiar to the eco-city 
storyline. Baeten (2007) points to a long tradition of urban dystopian 
imagination, emphasising “the possible environmental, economic 
and moral collapse of the city” (Baeten, 2007:54). Swyngedouw sees 
the construction of ‘apocalyptic’ external threats, including 
“globalization, non-competitiveness and uncontrolled immigration” 
(Swyngedouw, 2007:66), as symptomatically neoliberal, ‘post-
political’ governance tactics; such threats include the ‘spectre of 
climate change’ which “presents a clear and present danger to 
civilization as we know it unless urgent and immediate remedial 
action is undertaken” (Swyngedouw, 2010:214). The eco-city thus 
reflects wider discursive trends in urban policy where a “threatening 




system” and “require dealing with if a new urbanity is to be attained” 
(ibid., p.67).  
 
The ‘storyline’ underlying the eco-city discursive order therefore 
has wider resonance. Significantly, it would appear to be closely 
aligned with what Booker (2004) calls one of the seven ‘basic plots’ – 
indeed, he suggests that this may be the “most basic of all the plots” 
(Booker, 2004:219) around which narrative fiction is structured, and 
which he calls ‘Overcoming the Monster’: 
“The essence of the ‘Overcoming the Monster’ story is 
simple. [We] are made aware of the existence of some 
superhuman embodiment of evil power. This monster…is 
always deadly, threatening destruction to those who cross 
its path or fall into its clutches. Often it is threatening an 
entire community or kingdom, even mankind and the 
world in general. But the monster also has in its clutches 
some great prize, a priceless treasure, or a beautiful 
‘Princess’. 
So powerful is the presence of this figure, so great the 
threat which emanates from it, that the only thing which 
matters to us as we follow the story is that it should be 
killed and its dark power overthrown” 
(Booker, 2004:23). 
 
If eco-city documents resonate with this archetypal plot, the reader 
may be unsurprised to find that the threats they contain are 
sometimes given ‘monstrous’ qualities, or as unstoppable ‘forces of 
nature’: Freiburg suggests that the motor car needs to be “tamed” 
(17); Eco2 Cities aims to “absorb this powerful wave of urbanization” 
(1). The call to action is reinforced by a sense of urgency; the hero 
emerges ‘just in time’. The Eco2 Cities initiative “appears at a critical 
historical juncture” (xv), and “the correct time is now./It is in the 
urgent interest of helping cities systematically capture this value, 
while the window of opportunity is still open to them” (18). For 
OECD, “further delay is not an option” (13). Whitehill & Bordon has 
a “once-in-a-lifetime chance to ensure the sustainable regeneration of 
the town” (3). Huaibei will flow with the “Current of Change” at its 
“critical moment” (27). Greensburg positions itself “on the precipice 
of a shift toward the recovery of small town vitality” (65). The role of 
technological actants in the eco-city storyline also has a correlate in 




monster’s final overthrow is typically achieved through the use of 
various ‘magic weapons’; the reader of a text structured by this plot 
therefore expects its resolution to include a strong technological 
element.  
 
In Booker’s examples (ranging from the ancient Sumerian myth of 
Gilgamesh, and Beowulf, to the 1962 Dr No James Bond film), a human 
society – and often a particular settlement – is threatened by a 
mysterious external force disrupting its comfortable status quo. Out 
of the collectively threatened community, a hero arises to confront 
the distant evil, and thereby restores the settlement to a new status 
quo. Booker suggests that any story which can “make such a leap 
across the whole of recorded human history must have some 
profound symbolic significance in the inner life of mankind” (Booker, 
2004:22). There are grounds, then, to suspect that narratives 
structured around this plot have persuasive potential independent of 
their ability to describe external reality.  
 
The consensual public 
 
Distinctions between different groups of ‘stakeholder groups’ (the 
‘people’ and others), and between factions or individuals within each 
group, are eroded through the use of collective terms such as ‘the 
people’ and ‘the community’, portrayed as able to speak and think 
collectively. Thus, we read, for example, that “the community is 
proud of the rural quality of Greensburg” (6), while “[t]he people of 
Huaibei have made a commitment to sustainable development” (ii). 
OECD even implies a global singular public opinion in asserting that 
“people understand that these challenges must be overcome if we are 
to reach our environmental, social and economic goals” (92). 
Auroville posits the need for development guidelines, so as to 
“encourage development without violating the principles of 
planning for the common good” (3.1); it assumes that a singular 
‘common good’ exists and can be defined through these guidelines. 
 
These singular opinions and ambitions are presented as having 
been revealed through various deliberative processes. Theorists 
advocating deliberation draw on Habermas’ notions of 
‘communicative rationality’, in opposition to the self-interested 
‘instrumental rationality’ encouraged by liberal democratic 




procedures which create the conditions for “rational argumentation 
and intersubjective understanding, not coercion or domination” as 
the “basis for decision-making” (Purcell, 2008:46). The general rise of 
deliberative theory since the 1990s (Dryzek, 2000) has been reflected 
in urban planning more specifically, within the shift towards 
‘communicative’ or ‘collaborative’ governance approaches (Purcell, 
2008) outlined in Chapter One. Positioned against liberal democracy, 
deliberative democracy clearly has an emphatic ‘public’ aspect, in 
that it advocates accountable, visible, intersubjective debate. 
Conversely, the individual’s right to express opinions in private, 
with ‘public opinion’ understood as the ‘aggregation’ of privately 
expressed voting preferences, is not thought a sufficient condition for 
effective or legitimate democratic practice (Cohen, 1997; Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2004).  
 
However, the ‘publicness’ of deliberative approaches has been 
criticised by agonistic theorists as a politically circumscribed one. 
According to Haug and Teune (2008:12) scholars characterise 
deliberative debate essentially in terms of “cooperative behaviour”: 
“consensus, the common good/common ground, constructiveness 
and (willingness for a) transformation of preferences” (ibid). To 
position this common denominator as a normative presupposition, 
they contrast it with the importance placed by agonistic critics on 
“the importance of struggle and competition between different 
political positions” (ibid). From an agonistic perspective, then, “a 
cooperative discourse always implies an a priori consensus amongst 
the participants which limits the scope of positions to be debated in 
the discussion, thus excluding certain political actors and their 
opinions” (ibid). The agonistic perspective, conversely, “does not 
dream of mastering, or eliminating undecidability, for it realises that 
it is the very condition of possibility of decision and therefore of 
freedom and pluralism” (Mouffe, 2000:34). Relatedly, Sørensen 
(2014:152) suggests than governance theory and planning theory 
“share a tendency to overlook the role of conflicts in coordination 
processes or view them as a disruptive force that must be mollified 
or neutralized”; “[i]n effect, little attention has been given to the 
productive role of conflicts in promoting coordination” (ibid:154). 
Such concerns appear only to have grown over time among planning 
theorists, such that the notion of ‘postpolitics’ in planning, with 




“generic shorthand for our understanding…in the sense that there is 
not much room for divergent or radically different things to happen” 
(Bylund, 2012:322). 
 
No conclusions are drawn here about the relative merits of an 
aggregative, deliberative, agonistic, or any other particular approach 
to democratic decision making. Indeed, the construction of categories 
such as ‘agonistic’ and ‘deliberative’ itself serves to obscure 
differences within each category, and theoretical developments 
within these over time. Deliberative thinkers, for example, have 
sought to address agonistic criticisms directly; Dryzek (2000) thus 
promotes what he calls a ‘discursive’ version of deliberative 
democracy, which aims to be “pluralistic in embracing the necessity 
to communicate across difference without erasing difference” (3). 
Instead, two simple observations are made. First, insofar as the 
category of ‘deliberation’ has analytical value, it indicates a 
particular, and historically contingent, set of tendencies in the 
conceptualisation the process of decision-making. Second, that the 
simple assertion of inclusive deliberation should not necessarily be 
equated with an ideal implementational outcome, either on its own 
terms or on those of its critics. We should therefore be suspicious of 
its unqualified presentation as an approach which will self-evidently 
produce a transparent reflection of ‘public opinion’. 
 
In this sense, an agonistic perspective is useful as a foil to an 
unquestioned consensus-based approach; in postulating the limits of 
deliberation, it facilitates the possibility that its promotion actually 
serves a particular agenda. With regard to the exclusion of the public, 
the notion of ‘post-political’ social ordering is of relevance in this 
respect. For Swyngedouw, the conceptualisation of a “consensual 
and apparently inclusive order – since it only contains those who 
have voice, who are counted, and named” is fundamental to the 
“post-political condition” (Swyngedouw, 2007:64). From the post-
political perspective, “conflicts of interest and opinion” (ibid) are 
acknowledged, but can be reconciled by “assumedly neutral 
scientific” (ibid:67) technocratic means. Stavrakakis similarly points 
to an underlying assumption that “’technocratic’ solutions are able to 
calm every crisis, resolve in an impartial manner every antagonism, 
satisfy all social grievances and abort political explosions” 




significant repression through its attempt to reduce every moment of 
radical heterogeneity to a technical/administrative issue that the 
power/knowledge apparatus should be able to resolve and 
neutralize” (Stavrakakis, 2007:148).  
 
The deliberative governance orientation within eco-city plans, 
then, may not embrace emergent publicness so much as draw on 
post-political discursive norms. The possible exclusionary effects of 
deliberation, at least, are almost entirely invisible within the 
documents consulted here. Since processes of consultation are 
presented as fully inclusive, the consensus achieved is equated with 
a singularity of opinion within the community in its entirety. 
Portland claims that “[a]ll Portlanders and communities fully 
participate in and influence decision-making” (4); in its summary 
brochure, Whitehill & Bordon quotes the independent chairman of 
the Delivery Board as saying “[t]his is the most inclusive governance 
structure I have ever seen” (Whitehill & Bordon Eco-town, 2012:33). 
In Sejong, “great effort has been put to collect broad extent of 
opinions from every sector of society” (7); Freiburg mandates that 
“all parts of a city’s population must be invited to participate, 
cooperate and engage through appropriate modes of communication” 
(28). Valdespartera’s progress was founded on unanimous 
agreement “across the political spectrum, local unions, employers 
and neighbourhood associations” (11): “this spirit is always desirable 
for stability and success in large urban projects” (11). The City of 
Sydney’s consultation exercise was “the most extensive in the City of 
Sydney’s history” (197), such that “[p]eople from all walks of life, 
across generations and an extensive range of organisations have 
given ideas and suggestions to inform the Vision” (13). 
 
Where differences within this body of people are acknowledged, 
they are conceived in terms of various definable demographic 
groups – tending in this sense towards Boundas’ concept of ‘discrete 
differences’ describing “distinct entities” (Boundas, 1996:21), rather 
than radical heterogeneity. Thus, Whitehill & Bordon refers to 
representatives of different ‘faith communities’ with whom 
“discussions were held” during the consultation process (86). Sejong 
will create “housing supply to meet demands from different classes” 
(16). Sydney “is made up of diverse communities, with diverse 




student and visitor communities” (96), and it is necessary to 
recognise “minority group needs” (103). Sydney is not alone in 
overlaying spatiality onto this notion of discrete difference: “the city 
is made up of a ‘City of Villages’ of different character” (100); just as 
Auroville’s description of 96 ‘communities’ relates to their spatial 
differentiation (1.5.3b), and elsewhere analyses the make-up of its 
population demographically (1.6). Within Eco2 Cities’ “bottom up” 
‘City-Based Approach’, the basic building blocks are “particular 
neighbourhoods” (45) – in other words, spatially bounded 
collectivities. 
 
Any differences between these ‘distinct entities’ are not a source of 
ongoing, open-ended productive or destructive tension, so much as 
temporary problems to be resolved deliberatively in the process of 
reaching the desired consensus. For Auroville, diversity is even 
subsumed within unity: the city is “a unique example of the 
manifestation of human unity in diversity” (foreword). Although 
Frieburg urges the “encouragement of cultural diversity and 
distinctiveness” (7), its overriding desire is the “integration of all 
strands of society irrespective of ethnicity, gender or age” (11). Eco2 
Cities warns of “the tendency for all stakeholders to act in their own 
immediate interests”, which is a “barrier to the potential for positive 
synergies and optimum solutions” (34).  
 
Differences, then, are presented as inevitably resolvable, rather 
than as a source of creative tension as Lefebvre’s notion of 
representational space envisages. Social cohesion is forged out of a 
marriage of these differences; it is constituted by them 
unidirectionally. Thus, Auroville’s ‘Residents Assembly’ merely 
serves “the purpose of cohesion integration [sic] of Auroville” 
(1.10.3). Eco2 Cities valorises networks of social capital within the 
public, which “support an efficient and cohesive society” through 
“social and intellectual interactions” (95): while entertaining the 
positive implications of ‘interaction’, the emphasis here is on the 
possible ‘cohesion’ which will result. Greensburg reflects that “[o]f 
course there were differing opinions and life-perspectives on many 
issues, but often the disagreements and challenges lifted the dialogue 
to a more thorough evaluation” (6). Almere mobilises ‘diversity’ as a 
means to flatten out (spatialised) differences: “[v]arious districts of 




dwelling, urban amenities, natural resources, population 
composition and employment. In expanding towards a more mature 
city, the ecological, social and economic diversity must increase” (9).  
 
Syntactically, the public is often assigned a passive role in this 
trajective space. This is again achieved through nominalisation – the  
nominalisations themselves often being the passive objects of verbs. 
The subjects of these verbs may be the ‘leadership’ or different types 
of technology. Greensburg suggests that “[h]ousing design affects 
community interaction and walkability” (103). In Almere, “a wide 
range of living and working milieus will be built” (21). Individuals 
may, furthermore, be functionally, or even biologically, represented, 
such that they form part of a systemic whole. Sydney envisages a 
“City that is attractive for pedestrian movement and cycling” (90). 
Sejong’s more recent brochure claims to reflect the idea that “going 
forward a more human-oriented and environment-friendly city is 
widely sought and desired by people around the globe” (MACCA, 
2010a:2). (Here – as was the case for OECD, as noted earlier – the 
global public appears as a singularity.) A similar effect is achieved 
through the use of the expression ‘human-oriented technology’ 
(MACCA, 2010a:22). People appear only as ‘customers’ in Eco2 Cities’ 
diagram demonstrating the value of ‘layered maps’ (8); these layers 
represent the ‘real world’, ‘land use’, ‘elevation’, ‘parcels’, ‘streets’, 
and ‘customers’. 
 
The passivity of this constructed public is further emphasised in 
various assertions of their need to be educated – an assertion which, 
paradoxically, undermines the storyline by revealing that the 
authorities are in fact influencing public opinion and behaviour in 
certain directions, rather than merely ‘responding’ to it. Whitehill & 
Bordon feels the need to “encourage uptake of allotments and 
healthy food choices” (44). In Portland, research will be used to 
identify “how to influence human behavioural change” (13), while 
“[e]ngagement of the community through civic events” (13) is 
planned. Auroville operates “community and environmental 
awareness programmes” (1.9.17). OECD advocates policies to 
“encourage eco-innovation” (46). Eco2 Cities’ approach works to 
“assess and reward the performance of all stakeholders” (5); it 
recommends “conduct[ing] a fluency campaign” to help decision 




through the assertion that “many local decision makers operate 
under a series of myths and false assumptions” (30), which need 
correcting. 
 
Utopian space: the ‘sustainable’ goal 
 
What is here termed the ‘utopian’ space at the end of the trajectory 
has three key characteristics. First, it tends towards visualised and 
‘bird’s eye’ presentations of space. Second, it contains surface 
markers which explicitly mark it out as a location of timeless 
abundance. Third, it is metaphorically flat. These three characteristics 
are dealt with in turn below.  
 
Utopian space as visual space     
 
Of ‘utopian’ space’s three characteristics, its ‘visual’ ones are most 
easily illustrated with reference to the presence of masterplan 
diagrams and aerial photographs in the documents. References to 
‘landscape’ similarly point to a ‘bird’s eye’ perspective: Sejong will 
be a “cityscape where nature and artifacts are in harmony” (12); 
Huaibei will be developed “in accordance with the natural landscape” 
(20); in Greensburg, a “streetscape with [various features] will 
provide a welcome atmosphere for pedestrians” (33). Indicatively, 
pedestrians are noticeably absent from the architect’s impression of 








Space is aestheticised in other more subtle ways. In Almere, for 
example, “[t]he view of [the lake of] Ijmeer and Amsterdam” will 
lend a “metropolitan aura” (29) to a planned new district – the 
‘metropolitan’ thus being defined in visual terms. For Sydney, the 
cosmopolitanism of Newtown is a useful asset in its “role as a 
regional attraction” (100); this cosmopolitanism is not, then, 
considered as a spatially productive source of unpredictable social or 
political tension – rather, as an aesthetic quality which appeals to the 
outsider.  
 
Utopian space as abundance    
 
The ‘abundance’ which the space yields for its inhabitants is 
variously described in terms of health, safety, riches, employment, 
and recreational opportunities. Almere will be “liveable and 
healthy…a vital community with a wide diversity of living and 
working possibilities, in a salutary abundance of space, water, nature 
and cultural landscapes” (8); Sejong will be “a welcoming 
environment, abundant green land” (13), and provide “health care to 
ensure the quality of life” (9:26); Portland a “Healthy Connected City” 
(14); Whitehill & Bordon will “ensure people have opportunities to 
interact with nature, encourage recreation, sports and healthier 
lifestyles” (37). This abundance is only ever portrayed as inclusive: 
Freiburg’s open spaces are safe because they “attract a broad variety 
and age-range of people” (10); in Huaibei, “neighbourhoods will 
appeal to every person young and old” (4); Sejong will provide “a 
foundation for culture and welfare open to all” (27). Unqualified 
positive descriptors reinforce this universally accessible abundance. 
For example, Almere’s residents will lead “pleasant lives” (8); 
Huaibei will enable “the good life for all” (6:4); Sejong will be “the 
beautiful and the clean” (25). There is little discussion, finally, of this 
agreeable stasis ever being interrupted by ongoing or unpredictable 
threats and changes. Thus, for example, OECD’s recommendations 
will “ensur[e] high quality of life over the long run” (28); Sejong will 
be “a safe city prepared for disasters” (12); and Auroville is “a place 
of…a youth that never ages” (1.2.7).  
 
Utopian space as flat space   
   
The third quality of this utopian space – its flatness – is rhetorically 




contains no distortions, contradictions, instabilities or tensions: 
rather, it is defined using words such as ‘balance’, ‘integration’, 
‘synthesis’ and ‘harmony’. Almere will constitute a “synthesis of 
ecological, social, economic and spatial strategy” (3). Auroville will 
be “a place of peace, concord and harmony…where all human beings 
of goodwill…could live freely…obeying one single authority, that of 
the supreme Truth” (1.2.1). Freiburg’s ‘charter’ aims at “the 
assurance of social harmony” (7), with a “balance of people and uses” 
(10), and a “balanced age and social profile within functioning 
neighbourhoods” (11); population growth will occur in Huaibei, but 
in a “balanced” way (21), with the city embracing “the potency of 
living in harmony” (2). Notions of ‘completeness’ and ‘integration’ 
further this sense of harmonic unity: on becoming a “sustainable” 
city, Almere will also be “complete” (7); Eco2 Cities advocates a 
“one-system approach that enables cities to realize the benefits of 
integration by planning, designing and managing the whole urban 
system” (xviii); Portland will create “complete and vibrant 
neighbourhood centres” (14); Freiburg’s ‘City of the Future’ is one of 
“social and functional integration” (10).  
 
The goal of infinite accessibility is explicitly expressed, in Sydney’s 
intention, for example, to “ensur[e] equitable distribution and access 
to social infrastructure” (100), and in Sejong’s promise to “make the 
administrative buildings highly accessible, friendly and open to the 
citizens” (19). Accordingly, metaphors related to the levelling of 
impediments and the filling of holes are mapped onto the trajectory 
leading to the utopian destination; the resulting space will be one of 
unhindered interconnections and unimpeded flow. Thus, OECD 
portrays problems with existing networks as ‘gaps’ which “impede 
policy or programmatic activity” and therefore need to be “bridged” 
(94). The ideal is a city free of “institutional, regulatory and financing 
resource barriers” (9). OECD points to the need to create horizontal 
and transnational networks of governance in addition to integrating 
governance vertically (93). In idealising decentralisation (12), 
Freiburg’s implicitly positions hierarchy as a vertical ‘barrier’. Sejong 
will overcome the socio-economic “gaps between regions obstacles 
[sic] in national development” (MCT, 2006:15). For Almere “the 
mutual reaction between region and Almere can only take place via 
optimum connections” (18). Relatedly, the source domain of ‘fabric’ 




surface. Almere aims “to interlace more and more with the social and 
cultural structures of the [Randstad] metropolis” (16). Eco2 Cities 
promotes an “action-oriented approach that knits together cities, 
their senior or national governments, and their supporters at all 
levels” (44). So as to “link” its cultural landmarks, Sydney will create 
a harbourside walking trail, which it describes as a “Cultural Ribbon” 
(156); Huaibei’s plan “seamlessly integrates residential, commercial, 
park and recreation” (62). 
 
This flatness extends beyond the city itself; the possibility of an 
external threat is neutralised by the erosion of an inside-outside 
distinction. Thus, Sejong aims for “functional interconnection within 
the metropolitan area” (34); Almere will become “physically, socially 
and economically embedded in the surrounding area” (19); for 
OECD, “cities and regions would function in a collaborative network 
with other institutions and actors” (14); and Eco2 Cities prescribes 
“[c]ollaboration at the scale of the entire urban area or region” (4). 
The dichotomy between (externally threatening) ‘nature’ and the city 
is similarly erased by collapsing the distinctions between the two in 
the spatial vision. Auroville is “a human settlement in harmony with 
nature” (1.4.5); Sejong will exhibit “lively urban space in harmony 
with beautiful scenery” (22); for Almere, “the city and its environs” 
are “a single unit” (37); Huaibei will achieve “the integration of 
farming, industry and tourism” (77). Simultaneously, the natural 
world will be brought into the city space. Eco2 Cities endorses the 
idea of “nature integrated into a city” (44); Sydney promotes ‘green 
networks’; Huaibei will be a “living urban garden” (30) where 
“agriculture will infuse the city” (30); in Whitehill & Bordon “[t]he 
countryside is brought into the town” (102). Even the threatening 
characteristics of the night (which might elsewhere be understood as 
a temporal interruption to this utopian space) are sometimes 
countered by an erosion of the distinction between the two. Sejong 
will “supply high-density residential land united with commercial 
and operational functions to maintain vitality at night”. Freiburg will 
ensure ‘safety’ by making key locations “active throughout the day 
and late into the evening” (10). 
 
This eco-city space is reminiscent of Stavrakakis’ characterisation 
of a ‘neoliberal’ urban ideal of “utopia, order and flow of 




divisions are bridged at last, all the traumas healed: city/country, 
labor/leisure, capitalism/activism” (Stavrakakis, 2007:146). 
Stavrakakis sees this “holistic ideal of fun and enjoyment” as 
problematic: 
“isn’t something missing from all that? Where is decision, 
pluralism, the choice between real alternatives, power, 
antagonism? Can it really be taken for granted that 
business and recreation, labor and leisure are so easily 
compatible? For how many of us and who exactly? How? 
Is it really so obvious that the ‘tribes of the city’ will co-
exist harmoniously, that their priorities and orientations 
are compatible? Do all of them have the same access to 
this appealing utopia? Is there no exclusion?” 
(Stavrakakis, 2007:146) 
 
For  Stavrakakis, this utopianism functions in what Barthes (2007) 
calls a ‘mythological’ way: “not as something that ‘hides’ reality, but 
as something that ‘depoliticizes’ it” (Stavrakakis, 2007:145). If 
Stavrakakis is right to identify a broader policy discourse of the city 
whose ontology excludes the possibility of politics and the 
generative potential of social conflict, then this would seem to be 




5.2    The Open Spaces of Utopia 
 
Utopian space is closely aligned with Lefebvre’s ‘representations of 
space’ in its limited conceptualisation of the social dimensions of 
space. It is imagined on the basis both of an initial diagnosis which, 
in framing space as ‘defensible’, ignores the role of spatial practice in 
its production, and of an ensuing prescription of trajective space, 
which ignores the emergent public life of the city. It would be 
surprising, then, if this spatial storyline was disrupted by a more 
rounded normative presentation of the publicness of open spaces. 
While the open spaces of the city are not mentioned at all in the 
OECD framework, they do play a significant role in most of the other 
cases studied here – yet their publicness is never defined as socially 
produced; the public is imagined as civically complying with the 
intended use of the space; its character is not to be assembled 





In some cases, the emphasis placed on formal, aesthetic qualities 
clearly draws on the visual aspects of ‘representations of space’. 
Hence, Whitehill & Bordon will include “attractive” public space (7); 
Huaibei prescribes “high quality public spaces and public parks” (4); 
for Freiburg, ‘public spaces’ “form the public face of a city” (24). 
Sydney envisages (93) “vibrant public space” but this, along with “an 
inviting streetscape”, is valorised as a means of maintaining the city’s 
“international iconic status”. When Sydney suggests that “[t]here is 
room, too, for great public art” (16), this is not a countercultural 
conception of art, so much as one imposed by institutional decisions 
onto the ‘streetscape’.  
 
Elsewhere, other instrumental benefits are emphasised. Open 
spaces serve an ecological purpose for Eco2 Cities: ‘pedestrian 
pathways’ will keep the city cool and absorb rainwater (71), while 
increasing “physical and mental well-being” (37). Often, they are 
locations of leisure and healthy exercise: Sejong’s citizens can “come 
to enjoy the massive green space” (11); Whitehill & Bordon 
emphasises “[t]he potential for these spaces to provide a number of 
different services involving health, sport, art and culture” (46). Their 
benefits are often described in terms of ‘liveability’: in Freiburg, for 
example, “a great variety of liveable public spaces everywhere in the 
city has been achieved” (14). The word ‘liveable’ implies that such 
spaces exist prior to the public that may ‘live’ in them.  
 
Potential economic or place-marketing benefits are also often 
highlighted. In Huaibei, a “new Water Park City, of Disneyland 
quality…will provide crowd pleasing entertainment designed for 
high densities of people” (76) and communicate environmental 
educational messages “granting it a unique branding as resounding 
and sustaining as Disney” (76). Whitehill & Bordon’s green spaces 
were “highly regarded” by participants of the consultation process 
and will therefore become a key “selling point” for the city (31). For 
Sydney, the “liveability of the City Centre is of critical importance to 
achieving the future economic growth targets of the Metropolitan 
Plan for Sydney and the Sustainable Sydney 2030 Vision” (40). 
 
Most typically, the role of open spaces as key arenas where public 




to as ‘public spaces’. Huaibei’s downtown, for example, will be a 
“second living room and gathering place for people from the region” 
(4); it contends that “[l]ivable cities are reflected in the street life as 
created by the people who live, work and visit an area” (ibid). And 
yet, in place of complex ‘representational space’, or ‘spatial practice’ 
we find utopian notions of ‘cohesion’ and ‘community’ being created 
by this space; they result from it – and in this sense, this space is 
given agency as a technological narrative actant. Thus, for 
Greensburg, “[c]ommunity is created when people can meet up and 
relate to each other in public spaces” (37). In the Eco2 Cities scheme, 
‘city green areas’ are “a source of community” (37). In Greensburg, 
“[g]reat park and open space networks enrich the activities of 
everyday life” (128). Auroville’s communal ‘Matrimandir’ is the 
“spiritual and physical centre of Auroville” (1.5.6), its development 
reflecting the “increasing perfection of Auroville as a whole” (1.9.19). 
Freiburg asserts that: “All users of public space must respect the 
activities of others” (14); the possibility of disrespect, of social tension, 
is thereby constructed as ‘out of place’ in these spaces. The 
publicness envisioned as assembling in these spaces is exclusively 
civic in its modality. 
 
The open spaces of the city, then, are given primary agency as 
actants in the realisation of this utopia: they produce community. 
Their nature as places produced by the public life of the city remain 
undiscussed. Sydney, for example, claims to recognise the “role of 
streets, parks and squares in public life” (15), asking us to “watch 
what will happen” as a result of its central thoroughfare being closed 
to vehicles: “[t]here will be human life along the whole length of it” 
(16). Even Valdespartera, with its claimed focus – as noted earlier – 
on the ‘social construction’ of the city, and the public ‘appropriation’ 
of space, open spaces are considered in terms of their “quality” as 
sites of “basic neighbourly relations, cooperation, civic participation; 
in other words, social cohesion fostered by their spatial configuration, 
in terms of density, shape and multifunctionality” (143). The leisure, 
amenity and art facilitated by these spaces will “strengthen the 
identity of the new neighbourhood and generate an urban culture” 
(298). Thus, despite the professed concern to “consolidate 
[Valdespartera’s] urbanity” (6), this urbanity is understood as a type 
of social cohesion generated by the formal aspects of its space, rather 




5.3   Conclusions 
The tripartite conceptualisation of the city’s space, then, is 
constructed through a complex system of metaphorical mappings, 
which collectively work to provide an apparent explanation of the 
current and future characteristics of this space. In highlighting 
certain aspects of the space, however, they conceal others. This is a 
rhetorical strategy, empowered by the resonance of the storyline 
with an archetypal plot, which works ideologically to reinforce a call 
for action.   
 
Since the documents consulted here constitute a cross-section of 
international eco-city conceptualisations, reflecting the variety of the 
phenomenon if not statistically representing its substance, and 
including a variety of textual types, there is a strong suggestion that 
the storyline identified underlies the eco-city order of discourse as a 
whole. It is unsurprising that this storyline is not consistently 
realised in every document, since the coherency of the eco-city order 
of social practice, as discussed in Chapter Two, is definable only in 
terms of tendencies rather than absolute criteria. However, the 
similarities across all 12 documents, in terms both of the storyline, 
and of the rhetorical means of its construction, are more striking than 
their inconsistencies. 
 
This partiality of the storyline’s ontology is revealed when its 
three spatial dimensions are compared with a model of space such as 
Lefebvre’s. Instead of socially produced dynamic ‘place’, we find 
bounded ‘defensible space’; instead of politically contested and 
multiple ‘representational space’, we encounter linear trajective 
space shaped by various narrative actants in predetermined, 
collaborative ways. The utopian space of the storyline’s destination 
has similarities with Lefebvre’s ‘representations of space’ – a 
conceptualisation of space characteristic of modernity and which, in 
terms of the concerns of this thesis, has the effect of obscuring the 
emergent public modality of urban space.  
 
Implications for case study research 
The implications of these conclusions for research into implemented 
eco-city initiatives are discussed below, with reference to the two 





1. How does the assemblage of publicness in the eco-city differ from its 
conceptualisation in official documentation?  
From one perspective, the charge that planning documents and 
policies fail to account for unpredictable emergent publicness may be 
misdirected. It may be the case that consistency and singularity of 
purpose are necessary conditions for a ‘call to action’. Accordingly, 
planning will necessarily aim to bridge rather than stimulate or 
emphasise differences:  
 
“[in] striving to affect reconciliation, the planner must 
perforce resort to the potentiality for harmonious balance 
in society. And it is on this fundamental notion of social 
harmony that the ideology of planning is built” 
(Harvey, 1985:176). 
 
In positioning planning for unpredictable multiplicity as essentially 
oxymoronic, this perspective highlights the ‘problem of planning’ 
identified in Chapter One. Simultaneously, however, it need not 
imply that its resolution through alternative approaches is 
impossible in future. Allmendinger comments that while the 
planning system in Britain continues to aspire to be ‘apolitical’ and 
professional, it  
“has not tackled the root causes of urban problems 
because it was never meant to…Planning exists to help 
the market and support capitalism, not challenge and 
supplant it…The whole apparatus of planning was built 
around the notion of a benevolent elite working 
towards common goals” 
 (Allmendinger, 2001:1–2). 
 
While the “current favoured paradigm, collaborative planning, is 
based on a revised modernist notion of consensus” (ibid:4), it may not 
be an inevitable one. Indeed, planning has survived as a profession 
precisely because it has remained “flexible and amorphous” (ibid:4).  
 
As noted in Chapter One, planning theory at least has shifted in the 
direction of relativism, in rejection of the modernist ideal of objective 
description and scientific prescription. Truths mattering for the 
purpose of action are now theorised as arising pragmatically from 




‘postmodern’ normative theorists have explicitly called for 
alternative approaches which attempt to embrace more fully the 
pluralities of urban life. Postmodern planning theorists emphasise  
“decentralised, plural, community-led, fluid and reflective 
thinking which has a number of implications not only on 
planning but also on such issues as voting, community 
identification, freedom of information and, fundamentally, 
whether we need a planning system at all” 
(Allmendinger, 2001:228). 
 
Friedman, for example, argues for a decentred ‘Non-Euclidean Mode 
of Planning’ which “operates in real time by linking knowledge and 
action into a tightly looped process” (Friedmann, 1993:484) rather 
than being exclusively concerned with an “imagined future” 
(ibid:482). In order to escape the ‘dead-end’ of the “dualism erected 
between urban representations and the ‘real city’”, Shields proposes 
“multi-dimensional analyses which, rather than imposing 
monological coherence and closure, allow parallel and conflicting 
representations to coexist in analysis” (Shields, 1996:245). Without 
claiming to foresee the types of ‘knowledge technology’ through 
which planning will be implemented in future, Richards (1991:8) 
rejects ‘rationalistic’ or consensus-oriented processes, since “conflict 
and disagreement are essential to the continuously creative dynamics 
of the dialogic process”; the aim would be that “desirable systems 
emerge, where desirability is itself in continual flux”. 
 
Elsewhere, however, criticism has been levelled at planning and 
architecture theorists who “advance an extreme ‘postmodernist’ 
position of epistemological relativism” (Taylor, 1998:165). 
Allmendinger remains sceptical of relativistic approaches to 
planning, since planning is fundamentally “about closure – there can 
only be one decision about whether a development can proceed” 
(Allmendinger, 2002:180). Taylor distinguishes the goal of 
‘comprehensiveness’ in planning, which experience has shown to be 
“undesirable and unrealistic”, from the “pursuit of rationality” (ibid), 
without which plans cannot be made; advocating the envisionment 
of planning styles which are rational and yet proceed in “more 
piecemeal, incremental and ‘organic’ ways” (ibid). Bridge (2005) is 
similarly troubled by postmodern planning’s “endless openness” 
(146) and therefore promotes a form of ‘planning as argumentation’ 




promotes this as a ‘post-postmodern’ means of approaching change. 
This ‘dissensus’-based planning would still aim to provide outcomes 
leading to change, but assumes that change is normally ongoing and 
unpredictable, resulting from the accommodation of differences 
through situated argumentation, rather than from universal 
agreement achieved through rational discussion. This represents a 
shift of emphasis away from “bringing enquiry to a close” towards 
“exploring the dimensions of oppositions” (143); decisions about 
action, he suggests, should emerge from within the process of 
continually ‘expanding enquiry’ through agonistic communication, 
rather than only be seen as valid once the goal of progressively 
“narrowing down of argument to truth or agreement” (144) has been 
achieved. 
 
Bridge is therefore advocating a pragmatic, incremental, situated 
philosophy of planning. However, leaving aside the question of 
implementability, his interest here relates to the processes of decision-
making rather than to the plans resulting from these. He explicitly 
dodges the problematic possibility that the plan itself will always 
constitute an act of ideological closure, however arrived at. From this 
perspective, it might be argued that a plan’s failure to depict 
polyphony might instead be seen as a success on its own terms. This 
‘failure’, moreover, does not exclude the possibility that a pluralist, 
emergent public life will assemble itself in the actual performance of 
the city. This possibility presents a less pessimistic perspective on the 
ability of contemporary mainstream plans to deliver truly urban 
development, yet it still fails to guarantee the environmental, social, 
and economic sustainability of what will result.  
 
Official documents in themselves may therefore be poor guides to 
the ‘publicness’ of the eco-city. Holston (1989) describes the 
unexpected uses of the planned modernist space of Brasilia by its 
inhabitants. Bridge (2005:129) sees Holston’s study as an example of 
how the ‘abstractions’ evident in certain modes of planning can be 
“at odds with the lifeworld orientations of ordinary residents and 
also how space can, in some small degree, be reappropriated by 
those without power”. The reappropriation of space as it is 
‘performed’, moreover, may not only relate to its post-
implementational publicness; it may also describe the results of 




implementation. Shwayri’s (2013) recent study describes the 
‘Koreanization’ of Songdo, an eco-city under construction in Korea. 
While Songdo was originally designed to attract international 
residents, with “visual attributes of familiar western models” (49), its 
“implementation has been bogged down repeatedly by local politics, 
and regional and global economic crises (49)”. Additionally, as 
discussed in Chapter Four, the ‘smooth surface’ of published 
documents ratified through institutional procedures may belie a 
rather more contested process of negotiation leading to their 
publication. The suppression of dissent in a final document, then, 
need not be interpreted as evidence that such dissent does not exist. 
Exploring this possibility may require in-depth research into the 
specific motivations of the various actors involved in each individual 
case. If emergent publicness is assembled into a singularity within 
plans, rather than merely ignored by them, there is no reason to 
suppose that emergent publicness will not continue to shape their 
implementation in future.  
 
As well as studying the publicness of urban space which results 
from eco-city plans being implemented, the following two chapters 
therefore also pay close attention to the context in which the plans 
were devised. To see plans and policies as existing outside this 
context would itself be to impose a modernist framing on the 
analysis. Rather, they too are understood as emerging from their 
local context, shaped by an interaction between the international 
discourse of the eco-city and contingent local conditions; they do not 
so much direct the development of the eco-city ‘from above’ as form 
part of its broader experimental process. 
 
2. Is the eco-city currently serving to reproduce the ‘neoliberal’ status 
quo? 
  
In studying official documentation, as previously discussed, no 
equivalence is assumed between what is envisioned in a plan and the 
actual urban sustainability outcomes of the plan’s implementation. 
Nevertheless, as products of their context and enablers of change, 
plans – particularly those backed by significant institutional and/or 
commercial resources – may perform a catalytic role. They may have 
agentive force in drawing together particular agendas and actors, in 
shaping debate by making certain issues and framings more visible 




than others. If, thereby, they are serving particular agendas – 
concealed though these may be through various rhetorical tactics and 
even by the appealing yet nebulous goal of ‘sustainability’ itself – 
then it becomes important to identify what those particular agendas 
might be. The goal of real-world urban sustainability may be 
compromised by a rhetorical ideal of urban sustainability which 
conceals agendas that are rather less than transformative in intent. 
Identifying the rhetorical patterning evident in eco-city documents 
themselves – as this chapter has attempted to do – may provide an 
antidote to its potentially blinding effects. In turn, this should allow 
for a more constructive debate about the intended and actual effects 
of plans, without using the evaluative criteria of the utopian rhetoric 
itself.  
 
As a framework for thinking about the effects of the more specific 
content of eco-city plans on the real world, the idea of the ‘neoliberal’ 
eco-city is tested here. This is justified by the assumption that eco-
cities will not be immune to wider tendencies within urban 
governance – particularly since they are so often driven by local 
authorities themselves – which have been critically described as 
evidencing the ‘neoliberalisation’ of urban governance. Indeed, the 
phenomenon of ‘neoliberal urban environmentalism’ has recently 
been identified, in which “contemporary adaptation policies are 
being framed by neoliberal practices of market-oriented governance, 
enhanced privatisation and urban environmental entrepreneurialism” 
(Whitehead, 2013:1348).34 Rather than pointing the way forwards to a 
post-liberal mode of societal organisation, in which the problem of 
planning for urban sustainability is resolved through an embrace of 
emergent publicness, dominant modes of eco-city planning may in 
fact serve to reproduce existing institutional and economic structures 
in response to an ongoing crisis of liberalism. Again, the question of 
whether and how this neoliberalisation is actually realised, beyond 
its postulated performative presence in plans themselves (and the 
extent to which this perspective has explanatory force or critical 
value), requires analysis of individual cases.  
 
                                                          
34 A sizeable literature exists on the neoliberalisation of environmental governance more 
generally (see eg McCarthy & Prudham, 2004; Heynen et al., 2007; Castree, 2008a; 2008b; 





In Chapter Two, a series of characteristics distinguishing the most 
recent wave of eco-city initiatives from their predecessors were 
outlined. Many of these might be interpreted as indicators of 
neoliberalism, with potentially problematic implications for the goal 
of sustainability. First, the widespread adoption since the mid-2000s 
of the ‘carbon agenda’ – focusing on climate change and CO2 
emissions. This has been described elsewhere as having largely 
“overwritten” the 1990s urban SD agenda (Bulkeley et al., 2012:113), 
and as a type of ‘fetishisation’ (Swyngedouw, 2010a) allowing earlier 
socially radical models of sustainability to be usurped by ones 
“organized within the horizons of a capitalist order that is beyond 
dispute” (ibid:219). On this view, current mainstream urban 
sustainability policy typifies the neoliberal ‘post-political’ situation, 
failing to question or address the underlying structural causes of 
non-sustainability.  
 
Second, from the perspective of Gualini’s ‘neoliberal thesis’ (see 
Chapter One), the growth of newer ‘hybrid’ forms of governance 
exemplifies the ‘roll-back’ of the state. The wider trend towards the 
delivery and management of urban development through public-
private partnerships has often been aligned with the.    
neoliberalisation of the city (see, for example: Jessop, 2002; Harvey, 
2006a; Haughton & McManus, 2011; Crouch, 2011; Sager, 2011). For 
Purcell, this poses a challenge to democracy, in that “[o]ligarchic 
institutions like public-private partnerships, appointed councils, and 
quasi-public agencies are increasingly making decisions that were 
formerly made by officials directly elected by the public” (Purcell, 
2008:27). To the extent that this assessment is a valid one, it is 
difficult to reconcile with the ideal of ‘procedural equity’ being a 
central principle of sustainability, such that “participation is central 
to achieving effective and sustainable processes of regeneration, 
owned and mobilized by the general public as well as state 
authorities” (Haughton, 1999:236). The growing linkage of SD to 
“more negotiated or co-operative approaches” (Meadowcroft, 
2000:377) does not guarantee greater political ‘legitimacy’, which 
Adger et al. (2003:1096) see as one of the “key integrative elements for 
examining environmental decisionmaking” if the public is excluded 
from, or only tokenistically represented in, the governance process: 
 
“the current post-political condition, which combines 




view of social ordering, constitutes one particular fiction – 
one that in fact forecloses dissent, conflict, and the 
possibility of a different future” 
(Swyngedouw, 2007:71). 
 
Third, it would seem difficult to dissociate the eco-city from 
circuits of international trade, both in terms of individual cities’ 
desire to attract investment, and of their technology suppliers’ desire 
to replicate successes elsewhere. The growing involvement of 
international engineering and consultancy firms describes a 
globalisation of the processes of eco-city development. Insofar as such 
firms are involved with defining urban sustainability in each location 
– in particular, through frameworks of sustainability indicators (Joss 
et al., 2012) – there is some risk that their definitions will exhibit 
technological determinism (and thus conceive of the public as 
passive), since the primary remit of these actors is to provide 
enabling technology. Definitions may, furthermore, come to be 
shaped to a greater extent by commercial considerations which 
reflect global as much as local economic constraints and 
opportunities. There is no obvious sense in which the growing focus 
on IT-related innovation, in the form of the so-called ‘smart city’, is 
likely tend to buck this trend. Hollands calls for a more progressive 
version of the smart city, suggesting that in its dominant 
understanding, it appears to be a “high-tech variant” of the 
“entrepreneurial city”, whose promise of an infrastructural IT-driven 
harmonious future belies a “more limited  political agenda” which 
ignores power relations and induces further social inequality 
(Hollands, 2008:314–5).  
 
Finally, the foregrounding of commercially driven technological 
‘fixes’ is suggestive of a ‘green growth’ or ‘ecological modernisation’ 
agenda. In its weaker variants, the latter rests on assumptions that 
“with relatively minor technical and regulatory reforms, business as 
usual is possible under existing capitalist structures” rather than 
through recourse to radical societal transformation (Haughton, 
2007:282); dissenting ecological discourses which critique industrial 
society itself are excluded or deflected (Dryzek, 2005:179), and little 
consideration is given to the strengthening of the democratic 
dimensions of environmental policy through greater public 
participation (Barry & Paterson, 2004). If the implementation of a 




relevance of existing social and institutional realities, it reflects a 
tendency which Gill (1995) identifies within neoliberal ideology 
whereby local societal norms are not understood as part of the 
process but written off as ‘xenophobic’ barriers to progress. But 
while the significance of place-specific context is underplayed in the 
presentation of technology’s ability to effect a transition to 
sustainability, a more essentialist notion of place – as evidenced in 
the ‘defensive space’ of the eco-city documentation analysed above – 
is mobilised for branding purposes. Other commentators characterise 
the rise of ‘place branding’ as neoliberal in its alignment with the 
ideal of the ‘entrepreneurial city’  (Hall & Hubbard, 1998; Hackworth, 
2007; Greenburg, 2008; Sager, 2011). 
 
In more simple terms, the case can be made that this latest wave of 
urban sustainability initiatives subsumes the ‘environmental’ pillar 
of sustainability within the ‘economic’, and prioritises both over the 
‘social’ (particularly if this are conceptualised in terms of equity). 
Even if such initiatives are consistently promoted primarily in 
environmental terms, this may itself be read as a tactic within the 
‘project’ of neoliberalisation, as Brand (2007) argues. He suggests that 
the ‘environment’ has become increasingly incorporated “as an 
object of governmentality” such that it is 
 
“employed as a means of constructing citizens’ sense of 
themselves and their obligations, in a manner perfectly 
attuned to the individualizing demands of neoliberal 
urban transformation…Neoliberal urban governance, I 




In Brand’s view, “the progressive and libertarian aspirations of 
much early environmental thought have been subtly converted into a 
new form of subjection to the strategic requirements and political 
conveniences of neoliberal city administrations” (ibid:616). Gibbs et al. 
(2013:2151) argue that “[n]ew ‘sustainable’ urban imaginaries are 
increasingly taking root in cities and regions around the world” 
characterised by a growing “discourse of market triumphalism” in 
which “[s]tates – local, regional and national – seem to be rolling 
back their own authority and rolling out market-based approaches to 





It may nevertheless be misleading to theorise processes of urban 
neoliberalisation as inevitable ‘organic shifts’ occuring in the absence 
of other alternatives (Hackworth, 2007:17). Macro-level, aggregated 
ideological shifts might best be understood as intellectual constructs; 
in practice they translate into location-specific processes of 
negotiation and experimentation. Nor does the observation of such 
tendencies, as discussed in Chapter Two, imply that eco-cities are 
universally underscored by agendas characterisable as neoliberal. 
Understanding the nature of this uneven neoliberalisation therefore 
requires going beyond the identification of macro trends, to look at 
the detailed context in which its practical implications are 
reproduced or resisted in particular contexts. 
 
The analytical task, then, simultaneously involves interrogating 
the usefulness of the ‘neoliberal’ framework. The broader question of 
whether there is a “concordance or tension between capitalist 
accumulation and sustainability” (Rosol, 2013:2239) remains 
unanswered. Gibbs et al. (2013) outline an alternative position to that 
which constructs ‘sustainability’ as a noble goal which is being 
compromised or undermined by neoliberal approaches to urban 
governance; from a different perspective, the sustainability agenda 
may “[a]t the very least…imply a departure from, or at least some 
compromise of, a market-fundamentalist neoliberal urban landscape 
and its vernacular (While et al., 2010)” (Gibbs et al., 2013, p.2152). 
Nevertheless, they contend that the theoretical tensions between new 
sustainable urban imaginaries and ‘neoliberal urbanism’ tend to be 
overlooked in the search for practical design and economic solutions; 
the market-based approach remains fundamentally unquestioned 
even following the recent economic crisis.  
 
The question of whether the eco-city currently serves to reproduce 
a neoliberal status quo therefore has heuristic value. In asking it, 
however, no assumption is made about this necessarily being the 
most constructive angle from which to launch a critique. Rather, the 
possibility is also entertained that it may be unsatisfactory to focus 
only on the neoliberal dimensions of the governance models adopted; 
that instead they somehow point beyond liberal-modern notions of 
‘planning’, providing clues about how we might more constructively 




complexity. While this possibility seems more obviously worth 
testing in the case of Portland’s EcoDistricts initiative (Chapter Six), it 
is also unclear whether the framework of ‘neoliberalism’ will be 
revealing in the case of a society such as that of South Korea (Chapter 
Seven), since the notion of liberalism which it implies is essentially 
Eurocentric. 
 
The following chapters, then, look more closely at two particular 
cases, with consideration given to the contexts and actors which 
enabled their planning and implementation, the extent to which 
‘neoliberal’ goals were supported or opposed through these 
processes, and the publicness of the space which has resulted – with 




Chapter Six   
Co-opting the Emergent Public? Case 
Study of Portland’s EcoDistricts 
 
 
It was argued in Chapter Five that the public dimensions of the city 
are poorly conceptualised in mainstream eco-city plans and policies. 
As technologies attempting to fix specific outcomes of decision-
making processes, such documents promote or justify particular 
desired developmental trajectories. They promote a static, utopian 
vision of ‘civic’ publicness, in denial of urban tensions. Their 
ideological force works to obscure the particularity of their 
underlying agendas, raising questions about both their 
transferability and the sustainability of the solutions they propose. 
As representations of the urban, they constitute a form of ideological 
closure at odds with an open-ended ‘emergent’ concept of the public.  
 
The idea that emergent publicness might be ‘planned’ may appear 
oxymoronic, insofar as it is essentially unpredictable. Nevertheless, 
while plans cannot determine emergent publicness, it seems possible 
that they might still work to facilitate or hinder it in various ways. 
There is therefore good reason to look beyond the documentation, to 
explore the publicness of urban sustainability in practice. To this end, 
the following research question was proposed in the previous 
chapter: 
 
How does the assemblage of publicness in the eco-city differ from 
its conceptualisation in official documentation? 
  
In exploring this question, the eco-city is considered in terms of what 
results from the implementation of policies, and the real-world 
context through which these policies are developed. The documents 
themselves, as discussed in the previous chapter, are here thought of 
as forming part of, rather than standing outside, the dynamic 





Additionally, it was suggested that the particular agendas 
concealed by the utopian goal of sustainability are variously 
reflective of a broader so-called neoliberalisation of urban 
governance. From this perspective, rather than offering a satisfactory 
solution to the ‘problem of planning’ for sustainability (see Chapter 
One) which takes better account of the emergent city, the eco-city 
may currently tend to reproduce the structural causes of 
unsustainability. To explore this possibility, the following question 
has also been set: 
 
Is the eco-city currently serving to reproduce the ‘neoliberal’ 
status quo? 
 
This chapter examines the case of the EcoDistricts (henceforth 
usually ‘ED’35) initiative in Portland, Oregon (USA), with particular 
reference to its implementation in the Gateway district of outer 
eastern Portland. ED was chosen as a ‘critical case’ (as discussed in 
Chapter Four) since – as will be discussed – Portland more generally 
prides itself on encouraging what is labelled emergent publicness in 
this thesis. When considered in its broader context, then, might it 
provide some clues to the possible nature of a ‘post-liberal’ 
governance approach to urban sustainability? If it is interpreted as 
exemplifying neoliberal urban sustainability, how is this 
interpretation useful as a basis for critical commentary? 
 
The chapter begins by describing the initiative overall, before 
focusing on Gateway. The reasons for the relative failure of Gateway 
Green (GG) are explored, with reference to Gateway’s political and 
attitudinal distance from the dominant ‘Portland discourse’ 
informing the city’s strategic policies, and to the formal qualities of 
its space which hindered the initiative’s attempt to construct a 
‘Gateway public’ in the way envisaged. If ED has been realised more 
successfully in locations where it will most directly serve the city’s 
economic goals, by ‘showcasing’ its achievements, it has served to 
reinforce rather than challenge the structural status quo. However, in 
the final section, the conclusion that ED is thereby working to 
catalyse a process of neoliberalisation is problematised. Equally, as a 
‘post-liberal’ attempt to shape sustainable ‘cityness’, it was flawed 
                                                          
35
   In the text, ‘ED’ (in italics) indicates the EcoDistricts initiative as a whole, while 





precisely because of its institutional framing. As an experimental 
governance approach to sustainability, then, ED challenges both of 




6.1  The EcoDistricts Initiative: Main Characteristics 
 
Overview 
The ED pilot initiative was initiated in 2009 by Mayor Sam Adams of 
Portland, Oregon (USA) – a city with a long history of progressive 
urban policy-making, and a reputation for leading innovation in 
environmental matters (see Section 6.2 below). ED aimed to explore 
the potential for furthering urban sustainability at the district-wide 
scale. In describing Portland as a “laboratory for testing strategies” 
(DistrictLab, 2010:7), the focus was on real-world experimentation 
rather than testing predetermined solutions in an artificial 
environment. The intention was to tap into local knowledge and 
priorities, encouraging development strategies to emerge within 
contingent place-specific constraints “to determine what approaches 
are feasible in a developed urban context” (ibid). Rather than 
imposing solutions from above, a reflexive process of learning was 
envisaged, whereby the city authorities hoped to take their cue from 
the successes and failures of specific projects. The district scale was 
envisaged as a stepping stone between Portland’s acknowledged 
success at constructing individual sustainable buildings and the (as 
yet insufficiently understood) goal of achieving city-wide 
sustainability (DistrictLab, 2010:7).  
 
Mayor Adams instructed PDC to fund the Portland Sustainability 
Institute (PoSI) to establish a series of pilot schemes, with technical 
input from Portland’s Bureau of Planning and Sustainability (BPS). 
The mayor had established PoSI as an organisation “at the nexus of 
Portland sustainability efforts” (P4); ED was to be PoSI’s “bread and 
butter” (P4).36 Five districts were then chosen, the city-level research 
interviewees explained, according to the following principles. First, 
all were to be located in existing Urban Renewal Areas, so that 
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potential funding mechanisms would be in place along with a body 
of actors interested in local regeneration. Second, that the likely focus 
of the specific projects undertaken should differ. Third, following 
selection of three EDs in the urban core, it was decided that others 
should be chosen in outlying districts, to provide geographical 
diversity (Figure 6.1). PoSI assisted local organisers in determining 
their own priority actions. Reflecting the variety of district 
characteristics and stakeholders involved in each ED, it was expected 
that different governance structures might emerge, and these were 
deliberately not imposed. The outcomes of this decentralised process 
of diverse experimentation, it was hoped, would enable the 
identification of “generalisable principles that we can apply across 
the whole city” (P1).  
 
 
Figure 6.1: location of Portland’s five official EcoDistricts 




The city recognised all five pilot EDs as ‘Official Organizations’ in 
November 2012 following the appointment of new mayor Charlie 
Hayles. This recognition instructed PDC and BPS to maintain a 
relationship with the EDs, without defining this relationship (C6). 
However, the period of PDC funding, and PoSI’s convening 
responsibilities, ended in June 2013. PDC interviewees explained 
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that money may be available in future for specific projects, but not 
to facilitate governance processes. PoSI retained specific funding to 
work with the Clinton Climate Initiative Climate Positive programme 
in the South Waterfront ED, but otherwise individual EDs were 
expected to seek funding from elsewhere.  In May 2013, towards the 
end of the pilot scheme, PoSI decided to adopt a national (and 
potentially international) focus, changing its name to EcoDistricts,38  
aiming to provide consultancy and training to help implement EDs 
elsewhere, and disseminate best practice (EcoDistricts, 2013a). The 
reformed, self-funding organisation appears to have distanced itself 
from the pilot scheme; its ‘Protocol’ framework (EcoDistricts, 2014) 
only briefly mentions a “successful pilot program launched in the 
City of Portland in 2008, and extended across North America in 
2014” (EcoDistricts, 2014:4), listing the five EDs without 
commentary in an endnote. Its first annual report makes only 
passing reference to pilot initiative – though one ED (Lloyd), 
significantly, is singled out for special attention (EcoDistricts, 
2013b:9). 
 
Despite the diversity of the five pilot EDs, research interviewees 
generally concurred about their overall typology. The three in or 
adjacent to downtown were bracketed as having a more technical 
focus, and being backed by well-resourced developers, with a only 
small number of landowners involved. The other two, in outer East 
Portland, managed by local volunteers, were described as directed 
more towards building community capacity. Taken as a whole, they 
exhibit a wide range of characteristics of the eco-city phenomenon 
generally, as discussed in Chapter Two. 39 The Lloyd ED – arguably, 
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  The organisation is referred to throughout this thesis as PoSI.  
39
   Several other projects are underway in the Metro area which are at least closely 
aligned with the district-level sustainability-related ambitions of the ED 
initiative. The Conway initiative (NW Portland), which “likes to describe itself 
as an EcoDistrict” (C6), has created a masterplan to develop a large parking lot 
over next 10-15 years, using sustainability principles. Cully (NE Portland), 
according to one of the city-level interviewees, has been referred to as an 
unofficial “6th EcoDistrict”; its organisers have adopted PoSI’s governance and 
funding tools, working with the city to transform unused land into a 
community park (P2). Metro, meanwhile, has helped develop plans for projects 
“similar in terms of concepts and desired outcomes” (R1) to Portland’s official 
ED programme: Old Town Hillsboro: Eco-Efficient Action Plan (Metro, 2013a), and 
Gresham Vista Business Park: Eco-Efficient Action Plan (Metro, 2013b). Other 
initiatives which either echo the terminology or borrow variously from the 
concept may also be in evidence: the author noticed that the Sullivan Gulch 




the most successful – is described briefly below to exemplify the 
inner EDs, and special attention is then given to GG, to exemplify the 
‘outer’ EDs.  GG is of particular interest for the current research, in 
terms of its actual and desired publicness, because of its ambivalent 
urban status, and its concern with open spaces.   
 
Inner EcoDistricts: Focus on Lloyd  
 
 
Figure 6.2: Lloyd ED vision statement 
(Lloyd EcoDistrict, 2014:2) 
 
The Lloyd ED, which aims to become the “most sustainable business 
district in North America” (PoSI, 2012b:5; Figure 6.2), covers over 400 
acres on the west bank of the Willamette River opposite Portland’s 
central business district. It has historically lacked a strong identity 
(C4) and vitality outside office hours – partly because little of its land 
use (less than 10%) is currently residential (PoSI, 2010:15). Following 
preliminary research and consultation, PoSI created a detailed 
‘Roadmap’ for the district in November 2012, with input and advice 
from the local ED Board, various city bureaus, and representatives 
from large local employers and attractions such as the Oregon 
Convention Center and nearby hotels (PoSI, 2012b:2). The Roadmap 
sets out four categories of specific goals for 2035 (PoSI, 2012b). 
‘Prosperous’ goals include a programme of dense commercial and 




branding’, to create 10,000 new jobs. ‘Biophilic’ goals include green 
infrastructure corridors, street planting, and new parkland. 
‘Connected’ goals include creating pedestrian/cycle bridges over the 
I-5 and I-84 freeways, and redeveloping commercial streets. It gives 
particular emphasis to its ‘efficient’ goals, including retrofitting, 
LEED Gold accreditation of new buildings, on-site renewable energy, 
district energy, a district water utility, LED streetlights, and a zero 
waste target. To accompany the Roadmap, a ‘Project Playbook’ (PoSI, 
2012c) outlines various possible activities, with timelines, costings 
and partners (usually ED Board, City Agencies, and private sector 
property developers and owners). Those interviewees familiar with 
it had high expectations of its relative success, due to its governance 
structure (involving only a small number of enthusiastic property 
owners, and the pre-existing coordinatory Management Association), 
and because it is well resourced, allowing for a full-time salaried 
member of staff to oversee progress. 
 
Following the pilot’s end, the initiative continues to receive 
substantial institutional recognition and support. The Portland 
Development Commission (the city’s urban renewal agency) heralds 
the district’s “$160 million LEED Platinum four-block 
redevelopment” as a “showcase of the newest technology in energy, 
water, waste and stormwater green networks” (PDC, 2013) – though, 
perhaps significantly, without referring to it as an EcoDistrict.  The 
Portland Tribune reports that Lloyd will “receive $100,000 annually 
for 10 years, with a 2 percent increase per year, after the Portland 
City Council approved a plan by businesses in the district to tax 
themselves in November” (Hogue, 2014) – an outcome which 
Lloyd’s executive director describes as a “tremendous vote of 
confidence” (ibid). The Portland Bureau of Planning and 
Sustainability has reported that Lloyd’s newly published, and PDC-
funded, five-year Energy Action Plan (Lloyd EcoDistrict, 2014) is 
aligned with the “goals set in the City of Portland / Multnomah 
County Climate Action Plan” (BPS, 2014). Portland Monthly (a local 
property magazine) lauds it as a forthcoming “ecotopia” such that 
“[w]ith a new lush public plaza and major face-lift for the aging 
mall, Portland’s first ‘ecodistrict’ will be a lean, green, sustainable 





Although the most successful of the three inner EDs, Lloyd 
resembles South Waterfront (Box 6.1) and SoMa (Box 6.2) in its focus 
on technical and infrastructural fixes, the limited number of large 
landowners involved, and as an initiative to which the city is keen to 









Outer EcoDistricts: Focus on Growing Gateway  
 
 
Figure 6.3: header from GG website 
(source: Growing Gateway, undated) 
 
“its identity is undefined. Gateway remains an idea, a 
potential-filled location that is consistently pointed to as a 




In contrast to the bright future envisaged for the Lloyd district, a 
photo-essay in the regional Oregonian newspaper recently lamented 
the “failed vision for East Portland’s Gateway” (Boyd, 2013). Its 
verdict was that “[m]any feel Gateway could be much more and that 
its attributes have been squandered by inattention of leaders”, and 
that “[t]he center is a sterile, unwelcoming place, not the vibrant hub 





GG covers a series of middle- and lower-income (PoSI, 2010:26;44) 
neighbourhoods at some remove (approximately 8.5 km) from the 
urban core. Like Foster Green, it differs from the inner EDs in having 
an established residential community: South Waterfront was 
previously an industrial area (Box 6.1), most users of SoMa district 
live elsewhere (Box 6.2), and very little land in Lloyd is residential 
(see above). However, it has excellent public transportation 
connections to the wider Metro region, has long been marked as a 
future “node for intense development” (Abbott, 1983:259), and 
remains the only ‘Regional Center’ in Multnomah County.40 The city 
authorities continue to see Gateway as underperforming in various 
ways relative to more central districts; in this sense, it is constructed 
as problematic in its relative lack of urbanity. East Portland generally 
is characterised as “transitioning from its once suburban and semi-
rural form into an increasingly urban community” (City of Portland, 
2009:1). Similarly, a city-level interviewee asserted that Gateway: 
 
“is going to be a place that becomes more and more urban 
over time.  Right now, you could argue that it’s not very 
urban – that it’s very suburban… So we’re definitely 
implying that there’s a growth aspect…we’re trying to 
make that place more of a city from what had been more 
of a suburban mall” (C7). 
 
Built up significantly first in the 1950s, it exemplifies the ‘Eastern 
Neighbourhoods’ characterised as automobile-centric in the city’s 
urban design typology: “Commercial areas are in the form of 
automobile-oriented strip commercial areas located on multi-lane 
streets”; “Most residential streets, and some major streets, lack 
sidewalks” (City of Portland, undated). Larger plots make it less 
densely populated than ‘streetcar neighbourhoods’, and houses 
rarely have porches. The Portland Plan positions the 
underdevelopment of East Portland’s infrastructure and services, 
relative to its ongoing population growth, as a key obstacle 
“stand[ing] in the way of East Portland’s long-term success and 
vibrancy” (Portland City Council, 2012:96).  
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  The Metro government’s 50-year growth management strategy includes a 
hierarchy of urban centres: ‘Central City’ (ie Downtown Portland); ‘Regional 
Centers’, defined as “centers of commerce and local government services 
serving a market area of hundreds of thousands of people”); and ‘Town Centers’ 
providing “localized services to tens of thousands of people within a two- to 





A preliminary baseline study led by PoSI (DistrictLab, 2010) 
included analyses of local land uses, connectivity, resource 
consumption, air quality, water management, infrastructure and 
amenities, and a consultation process to identify ‘community 
priorities’. This involved two “discussion circles”, “numerous one-
on-one interviews”, and a local exhibition; with input from residents, 
Neighbourhood Association (NA) leaders, local businesses, health 
care providers, built environment professionals, developers and 
landowners (ibid:16). The area’s current problems, as defined 
through the site analysis and consultations, included: “a visible 
absence of parks and public spaces” (DistrictLab, 2010:27); high 
levels of automobile use (ibid:31); a poor pedestrian environment due 
to a shortage of pavements; insufficient street trees; very long block 
lengths (ibid); a weak local identity (“There’s no ‘there’ there” 
(ibid:19)); excessive stormwater run-off (ibid:29); anti-social and 
criminal behaviour; and the need for aesthetic improvements (ibid: 
20-21). The report comments that  
 
“While the EcoDistrict concept was well received, 
environmental performance was not the highest 
community priority. Enthusiasm was high for discussions 
about economic development and physical neighborhood 
improvements. Greater opportunities for social interaction, 
investments in education, and economic development 
were consistently identified as critical issues” 
(DistrictLab, 2010:2). 
 
One consultee is quoted as saying “Don’t talk to me about 
bioswales and green streets when there are people being shot at over 
here” (DistrictLab, 2010:21). The report also identified 17 local 
‘assets’, including good local schools, an existing local business 
association, and various potential physical interventions in the 
locations observed in the current research: Halsey Street, which “has 
historical quality as Gateway’s ‘Main Street’”; the PDC-owned 
neighbourhood park as an “[o]pportunity to create a new civic 
space..[to]..increase connectivity, walkability, and habitat within the 
district”; and the vicinity of the Transit Center, where environmental 
improvements could create a “multi-modal corridor” linking to the 
main shopping streets – as well as nearby waste land which could be 




greenway” (DistrictLab, 2010:23). The report proposes a series of 
‘catalyst projects’, but notes that “it is widely understood that both 
public funding and ability to pay among private property owners is 
lacking” (ibid:19-20). The question of how to fund and govern future 
activities is left unanswered (ibid:67).  
 
Subsequently, a steering committee was established with 
assistance from PoSI, staffed by volunteers from local non-profit-
making and neighbourhood organisations, professionals, and 
employers. It accepted an offer of rent-free office space, and worked 
to raise awareness of the ED through targetted outreach and 
community events. Meanwhile, PoSI developed a technical ongoing 
assessment framework (2011) on behalf of PDC, setting specific goals 
across nine areas, defining indicators for each with specific targets, 
timeframes, baselines, and specific strategic recommendations 
(without specifying actions). Its integrative analysis suggested that 
particular attention should be paid to developing  
 
“more high quality public (or quasi-public) space and 
parks…in the district. This strategy benefits every 
Performance Area, therefore showing the most synergy 
across goals and proving to be a beneficial strategy with 
which to move forward” 
(PoSI, 2011:87). 
 
The local and city-level interviewees broadly agreed that the 
paucity of open and ‘third’ spaces’, and non-pedestrian friendly 
environment, undermine community cohesion in Gateway. Board 
members concurred with the strategy of focusing on well-chosen 
interventions to catalyse a wider process of change. One of the key 
outcomes hoped for was greater intersubjectivity among pedestrians, 
to build social capital and a sense of collectivity to facilitate later 
district-wide collaborative actions. Aesthetic improvements, they 
anticipated, would attract attention and investment, raise property 
prices, and constitute a visible “symbol of rebirth, and a symbol of 
the community we’re going to get there” (L1). For Gateway 
specifically, this catalytic or symbolic potential may be unrealised 
because such “civic spaces” (C7) fall between the geographical areas 
on which NAs focus (P1), but overall GG is similar to the other outer 
ED, Foster Green (henceforth ‘FG’), in its socio-economic focus, small-




Despite their agreement with some of PoSI’s conclusions, GG’s 
board members described the baseline reports as disproportionately 
technical and extensive relative to the very limited range of activities 
which might realistically be considered at that stage. Further 
irritation was expressed that PoSI had now rebranded itself as 
‘EcoDistricts’ to market itself nationally:  
 
“PoSI should capitalis[e] on the strengths of their own 
EcoDistricts and the work that’s been done…to make a 
difference before they go out and brand themselves as 
EcoDistricts?” (L2). 
 
 “they tout themselves as having all these great 
EcoDistricts, but we’re not a functioning EcoDistrict” (L3). 
 
There are mismatches, in other words, both between the ambitions 
developed in PoSI’s documentation and the GG participants’ own 
sense of what might realistically be achieved; and between the public 
experience of the pilot scheme and the construction of the ED 




In practice, GG began implementing only one project, 
‘Reenergising Gateway’ (which departed from PoSI’s 




energy efficiency (and thereby lower utility bills). Plans for a second 
project, ‘Wayfinding’, aiming to improve local pedestrian and bicycle 
signage – especially at the transit hub – were not finalised and 
funding was not found. Board members were also keen for unused 
land off the main thoroughfare (Halsey Street), owned by PDC, to be 
developed as a community park, as recommended by PoSI, but no 
immediate funding for this was available. Finally, the development 
of ‘Gateway Green’, as recommended by PoSI, is proceeding, but this 
project is only tangentially connected to the ED initiative. It is using 
‘crowdsourced’ funds to create a recreational and cycling park on a 
large unused open space near the transit station. When interviewed, 
GG board members remained optimistic about the ED’s long-term 
potential, but the chair has since resigned and its activities have 
ceased; its website and offices are no longer operational. 
 
The fact of GG’s limited achievement does not imply that the ED 
concept more generally is flawed; a ‘pilot’ scheme is justified to the 
extent that it reveals implementational and conceptual shortcomings. 
Indeed, the city-level interviewees did not expect all five EDs to be 
equally successful; any ‘best practice’ lessons were intended to be 
unpredictable, and one thought it “probably reasonable…that a 
couple of them will ultimately fail or just fizzle out” (C4). But it is 
instructive to reflect further on the reasons why the outer EDs such 
as GG have seen less progress than their city centre counterparts 
such as Lloyd. These reasons, discussed below, are linked to further 
questions about the relation of Gateway to the rest of Portland and 
its broader region. 
 
Reasons for the failure of Growing Gateway 
The immediate practical reason for GG’s failure was a lack of 
funding. Several interviewees felt the initiative was constrained by 
having no salaried staff members (unlike Lloyd in particular). Unable 
even to afford to apply for charitable ‘501(c)(3)’ status (G1; G6), it 
relied on a fiscal sponsorship arrangement with a local NGO. While 
hoping its first successes in the ‘Reenergising Gateway’ project might 
attract further sponsorship, it lacked the seed capital to extend the 
scheme beyond a small number of household refurbishments (G1). It 
has struggled to promote itself locally, relying on unpaid assistance 
from local professionals to design materials (G1). Reflecting this, the 




people asked, none could name any ‘local initiatives or schemes 
which aim to improve the local area’. On prompting with GG’s name, 
only 2 of the 50 claimed any recognition (though this was non-
committal: “maybe” and “sounds familiar”). One board member 
commented: “we’re just a seedling – we’re an EcoDistrict that’s 
struggling to get started” (L3). Several board members expressed 
disappointment with the city in this respect – particularly because no 
usable business plan had been created (as originally envisaged) 
before PoSI’s withdrawal in June 2013, with available funding spent 
on the technical baseline studies mentioned above.   
 
One lesson implied by the story of GG is the possibility that some 
intended experimental ‘niches’ will fail not so much because of wider 
‘regime’ constraints (Geels, 2002), as because the preconditions for 
experimentation to occur within them are unsatisfactory. As a ‘niche’, 
GG might be described as poorly ‘protected’; and one city-level 
interviewee acknowledged that GG and FG had been 
“underempowered” (C5). The greater progress of city centre EDs, 
conversely, appears to be largely facilitated by powerful actors. The 
PDC interviewees considered the city centre EDs more likely to 
qualify for future financial support. Their infrastructural focus makes 
them more suitable as ‘showcases’ for the city to bolster its desired 
reputation for expertise in exportable green technology. Thus, a 
supposedly open-ended process of experimentation, ostensibly in the 
service of sustainability and social equity, and based on emergent 
public priorities, has in practice been shaped primarily by, and may 
lead to the further empowerment of, those actors best placed to 
deliver economic benefits to the city.  
 
It is not unreasonable that the city should provide greater support 
for projects furthering its own goals, but this reveals the initiative to 
be rather less ‘bottom up’ than first appearances suggest. The project 
remains innovative as a type of ‘research in the wild’ insofar as the 
city is reacting to the solutions developed by local actors, rather than 
testing predefined solutions. However, in combination, the 
underfunding of GG and the ongoing support for Lloyd significantly 
skewed the outcome. In fact, the details of the process, as visualised 
in PoSI’s Pilot Study (Figure 6.4), explicitly envisage a ‘filtering’ 
process. Whether or not ideas could be captured which had 




was to be framed by the local ‘site conditions’ as constructed by the 
city, and their translation into projects and strategies was to be 
accomplished with reference to ‘Plans for Future Growth and 
Development’. In this sense, a “bounded form of collaboration” 
(Parker et al., 2015: 519) was in evidence: the institutionalised nature 
of the process would seem likely to exclude any emergent ideas 
which conflicted with the city’s existing policies and priorities (as 
outlined in the following section). Progress in the inner EDs may 
have been facilitated not only by the pre-existence of management 
structures, but also because the interests of the actors involved were 




Figure 6.4: visualisation of the “multiple components” which 
“informed the recommendations for EcoDistrict pilot projects” 
(DistrictLab, 2010:14) 
 
While expressing genuine support for an open-ended goal of 
sustainability, several city-level interviewees justified ED in 
instrumental terms with explicit reference to institutional goals. Its 
official recognition in 2012 was interpreted as reflecting its perceived 
value as a means of implementing the Portland Plan (C5; C6). One 
BPS interviewee described the city’s main interest as relating to one 
of the three ‘Integrated Strategies’ around which the Portland Plan is 
structured:41  
 
“From the city’s perspective and what we are truly 
invested in is this notion of a ‘Healthy Connected City’, 
and EcoDistricts is a conceptual tool, and it’s an 
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  The three integrated strategies in the Portland Plan are: ‘Thriving Educated 
Youth’, ‘Economic Prosperity and Affordability’, and ‘Healthy Connected City’ 




implementational tool, and if it’s the vehicle that needs to 
get used, then it will exist” (C6). 
 
By implication, then, the city has lent support to ED to the extent that 
it helps realise a particular strand of its developmental strategy. 
 
More specifically, it is understood to have particular potential 
value as a “community development tool” (C6); “for me, the whole 
notion of the EcoDistricts is just a systematic way of prioritising what 
the community wants” (P1). This understanding might appear to 
distance ED from a ‘technological showcase’ model of development, 
and overturned several interviewees’ earlier expectations of a more 
direct focus on infrastructural and environmental issues. A 
discursive logic was apparent in the claim that ED thereby 
constituted “just the newest version” of Portland’s “long-standing 
tradition” of public participation (C4), as a “natural evolution of the 
culture that’s inherent in the city” (C2). One PDC interviewee 
queried the nature of this ‘evolution’, however: “if it’s more of a 
neighbourhood system”, then “why didn’t we just work through the 
NAs?” (C4). One answer may lie in a planner’s comment that the 
district scale represented a deliberate attempt to temper the negative 
implications of the “fiefdoms of power” enscribed on the city by the 
geography of the NA system (C7). This, in turn, reflects the 
innovative spatiality of the Portland Plan’s ‘Healthy Connected City’ 
concept – which “was threatening to some associated with the 
neighbourhood system, because they perceived it as an attack on 
their power” (C7). On this view, the stated desire to empower local 
communities masks a strategy to disrupt existing formations of civic 
power, in order to facilitate the implementation of the Portland Plan. 
 
Downtown perceptions of Gateway as underperforming, however, 
are not necessarily reflected in its residents’ own assessments. In the 
street survey (see Table 6.1), the most top-of-mind desired 
improvements – to the PDC park on Halsey Street, crime and safety, 
a pedestrian environment, and the retail offer – echoed GG’s 
understanding. And yet these were mentioned only by minorities: 
most commonly, respondents were unable to think of any particular 
improvement. Although a street survey of this type allows little time 
for participants to consider their responses, the findings provide no 
evidence that GG is tapping into an existing groundswell of active 





Table 6.1: residents’ top-of-mind desired improvements to Gateway area 
 
If, rather than dissatisfaction, these findings indicate a degree of 
apathy, this is partly explainable by the geography of the ED. Like 
the Portland Plan, it might be interpreted as consciously disrupting 
existing political imaginations – it covers 13 NAs.42 The attempt to 
build social capacity may be undermined by the weak identity of the 
envisaged ‘district’ as a geographical unit; its incoherence was 
recognised both by city-level and local interviewees. One city-level 
interviewee called Gateway a “planner’s construct” (C1), originally 
named after the (now removed) arches outside the Fred Meyer 
supermarket opened in the 1950s. 43  The research interviewees 
generally agreed that residents more strongly identify with their own 
neighbourhood than with Gateway as a whole. The task of 
improving the district, then, was partly one of constructing the 
district in the image of GG; of calling a ‘Gateway public’ into being. 
  
Rather than drawing on and learning from emergent publicness, 
then, the initiative attempted to assemble publicness in a particular 
way. The city attempted unsuccessfully to impose a particular 
                                                          
42
  The ‘strapline’ on the GG website (Figure 6.3), ‘Creating a Healthy Community’ 
appears to speak to the Portland Plan ‘Healthy Connected City’ strategy, whose 
consciously disruptive geography was discussed earlier. 
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ontology of Gateway, resting on an artificial geographical bounding 
of an envisioned self-identifying public sharing the city’s broader 
developmental goals, and sought to represent the views of this 
summoned public through a predetermined framework of categories. 
In this sense, and looking beyond practical funding issues, the failure 
of GG describes the outcome of a discursive mismatch: a dominant 
institutional discourse of Portland in intractable tension with the 
emergent public discourses in this part of the city. The following 
section therefore posits the existence of a dominant ‘story’ told about 
Portland, organised around the idea of Portland’s ‘difference’ from 
other cities, and reflected in institutional policies. This story, it is 
argued, has limited resonance in Gateway, which is distanced from 




6.2   Enabling Context: Policies, History, and the 
 Discourse of Portland’s ‘Difference’ 
 
Fragmentary evidence from the representation of Portland across a 
wide range of channels is collated here to infer a broadly cohesive 
body of discourse eulogising the city’s ‘difference’. The discursive 
nature of this difference is signalled both by the way it is typically 
evidenced through reference to external perceptions of Portland, and 
by the limitations of its descriptive scope. The metaphorical 
‘Portland’ thus constructed evidently has clarificatory power, since it 
appeared to shape interviewees’ own interpretation of their city – 
although, significantly, this held less true in the outer district of 
Gateway. Its presence within city policies, furthermore, implies its 
official – though selective – acceptance in the service of particular 
developmental goals. The ideological potency of the discourse, then, 
is suggested by both its widespread currency and its backing by 
powerful resources (Locke, 1984). It also, however, obscures various 
contradictory aspects of Portland’s reality, some of which are 
identified in the critical academic literature. The five interrelated key 
strands of this discourse – its ‘liveability’, ‘weirdness’, ‘well-









Descriptions of Portland often refer to the way it is imagined 
elsewhere in the US. Ozawa’s (2004:4) claim, for example, about its 
‘quality of life’ is supported by reference to the “attention lavished 
upon the region by the national press”. Elsewhere, we read of 
Portland’s consistently high rankings as a ‘liveable’ city (Abbott, 1983; 
2011; Flood, 2010) where Americans would like to live (Mayer & 
Provo, 2004). This reputational evidence is complemented by 
selective reference to cultural and leisure-related phenomena, 
positioned as untypical for the US. These include its wealth of 
independent restaurant, coffee and microbrewing establishments 
(Flood, 2010); varied street-food outlets (Newman & Burnett, 2013); 
bicycle culture (Abbott, 2011); many accessible ‘natural areas’ (Peirce 
& Guskind, 1993; Poracsky & Houck, 1994); farmers markets and 
urban agriculture (Flood, 2010); and long-established vibrant arts 
(Abbott, 2011) and independent music (Flood, 2010) scenes. 
Collectively, such features construct Portland as unusually able to 
resist the “forces of economic integration, copycat commercialism, 
and cultural homogeneity” (Sussman & Estes, 2004:136), and a 
‘Mecca’ for well-educated young people attracted by values of 
“idealism, risk-taking, and action” (Flood, 2010).  
 
Portland’s reputation for liveability was already established in the 
1980s (Abbott, 1983), but appears to have been reinforced by its 
subsequent economic growth. Interviewees recalled Portland in the 
1980s as having significant socio-economic problems; Inner North 
and North-East Portland were known as the ‘meth lab’ capital of 
America (L5). By the early 1990s, however, the same neighbourhoods 
were gentrifying: “upscale restaurants and retail establishments 
rooted and flourished in Portland’s oldest commercial districts” 
(Witt, 2004:97). The 1990s saw an overall growth of manufacturing 
jobs untypical for US cities at the time (Mayer & Provo, 2004), often 
created in high-tech sectors including semiconductor manufacturing 
(Mayer & Provo, 2004) in synergy with the so-called ‘Silicon Forest’ 
in nearby Washington County (Gibson & Abbott, 2002). 
Accompanying this regional economic growth, the four-county 
population grew by 68% between 1980 and 2010 (Abbott, 2011).  
 
Nevertheless, Portland’s economy is not without problems; these 




literature (and were highlighted by interviewees) – and constitute a 
counterstrand within the otherwise eulogistic discourse. 
Unemployment has remained high relative to the national average 
(Gibson & Abbott, 2002; Flood, 2010; Portland City Council, 2012); 
Portland’s population has expanded faster than its job market (PDC, 
2015:4), with the city itself creating only five per cent of job growth in 
its ‘Metropolitan Statistical Region’ between 2000 and 2008 (Portland 
City Council, 2012:46); the metro area underperforms in terms of 
employment rates and per capitum personal income relative to 
population size (Value of Jobs, 2011:5); educational attainment lags 
behind that of ‘closest competitor metros” (PDC, 2015:4); and 
personal income has grown more slowly than in “cities our region 
traditionally likes to compare itself to such as Seattle, Minneapolis 
and Denver” (Value of Jobs, 2011:5). Problems with unemployment, 
especially among younger residents, are reflected in a humorous 
saying mentioned by two interviewees (P2; R2): “Portland: the place 
where young people come to retire”. Meanwhile, declining housing 
affordability has long been identified as a pressing regional problem 
(Gibson & Abbott, 2002; Portland City Council, 2012).  
 
The core strategic priorities informing the current Portland Plan 
(City of Portland, 2012:3) are summarised as ‘Prosperity’, ‘Education’, 
‘Health’ and ‘Equity’. The last of these is assigned a coordinatory role, 
with the Plan defined overall as a ‘Framework for Equity’: 
“Advancing equity must be at the core of our plans for the future” 
(Portland City Council, 2012:4). The three integrated strategies 
structuring the Plan – ‘Thriving Educated Youth’, ‘Healthy 
Connected City’, and ‘Economic Prosperity and Affordability’ – and 
their associated dimensions, are presented as emanating from this 
core (see Figure 6.5). Accordingly, the strategic importance of 
economic growth is justified using statistical evidence to construct 
relative economic shortcomings as a problem of inequality (see, for 
example, p.15). And yet the assumption that economic growth 
should necessarily constitute a strategy for alleviating this inequality 
goes unquestioned. In this respect, Portland’s institutional 
construction of sustainability is clearly distanced from ‘green 
radicalism’ (Dryzek, 2005). Despite Portland’s reputation for 
alternative thinking and progressive politics – discussed below – 
there is no sense, for example, in which policy documents aspire to 





Fig. 6.5: the Integrated Strategies of the Portland Plan 





“everyone looking to make a new life migrates west, 
across America to the Pacific Ocean. Once there, the 
cheapest city where they can live is Portland. This gives us 




A second aspect of Portland’s discursive construction, reflected in 
popular culture, and mentioned consistently across the research 
interviews, though not explicitly highlighted in city policies, 
concerns the eccentricities of its inhabitants (Flood, 2010). This 
embrace of eccentricity is emblematised by the ‘Keep Portland Weird’ 
slogan, which residents appear to have adopted enthusiastically. 
According to Long (2013), the ‘Keep ____ Weird’ phenomenon 




proclaimed ‘weird’ campaigns across North America—a trend that 
presents an opportunity to explore placebased expressions of 
resistance in the larger context of an evolving and pervasive period 
of neoliberalism” (Long, 2013:53). The author observed stickers with 
the ‘Keep Portland Weird’ logo on bumpers and in shop windows 
repeatedly during fieldwork (Figure 6.6) – and parodies thereof (also 
predicted by Long, 2013) (Figures 6.7 and 6.8). 
 
 
Figure 6.6: bumper sticker, for sale in city centre shops 
 
   
Figures 6.7 and 6.8: car window sticker (seen in Gateway), 
parodying the ‘Keep Portland Weird’ slogan, and official city slogan 
of ‘Portland: The City that Works’ which it appears to be subverting 
(here on the side of a municipal street-cleaning vehicle, downtown). 
 
The opening sequence of the popular, internationally broadcast 
Portlandia television series, which satirises the city’s eccentricities, 
includes the mural shown in Figure 6.9 along with various portraits 
of ‘alternative’ local characters, juxtaposed with images of city 
landmarks. Thus, the television show – understood by interviewees 
as contributing to Portland’s external mythologisation – implicitly 






Figure 6.9: mural on SW 1st Avenue near Burnside (Old Town District) 
 
Echtner and Ritchie (2003) argue that general media reports 
contribute significantly to the formation of preliminary images of 
possible tourist destinations. Accordingly, texts in mass-market 
publications outlining reasons to visit particular places also 
contribute to outsiders’ understanding of their distinctive 
characteristics, or ‘unique aura’ (Echtner & Ritchie, 2003). It is 
significant, therefore, that the list of ’10 Things to Do’ in Time 
magazine’s online travel guide to Portland (Brooks, undated) seems 
closely attuned to the ‘liveable’ and ‘weird’ strands of Portland’s 
discourse of difference. Echoing some of the specific ‘liveable’ 
features mentioned above, it includes three green open spaces, 
Portland’s cycling culture, independently owned Powells bookshop, 
and four unusual food and drink experiences (independent 
microbreweries, ‘movie brewpubs’, food carts, and the Voodoo 
Doughnuts outlet). The last of these is described as epitomising the 
city’s defining ‘weirdness’: “If there ever was a business that 
captured the kooky essence of Portland, it’s Voodoo”. Portland’s 
strip clubs are included partly on the grounds of weirdness: “this 
town has an abundance of eccentric and very naked establishments”. 
The weird, liveable and green strands of the discourse, along with a 
sense of political difference, are intertwined in the text 
accompanying one recommendation: “Portland has a reputation for 




of the popular Lonely Planet travel guide to the city, Portland’s 
implied eccentricity is woven into the other strands of the discourse 
described in this chapter:  
“It’s a city with a vibrant downtown, pretty residential 
neighborhoods, ultragreen ambitions and zany characters. 
Here liberal idealists outnumber conservative stogies, 
Gortex jackets are acceptable in fine restaurants and 
everyone supports countless brewpubs, coffeehouses, 
knitting circles, lesbian potlucks and book clubs”  
(Bao, 2011:200). 
 
These representations, however, ignore the uneven distribution of 
‘weirdness’ across the city. Lonely Planet’s claim that “everyone” in 
Portland enjoys the activities listed may be lighthearted, but insofar 
as it has explanatory force as a caricature, the fact of its limited 
reference may be obfuscated. As one (academic) interviewee 
commented: “There’s a part of Portland you never hear about” (P1). 
As a spatial analyst, he had identified a particular “geographically 
isolated” part of Portland corresponding to the Portlandia lifestyle, 
illustrated in Figure 6.10.44 Two other city-level respondents (C5; C6) 
concurred; describing ‘East Portland’, as “east of 82nd“, suggesting 
that from the perspective of the residents of “Portlandia Portland, it’s 
very different” (C5). Outer Eastern districts such as Gateway and 
Foster Green, another commented, are more like “anywhere USA” 
than Portlandia (R2). Goodling et al. (2015:508) similarly observe that 
“[o]ver the last two decades, 82nd Avenue has become a symbolic and 
material demarcation between a world-renowned sustainability 
mecca and its devalued hinterland”. 
 
Gateway’s cultural distance from inner Portland is reflected in 
some metropolitan snobbery towards it, reported by the Concordia 
interviewee: “We call them the sneaker crowd. Because they always 
have bright white sneakers on and they still cut their hair in the 
mullet style of the 70s and 80s…they wear sweatpants and think 
that’s dressed up” (C1). There is a long history, according to one GG 
board member, of Portlanders referring to the “great unwashed East 
Side” – and “the further east you go, the more the image is lower 
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   In his words: “about 39th Street and into Downtown, going down to Powell 
boulevard – maybe up to Holgate, to Killingsworth…When you get out to 82nd 
avenue, it’s exactly like Houston or Atlanta – cities that you would consider the 




class” (L7). One city-level respondent spoke of a “cultural chasm” 




Figure 6.10: extent of ‘Portlandia’ in city of Portland, based on 
description by interviewee P1, and location of 82nd Avenue, 
Gateway and FG 
 (source: author’s own map, based on map from BPS) 
  
Interviewees were ambivalent about the economic implications of 
this reputed ‘weirdness’; while branding the city as unique, it may 
lessen its appeal for corporate employers. This problem was 
understood as exacerbated by the image of ‘liveable’ Portland, in that 
“people who want to spend a lot of time skiing and surfing and so 
on…are not perceived to be so much the American work ethic of 
working 70 or 80 hours a week” (R2). Nevertheless, Portland’s low 
wages relative to other large West Coast cities were understood as 
appealing to some large employers (R2). 45  Even though venture 
capital for entrepreneurial activity may be in shorter supply than in 
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   Large corporations in the Metro area include Nike’s global headquarters and 
Intel’s “largest and most complex site in the world, a global center of 
semiconductor research and manufacturing, and the largest private employer in 
the state” (Intel, undated). Major downtown employers include Portland State 




“competitor cities” (PDC, 2015:4), there was general agreement about 
its appeal for ‘start up’ companies. A PDC interviewee suggested 
that weirdness “attracts a certain generation who are creating the 
next businesses…it’s a place for them to start, to experiment, like the 
city experiments, and to expand with little risk” (C4).  
 
In Abbott’s observation of “perhaps an overly self-conscious 
hipster style plus lots of small entrepreneurs and artisans building 
upscale bicycles, designing clothing, brewing beer, or roasting coffee” 
(Abbott, 2011:174), the elision of ‘weirdness’ with commercial 
activity seems significant. One interviewee (C1) differentiated 
Portland’s ‘hipsters’ (“the young urban professional, you know sort 
of metrosexual person that’s sort of polished and edgy”) from its 
‘hippies’ (“more Grenola…dreadlocks, Grateful Dead”). This 
distinction suggests Portland is characterised as much by what Lloyd 
(2010) calls ‘neo-Bohemianism’ as by its anti-establishment 
tendencies. Its economically productive ‘hipster’ class might provide 
evidence to support Florida’s (2002) thesis about the instrumental 
economic benefit of attracting the ‘creative classes’. Peck (2005:767–8), 
however, sees the “cult of urban creativity” espoused by Florida as a 
“form of soft law/lore for a hypercompetitive age”, leading to 
strategies which “subtly canalize and constrain urban-political 
agency”. Lloyd (2010:xii–xiii) similarly questions the “leveraging of 
artistic energies”: while “enriching the cultural landscape”, it also 
“[abets] the neoliberal tendencies toward cutthroat interurban 
competition and the promotion of gentrification”. Echoing Lloyd’s 
turn of phrase, one of the Portland Plan’s ‘Guiding Policies’ is to 
“leverage our arts and culture community to drive innovation and 
economic growth” (Portland City Council, 2012:54). The 2012 annual 
report published by the newly renamed EcoDistricts frames its 
discussion explicitly in terms of Florida’s thinking, describing him as 
a “visionary” (Figure 6.11). 
 
Portland’s weirdness may, then, be implicitly embraced by city-
level actors, but only insofar as it serves the city’s goal of improving 
Portland’s economic competitiveness. Since non-conformist self-
expression potentially extends beyond the neo-bohemian 
characteristics of the ‘hipster’ into more radical social and political 
ways of being, its explicit encouragement within policy would 






Figure 6.11: opening text from main section of EcoDistricts 2012 report 
(EcoDistricts, 2013b:4) 
 
‘Well-plannedness’ and ‘greenness’ 
Portland is also discursively positioned as practising exemplary 
urban planning. This overlaps with its reputation for cutting-edge 
‘green’ innovation, with the former understood as uniquely 
accommodating towards the latter. The story told is one of 
integration across different levels of governance, geographical scales, 
sectors, and across time. 
 
As is the case for its liveability, the sense that Portland is ‘well 
planned’ is often evidenced with reference to external reputation, as 
the “poster child for regional planning, growth management, and 
other innovative urban planning policies” (Mayer & Provo, 2004:9), 
the “urban planners’ Mecca” (Chapman & Lund, 2004:208), or an 
“example of innovative planning for the rest of the country” (Abbott, 
1983:8), attracting the “accolades of planners seeking to emulate its 
innovations” (Goodling et al., 2015:504). Long-term admiration is 
reported for the relative vitality of both its urban core (Abbott, 1983; 
Mayer & Provo, 2004) and architecturally “intact neighbourhoods” 




community” (Flood, 2010). This discursive ‘well plannedness’ is 
structured chronologically by a succession of local and state policy 
initiatives dating back to the 1970s. Chief among these was its 1972 
Downtown Plan, reversing previous policies favouring car use and 
freeway construction (Abbott, 2011). Envisioned features included a 
waterfront park, pedestrian-oriented design, high-density retail, 
office corridors, and a car-free transit mall. It also entailed a 
“complementary effort to revitalize neighbourhoods” to “avoid the 
flight of middle-class families to the suburbs” (Mayer & Provo, 
2004:19). The Downtown Plan was implemented under Mayor 
Goldschmidt (1973-79), who also organised funding to rehabilitate 
older residential areas, at first to the immediate west of downtown. 
 
Infrastructural improvements through the 1980s also contribute to 
this ‘back story’. These are significant, according to Abbott (2011), 
because they were achieved in spite of the city’s concurrent 
industrial and economic decline (Hagerman, 2007). Construction of 
Pioneer Courthouse Square (now Portland’s central open space), on 
the site of a proposed multi-storey carpark, was completed in 1984. 
Portland’s light-rail system, gradually expanded since 1986, has 
brought about “high-density, mixed-use communities in close 
proximity to the stations” (Mayer & Provo, 2004:22). At the same 
time, the city’s 1980 ‘Industrial Sanctuary’ policy helped preserve 
light-industrial land uses near the urban core (Gibson & Abbott, 
2002:428) and support social diversity elsewhere by ensuring “wider 
access to middle-income jobs” (Seattle Industry, 2007). Ozawa and 
Yeakley’s (2004:257–258) observation that “[v]oters in the Portland 
metropolitan region…consistently list the protection of natural 
resources, parks and open spaces as among their highest priorities” 
implies the continuous democratic legitimacy of environmental 
policy-making over time.  Less problematically than in the case of 
Portland’s economic prospects, Portland’s ‘weirdness’ was 
understood by city-level interviewees as an enabling factor in its 
relative ability to implement such initiatives. Thus, its ‘weird’ and 
‘green’ images are “two sides of the same coin” (C4), with the former 
facilitating experimentation in sustainability: “Portland is more 
willing to take a run at things than any other city I’ve been at” (C4). 
The conclusion is drawn that Portland merits praise for its successful 




necessary political backing” (Wheeler, 2000:138) for ongoing 
innovation, and for its consistently long-term strategising: 
 
 “the results on the ground in Portland can be traced to a 
50-year effort at planning, policy-making, and 
implementation…This is not a story of a single initiative 
or programme or ribbon-cutting”  
(Cotugno & Seltzer, 2011:304). 
 
Its credentials as a “standard bearer for sustainability” (Goodling 
et al., 2015:520) are further discursively justified with reference to its 
wider regional embedment. As a state, we read, Oregon has been 
associated with ‘progressive’ politics (Clucas & Henkels, 2005) for 
several decades – particularly those relating to environmental 
protection (Knaap & Nelson, 1992; Gibson & Abbott, 2002; Ozawa & 
Yeakley, 2004; Steel & Lach, 2005). The ‘Urban Growth Boundary’ 
surrounding Portland’s metropolitan area, introduced in 1979 
following state legislation in 1973 (Seltzer, 2004; Abbott, 2011; Metro, 
undated a), and contrary to standard practice in the US (Knaap & 
Nelson, 1992), was spontaneously mentioned across the research 
interviews as a defining characteristic of the Portland area. 46 
However, Abbott (2011:173) suggests that this progressive image 
belies growing geographical polarization on many issues since the 
1990s, with western Multnomah County significantly more liberal 
than elsewhere. Clucas and Henkels’ (2005:5) analysis of the political 
geography of Oregon as a whole also suggests that residents of 
eastern, more rural areas are significantly more conservative (ibid:2-
3). This unevenness is reflected in PoSI’s finding that environmental 
projects failed to inspire enthusiasm in GG (DistrictLab, 2010), as 
echoed by the Gateway resident interviewee’s opinion that support 
for “the green thing, the recycling…encouragement to use public 
transportation” was diluted in outer Portland generally (L8), and by 
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  The success of Portland’s growth management strategies in reducing sprawl is 
not universally accepted in the academic literature (Chapman & Lund, 
2004:208). The officially recognised problem of housing affordability (Portland 
City Council, 2012) has been blamed on the UGB – even if  causal links between 
the two have not convincingly been demonstrated (Seltzer, 2004:57). Dong and 
Zhu (2015) argue that evaluating the success of the UGB (and Portland’s other 
‘smart growth’ policies) is problematic since the assessment will vary 
depending on the criteria used, and warn that drawing causal links too readily 
between particular land-use policies and observable outcomes may tend 





one city-level interviewee’s (C1) concern that the ‘eco’ aspect of the 
EcoDistrict label may not resonate in areas such as Gateway. It also 
finds an echo in PDC’s suggestion (PDC, 2015:4) that the “wide 
disparities in quality of life, access to services and employment, and 
quality of infrastructure across Portland neighborhoods” constitute a 
key challenge facing the city, with poverty being concentrated in its 
eastern districts. 
 
Portland’s image as ‘well-planned’ is closely articulated with its 
‘green’ credentials particularly in the understanding that economic 
growth has not compromised the natural environment. In practice, 
one urban designer interviewee suggested, Portland’s environmental 
policies may not be uniquely innovative; its experimental spirit may 
be a “west coast thing generally” (L1). Yet Abbott (2011:158) 
describes a discursive consensus such that “[o]verall, many experts 
believe that the Portland area is among the nation’s most successful 
in balancing economic growth and environmental protection”. Flood 
(2010) implies an envisaged synergy between these two goals, in that 
Portland “places a great deal of its economic hopes on being the 
greenest city in the nation”. When the Portland Plan asserts, with 
reference to its green infrastructure, that “Portland enjoys the 
position of being one of the most fully functional urban laboratories 
for innovation in sustainability” (Portland City Council, 2012:54), this 
is within a discussion of its commercial competitiveness: “Portland’s 
focus on sustainability is an economic asset and an advantage over 
peer cities” (ibid). City ranking exercises are again cited to illustrate 
Portland’s lead in high-tech and green-tech industrial production 
and adoption (Mayer & Provo, 2004; Abbott, 2011). In these terms, 
Portland’s approach exemplifies the classic assumptions of EM 
theory: 
“that environmental degradation can be addressed 
through foresight, planning, and economic regulation; in 
particular, new technologies can be developed and 
utilised to enhance economic growth while 
simultaneously curtailing waste” 
(Schlosberg & Rinfret, 2008:254) 
 
Just as, following the discussion in Chapter Two, this EM 
approach may be in tension with the centrality of ‘equity’ visualised 
in the Portland Plan, others argue that Portland’s approach to 




assumptions. Rutland and Aylett (2008) suggest that its ‘common 
sense’ worldview has been constructed based on selective 
environmental criteria and an arbitrary municipal spatial framing. 
The consensus constructed in Portland may allow city policy to 
obviate the possible need for more radical lifestyle changes (ibid). 
Relatedly, Hagerman (2007:286) traces the “shifting social 
constructions of nature implied by references to green values” within 
the ‘liveability discourses’ circulating in Portland, which depend on 
unstable combinations of arbitrary “imaginaries of post-industrial 
economies, ecologies and urban citizenship” (287). As predicted in 
Chapter Two, then, closer inspection of broad environmental claims 
reveals a contingent interpretation of sustainability, resting on 
certain discursive assumptions, and reflecting specific agendas. This 
has implications for the transferability of Portland’s distinctive 
approach to sustainability: the ideological potency of its discursive 
storylines may be diluted in other settings.   
 
One (academic) interviewee’s (P1) comments reconstitute the 
received version of Portland’s planning history as a rhetorical 
construct serving to reinforce the discourse of its ‘difference’ as a 
sustainable city. He suggested that selective aspects of Portland’s 
legacy of historical urban planning had been coarticulated in a 
storyline projected through the lens of contemporary policy agendas, 
and thus ‘repackaged’ to become internalised within Portland’s 
‘green’ discourse. Portland’s current reputation for being sustainable, 
on this view, rests on historical good fortune rather than 
intentionality. He gave the example of the UGB: “that just happens to 
have been something in 1972 – the stars aligned – and now Portland 
is considered sustainable because of that 40 year-old act”; it was 
established originally to protect farmland (Mayer & Provo, 2004). 
Similarly, cycle lanes were implemented, P1 suggested, due to a 
particular combination of economic constraints and political actors: 
“there was very little money for a lot of alternative infrastructure, so 
bike lanes were put in. There were some champions in the city who 
moved that forward. And now that’s been folded into the 
sustainability effort”.  
 
Taking this argument further, even the foundational work of the 
1970s might be interpreted as largely dependent on favourable 




credit for preserving the streetcar city in the age of the automobile”; 
the hills west of downtown and the Columbia river to the north 
provided natural barriers to sprawl (Abbott, 1983:3). Additionally, 
the pre-existence of relatively small blocks in the urban centre 
(Abbott, 2011) may have served to promote pedestrian vitality – an 
enabling relationship generally accepted in urban design theory, 
following Jacobs (1961). One city-level interviewee (C8) similarly 
thought it serendipitous that “the original founding fathers laid out 
the downtown grid in a 200 x 200 [foot] block system, where most 
major cities are 400 x 400”. Meanwhile, Portland’s relatively slow 
suburbanisation may have been historically fortuitous (Mayer & 
Provo, 2004); even its oldest neighbourhoods had not suffered the 
“full cycle of deterioration” by the late 1960s (Abbott, 1983:3). The 
long-term ‘front porch’ culture of these neighbourhoods has now 
been bundled into what is now called a ‘liveability’ agenda (R2). 
 
A critical historiographical argument of this type, in its implicit 
call for revisionism, acknowledges the existence of a dominant 
narrative; it does not deny the enabling role of this narrative for the 
circulation of current discourse, and therefore the effects that this 
discourse has on the world. The received narrative of Portland’s 
planning history, in other words, however partial or deterministic it 
seems, may itself function as an important precondition for the 
implementation of the city’s contemporary sustainability policies. To 
the extent, meanwhile, that such criticism is unconvincing in its 
attempts to deconstruct the causality of the narrative, the contextual 
significance of these historical enabling relationships needs to be 
accounted for in a description of the present. Either way, a particular 
context (real or imagined) can be identified as shaping and enabling 
Portland’s current approach to sustainability. This problematises the 
transferability of ED more specifically – in terms of technologies, 
policies, governance processes, and democratic legitimacy – insofar 
as it too is enabled by its context. Not only may it have limited 
applicability for other cities, but also for those parts of Portland itself 
where the dominant discursive construction more obviously departs 
from the way the city is imagined by local residents. 
 
Civic engagement 
The reputed ‘difference’ of Portland’s governance practices also 




considered a significant influence on the city’s development since 
neighbourhood conservation and issue-based activism first 
flourished in the late 1960s (Abbott, 2011). Evidence provided for 
early successful civic activism includes the protests leading to the 
replacement of the Harbor Drive multi-lane expressway with 
Riverfront Park, and to the cancellation of the proposed Mount Hood 
freeway, which would have destroyed several communities in 
Southeast Portland – its funding channelled instead into the MAX 
(Metropolitan Area Express) light rail system. Johnson links this 
engagement directly to Portland’s discursive construction as ‘well 
planned’ and ‘liveable’: 
 
“the exceptionalism of Portland’s civic life is one 
significant reason for the city’s reputation as a well-
planned city with a lively downtown and a strong creative 
community…It is widely accepted that Portland is a city of 
engaged citizens and that government agencies routinely 
involve citizens in public policy debates” 
(Johnson, 2004:102, italics added). 
 
But if, as Taylor (1998:89) suggests, the feasibility and desirability of 
participation has, since Plato, formed “part of a more general 
philosophical debate about democracy”, then the precise nature of 
Portland’s ‘citizen engagement’ merits closer attention.  
 
The claimed exceptionalism of Portland’s civic life is typically 
framed less by the efficacy of anti-establishment protest than by City 
Hall’s unusual willingness to listen to citizens’ views. As one city-
level interviewee claimed: “Portland has such a long history of 
empowering its neighbourhoods and communities more broadly – 
we can’t not do it!” (C6). Evidence for this historic willingness is not 
difficult to find. Already in 1976, a study commissioned by the 
mayor described citizen participation as “part of Portland’s 
‘equilibrium’ – it is beyond dismantling” (Witt, 2004:99). 47  In its 
introductory ‘Citizen Goals’ section, the 1972 Downtown Plan is 
positioned as a citizen-led framework for decision-making: 
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   The author did not have access to the source of this observation, which Witt 
gives as: “Dondero, Russ. 1976. Memorandum to Neil Goldschmidt, August 7. 





“The Downtown Plan is an opportunity for the citizens of 
Portland to say: Let’s first decide how we want to use our 
Downtown and then determine what tools are necessary 
to achieve our land use decisions” 
(City of Portland, 1972:2). 
This broke with conventional practice in its rejection of “tranditional 
[sic] land use determinants” which hinder the achievement of goals, 
in favour of “alternative implementation methods” (ibid). The move 
away from ‘top-down’ planning was further institutionalised in 1974, 
when mayor Goldschmidt’s established an office to fund and assist 
NAs across the city (Mayer & Provo, 2004:19). Putnam et al. (2003:241) 
differentiate Portland from other cities not so much in its level of 
civic activism in the early 1970s, as in its maintenance through to the 
1980s, while participation generally declined elsewhere. In a study 
from the early 1990s (Berry et al., 1993), researchers found an 
“unprecedented level of commitment to citizen involvement by 
comparison with other cities nationwide” (Witt, 2004:84).  
 
Cotugno and Seltzer (2011) position the ‘Metro’ government as a 
key enabling factor in such achievements, particularly in its ability to 
coordinate actions across individual municipalities (Figure 6.12). As 
the nation’s only directly elected regional government (Abbott, 
2011:150), Metro was formed following voter approval in 1978; its 
region-wide responsibilities include land use, solid waste disposal, 
visitor attractions, transportation planning, and parks. The 
development of Metro’s Region 2040 Growth Concept 50-year ‘long-
range plan’, adopted in 1995, is presented as having entailed 
outreach (Mayer & Provo, 2004) among “thousands of Oregonians in 
the 1990s” (Metro, undated b). Collectively, such commentaries 
construct a sense of regional consensus and inclusive civic 
participation, where the state, as far as possible, directly reflects the 






Figure 6.12: Metro region: border shown as dark line 
(source: MetroMap) 
 
While, however, the public has had a well documented shaping 
role in Portland’s institutions and policy-making, its voice has been 
mediated through particular institutional processes. Claims such as 
Abbott’s in the early 1980s, that public action is a key factor in 
producing “the sense of Portland as a very specific place” (Abbott, 
1983:5), do not indicate the presence of direct democracy, or that the 
space of Portland should be understood primarily as a Lefebvrian 
‘representational’ space produced through emergent public 
contestation and expression. Rather, a set of particular technologies 
of governance are employed to assemble and represent the public.  
 
The nature of the processes through which public engagement 
should take place is highly contested. As discussed in Chapter Five, 
dominant norms of practice, drawing on an ideal of communicative 
rationality, and oriented towards a goal of variously defined 
‘consensus’, have been critically interpreted as suppressing the 
‘political’. Emphasising rational dialogue in deliberative forums in 
order to ‘bracket’ social inequalities  
 
 “means proceeding as if they don't exist when they do, 
this does not foster participatory parity. On the contrary, 
such bracketing usually works to the advantage of 




Cochrane (2007) examines current participatory practices within 




radical disagreement is excluded to the extent that the participation 
takes place on the government’s own terms. Choices about these 
terms, accordingly, are choices over how publics should be 
assembled through processes of active governance. Barry (2013:98) 
outlines a series of technologies, including town hall meetings, 
stakeholder forums, consultation processes, and opinion polls which 
construct publics in that they are employed “both to assemble and to 
speak on behalf of specific publics” (Barry, 2013:97).  
 
In encouraging widespread engagement in decision-making 
processes, the state folds its own self-interest into questions of the 
common good. The value of such engagement is summarised by 
Seltzer (2004:55): it offers “cover and legitimacy” to planners and 
decision-makers; increases the “range of ideas at the table”; and 
“makes ownership of the results, the plan, widespread, particularly 
over the years and decades that it takes to act on plans”. Since similar 
points were made by many of the research interviewees, a coherent 
view might be inferred on the potential benefits of citizen engagement 
as practised in Portland. But to equate the extensiveness of 
engagement with the realisation of such benefits obscures the 
mediating effects of particular techniques of public assemblage. Such 
effects describe the gap between the ambition of representing the 
public in all its emergent variety, and the inevitable limitations of the 
state’s ability to do so in practice.  
 
First, there is no guarantee of all social groups being represented 
equally – or at all – in such processes. In Portland, according to one 
city-level interviewee, “it tends to be very white upper-income 
controlled and so we’ve got an unrepresentative system” (C7); Witt 
(2004:96) describes the involvement of younger residents, African 
Americans and ethnic immigrants as “nominal”. One (academic) 
interviewee cited research showing that the Portlanders most likely 
to engage with neighbourhood-related city politics are long-term 
homeowners, who identify more strongly with their neighbourhood 
(P1). The relative apathy which, conversely, correlates with 
transience may have been exaggerated by displacements following 
inner neighbourhood gentrification; PDC (2015:4) presents the “[l]ack 
of affordability in close-in neighborhoods, resulting in gentrification, 
displacement and concentration of poverty in East Portland” as one 




East Portland is “now home to the city’s least affluent and most 
diverse population” (Goodling et al., 2015:520); the current Portland 
Plan notes that ethnic diversity decreased between 2000 and 2010 in 
inner North and Northeast districts, but “significantly increased in 
East Portland”, where incomers additionally tend to be less wealthy 
(Portland City Council, 2012:109). Abbott (2011:162) cites Parkrose 
neighbourhood – in Gateway – specifically as exemplifying a suburb 
becoming “increasingly cosmopolitan” as lower-income households 
are “pushed” there.  
 
Second, a system rewarding participation may tend towards an 
inequitable outcome if, as Broady (1968:47) suggests, “the activity of 
responsible social criticism is not congenial to more than a minority”. 
When, consequently, the system is “hijacked by cliques and those 
with…time and power” (Allmendinger, 2002:207), it may serve to 
reproduce existing power structures (Ellis, 2004). These possibilities 
were borne out in one interviewee’s observation that “the more 
politically powerful [NAs] have actually got their own war chests” 
(C8) for contesting unwelcome decisions.  
 
Third, the voices of self-interested parties may drown out more 
civic-minded ones (see eg Dear, 1992; Hillier, 2003; Innes & Booher, 
2004). One city-level interviewee commented that “the unfortunate 
thing about really strong local governance structures is that they 
don’t always choose the enlightened path…they tend to go with the 
status quo…we’ve got some neighbourhood associations that 
actively resist change” (C7). Over a decade ago, Putnam et al. 
(2003:267) suggested that the older civic activism of 1970s had been 
replaced by NIMBYism, and civic participation by increasingly self-
interested groups. Johnson (2004:116), similarly, identified a trend 
from “collective vision” to more “divisive tactics of special-interest-
group politics”, with local politics gradually polarising since the late 
1960s. The problem of self-interested participation also disrupts the 
narrative of consensual decision making across the Metro region 
overall. Gibson and Abbott (2002) describe regional growth 
management policies as having repeatedly been resisted, both by 
wealthier suburban residents with a preference for low-density 
residential land use, and by others fearing gentrification. One 




pushback over the need to protect single-family residential 
neighbourhoods” (R1).   
 
Finally, the flexibility of any specific technology of engagement 
may be constrained by institutional capacity. Despite optimism that 
wide engagement both indicates and facilitates democratic 
legitimacy (R2; C2), and coordinates diverse actors’ efforts “to 
accomplish something they couldn’t do alone” (P4), interviewees 
were aware that capacity is uneven across the broader region. One 
regional-level interviewee explained Portland’s willingness to 
engage as more related to funding levels than unwillingness 
elsewhere: “the city of Portland gets maybe 2-3 times as much money 
per resident as [my city] does” (R2). In Portland itself, public 
involvement has often led to considerable expense and frustration 
for city authorities (Johnson, 2004:102). Reflecting Putnam’s et al. 
(2003:249) observation that “[p]olitics in Portland isn’t placid or 
cuddly”, the downtown property developer interviewed referred to 
Portland’s nickname of “Little Beirut” (C8). One city-level 
interviewee reflected that: “the best thing about Portland is we offer 
everybody a voice. And the worst thing we do is offer everybody a 
voice because it slows us down” (C2). Open-ended engagement, in 
other words, conflicts with the practical need to reach ‘closure’ 
(Allmendinger, 2002) in policy decisions.  
 
The potential for engagement to hinder the efficient 
implementation of policy is reflected in the status of PDC, which has 
played a significant role in Portland’s development since its 
establishment in 1958 (Gibson & Abbott, 2002). PDC is “legally 
structured so that it can move faster than the typical bureaucracy” 
(Gibson, 2004:65), accountable only to the mayor and his governing 
board, and many Portlanders have viewed it as “arrogant”, “closed”, 
“autocratic” (Gibson, 2004:62), and a “threat to proper planning” 
(Abbott, 1983:176), associating it with the displacement of 
communities during the 1970s urban clearance programmes (ibid). 
Gibson (2004:74) refers to the “incredible mistrust” of PDC in outer 
Southeast Portland. One interviewee joked that PDC’s historical role 
was less about ‘placemaking’ than ‘displacemaking’ (L7). Since the 
late 1990s, according to Gibson (2004), PDC has become more 
accountable following pressure from elected officials and 




“technical expertise and funds to engage in big redevelopment 
projects that privilege established market actors. Decision making 
remains in their hands” (Gibson, 2004:81).48 
 
The pride expressed by the city-level research interviewees in 
Portland’s strong and institutionalised system of NAs need not 
imply that institutional actors themselves believe that local political 
processes are – or could ever be – fully inclusive in practice. Innes 
and Booher (2004) suggest, referring to Schumpeter (1942), that 
public officials may simultaneously believe in democracy and be 
sceptical about participation. Equally, a desire for more inclusive 
participation is not necessarily incompatible with apprehension 
about its practical implications; there is no guarantee of a particular 
administration’s policy agenda being strengthened through greater 
civic engagement. Indeed, Aars and Christensen (2013) found the 
opposite outcome in Norway, where residents of municipalities with 
“a high density of local voluntary associations…tend to be less 
approving of their local councillors” (Aars & Christensen, 2013:383).  
 
Gateway specifically is characterised by its estrangement from 
City Hall. Perhaps reflecting the relative transience and lower 
income (and therefore time-poverty) of the local population, 
residents are relatively politically unengaged (P1); city officials have 
historically ascribed underinvestment in Gateway to residents’ 
failure to make their voices heard (L5). Electoral participation levels, 
according to regional advocacy group Coalition for a Livable Future 
(undated), are noticeably lower than in gentrified inner NE Portland. 
Its relatively recent annexation (in the 1980s) was locally opposed 
due to ensuing increased taxation (C4), and its legality later 
questioned (L3). Several interviewees described a lingering suspicion 
of the city authorities:  
“a feeling of disenfranchisement from the very beginning 
when it was annexed out here, there was a lot of promises 
made, a lot of things were supposed to happen out here 
but the city has never followed through…There’s a lot of 
frustration with City Hall, a lot of distrust” (L7). 
 
                                                          
48
   Following the recent economic recession, according to the PDC interviewees, 
the organisation has turned its focus more towards economic development and 




One expressed a sense of injustice, claiming ‘a study’ had shown that 
investment in public projects in Gateway was low relative to the tax 
gathered from the area, and to spending downtown (L5). Another 
argued that public money spent in Gateway often served politicians’ 
interests (such as meeting low-income housing targets) without 
strengthening the tax increment base of the local Urban Renewal 
Area (L6). City-level interviewees acknowledged Gateway residents’ 
distrust of municipal authorities, seeing it as a possible barrier to 
implementation of the ED (C4).  
 
Implications 
The discussion above has outlined a multidimensional image of 
Portland, characterised by consensual inclusive decision making, 
liveability, acceptance of difference, environmental sustainability, 
and democratic vibrancy, all reinforced through their embedment 
within a wider regional and historic context. This discursive Portland 
is a very public city in both a ‘civic’ sense – as an inclusive space of 
tolerance and collaboration – and in a ‘emergent’ sense whereby the 
political both expresses itself, and is allowed to shape, urban space. 
As an image with broad appeal, the metaphorical Portland is 
mobilised as a structuring device for the city’s developmental goals. 
 
However, the ideological force of this metaphor simultaneously 
obscures the more particular agendas which underpin it, as well as 
the actual unevenness of Portland’s ‘difference’, socially and 
spatially. This unevenness might be understood as a type of friction. 
In particular, the various strands of the discourse appear more 
obviously at odds with the reality of East Portland. To the extent, 
then, that ED is aligned with mainstream policy, it too might be 
expected to arouse less enthusiasm in Gateway.  On one level, then, 
its failure describes an inability to assemble the ‘Gateway public’ in 
an intended way; as a process, it did not support the expression of a 
genuine emergent publicness, and failed to further significantly its 
civic public life. 
 
The following section explores further the possibility that ED was 
somehow misaligned with Gateway’s publicness, by comparing the  
assemblage of publicness in different parts of the city, using the 
criteria outlined in Chapter Four. The problematic nature of 








6.3  The Publicness of Portland’s Space  
  
Spaces of ‘civic’ publicness 
 
The four downtown observation spaces (Figure 6.13) can be 
bracketed together as highly regulated and clearly bounded, 
displaying very civic publicness more oriented towards consumption 
than transgression. All were busier than the average for the locations 
in Portland, with a strong sense of safety; Pioneer Square (Figure 6.15) 
was patrolled by security guards. Posted regulations serve to 
demarcate these spaces from their surroundings (Figures 6.15 & 6.17). 
Loose space activity was much in evidence – for example, people 
were gathered around a game of giant chess in Pioneer Square; 
mothers interacted while their children played in Director Park’s 
water feature; people ate lunch in Pettygrove park and sat at cafés 

























    







Figure 6.17: Pettygrove Park, with regulations (Portland) 
  
The ‘programmed’ nature of much of Portland’s downtown has 
been commented on elsewhere: Abbott (2004:166) interprets a 
comment by journalist Robert Kaplan (1998) as ‘typical’: “With its 
neat trolley lines, geometric parks, rustic flower-pots beside 
polymer-and-glass buildings, crowded sidewalk benches…Portland 
exudes a stagy perfection”. The “systematic programming of 
activities” by Pioneer’s Square’s management committee is in fact a 
deliberate tactic to deter “derelicts and spike-haired teenagers” 





The three locations observed in South Waterfront (Figure 6.18) also 
sit well within the ‘civic’ space type, with a strong sense of security, 
exhibiting loose space rather than emergence. While the streetcar 
terminus was relatively busy and diverse, only local residents 















Figure 6.20: South Waterfront riverside pathway 
  
 




While not in the downtown area, Alberta Park (Figure 6.22) also 
sits well in this cluster of ‘civic’ spaces. This resembled Pettygrove 
Park in its level of use, sense of security, and loose space activity 
(with dog walkers opening conversations with others, and parents 
talking while their children played, for example). The types of 
emergent publicness resulting from territorial tensions highlighted in 
other studies of green parks (eg Byerley & Bylund, 2012) were not 
evident to the author in these cases. 
 
Figure 6.22 publicness ratings for Alberta Park, Concordia (Portland) 
 
  
Figure 6.23: sporting facilities and dog walkers in Alberta Park 
(photographs by Catherine Browne) 
 
 
Downtown fringe: highly visible space of emergent publicness 
 
2nd Avenue in Old Town (Figure 6.24) had a similar volume of use to 
other downtown spaces. It differed from them, however, in its 
‘edginess’: street beggars were present, along with some rowdy 
behaviour among pedestrians (during the late afternoon); the streets 
are less well cleaned than in the urban core. The area is less 
obviously securitised than the other downtown spaces, with a 




stickers. Indicatively, the ‘Keep Portland Weird’ mural depicted in 
Figure 6.9 is located nearby – both a celebration of alternative 
behaviour and itself a non-institutional intervention in the urban 
fabric. While the centrality of Old Town makes it, like the main 
urban core, a well-frequented and highly visible area, it 
simultaneously sits uncomfortably with downtown since it feels less 
secure and its publicness is more emergent; it is therefore 
typologised separately here, as the ‘downtown fringe’. 
 
 
Fig. 6.24 publicness ratings for SW 2nd Ave, Old Town (Portland) 
 
 
Figure 6.25: SW 2nd Avenue (Old Town) 
 
Conscious decisions made by the city authorities may partly 
explain the differences in publicness between Old Town and the 
main urban core. It has effectively been designated as a space of less 
regulated and non-mainstream behaviour. Current policies promote 
it as an ‘entertainment district’ (Theen, 2013); homeless shelters and 
other social services are concentrated here, following tacit 
agreements made during negotiations between City Hall and 




2004:174). Old Town is characterised internally by various types of 
boundary blurring, reflecting its emergent qualities. Significantly, the 
‘R2D2’ homeless encampment is located on Old Town’s main 
thoroughfare (Figure 6.26). As a squat, its legality is fiercely 
contested by its occupiers, the city, and the landowner. Symbolically, 
its physical boundaries are marked by artistic and political messages, 
including some directly questioning the nature of private property 
ownership, with a call to ‘disturb the comfortable’ (top right on 
Figure 6.26). Indicatively, the author observed a policewoman 
attempting to prevent a group of young people from smoking 
cannabis; they acquiesced only temporarily, after challenging her 
authority. This marked an instance of ‘a-legality’ (Lindahl, 2013): the 
right of the establishment to regulate behaviour was tested rather 
than clearly upheld or transgressed. Boundary blurring was also 
evident in a symbiotic enmeshment of commercial activity and 
emergent publicness; the area’s self-consciously countercultural 
retail establishments are perhaps best typified by ‘Voodoo 
Doughnut’, a well-established ‘weird’ visitor attraction. 
 
  
   





Gentrified neighbourhoods: local spaces of emergent publicness 
 
Alberta Street (Figure 6.27), in the gentrified Concordia 
neighbourhood, like 2nd Ave, was characterised by considerable 
loose space activity (pedestrians strolling, window shopping, 
romantic activity, skateboarding, dog walking, etc). As part of a 
residential neighbourhood, however, it was less busy than the 
downtown locations (more similar to South Waterfront). While 
lacking the ‘edginess’ of 2nd Avenue, several cases of low-level anti-
social behaviour were observed by the author (begging, drunkenness, 
cars driving past with loud music).  
 
 









Alberta Street stood out most characteristically among all 13 
locations, however, for its emergent publicness. Many walls display 
artistic murals, and municipal infrastructure is covered with graffiti, 
stickers and posters, containing political messages and promoting 
subcultural or artistic events (Figure 6.29); children make colourful 
chalk markings on the streets and pavements (Figure 6.30). To some 
extent, the authorities encourage its ‘artistic’ appearance: its 
municipal wastebins, for example, are unusually decorated with 
recycled road signs (Figure 6.31); Portland’s official tourism 
organisation promotes a monthly open-air arts festival here (Travel 
Portland, undated).  
 
  
 Figure 6.29: stickers and graffiti on Figure 6.30: chalk markings on  




Figure 6.31: municipal wastebins on Alberta Street 
 
Various types of ‘spherical blurring’ are evident in the vicinity of 




artistic objects displayed on residences, and commercial art are all 
mutually derivative (Figures 6.32 and 6.33).49 Simultaneously, in the 
wide variety of signs and symbols (Figure 6.34) displayed outside 
residential properties nearby, there is evidence of personal 
sentiments publicly emerging.50 Some of these have artistic and/or 
political content; others publicise rather intimate sentiments. 
Significantly, while most interviewees began by mentioning 
‘showpiece’ downtown open spaces or publicly-owned 
infrastructure and institutions, several then qualified this with 
reference to the more immediate vicinity of their home – for example:   
 
“really public spaces are…the sidewalk in front of your 
house and in front of your neighbour’s house…in the 
Portland way, I think that really the most public of spaces 
is everybody’s front yard public space” (P1). 
 
The same respondent evoked a sense of publicness having different 
modalities when commenting that “downtown…there’s clearly more 
public-private delineation than there is at the neighbourhood 
scale…But in [Portland’s older] neighbourhoods there’s a little bit of 
a different sense of what’s public” (P1). 
 
   
Figures 6.32 & 6.33: ‘blurring’ in the Alberta Street area: graffiti 
adopted by commercial actors; counterinstitutional opinions 
publicised in a ‘private’ front garden 
                                                          
49
   In his discussion of political claim making in public spaces, Iveson similarly 
observes a “marriage between graffiti writers and commerce” in Sydney, such 
that shop-fronts, packaging, advertising, and commodities all use “graffiti 
styles to attach a ‘street’ aesthetic to their products” (Iveson, 2007:133). 
50






Figure 6.34: examples of signs displayed on houses near Alberta Street 
 
‘Outer suburbs’: the defence of the personal sphere 
 
To characterise more clearly the categories of Portland space 
proposed above, it may be useful to contrast them with the (wealthy) 
outer suburbs of the Metro area. The author gained some insight into 
this type of space during a two-day stay in ‘Highland Heights’, a 
residential area of the city of Beaverton, immediately west of 
Portland (Figure 6.35). The author’s main impression was the non-
urban ‘feel’ resulting from the zoned exclusion of commercial land. 
Although children played outside, and neighbours conversed 
informally, this appeared to evidence what Lofland (1998) calls the 
‘parochial’ sphere – an extension of the personal sphere rather than 
true publicness (see Chapter Three). One of the interviewees 
discussed Beaverton specifically, caricaturing it as an example of 
somewhere that people live because:  
 
“the urban experience isn’t important for you. If home is 
your focus…There aren’t as many annoyances. 
Everything’s tidy and orderly. You put your residential 
here and you put your commercial there and you have 
your green spaces, and a lot of the people around are very 
similar to you” (L1). 
 
As an ‘ideal type’, then, the outer suburb is at least imagined as a 
fundamentally non-public space, lacking social and functional 
heterogeneity, and characterised by harmony rather than tension. It 
is not a civic space of tolerance, since there is little ‘otherness’ to 




significant reason for emergent publicness to be assembled. Zoning, 
which leads to land being occupied exclusively by residential 
properties and the roads leading to them, means that publicness even 




Figure 6.35: Highland Heights: monozoned outer suburban residential space 
(photographs by June Stephens) 
 
 ‘Urban suburbs’: potentially emergent, but formally personal 
space 
 
Several interviewees emphasised the importance of ‘porchlife’ in 
facilitating social intercourse in Portland’s older neighbourhoods, 
where homes are “outward facing” and “engaged with the street” 
(P1). If Chapman and Lund (2004:214), in their study of Portland’s 
densification policies, are right to “include in public space the public-
private transition in residential areas that includes front porches, 
sidewalks, and planting strips”, then it may be significant that outer 
Portland neighbourhoods typically lack all three of these 
ambiguously public features. The formal qualities of Gateway reflect 
those of an ‘outer suburb’: it is clearly zoned, car-centric, and its 
architectural and urban and design practices are oriented primarily 












Figure 6.37: typical 1950s ‘ranch’ style (bungalow) housing in 
Gateway area: lack of density; no porches; space oriented towards 
defence of the personal sphere 
 
While, indicatively, PDC promotes Gateway externally on its own 
terms rather than as a “Portland-style place” (C1), since the ‘Portland 
brand’ is not considered relevant to its likelihood to attract 
investment, Gateway diverges markedly from the ‘outer suburb’ 
ideal type. Its ambivalence was reflected in research interviewees’ 




suburban. Its characteristics as a socially diverse, relatively low 
income area traditionally marked by dissatisfaction with the 
institutional expectation of its residents being problematically 
‘entangled’ (Marres, 2012) with the different spheres of city life. In 
other words, Gateway displays the preconditions of emergent 
publicness. Barnet and Bridge (2013:1035) understand the urban 
partly as “a complex of issues, problems, and objects that generate 
contention”; but also as a “field where the diversity and 
interconnectedness of effects operates as a seedbed for issue 
recognition”. If, as suggested here, the formal qualities of Gateway 
serve to ‘design out’ public life, then the possibility of the assemblage 
and visibility, or recognition, of emergent publicness is denied. 
 
Due to the unwelcoming environment for pedestrians, even civic 
publicness is formally impeded in Gateway’s open spaces (Figure 
6.38). Very few pedestrians were observed on its main thoroughfare, 
Halsey Street (Figure 6.39); retail customers mostly arrived by car 
(plentiful parking space being available). The ‘PDC Park’ adjoining 
Halsey was almost entirely unused, except by a small number of 
street drinkers (Figure 6.42). This no doubt reflects the fact that it has 
been left undeveloped – but also echoes the lack of pedestrians in its 
vicinity. A vicious circle may have emerged, where underuse adds to 
its appeal for street drinkers (Jacobs, 1961); the resulting sense of 
insecurity repels others from the space (Byerley & Bylund, 2012) and 
its vicinity. The transit station approach (next to Oregon Clinic), 
finally, had a higher pedestrian volume than the other two spaces, 
and did exhibit limited loose space activity (for example, 
skateboarding), but few people lingered here (reflecting its clear 
intended function as a ‘link’ rather than a ‘place’) and there was no 














   
   







Figure 6.40: main pedestrian access path to Gateway Transit Hub 






Figure 6.41: first impressions of Gateway on leaving the transit hub: 




Figure 6.42: views across PDC park towards Halsey Street in 




Various local interviewees emphasised that neighbour interactions 
were very common in Gateway, pointing again to a parochial (rather 
than public) intersubjectivity. Several mentioned that another local 
park does attract a wide variety of users, but that nevertheless little 
obvious mixing between social groups occurs: 
 
“I think everybody in this neighbourhood’s really friendly 
– we’ve shared our garden produce with the Russian 
neighbours down the street. But then I go to the park and I 
see that different groups do really stick together, and it 
would be difficult to break that” (L8). 
 
This observation problematises the assumption of an unmet desire in 
outer residential areas for ‘mixity’ with diverse others. In downtown 
spaces, differences and tensions are highly regulated, resulting in a 
civic type of intersubjectivity. In residential areas such as Gateway, 
however, differences may be managed through self-segregation at 
the public level. This marks another potential departure, culturally, 
from the norms of the Portland discourse. As discussed earlier, the 
city and GG board members understood some of Gateway’s formal 
characteristics as obstacles to its economic and social development. 
Its lack of open spaces and non-pedestrian friendly environment are 
thought to impede a collective life – expressed variously in terms of 
‘vibrancy’ and ‘community cohesion’. But the ED’s ability to further 
sustainability goals is predicated on a degree of collective 
engagement. Attracting interest from private investors, so as to 
catalyse the process, has proven difficult given Gateway’s existing 
negative image. A ‘chicken and egg’ situation has thus emerged.  
 
Nor can GG turn to the city to fund interventions with diffuse 
aims such as ‘walkability’ – described by one PDC interviewee (C1) 
as “incredibly expensive”. Following PoSI’s withdrawal, and recent 
budget cuts to PDC, funds will only be available to support projects 
with quantifiable forecasted economic benefits, rather than for open-
ended experimental purposes. PDC will tend to invest “where 
there’s already interest” (C4), and has no incentive to fund process: 
“What I get measured on is capital investments – not how many 
neighbourhood meetings take place” (C4). 
 
GG’s capacity to shape Gateway’s development is therefore 




aligned with the goals of the Portland Plan. Gateway’s political, social, 
and economic distance from the inner city, described by the 
mismatch between the dominant Portland discourse and the reality 
of East Portland, suggests that a rather different ‘bottom-up’ vision 
might otherwise emerge. Certainly, the developmental model of 
Portland’s gentrified neighbourhoods had little appeal for 
interviewees, either culturally (“We don’t want boutiques – we’re not 
boutiquey people” (L4)) or socially: ideally GG board members 
hoped for a “mixed-income” rather than an upmarket future (L5). 
Even if funds were available, however, it is also questionable 
whether encouraging an emergent type of publicness in Gateway 
would lead to the city’s goals being furthered (unlike in the 
Portlandia areas, which constitute ‘neo-bohemian’ enclaves). The 
constructed, civic publicness of the downtown ‘showcase’ was 
untransferable to the specific context of Gateway not only because its 
formal qualities mitigated against this, but perhaps also because of 




6.4  Discussion 
 
Portland, according to the dominant discourse, is a paradigm of 
public space. This discursive publicness has a civic modality, in the 
city’s ‘liveability’, and an emergent one, both in its fêted visible 
‘weirdness’ and its residents’ intense involvement in political 
decision-making. Portland appears in this discourse as a Lefebvrian 
‘representational space’, significantly shaped by emergent publicness. 
Supposedly, its progress as a relatively sustainable city has been 
enabled by the unusual extent to which the city’s decision-making 
processes give expression to emergent publicness. 
 
In reality, however, publicness is assembled unevenly across 
Portland, with the city centre most obviously characterisable as civic, 
and gentrified neighbourhoods such as Concordia most emergent. 
The gentrified enclaves are characterised by widespread polemical 
civic engagement, and a history – through the process of 
gentrification itself – of a ‘DIY’ reshaping of the material 
environment; the results are aligned with (and constitutive of) 




institutional policies, since they are considered economically 
beneficial. There may be little motivation to encourage emergent 
publicness in Gateway because it will not obviously serve this 
purpose. Instead, a civic sense of publicness is envisaged, by city-
level ED actors, and in the local plans which have been allowed to 
emerge, as an aspiration for Gateway. This type of publicness, 
however, was unrealisable since Gateway retains the spatial 
characteristics of a suburban residential neighbourhood; the expense 
of intervening into its material space to achieve these cannot be 
justified by the city, which prioritises visible infrastructural fixes, to 
‘showcase’ the city’s environmental and economic aspirations, over 
facilitating ‘social cohesion’ among a group distanced from the 
dominant discourse. 
 
The ED initiative as a whole appears to have appealed to City Hall 
for two reasons. First, it could be piloted at little cost to the public 
purse at a time when funding for infrastructural projects was 
restricted. Second, it inspired genuine enthusiasm as an innovative 
experimental approach to developing ideas for the city’s 
development; faced with the uncertainty of how to further 
sustainability in the complex, open system of a city, the ambition of 
letting solutions emerge from the system itself had a beguiling logic. 
Both reasons are illustrative of broader trends in governance, and are 
discussed in turn below.  
 
The first, along with the goal of delivering social change in 
collaboration with private sector actors, would appear to lend weight 
to the ‘neoliberal’ governance thesis (Gualini, 2010), as discussed in 
Chapter One. Portland clearly exhibits some of the ‘surface markers’ 
of ‘neoliberal urban sustainability’ discussed in Chapter Five. It 
consciously brands itself competitively with a focus on sustainability; 
City Hall is keen to export its private sector sustainability expertise; 
it prioritises technological innovation; its economic aspirations 
appear to draw on a discourse of EM. While its policies are not 
primarily structured around a ‘carbon agenda’, reducing emissions 
remains a key ‘measure of success’ (Portland City Council, 2012:125); 
its Climate Action Plan describes climate change as “the defining 
challenge of the 21st century” (BPS, 2009:7), and boasts about 
Portland’s history of supporting “ambitious carbon-reduction efforts” 




ED’s claim to be “a new model of public-private partnership” 
(EcoDistricts, 2013c:3). Similarly, the Portland Plan repeatedly brings 
the public and private sector together: it elides the two in aiming to 
“support public and private innovation” (Portland City Council, 
2012:45); its “universities and businesses are active in research and 
development and the commercialization of new technologies” 
(ibid:54). In admitting “limited public resources for business 
assistance” (ibid:52), it distances its governance role from that of 
providing direct subsidies or operating a ‘command’ economic 
model; it looks to private businesses to implement these aspects of 
the plan. Its devolution of traditional municipal responsibilities to 
NGOs and individual residents may be symptomatic of neoliberal 
disciplinary ‘terror’ (Savitch & Kantor, 2002; Purcell, 2008) – the 
result of competitive pressure on municipal authorities to reduce 
services funded through taxation. From a critical perspective, then, 
Portland’s policies appear to be in the service of neoliberal urbanism; 
and ED appears as a neoliberalising initiative insofar as public 
opinion has been assembled in line with these policies. The broader 
neoliberal context has meant that economic competitiveness is 
privileged over other considerations, serving in effect to filter out 
local activities which do not obviously serve this goal. This all 
appears to bolster an argument that Portland’s policies are catalytic 
of neoliberalism rather than, as its discursive construction insists, 
resistant to it. 
 
This argument is problematic, however, in that the label 
‘neoliberal’ is not neutrally descriptive. Rather, as discussed in 
Chapter Five, it has a heavy normative charge; it coarticulates 
various political and economic tendencies as inter-related and posing 
a multivalent threat to a valorised ideal of ‘social democracy’. Its use 
by European commentators rests on a critical stance towards “an 
American “pull” on other cities” (Savitch & Kantor, 2002:307). If it 
thereby represents a charge of ‘Americanisation’, it is of limited 
analytical help in understanding American cities themselves, which 
have their own “particular setting” (Savitch & Kantor, 2002:283) and 
internal divisions. For the actors in Portland, indeed, the accusation 
misses its target. While an academic interviewee recognised the 





“another interpretation, which has to coexist, is that when 
people feel connected to their place and have some 
ownership of that place, they’re going to be more inclined 
to care for that place…The notion of ownership and 
having a voice in public decision making is a powerful 
one” (P1). 
 
Portland’s city-level interviewees did not express the strong 
reservations about devolution which the notion of ‘terror’ might 
imply. More typically, it was described in positive terms, as a 
pragmatic response to inherited problems: 
“it’s a simple response to filling the gap. The resources 
aren’t there, not slated for future development. So there’s 
a clearly defined community and they’re taking it up and 
moving forward” (P4). 
 
Gateway residents themselves were unambiguously welcoming 
towards devolution of power, given their previous negative 
experience of City Hall: “by having us initiate it and do it as 
volunteers, we have a lot more to say about what they do” (L4). The 
ED was embraced as better attuned to an imagined regional culture 
of “incredible citizen engagement…something of a participatory 
democracy approach – Oregon is strong on that” (L7), where 
“engaged citizens, informed, speak their voice, and their 
representatives choose to listen or not listen at their peril” (L3). 
 
From one perspective, these attitudes may suggest a 
‘normalisation’ of neoliberalisation. As Miraftab (2009:33) argues: 
“neoliberalism, as a strongly ideological project, relies on 
legitimation and citizen’s perception of inclusion to achieve 
hegemonic power…the neoliberal technology of rule does not rely 
primarily on coercion and military force”. Accordingly, it is 
unsurprising that one interviewee explicitly presented devolution as 
a precondition for sustainability:   
“We have more infrastructure in the ground than we can 
maintain. And in general the government is out beyond its 
means. And so we’re looking for ways to reallocate 
responsibility for some of these things to a level which is 





Nevertheless, the accusation of neoliberalism fails to capture the 
possibility that Portland’s policies are relatively progressive in its 
context; in assembling publics in line with these policies, it is 
protecting their status as a progressive departure (Gibbs et al., 2013) 
from North American norms. Although forced to compete 
economically in this context, Portland’s chosen strategy is to remain 
distinctively progressive relative to its competitors. In this light, even 
if local actors are understood as victims or conduits of their 
neoliberal context, they also have an agentive role in shaping its 
implementation. As Springer (2010) observes, urban neoliberalisation 
is an ‘uneven’ process, variously accepted or resisted within existing 
institutional landscapes, rather than a singular phenomenon (Peck et 
al., 2009).  
 
One way in which ‘conformity’ to neoliberal agendas may be 
encouraged is proposed by Swyngedouw’s critical position (as 
outlined in Chapter Two) that contemporary interpretations of SD 
tend to depoliticise decision-making. But this position is challenged 
by the case of Portland. The evidence here appears, rather, to support 
Cochrane’s alternative conclusion that SD, when mobilised by the 
state as a framing device for neo-liberal projects, tends not to lead 
towards passive post-political acquiescence so much as “generate a 
contested political space in which the political meaning of 
sustainability becomes the focus of argument, debate and negotiation” 
(Cochrane, 2010:378). The ‘smooth surface’ of published ED 
documentation, then, may belie ongoing contestation, but is also 
potentially actively generative of emergent publicness – frustrated 
though this may have been in Gateway.  
 
In a more nuanced reading, then, ED enacts a progressive 
modification of a neoliberal status quo; while constrained by its 
wider political and economic context, Portland seeks to change this 
on its own terms. In subordinating emergent publicness to its policy 
goals, it has protected this progressive position. Nevertheless, the 
particular implementational outcomes of the initiative to date 
highlight the significant shaping role played by contingent economic 
and political geographies of power at different scales. Such 
considerations raise further questions about its straightforward 
transferability to other settings. Such questions are not addressed, 




merely proclaims a “replicable model for cities to accelerate 
neighborhood sustainability” (EcoDistricts, 2013c:3).  
 
The second reason for its appeal – its innovative experimental 
nature – may align it closely with broader international trends 
towards what Chandler (2014b) calls ‘post-liberal’ governance, 
implicitly claiming to embrace uncertainty and complexity. ED is 
illustrative of newer, adaptive, feedback-based “forms of governance 
that abandon the Modernist dream of total control, acknowledging 
the inherently unpredictable and unplannable nature of cities” 
(Evans, 2011). One explicit motivation for ED was the desire to learn 
what sustainability might mean at a city-wide scale; the process of 
real-world bottom-up experimentation, or ‘research in the wild’ 
(Callon et al., 2009) in the face of uncertainty, it was hoped, might 
fulfil this desire. Aiming to learn both from successes and expected 
failures, ED emphasised post-hoc reflexivity rather than modernist 
‘problem solving’. Solutions were to be induced from, rather than to 
determine, practice. It attempted to tap into place-specific knowledge 
so as to “enable complex life to govern through its own mechanisms 
of creative problem solving” (Chandler, 2014b:35).  
 
In practice, however, it appears to demonstrate a paradox which 
may be inherent in all such attempts at ‘post-liberal’ governance: the 
transformative power of emergent publicness was constrained 
precisely to the extent that it was institutionalised. Mahony (2010) 
observes a similar confusion within other state-organised ‘public 
making projects’: although state actors promise to allow the public to 
organise itself, they “also [affiliate] and thereby [align] these 
processes to particular pre-existing organisations, institutions and 
sets of already established political aims and projects” (Mahony, 
2010:19). This produces a tension between “two contradictory ideas 
of the public” (ibid:18). While one GG interviewee described PoSI as 
having “put five seeds in the ground, and they’re all going to bloom 
on their own, and then we’re going to be able to cull the best 
practices from each” (L5), in fact the initiative was never aimed at 
self-organising public autonomy; rather, the state would inevitably 
play a crucial ‘gardening’ role (Bauman, 1989). In this particular case, 
at least, the short-term evidence does not support the interpretation 





6.5     Conclusions 
 
The conditions in those areas of Portland where ED currently 
appears to be successful include: (a) more obvious alignment with a 
longer-term legacy of enabling discursive and political factors; (b) 
backing by powerful resources; and (c) relatively simple governance 
arrangements which do not involve intensive engagement with a 
diverse public. If ED is microcosmic of the experimental nature of the 
eco-city worldwide, the phenomenon is likely to reproduce existing 
power structures (since these provide more benign laboratory 
conditions), to favour a very civic form of publicness, and to be 
relatively untransferable from the privileged niches in which it 
succeeds. Emergent publicness may only be encouraged in enclaves 
where it is likely to serve the predefined goals of institutional 
authorities. The processes of active governance through which eco-
cities are implemented may tend to exclude more radical, contrary, 
or contradictory positions, because of the need, institutionally, to 
impose ideological closure. Governing for and through dynamic 
unpredictable complex plurality remains a self-contradictory 
ambition, and even in this most public of cities, emergent publicness 
remains fundamentally at odds with representation. 
 
This critical case suggests that the broader problematic of 
planning for urban sustainability as outlined in Chapter One is not 
necessarily resolved by the state’s adoption of progressive 
governance techniques; and that this impasse is reflected in the 
apparently oxymoronic nature of the endeavour of planning 
‘cityness’. If this endeavour is indeed a futile one, then a case might 
be made that the role of policy-makers need not encompass emergent 
publicness. Perhaps a more modernist approach to urban 
transformation may more successfully effect technological change, 
while emergent publicness itself will self-assemble around this to 
produce the ‘city’. This possibility is explored in the following 





Assembling the Civic Public: Case Study 




“The utopian city for everyone” 
(The City of Happiness Sejong brochure, MACCA, 2012a:6–7) 
 
The case of Portland suggests that the aim of harnessing emergent 
public life for planning purposes is self-contradictory; that the 
constructive force of institutional policy making and the emergent 
modality of public life pull in opposite directions; that the latter will 
only be enfolded into the former on a selective basis, precisely 
because any institution will tend to seek to reproduce itself; that 
institutions are predicated on static representation while emergent 
publicness is constituted through representational space. But what 
becomes of a city whose plans pay no regard to emergent publicness?  
In a city for which a very civic form of publicness is envisioned, in 
whose plans the social only appears as a type of ‘harmony’ and 
‘happiness’ determined by the city’s form and technologies, is the 
oppressive potential of planning merely intensified, or will an 
emergent dimension of public life appear of its own accord? If the 
latter occurs, then there may be a case for eco-city planners to 
concern themselves only with technologies; for a consciously 
‘utopian’ mode of planning which ignores social and political context 
since it can exert no influence on these. The eco-city as technological 
showcase, in short, may be a more efficient way of introducing and 
testing sustainable technologies. This chapter tests the proposition 
that emergent publicness might assemble even in a meticulously 
planned, ‘top-down’ eco-city initiative such as Sejong City in South 
Korea, studied as a ‘critical case’ in the sense outlined in Chapter 
Four.  
 
The chapter begins with a scene-setting description of Sejong’s 




credentials. However, the question of its performance in 
environmental terms is largely bracketed, partly because the city is 
incomplete, and partly because no standard way of measuring this 
exists (as noted in Chapter Three); the aim, rather, is to demonstrate 
how Sejong has been enabled by a particular political, cultural and 
historical context. This is important not only because it raises 
questions about the replicability of Sejong as a model of urban 
sustainability – and illustrates well the contestations which lie 
behind the ‘smooth surface’ of official documents – but also because 
it has significant implications for the nature of the publicness which 
is envisaged and performed. The chapter continues by looking at the 
types of observable publicness which have resulted, which are 
interpreted as being aligned with the plans. The apparent success of 
the development on its own terms, however, does not necessarily 
qualify Sejong as a transferable model of transformative sustainable 
urbanity. 
 
7.1  Sejong City: Main Characteristics 
 
Sejong is located in the centre of the Republic of Korea (‘South Korea’, 
hereafter referred to as ‘Korea’), approximately 75 miles south of 
Seoul (Figure 7.1). The city forms part of the new ‘Sejong Special 
Autonomous City’ region,51 which is approximately 70% the size of 
the municipal Seoul area (Cho, 2013). The City Region borders the 
metropolitan region of Korea’s fifth most populous city, Daejeon, to 
its south. While the new city itself has an area of just under 73 km2, 
the City Region extends over approximately 465 km2, with South 
Chungcheong Province (‘Chungcheongnam-do’) to its west and 
North Chungcheong Province (‘Chungcheongbuk-do’) to its east 
(Figure 7.2).  
 
 
                                                          
51
   In this thesis, ‘Sejong’ is used to indicate the new ‘Multifunctional 
Administrative City’ currently under construction; the ‘City Region’ refers to 
the broader ‘Special Autonomous City’ area which encompasses the new city as 





Figure 7.1: South Korea’s five largest cities and Sejong 





Figure 7.2: South Korean provinces, including new Sejong City Region 
(source: KOCIS, 2013) 
 
The City Region approximately maps onto what used to be called 
Yeongi County at the eastern edge of South Chungcheong Province, 
and incorporates the previous county capital town of Jochiwon. 
Yeongi County was a largely rural area; approximately 20,000 
residents and farmers were evicted to accommodate the new 
development. The older settlements within the city limits have 
mostly been demolished, although one, in Sejong’s central park, will 
be restored as a ‘history park’ (Hong, 2013). Sejong City Hall, 
established in Jochiwon along with the City Region in 2012, should 
relocate to Sejong in summer 2015.  
 
The national government will spend a projected ₩22.5 trillion (£15 
billion) on developing Sejong (Mundy, 2013). Development is being 
managed by the Multifunctional Administrative City Construction 
Agency (MACCA), a governmental organisation formed in 2006 and 
accountable to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. 
The implementation of the current plans, based on the winning 
design from an international competition held in 2006, is guaranteed 





The first residents moved into the ‘Chonmaeul’ (first village) 
complex in December 2011 and the city was officially opened in July 
2012. On completion in 2030, Sejong is designed to accommodate up 
to 500,000 residents (with a target of 800,000 in the broader City 
Region – compared with c.92,000 in 2010). As of June 2014, only one 
residential neighbourhood (Hansol, containing Chonmaeul) was 
fully built and occupied, with around 30,000 residents. The rapid 
pace of construction, however, means that 150,000 are expected as 
soon as 2015 (Shin et al., 2011). The state Board of Audit and 
Inspection has recently questioned the feasibility of the population 
projections (Power, 2012), and according to one MACCA interviewee 
population targets had not been met (SM4).52 Nevertheless, both the 
estate agent and the MACCA interviewees contended that interest in 
residential and commercial property in the new city (speculative and 
in terms of actual offers made) remains strong. While, nationally, the 
cost of land has been relatively stable for last 6 years, Sejong City saw 
a large increase for “second consecutive year, with 5.5 percent 
growth in 2013” (Joo, 2014). 
 
Land preparation, infrastructural development, and the 
construction of the first residential complexes, has been executed by 
state construction agency Korea Land & Housing Corporation (‘LH’). 
The government commissioned LH to purchase the necessary land, 
and LH will retain the profits from property sales. Most of Sejong’s 
ongoing residential building work has been contracted to private 
development companies. According to the MACCA research 
interviewees, no significant problems have been encountered with 
the private developers’ willingness to comply with the city plans, 
beyond normal negotiations over prices, though this may be a 
significant test of the city’s success looking forward (SM2).  
 
Following the completion of the new Government Complex in 
Sejong in November 2013, most of the government’s ministries and 
sub-agencies relocated to Sejong, largely from the Seoul metropolitan 
area, between 2013 and 2014. Some key state organisations (such as 
the Presidential Office, the National Assembly, and the Foreign 
Ministry and the Ministry of Defence), will remain in Seoul; the 
Prime Minister’s Office is among those relocated, however. A total of 
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approximately 13,000 civil servants across 36 organisations have 
been mandatorily transferred to Sejong (KOCIS, 2013). The 
unwillingness of many to move has been widely reported in the 
press, along with problems associated with family separation (see eg: 
Korea Times, 2011; Korea Herald, 2012b; 2013a; Mundy, 2013), and 
ongoing concerns over inefficiencies due to staff making regular 
journeys between Seoul and Sejong (see eg: Korea Herald, 2012a; 
2013b; Kim & Choi, 2013; Mundy, 2013). 
 
MACCA claims that Sejong will be “one of the world’s greenest 
cities” (MACCA, undated b), and “Asia’s Green Metropolis of the 
Future” (MACCA, undated a). This claim relates in part to its “goal 
of reducing CO2 emissions by 70% and raising renewable energy 
ratio up to 15% before the year of 2030” (MACCA, 2010b). The 
reduction of emissions is to be achieved both by increasing the 
uptake of CO2 through the provision of urban green space and 
surrounding forest (with 40 million trees to be planted), and through 
“environmentally friendly urban planning, energy efficient building 
design, and renewable energy use during the planning phase” (Shin 
et al., 2011:1). Electricity is provided from a central waste to energy 
plant, solar panels, and a hydroelectric plant on the river Geum, 
which runs through the city. As part of the national Four Rivers 
Restoration Project, the river’s wetland has been expanded by 50% (to 
1,200,000 m2), to provide “the most biologically diverse of all 
ecosystems in Sejong” (MACCA, undated a:10).  
 
Surface parking spaces are limited in the city, but residential 
blocks contain large underground parking lots – in line with national 
minimum standards for new developments (SM2; SM4); the land 
devoted to road surface is deliberately restricted to encourage use of 
alternative transport (SM2). However, workers and residents have 
already complained about the lack of surface parking and road 
congestion (Kim & Choi, 2013; SM4). According to a research 
interviewee from MACCA (SM1), a balance was struck between a 
realistic appreciation of people’s desire to own and drive cars, and 
provision of alternatives. Hence, a Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) service 
will run around the city on dedicated lanes, along with regular local 
bus services running through neighbourhoods and linking these to 
surrounding towns and villages, and 220 miles of bicycle paths will 




connects Sejong with Daejeon’s underground metro network to the 
north and Osong railway station to the south (which has a high-
speed rail link to Seoul), and will be extended to Cheongju 
International Airport to the east in future. In the absence of a direct 
train service, regular inter-city buses connect the city to Seoul.   
 
In more recent promotional material, the city’s ‘greenness’ is more 
obviously related to quality of life: it promises to be “a pleasant city 
where humans live in harmony with nature” (MACCA, 2012a:12). 
Related features include riverside bicycle lanes and hiking trails and 
a “double-layered green belt that provides the most pleasant 
environment” (MACCA, 2012a:12); peripheral green spaces will be 
connected by green corridors to a large park in the centre, which 
includes hills, forested areas, a national arboretum, and a lake. ‘Eco-
bridges’ allow the green corridors to remain unbroken. All 
residences will therefore be within a short walk of open green space, 
with parks and green space accounting for 52% of the overall land. 
500 rentable allotments have been provided within walking distance 
of the First Town (MACCA, 2012b). Communal gardens and exercise 
areas are located next to residential complexes; these are open to all, 
reflecting the aim of creating an inclusive, uncluttered, “human-
friendly” environment “without utility poles, trash cans, concrete 
walls, advertisement billboards” (MACCA, 2012a:23). This is 
intended to contrast with Seoul’s cramped pedestrian environment, 
where the general public is often excluded from open spaces and the 
recreational facilities in residential complexes [SM4].   
 
Sejong will boast the ‘world’s first ring-shaped urban form’ 
(MACCA, 2012a:12) around the central park. Although more than 
one research interviewee drew an analogy with Central Park in 
Manhattan, and the influence of Howard’s ‘Garden City’ plans might 
be inferred, this design is novel not because it includes a park in its 
centre, but rather because there will be no city centre; the city is 
divided into six functional areas, dispersed around the ring, with 
residential and retail properties interspersed throughout (Figures 7.3 
and 7.4). Frequent BRT services around this ring will allow residents 
to travel anywhere in the city within 20 minutes without using a car. 
Building density is mixed but high by western standards, with the 
tallest (often 25-storey) residential buildings located nearer to the 




advantages of the ‘compact city’ in terms of access to facilities, but 
without reproducing the Seoul-like congestion against which – as 
discussed in the following section – the new city defines itself. 
 
 
Figure 7.3: rendering of Sejong showing ‘ring-shaped’ layout 
(Source: Korea.net, 2012) 
 
 
Figure 7.4: the six functional areas of Sejong 
(Source: MACCA, 2012) 
 
The early residents of the new city are, according to one MACCA 
interviewee, typically couples in their 30s and 40s with small 
children (SM4). This is reflected in data collected by Statistics Korea 
(MSCT, undated) which show significant shifts in the demographic 
profile of the City Region as a whole since the first residents arrived. 
Overall, the population increased by 27% (from approximately 92,000 




65 and over increased by only 7%, compared with an increase of 29% 
among people of working age (15-64). The number of household 
units increased by 33%, and the number of schoolchildren by 39%. 
Meanwhile, the number of residents working in the agricultural 
sector dropped by 7.5%. Of the first 300 residents of Sejong, 32% 
were in their 30s, and 25% in their 40s, thus making the town “young 
and vibrant” (MACCA, 2011); this compares with c.17% of the 
population for each age group in Seoul, based on 2013 data (Chosun 
Ilbo, 2014). In part, this age profile may be explained by the influx of 
civil servants (of working age), and may therefore be expected to 
change over time. One MACCA interviewee, however, expressed 
concerns that the social sustainability of the city may be 
compromised due to the likelihood that income levels will be 
unrepresentative, with few poor people or very rich people, and with 
education levels higher than the national average (SM1). 
 
This expectation that residents will be highly educated reflects the 
government’s designation of Sejong as a “center of research, 
education, and high-tech industry” (MACCA, undated b). One 
academic interviewee (SA3) expected Sejong to be functionally 
distinct from other Korean cities as a “centre of information making”, 
both in terms of government activity, and interactions through 
international conferences. Joss (2015) uses Sejong as an example of a 
‘knowledge city’, identifying this as a key discourse underpinning 
many contemporary approaches to urban sustainability. He observes 
that the city’s shape has literally been conceptualised around 
knowledge, in that the five functional zones around the central park 
are “variously designated knowledge centres” (ibid:239). Reflecting 
its hi-tech ‘knowledge city’ credentials, all buildings provide free 
wireless broadband internet, and residents have access to a wide 
range of digital services (discussed in the following section). Given 
the various government research facilities, university branches, 
hospitals, and IT, biotech, and green-tech companies which the city 
hopes to attract, Sejong has been designated part of the ‘International 
Science Business Belt’ incorporating the nearby cities of Daejeon, 
Cheongwon and Cheonan (MACCA, 2012a:9). This is intended to 
form an R&D cluster, as a pole of attraction away from Seoul (SA3).   
 
Attracting businesses to the city was acknowledged by MACCA 




is the case with universities, which, according to one MACCA 
interviewee (SM4) “want to be here but do not want to start first”, a 
‘chicken and egg’ situation has emerged. Since some of the city is 
inhabited, more attention will now be turned to this goal (SM1). 
Problematically, however, financial incentivisation from central 
government is likely to be limited due to complaints from other 
urban and regional authorities, “so it’s not easy to get the political 
support as far as the economic privilege is concerned” (SM1). As of 
August 2013, five universities had submitted business plans to locate 
branches in Sejong (of which two would be selected) (MACCA, 
2013b). Sejong’s library – one of its landmark pieces of architecture – 
and the National Library’s only regional branch (MACCA, 2013a), 
was universally cited by research interviewees as among the city’s 
great successes. More broadly, the promotion of the city’s “world-
class education environment” (MACCA, 2012a:14) reflects Korean 
people’s priorities in choosing a place of residence. What Shin 
(2012:221) describes as an “obsession with ‘a good educational 
background’” was reflected in the views of residents interviewed.  
According to one academic, Koreans’ future prospects are strongly 
shaped by their choice of university (SA4).  
  
The city already boasts a high-tech elementary school “designated 
as a pilot school for Smart Education” (Jang, 2012), with a total of 25 
smart elementary and secondary schools planned (Bae, 2013; Ser & 
Chun, 2013). The school has attracted considerable international 
attention; the headmaster devotes one afternoon most weeks to 
receiving guests from Korea and abroad. Nevertheless, press reports 
claim that civil servants remain concerned about Sejong’s education 
infrastructure (see eg: Kim & Choi, 2013). One resident explained 
that such concerns relate particularly to the lack of private after-
school tuition for teenagers, seen as vital for obtaining a good 
university place (SR4). In Korea’s competitive educational 
environment, this is in her view the “number one reason” for 
people’s reticence to move their families here (SR4). Private tuition at 
secondary school level is very widespread in Korea, and has become 
what a spokesperson from the Korea Education and Research 
Information Service calls a “necessary evil” (Jang, 2012). 
 
The overall story, however, is that infrastructure and building 




interviewees – the plans have not been significantly compromised or 
altered since being finalised. It would therefore seem reasonable to 
credit Sejong with being well-planned and successfully implemented. 
The next section, however, outlines the particular conditions through 
which the final plans were assembled, and in so doing marks Sejong 
out as more specifically a product of its contingent context than 
necessarily a model of urban sustainability which can easily be 
transferred to other settings. These conditions include a series of 
national policy agendas (relating to the environment, ‘balanced 
national development’, a history of ‘new towns’ and other mega-
projects, and the idea of the ‘ubiquitous city’), which themselves 
have particular histories, as well as a decade of directly related 
fervent political disputation. 
 
 




While Sejong describes itself as “one of the greenest cities in the 
world” (MACCA, undated:8), its ‘greenness’ takes a particular 
context-specific form. National environmental policies explicitly 
oriented towards economic goals, announced during Sejong’s 
evolution, have at least a strong shaping role in this aspect of its 
aspirations. Although Korea’s first national environmental policy 
was introduced in the 1960s (Moon, 2009), environmental issues were 
considered low priority during the following decades relative to the 
need for economic growth (Moon, 2010). Local Agenda 21 was 
adopted in many municipalities in the early 1990s, but was only 
loosely implemented (Moon, 2009). A Presidential Committee on 
Sustainable Development was established in 2000, leading to the 
adoption in 2006 of the National Strategy for Sustainable Development 
(NSSD), which identified a variety of negative trends in resource use, 
waste generation, and GHG emissions, among other problems 
(Moon, 2009). According to the OECD, South Korea’s GHG emissions 
nearly doubled between 1990 and 2005, representing the highest 
increase in the OECD area (Kamal-Chaoui et al., 2011:19); urban air 
quality was poor relative to other OECD nations (OECD, 2006; 
Kamal-Chaoui et al., 2011), and energy, water, pesticide and fertiliser 




Against this background of internationally observed 
environmental problems, President MyungBak Lee announced a Low 
Carbon, Green Growth strategy in 2008, to guide national development 
over six decades (Moon, 2010). This included targets for renewable 
energy production, development of ‘green homes’ and eco-friendly 
vehicles, and a doubling of investment in green technology (ibid). 
This strategy was promoted as a “new locomotive of national 
economic growth”, with economic and environmental improvements 
working together in a “virtuous cycle” (Lee et al., 2012:4). Various 
climate change-related targets introduced since the millennium have 
been interpreted as augmenting growth-oriented policies devised in 
the 1980s to encourage science technology and research (Shapiro, 
2009). The economic focus is apparent in the announcement of the 
Green New Deal in 2009 in response to economic recession. This 
provided US$38.1 billion of economic stimulus, 80% of which was 
earmarked for environmental projects (Moon, 2010), including the 
controversial Four Major Rivers Restoration Project (Kamal-Chaoui et 
al., 2011). It was extended into a five-year Green Growth Plan later that 
year, setting out specific targets (Lee et al., 2012) and allocating 
US$83.6 billion to specific policy initiatives, as part of a National 
Strategy for Green Growth up to 2050 (Kamal-Chaoui et al., 2011). 
Funding has been controlled by central government, leading to 
competition rather than cooperation between local and regional 
authorities (Kamal-Chaoui et al., 2011:75–76). 
 
The plans for Sejong have echoed these recent policy 
developments. In fact, while the 2005 Act envisaged an 
“environmentally friendly setting in general” (Shin et al., 2011:8), it 
would be misleading to describe Sejong as primarily an exercise in 
environmental sustainability; its eco-credentials gained prominence 
as the plans developed. The goal of creating a ‘Carbon-Neutral 
Sejong’ by 2030 was announced in 2008; it was not part of the 
original special law of 2005 (Shin et al., 2011:8). Further carbon 
emission and renewable energy policies were announced in 2010 
with the aim, according to MACCA, that Sejong should “take the 
lead in President Lee’s low carbon & green growth scheme” 
(MACCA, 2010b).  Given the challenges issued within Korea towards 
its Green Growth policies, Sejong’s alignment with them suggests that 
its sustainability credentials are at least contestable. Critics variously 




economic growth and faith in science and technology at the expense 
of social considerations, oppose their top-down management for 
excluding local actors from active participation, provide evidence of 
actual detrimental effects on local environments, and question 
whether certain elements, such as nuclear power, should be included 
(Moon, 2010). While accepting that the Green Growth policies 
represent a “positive start”, Moon concludes that “green growth 
policy protects the environment only when it is economically 
beneficial to do so. On the contrary, SD develops the economy within 
the limits of environmental capacity” (Moon, 2010:411). Cho (2010) is 
equally sceptical, contrasting the ‘deep ecology’ espoused by 1990s 
civil society groups with the more recent adoption of the 
environment as “the main policy agenda for neo-liberal metropolitan 
restructuring which favors an entrepreneurial leadership in urban 
institutional politics” (Cho, 2010:164). 
 
Balanced national development 
As mentioned above, Sejong’s original raison d’être was not primarily 
related to environmental policies. The key stated aims of the 2005 
Special Act on the Multifunctional Administrative City were: (1) 
“eliminating urban sprawl of the capital region”; (2) “strengthening 
the national competitiveness”; and (3) “balancing national 
development”. Korea’s Special Act on Balanced National Development 
had been enacted in 2004, under President Roh, envisaging Sejong as 
one of four key projects, along with the dispersal of smaller 
government agencies to the regions, an ‘enterprise cities’ initiative to 
boost industry, research and tourism in six smaller cities, and an 
‘innovation cluster’ initiative to encourage cooperation between 
industry and academia (MACCA, 2006a). The Seoul Metropolitan 
Area (SMA), encompassing Seoul itself, the port city of Incheon, and 
the surrounding province of Gyonggi, represents c.12% of Korea’s 
territory, but houses around half its population (MACCA, 2006a; 
Kim & Han, 2012:143) and contributed almost half of national GDP in 
2009 (Kamal-Chaoui et al., 2011:12). MACCA’s Chairman asserts that 
“Seoul doesn’t have much room for further growth considering its 
density. For further growth of the nation, we need another city” (Lee, 
2013). Despite these ambitions, however, there is no evidence so far 
of a significant residential exodus from the SMA to Sejong. 
According to the local estate agent interviewed (SP1), most interest in 




Daejeon. One of the MACCA interviewees suggested that, 
realistically, Sejong is unlikely to create an immediate “revolution” in 
the Korea’s developmental balance, but may make people “start to 
think differently” – with the possibility that this new “mindset” will 
influence policies since policy makers themselves will be living in 
Sejong (SM2). For now, continuing opposition to Sejong draws both 
on cultural snobbery (SA2) and recalcitrance among those wishing to 
retain the “control and privileges that they’ve enjoyed in the capital 
area” (SM2). Nevertheless, Sejong’s future seems relatively immune 
to political interference, given the protection of the long-term plan by 
special legal frameworks until 2030 (SM2). 
 
While it is too soon to assess Sejong’s implications for the balance 
of national development, its effects on the immediate region are 
being keenly observed by the authorities. There appears to have been 
little local opposition to the way the new city has developed; as 
discussed later in this section, residents of North and South 
Chungcheong province consistently supported it during the early 
planning stages. The consensus among research interviewees was 
that the eviction of existing residents was not acrimonious, though 
one interviewee recalled reading about complaints from farmers 
several years ago (SA4). Residents were offered financial 
compensation (above market prices), options to purchase land 
elsewhere at a reduced tax rate – for agricultural purposes or to build 
a new house – and career training for several years beforehand (SM3).  
1,000 social housing units have been provided within Sejong itself 
(with priority given to families receiving less financial compensation) 
(SM3), and further low-rent housing is being developed in Jochiwon 
to cater for displaced residents (SC1).  
 
Sejong’s official status as a “self-sufficient city” belies the 
consideration which has been put into its relationship with other 
nearby towns – including its contribution to the creation of an 
‘International Science Business Belt’ (see earlier this chapter). S.-B. 
Kim (2006) posits the long-term risk of Sejong eventually becoming 
part of Seoul’s sprawl, and therefore argues that it should be 
considered an extension of Daejeon. The City Hall interviewee (SC1), 
however, was keen to emphasise its functional separateness from 
Daejeon, such that the two should complement each other. Indeed, 




same interviewee, was to discourage people from commuting from 
Daejeon rather than living in Sejong (SC1). 
 
Some tensions were reported between Sejong and the older county 
capital Jochiwon. One academic interviewee suggested that 
imbalances between the two, economically, demographically, and in 
terms of residents’ facilities, have become the “main issue in City 
Hall” (SA3). One interviewee had recently moved to Sejong 
specifically because Jochiwon “felt like an old place, not for young 
people…Old and poor people – sorry to speak like that – but in the 
construction city I feel they are young and with more money” (SR2). 
Furthermore, some envisaged infrastructural development outside 
the new city – including the upgrade of the road to Jochiwon – has 
not materialised (SC1). The provision of ‘smart’ school facilities, 
whose initial and ongoing maintenance costs are unusually high 
(SE1), has been questioned by schools and parents elsewhere in the 
region who suffer from large class sizes and insufficient equipment 
(SA3). Nevertheless, City Hall and MACCA were generally 
understood to have a constructive relationship; it is seen as 
advantageous for this relationship that the new mayor (as of July 
2014) is an ex-Chairman of MACCA (SC1; SM4). In short, it would be 
difficult to conclude, based on the available evidence, that 
widespread local public or institutional discord has emerged during 
the city’s development, but Sejong’s relationship with Seoul remains 
ambivalent. 
 
New Towns and other mega-projects 
 
Since the 1960s, Korea has regularly undertaken large construction 
projects, mandated by central government (Park, 2011). Driven 
primarily by national economic considerations, these reflect Korea’s 
characterisation as a ‘Developmental State’, a concept glossed by 
Woo-Cummings (1999:1) as: 
“shorthand for the seamless web of political, bureaucratic, 
and moneyed influences that structures life in capitalist 
Northeast Asia. This state form originated as the region’s 
idiosyncratic response to a world dominated by the West, 
and despite many problems associated with it, such as 
corruption and inefficiency, today state policies continue 




competitiveness and by a residual nationalism (even in the 
contemporary context of globalization)”.  
It seems reasonable to suggest that this history of economically 
motivated “state-led mega projects” (Kim, 2011:192) was an enabling 
factor in the emergence of plans for Sejong. Significantly, such 
projects have traditionally been shaped by the need to mobilise 
support from local political leaders and voters (Park, 2011); they are 
tied into electoral tactics as much as intended to promote national 
development. 
 
More specifically, Sejong continues a tradition of new city 
development in Korea. A series of ‘industrial new cities’ were built in 
the 1960s and 1970s, with Gwacheon (in the SMA) in 1979 (Seo, 2013) 
marking a precedent for government ministry relocation. Large-scale 
housing developments since the 1980s around Seoul have sought to 
meet rising housing demand and stabilise land prices (ibid; Kim & 
Han, 2012). Simultaneously, the 1980s were marked by state-led 
programmes, relying on Korea’s “highly speculative” (Shin & Kim, 
2015:2) property market, to replace informal settlements with new 
high-density accommodation (Shin, 2009; Shin & Kim, 2015). Sejong 
is not the first large project to adopt environmentally friendly 
principles; this is typical of housing developments since 2000, 
according to Seo, who gives the example of Dongtan in Gyeonggi 
Province, developed as “a high-tech driven green city” (ibid). The 
new town agenda has recently addressed more specific purposes, 
with projects including the eco-city of Songdo linked to ‘free 
economic zones’, and various other “innovation cities nationwide 
where public organizations, including state-run companies, will be 
relocated” (ibid). Sejong’s evolution as a ‘mega-project’, then, is not an 
isolated phenomenon. 
 
The environmental credentials of Korea’s mega-projects generally 
have been challenged. President Lee’s government was criticised for 
focusing excessively on “land development and construction projects” 
(Park, 2011:186). In promoting mega-projects, the government has 
emphasised “the preservation and value of the environment, but in 
reality it promotes development, and we call this neo-
developmentalism” (Cho, 2003:50, translated in Park, 2011:187). 
Elsewhere, questions have been raised about the social and economic 





“The proliferation of huge projects requires massive 
investment of public funds that could otherwise have been 
devoted to social and economic fields, such as social 
welfare and the development of small and medium-sized 
enterprises, which would have been a more effective form 
of job creation. Moreover, the development of mega-
projects and the resulting expansion of the state sector 




Korea may not be untypical in this respect: according to Flyvbjerg 
(2003:7), the governance of mega-projects internationally tends to 
display a relative lack of commitment to deliberative ideals, with 
civil society involvement minimised since it is “seen as 
counterproductive to getting processes started” (2003:5). Conversely, 
business lobby groups are overinvolved (ibid:91), resulting in a “lack 
of accountability induced by project promoters whose main ambition 
is to build projects for private gain, economic or political” (ibid:142). 
The genesis of mega-projects in politicians’ ambitions and power 
struggles appears to be more demonstrable than their economic or 
environmental benefits (ibid:4). Conversely, this may imply that 
mega-projects are more feasible in countries with weaker traditions 
of democratic engagement (as discussed later in this section), where 
public objections are less often incorporated into the democratic 
process. One academic interviewed suggested that in Korea’s city-
building projects, including Sejong, “the city becomes the game of 
the government to attract foreign capital, reinforce their political 
powers, and also to make some money” (SA4). If this assessment is 
fair, it seems sensible to question the social characteristics of the cities 
which result. 
 
Sejong in particular draws on a history of “plans that proposed an 
administrative and political centre in a place safe from any North 
Korean threats” since the country’s division in the 1950s (Kim, 
2011:191). According to MACCA officials, the idea of relocation can 
be traced even further back, to the beginning of the twentieth century 
(SM1; SM4). Most notably, for authoritarian president ChungHee 
Park, planning a new capital was an “obsession” (Kim, 2011:193), 
though he was assassinated in 1979 before the plans were completed. 




but also by the need to limit Seoul’s population growth (ibid:192) – a 
concern which has only grown over time, as discussed above – and, 
implicitly, through its symbolic features. In particular, moving the 
capital has historically been associated with the beginning of new 
eras in the Korean state (SA4). The choice of location took into 
account the need for the new city to be “quite detached from any 
existing town” so as to “gain symbolic power” (SA4). Pung su – the 
Korean version of Chinese Feng Shui (SA4) – was furthermore a “vital 
criterion for site selection” (Kim, 2011:196).  
 
While pung su is no longer used as an explicit government 
decision-making tool, and rational justifications may have become 
more important in democratic Korea, this historical legacy has 
ongoing significance since detailed research conducted into the site 
in the 1970s, based on pung su, formed an important resource 
informing Roh’s more recent plans to move the capital (SA4). Nor is 
Sejong’s contemporary justification devoid of symbolic and 
nationalistic dimensions. MACCA explains that, following a 
competition in 2006, “[t]he commission named the city after the 
greatest king in Korean history for having secured the dignity of the 
nation” (MACCA, 2006b). The winning proposal, reproduced on 
MACCA’s website, brings geographical considerations into this 
nationalist discourse: “The image of the king also suggests being at 
the center of the nation. Three mountains resemble a crown” (ibid). It 
is promoted as the “most innovative and traditional city” which 
“honours the Korean spirit and creativity of King Sejong” (MACCA, 
2012a:11). Elsewhere, the people and the government are elided as 
‘the nation’: “The Multifunctional Administrative City Construction 
Agency is working together with citizens to build the nation’s proud 
city” (MACCA, 2012a:12). Conscious attempts are being made to 
promote a sense of historical cohesion – including the restored 
village described earlier, and a park exhibiting Baekje-era tombs 
found in Hansol – such that “[v]isitors and residents would see a 
comprehensive and time-transcending realization of being Korean” 
(MACCA, undated a:12). The continuities between the older plans 
and the current ones may, then, be as much discursive as practical, 
just as earlier spatial interventions in Portland have discursively 
enabled more recent ones despite originally being unrelated to the 







In describing itself as a ‘smart city’, Sejong boasts an array of so-
called ‘ubiquitous’ internet-based services (Figure 7.5) which will 
provide citizens with “convenience and high technology” (MACCA, 
2012a:21). 
 
Figure 7.5: Sejong’s 49 ‘u-city’ services 
(source: MACCA, 2012a:21) 
The notion of the ‘Ubiquitous City’ (or ‘U-city’) contributes to the 
Ministry of Land, Transportation and Maritime Affairs’ action plan 
for greening cities (Kamal-Chaoui et al., 2011:53). The label refers to 
‘ubiquitous computing’, a term first coined by R&D company Xerox 
PARC in 1991 (Yigitcanlar & Lee, 2014). As of 2011, 35 local 
authorities had implemented specific u-city projects (Yigitcanlar & 
Lee, 2014:54), aimed variously at improving quality of life and 
economic competitiveness (Kim, 2015). In Yigitcanlar and Lee’s 
(2014:6) definition, a u-city is one where  
“any citizen can access any u-service anywhere and 
anytime through any digital network and devices. 
This concept is evolved from the earlier informational 
and ICT-driven digital city concepts. A u-city is also a 
high-tech city with an increased quality of life and 
strengthened urban competitiveness”. 
 
More recently, the model has been adapted “to include a greater 
focus on ecological technology, in the U-eco city model” (Kamal-
Chaoui et al., 2011:54). Yigitcanlar and Lee (2014:6) suggest this 
recent fusion “lays emphasis on the connection between 




by local community initiatives…to provide citizens with higher level 
[sic] of sustainable living and democratic governance”. However, 
they interpret the relabeling as a ‘patch’, “perhaps to gain more 
recognition internationally….[M]any so-called u-eco-city projects 
from Korea…are still referred to as u-city at the promotion materials 
including official websites” (ibid:12). They also observe that both the 
U-city and U-eco-city concepts were forged in the wake of financial 
crises (in 1997 and 2008 respectively), such that the stated goals of 
citizen empowerment (including the possibilities of ‘e-democracy’) 
may be constrained by the economic ambitions which they embody. 
They propose that the u-eco-city represents a “new way of building 
functionally sophisticated sustainable enclaves into society, mainly 
serving to high income groups”, and is thus “more likely to increase 
social polarisation and urban segregation” (ibid:12). The main 
benefits, they suggest, may accrue to construction and technology 
companies; ordinary people “are made to adjust to a new 
technologically mediated mode of urban life without much room for 
choices of their own” (ibid).  
 
The emphasis on high technology may tap into a more general 
“way of life, a lifestyle, a dream” in Korea; a discourse of technology 
– but which is “not so much technology, it’s perhaps a kind of 
consumerism” (SA2). Joss et al. (2013) use the label ‘ubiquitous eco-
city’, in conscious reference to Korean policies, to denote a broader 
international trend, potentially problematic in its tendency towards 
technological determinism and relative insensitivity to local political, 
social and cultural contexts (ibid: 73). Insofar as the non-place 
specificity of the adjective ‘ubiquitous’ resonates with the idea of 
‘utopia’, which always entails a “suspension of the political” 
(Jameson, 2004, cited in Stavrakakis, 2007:149), the stated objectives 
of enhanced democracy and sustainability may appear to be 
compromised. Place-specific conditions, moreover, are likely to 
undermine the efficacy of U-city technologies if, as David Harvey 
suggests, utopian projects inevitably  
“get perverted from their noble objectives by having to 
compromise with the social processes they are meant to 
control…materialized utopias of the social process have to 
negotiate with spatiality and the geography of place, and 
in doing so they also lose their ideal character, producing 








Whether we interpret Sejong’s claim to be the ‘utopian city for 
everybody’ as harmless promotional aggrandisement, or as 
indicative of deeper conceptual neglect of political and social 
considerations, its implicit characterisation as a ubiquitously 
replicable ‘ideal city’ seems less convincing than its explication as a 
particular urban development whose existence and precise form 
depends on a very particular context. But nor should it be 
understood as having flowed smoothly from this context.  
 
The current plans for Sejong are on display in the Sejong City 
Information Centre, along with timelines from the city’s history and 
future. As a travel writer affiliated with the Asian Correspondent news 
service observes, however:  
 
“Presented is the politically neutral version of the 
history…You won’t see any mention of who was behind 
or opposed to the city’s formation, for example, nor will 
you garner who was opposed to the concept” 
(Backe, 2012). 
 
This would seem a good example of outwardly facing plans having a 
‘smooth surface’ which belies a history of contestation. In fact, the 
plans have a turbulent history which “generat[ed] sharp conflicts 
between the parties and polariz[ed] public opinion” (Choi, 2010:16). 
Thus, they form part of a dynamic emergent history, and may in 
future give rise to as yet unpredictable assemblages of publicness. 
 
The current plans for Sejong, then, describe the outcome of a 
particular trajectory of political machinations shaped by a mixture of 
personal political ambitions and tactical electoral considerations, 
folding public opinion into the plans as well as attempting to 
construct it. The current city was first envisaged by President Roh 
(2003-2008), in an echo of Park’s earlier intentions, as a relocation of 
the national capital. His motivation appears partly to have been a 
desire to woo voters in South Chungcheong and North 
Chungcheong (Korea Times, 2011) – both traditionally ‘swing-voting’ 




“biggest failure” as president, the relocation was ruled 
unconstitutional in 2004. The city was then reenvisioned as an 
administrative centre housing various government ministries and 
agencies (Jackson, 2010). More conservative MyungBak Lee, who had 
supported for Roh’s revised proposals while campaigning for the 
presidency, attempted to downgrade the plans significantly after 
being elected in 2008. The new plan, involving significantly less state 
expenditure (Kim, 2010) envisioned a hub of industry, research and 
education (Jackson, 2010). The revision was supported on balance by 
voters across the country, though opposed in the Chungcheong 
Provinces (Na, 2010a; 2010b; Kang, 2010). This local opposition was 
very vocal, including a “mass head-shaving in front of the National 
Assembly” (Jackson, 2010). The Korea Times reported in 2009 a 
“widespread popular suspicion…that Lee wants to leave his own 
legacy in major projects that change the surface of the national land 
rather than inheriting his predecessor’s original pledge made to the 
people” (Korea Times, 2009). In a retrospective article, it judged the 
plan as “a typical case of populism and deep-rooted regional 
antagonism exploited by political leaders to garner votes” (Korea 
Times, 2011).  
 
Lee’s revision was also opposed by other political parties, and 
even by the chairwoman of his own Grand National Party (GNP), 
GeunHye Park (T.-H. Lee, 2009). Park proclaimed the new plan a 
“violation of the people’s trust”, since the GNP had voted in favour 
of the special law on Sejong in 2005 (Jackson, 2010). It has been 
observed, however, that GNP support of Roh’s plan in 2005 was 
based on political calculations (awareness of the project’s popularity 
among voters) rather than on principles (Jackson, 2010). According to 
professor of politics BungKwon Song (quoted in Kim & Kim, 2013), 
Park’s motivation for backing the plan at this stage was the “strategic 
value of Chungcheong”; it was likely to be represented by extra seats 
in the National Assembly in future due to its rapidly growing 
population.  With Korea’s largest corporations reportedly unwilling 
to commit to investment due to political insecurity (T.-H. Lee, 2009; 
Kim, 2010), and lacking the support of Park (J.-C. Kim, 2009), Lee’s 
plans were rejected by a parliamentary committee in June 2010 
(Chosun Ilbo, 2010; Korea Herald, 2012b). On completion of Lee’s five-
year term in office, Park was elected president, and continued to 




One MACCA interviewee regretted this political turmoil since 
energy had been diverted from creative thinking about Sejong’s 
implementation; equally, he saw the final result as more legitimate 
since a variety of opinions had been tested (SM2). Either way, 
Sejong’s political history demonstrates the contingency of its 
evolution, shaped by and shaping national government institutions. 
It is significant, however, that active public participation in this 
process consisted of political protest and voting, rather than 
institutionalised deliberation.  This point is explored further in the 
following section. 
 
State and society 
Using broad generalisations to characterise a given social group, or a 
society as a whole, may problematically contribute to an 
‘essentialisation’ of culture. In Werbner’s definition, to essentialise is 
to: 
 
“impute a fundamental, absolutely necessary constitutive 
quality to a person, social category, ethnic group, religious 
community, or nation. It is to posit falsely a timeless 
continuity, a discreteness or boundedness in space, and an 
organic unity. It is to imply an internal sameness and 
external difference or otherness”  
(Werbner, 1997:228). 
 
This process tends to “homogenize and stereotype people’s identities” 
(Carrim & Soudien, 1999:170). Nevertheless, aggregated assessments 
may facilitate useful macro-level comparisons, as is the case with 
Hofstede’s (2003:215) multinational index of ‘individualism’, which 
places South Korea and the US at opposite ends of the spectrum. The 
author’s own impressions as a western visitor to Korea chimed with 
the collectivism which Hofstede found. The author observed orderly 
behaviour on the street; almost no graffiti or litter; a conformist, 
modest dress-code; default deference to elders (within the school 
visited and elsewhere); and a reticence to express strong personal 
opinions, political or otherwise, to anybody but close friends and 
relatives. The accuracy of such impressions as characteristic of 
everyday life was confirmed by interviewees when prompted; they 
at least reflect interviewees’ own imagined sense of ‘Koreanness’. In 




and social codes rather than to assert one’s own will, and thus to a 
public life very civic in its orientation.  
 
Simultaneously, however, Korea’s history of regular and very 
visible social protest is widely documented (Choi, 2010:19; S.-H. Kim, 
2009:1), and has strongly influenced the democratisation and 
ongoing democratic consolidation of Korea since the 1960s 
(Armstrong, 2002; Cumings, 2002; Hwang, 2010), playing a critical 
role in the overthrow of the authoritarian regime in the late 1980s 
(Cumings, 2002; Oh, 2012). Protests are “so ubiquitous in South 
Korean politics that major newspapers in South Korea casually label 
their nation a ‘Republic of Demonstrations’” (S.-H. Kim, 2009:3). 
Since the democratic reforms of 1987, the number, variety, and 
dynamism of associations “independent from and often critical of the 
ruling government” (Armstrong, 2002:1) have proliferated. 
Departing from earlier aims of democratic reform and national 
reunification, the causes espoused are now more fragmented and 
typically critical of particular policies (H.-W. Lee, 2009:523; 
Armstrong, 2002:5). Examples of motivations include local political 
autonomy, religious agendas, farmers’ interests (Armstrong, 2002:2–
3), fair elections, healthcare reform, workers’ rights (Oh, 2012:259), 
women’s rights (Kim, 2012:558), and environmental protection 
(Armstrong, 2002:2; Oh, 2012:529). The groups espousing these 
causes constitute “what many Koreans called ‘civil society’ (simin 
sahoe)" (Armstrong, 2002:1).  To contextualise Sejong’s publicness, it 
seems important to reconcile the characterisation of Korean society 
as “highly homogeneous, pliant” and managed by a “paternalist” 
state (Koo, 1993a:2) with the emergent publicness at the heart of the 
modern republic’s democracy.  
 
The research interviews provided some insight into how this dual 
characterisation might cohere. First, the discontinuity may only be 
superficial. One academic (SA1) observed that everyday compliance 
with regulations does not necessarily reflect an unqualified active 
acceptance of a social contract. Another suggested that Koreans are 
in fact often “unhappy or angry” about issues, but tended to “refrain 
themselves from showing it” (SA2). The civility of Korean public life, 
then, does not imply a lack of problematic entanglement. As 
predicted in Chapter Three, the enactment of civility more accurately 




emergent publicness in which frustrations are given voice). 
Individual Koreans’ anger may remain hidden until “some kind of 
critical mass” of similarly discontented people becomes evident 
(SA2). In one resident’s words: “we obey many times…follow the 
majority system, the ruling system. But when really bad things 
happen, then yes, we react, we resist” (SR4). The need for a critical 
mass of fellow protestors to be identified suggests Korean protest 
itself is related to collectivism.    
 
According to Kim and Park (2013:328), Koreans tend to define 
themselves less in terms of individual attributes than in terms of 
“relationships and their roles in those relationships”, so as to 
“contribute to social harmony and order” – a tendency which the 
authors interpret as rooted in Confucian ideals. Confucianism is 
often understood as underpinning the “social stability and successful 
capitalist development in the absence of democratic politics” in East 
Asia (Armstrong, 2002:15); it is sometimes assumed that “a basic 
social consensus, derived from deep-seated cultural norms often 
associated with "Confucian" historical legacies…mitigated against 
Western democracy and favored authoritarian governments" 
(Armstrong, 2002:3).53 Korea has been described as traditionally the 
most ‘Confucianized’ state in Asia (ibid; Choe et al., 2006:293). U.-C. 
Kim accepts that Confucianism “must have been an important factor 
in Korea’s modern transformation” (2006:221), and can usefully be 
understood as a cultural force “similar to Weber’s Protestantism in 
the rise of Western capitalism” (ibid:223), enabling the “strengthening 
of collectivity in its enterprise of modernization” (ibid: 226). He also, 
however, suggests that its role was not a straightforwardly causal 
one, given its “oblique or negative character in relation to what it 
takes to become a modern nation” (ibid:223); the intentional 
modernisation of Korea might, then, equally be defined in terms of 
opposition to Confucianism. Its probable contribution to the 
“enhancement of the authoritarian character of development” would 
not in itself explain the emergence of democracy (226). 
 
The Confucianism underpinning Korean collectivism nevertheless 
suggests a sense of relational societal emplacement qualitatively 
different from the demarcation between the ‘private’ and ‘public’ 
                                                          
53
  This departs from earlier understandings of Confucianism as an "impediment 




sphere in western liberal thought, whereby citizens imagine 
themselves as private individuals and as collective publics in 
structural contradistinction to the ‘state’ (Geuss, 2001). Koo 
(1993b:238), similarly, interprets the “separation of society and state, 
and the importance given to the sphere of social life as distinct from 
the state” as deriving “essentially from…nineteenth-century Western 
liberal political thought”. One Sejong resident, having lived in 
America, viewed “the concept of country, the state, the nation, the 
government” as differing from America’s, with Koreans more likely 
to “identify government with the nation itself…we never separate us 
from the country, we are always the member, or the subject of 
government…we always really respect the country, the nation. But in 
America, especially the Republicans think that the government 
should be small, and shouldn’t interfere in business life” (SR4). A 
discursive sense of ‘homogeneity’ appears to feed into the 
collectivism flavouring this imagined sense of national community 
(Anderson, 1983).54 The same resident asserted that “most Korean 
people, we are very homogeneous, we are relatively educated to 
achieve an agreement, better than American people, they are very 
heterogeneous society” (SR4). The ideal emphasised, of the nation 
seamlessly co-constituted by the public and the state, is one of unity; 
the ideal is not one where private life is uncompromised by state 
interference. Protests, it would appear, may occur when this sense of 
unity is breached.  
 
These differences do not translate, however, into Korean 
ambivalence about the principles of liberal democracy; Kim et al. 
(2002:1) found strong support, in their survey-based comparison of 
Danish and Korean citizens, for “basic ideas…such as the right to 
vote, to participate in political organisations, to gather and 
demonstrate, to be fully informed of government activities, to 
freedom of speech, and to criticise government”. While the public in 
both nations “also supported…harmonious family life, harmonious 
social relations, and governmental welfare programs” (ibid), Korean 
voters differed in their deep suspicion of state institutions and “a 
high degree of political alienation” (Kim et al., 2002:1). In democratic 
Korea, it has become problematic that the Confucian legacy has left 
the state with an “unusual degree of…power”, such that “[h]ardly 
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  Korea has been shown to display strong ethnic homogeneity relative to other 




anything socially consequential…is left untouched by the regulatory 
actions of the state, and few groups or organizations in society exist 
without some kind of state attention” (Koo, 1993a:2); the state 
remains actively engaged in preventing political protest and freedom 
of association (Cho, 2002; Choi, 2010). Nevertheless, Koo argues 
against the assumption that a weak society is a “logical correlate of a 
strong state” such that an “’overdeveloped’ state structure 
necessarily produces an underdeveloped civil society” (Koo, 1993a:4). 
Older studies of East Asian economic development, he argues, 
tended to overstress “the independent role of the state at the expense 
of societal forces”, and downplay the way that “the state is 
embedded in society and draws its essential characteristics from 
society itself” (Koo, 1993a:5). He prefers the formulation that Korea 
displays both a ‘strong state’ and a ‘contentious’ civil society (Koo, 
1993b).  
 
Others stop short of interpreting publicly tolerated mass social 
protests too straightforwardly as evidence of a ‘strong’ civil society 
(Choi, 2010:19; S.-H. Kim, 2009:1); protests have more typically had 
little effect on structural relations between citizens and the state, or 
on policymaking (Choi, 2010:19; Oh, 2012:529). Their dominance as 
forms of political expression (S.-H. Kim, 2009:3) may reflect the 
paucity of options for participation in the democratic process, other 
than the ballot box (Choi, 2010:19). Thus, “mass mobilization against 
government policies” reflects exclusion from the policymaking 
process (Oh, 2012:529), and impotence in the face of the state (Choi, 
2010:21–22), while “[d]eliberative and public reasoning are 
completely absent or perfunctory at best, both in the legislative body 
and in civil society” (Choi, 2010:12). Civil protest marks what Lee 
(2009:499) categorises as a form of ‘unconventional’ political 
participation, chosen by an individual who “experiences 
disappointment and frustration” with ‘conventional’ participation 
which “pertain[s] to the existing political system”. 
 
According to S.-H. Kim (2009:17), one reason for “the persistence 
of protest politics lies in the underdevelopment and 
underinstitutionalization of an effective political party system in 
South Korea…South Korean parties are notorious for their frequent 
alignment and realignment, integration and disintegration”. The lack 




unaccountable bureaucracy, the powerful lobbying power of large 
corporations (Choi, 2010:9) in a system of state patronage (Lie, 2006), 
and a lack of localised civic or institutional participation in 
centralised decision-making (SA1), finally, are combined with a 
“highly personalized”, presidency (Choi, 2010:5). This results in 
policy-making as “a makeshift, short-sighted, and improvised 
process influenced by the president’s immediate policy concerns” 
(Choi, 2010:12).  Choi (2010:17) characterises the history of Sejong’s 
plans as indicative of “instantaneous politics and the personalisation 
of presidential power”, in turn reflecting “the multiple combinations 
of a strong state, weak civil society, strong presidency, and weak 
party system”. 
 
The relationship between the public and the state which forms the 
context for Sejong differs from that of Portland not only in terms of 
the possibilities for conventional participation, but also in the Korean 
public’s apparently differing levels of trust between, on the one hand, 
politicians – and, by extension, the state’s bureaucratic-administrative 
structure (Choi, 2010:5) – and, on the other, the technical abilities of 
individual civil servants. One academic commented that “unlike in 
European countries, the trust in the bureaucratic expert is quite 
high…people consider them as very intellectual and very enlightened 
minds. So once they decide, there is a certain trust in their 
technocratic decisions” (SA4); they are revered as an “elite group” 
well qualified to guide practical endeavours (SM1). Accordingly, 
despite the decade of contention over the broad shape of Sejong, 
MACCA interviewees claimed there was little public objection to the 
details of the masterplan: this was seen as a “technical matter” (SM1). 
Despite earlier promotional claims (MACCA, 2007:7) that “great 
effort has been put to collect broad extent of opinions from every 
sector of society”, and that the masterplan had been “established by 
collecting opinions from the nation”, this process is not mentioned in 
the current main brochure (MACCA, 2012a), and interviewees had 
little recollection of how such consultation was conducted. This 
marks a clear contrast with urban planning in Portland, where the 
details of proposed developments are often closely scrutinised and 
hotly contested (see Chapter Six). The successful planning and 
implementation of the plans for Sejong may not, then, imply active 
public approval so much as a default faith in planners’ technical 




be seen as less well innoculated to resistant emergent publicness in 
the long term, or as enabling more efficient development of a city 
which is at least relatively sustainable since it draws on accumulated 
practical experience from around the world.  
 
 
7.3  The Publicness of Sejong’s Space 
 
Sejong’s publicness might be usefully contextualised through a 
comparison with Seoul, against which – as discussed earlier – it 
defines itself. The publicness observed in a series of locations in 
Seoul is therefore first discussed below, to provide context of a 
specifically Korean cityness. The same criteria were used as in 
Portland (see previous chapter). 
 
It is helpful at this stage to ‘de-essentialise’ the notion of Korean 
collectivism, by assuming that its character will have changed over 
time, varies among social groups, and is spatially differentiated. One 
academic (SA1) interviewee contended that younger Koreans are 
more likely to display individualism, while older Koreans tend to 
respect the letter of the law; that teenagers and students now behave 
in public in ways “unthinkable” twenty years ago – for example 
kissing in public; with coloured hair no longer having the power to 
shock. Within Seoul, more individualistic or transgressive behaviour 
may be restricted to certain areas such as Gangnam (with a relatively 
wealthy and educated population), Hongdae (an ‘artistic’ student 
area – and one of the observation locations described below), and 
Daehak-ro (a theatre district). Cho (2002:429) likens Seoul to a 
changing “mosaic of civic spaces, each representing the identity of a 
group of people”: in contrast to “traditional street parks where the 
older generations gather”, areas like Hongdae attract young people 
who are “individualist, consumerist and sensitive to commodities 
like brands, images and codes”, and are characterised by “a mix of 
commercial and cultural establishments, allowing for a lot of 
engagement and conversation, and cultural performances in a 
vibrant setting” (ibid). The present research has only yielded an 
impressionistic caricature of a small part of this variegated ‘mosaic’ 
of spaces; rather than producing a detailed or representative analysis, 
it aimed to outline at least some of this variety, so as to relate 





Two characteristics applied to all the spaces observed in Seoul. 
First, compared with Portland, Seoul’s open spaces generally have a 
high volume of pedestrian users, reflecting the higher density of the 
urban environment, and possibly its larger metropolitan population; 
as described in Chapter Four, the simple fact of people using shared 
space is understood in this thesis as a precondition of publicness 
(without people, publicness cannot be assembled). Second, the 
behaviour in all of the spaces was characterised by civility (and this 
held true elsewhere in the city as experienced by the author – 
including late at night when many restaurants, bars and other 
entertainment establishments were busy). An objective affirmation of 
the author’s sense of a lack of threat to personal security was 
arguably provided by the high proportions of women visible in open 
spaces at all hours. During the observation shifts, the pedestrian 
profiles were noticeably skewed towards women, unlike in Portland. 
This finding seems more reflective of a tendency towards civility 
than to be predicted by gender equality more generally in Korea. 
While in recent decades women in Korea have gained more formal 
rights (Kim, 2012), and traditional views on gender roles have 
softened (Choe, 2006:305), South Korean women continue to lag 
behind other countries with formal related rights and institutions in 
terms of gender equality and empowerment (Kim, 2012), and the 
employment rate for women has remained “one of the lowest among 
all OECD countries” (Brinton & Choi, 2006:310). One of the MACCA 
interviewees (SM4) agreed that women face little everyday 
harassment on streets in Korea. Significantly, however, when 
quizzed about the stated aim of making Sejong a ‘City for Women’s 
Happiness’ (MACCA, 2008:7), she related this to the provision of 
facilities for housewives and children; the city’s plans therefore 
envisage the continuation of existing gender roles.  
 
The Cheonggyecheon river (Figure 7.6), flanked by walkways, is a 
showpiece of urban regeneration in Seoul, widely praised both 
within Korea and internationally as exemplifying best practice in the 
use of urban open space. There was strong evidence here of loose 
space activity (for example, young couples and groups of elderly 
people strolling, children enjoying crossing the stones across the 
water, people seated and reading newspapers or playing games on 




environment is very well maintained, and explicitly policed by 
security guards positioned on bridges. The author observed two 
cases of these guards blowing whistles at people smoking cigarettes 
on the walkway in contravention of posted regulations. 
 
 
Figure 7.6: publicness ratings for Cheonggyecheon River (Seoul) 
 
 
Figure 7.7: Cheonggyecheon River (Seoul) 
 
Publicness here is assembled in accordance, then, with explicit 
regulation, and in line with its institutionally intended uses. While 
Cheonggyecheon thereby displays parallels with the civic publicness 
of Portland’s Pioneer Square as a regulated downtown ‘showpiece’ 




gentrified neighbourhoods was not echoed in the observed space of 
Hwigyeongdong, a typical residential area of Seoul (Figure 7.8). 
Hwigyeongdong was, similarly, a highly regulated environment 
with only civic publicness in evidence. Many of its users appeared to 
be behaving in an instrumental way, walking through the space to 
other destinations, but some loose space activity was evident (people 
stopping to converse, and families playing on nearby sport courts). 
 




Figure 7.9: local residential open space, Hwigyeongdong (Gangbuk, Seoul) 
 
The two thoroughfares observed in Seoul (Figure 7.10) were similarly 
marked primarily by civic behaviour. Pedestrians on Jongno Sa-ga 




the pedestrianized street in Myeongdong was better characterised by 
loose space activity – with more social interaction, pausing, window 
shopping, and people consuming food and drink. Nevertheless, there 
was some evidence of emergent publicness near the observation 
location on Jongno Sa-ga: some fly posters, drunken elderly people, 
and a small number of illegal street stalls. A large group of police 
was posted during both observation shifts outside nearby Pagoda 
Park, a traditional venue for political protests (Cho, 2002). The 
observations took place during a pre-election period, and the police, 
according to a passer-by, aimed to pre-empt protest in this space. The 
tense atmosphere (as well as the drunken elderly people) 
undermined the sense of security in this location. The police presence 
also enacted an intentional suppression of emergent publicness; as 
argued above, a civic appearance does not straightforwardly indicate 











Figure 7.11: Jongno Sa-ga (Seoul) 
 




Even if emergent publicness is effectively excluded from many 
parts of central Seoul (forbidden by unwritten social codes, or 
suppressed by institutional authorities), the observed space of 
Hongdae (Figure 7.13) disrupts the idea that Korean society is 
universally characterised by compliance to legal codes and collective 
social norms. Hongdae stood out among all the Seoul locations for its 
strongly emergent publicness. In contrast to the rest of central Seoul, 
the visitor is immediately struck by the presence of buskers and 
other street performers (Figure 7.15), stickers and posters advertising 
countercultural events, litter, and graffiti on municipal furniture and 
advertisements (Figure 7.16). Perhaps significantly, like Old Town in 
Portland, Hongdae is located on the periphery of the city centre; it is 
central enough to attract a large number of people and be ‘visible’, 
and yet its publicness is rather less ‘policed’. While the area may thus, 
in its totality, constitute a challenge to the ordering of space 
elsewhere in the city, this challenge is effectively ‘contained’ and 
spatially marginalised. Perhaps relatedly, the age profile of its 
pedestrian users was abnormal for Seoul: the vast majority appeared 
to be of university age or slightly older, and thus peripheral to the 
social mainstream.  
 
 






Figure 7.14: Hongdae (Seoul) 
 
The hypothesis that emergent publicness is necessarily linked to a 
poor sense of security was, however, undermined by the case of 
Hongdae, where the atmosphere was more one of playfulness than 
threat – in the author’s eyes at least. Despite the untypical 
concentration of ‘traces’ of representational space, the appropriation 
of space by street performers, and a higher frequency of ‘alternative’ 
styles of appearance, the behaviour of the vast majority of 
pedestrians was entirely ‘civil’. The feeling of safety – relative to 
Portland at least – was true of all observation locations in Korea, 
suggesting that if ‘edginess’ correlates with cityness, it is not a 






















A consideration, then, of just a small number of Seoul’s open 
spaces disrupts a simple characterisation of Korean society as devoid 
of emergent publicness. The cultural tendency towards collectivism 
works in tandem with institutional regulation to produce a norm of 
civility. However, at its edge, literally and figuratively, the 
representational space of Hongdae demonstrates the presence of a 
playful type of emergent publicness, just as the history of street 
protest evidences the frustrations lying underneath the civil surface. 
While, within its mosaic of spaces, Seoul accommodates different 
modalities of publicness, the goal of constructing a city where only 
civic publicness is envisaged may therefore seem unfeasible. It may 
also be unsustainable insofar as it constitutes an act of repression, 
which, as Stavrakakis (2007:147) reminds us, “always entails the 
return of the repressed”. 
 
Sejong’s open spaces (Figure 7.17) are rather more easily 
summarisable than those of Seoul: no evidence of emergent 
publicness was observed in any of the four. One very significant 
difference from Seoul was the large number of children playing, 
cycling and walking around, more often than not unaccompanied by 
adults. Clearly, residents consider Sejong a safe place for children – 
no doubt partly because cars are excluded from much of the space. 
 
 
















Figure 7.19: Noeul Sam-ro (Sejong) 
 
 
Figure 7.20: beside the National Library (Sejong) 
 
 




In line with the discussion earlier, the objection might be made 
that the appearance of civic publicness, while reflecting a cultural 
preference for collectivism, may belie repressed discontent. Such 
repressed frustration might be indicative of problems in the long 
term for Sejong’s ‘harmonious’ current envisionment, only becoming 
clear when they emerge in the form of protest. To this end, it is 
important to acknowledge that the very civic nature of Sejong’s open 
spaces was rooted in strong approval by residents, who variously 
praised the greenery, peace, provision of seating facilities, exercise 
machines and sports courts (Figure 7.22), high quality landscaping, 
overall variety, fresh air, the lack of cars, and freedom of movement. 
Even the youngest (22-year-old) resident interviewed, who was 
frustrated by the lack of facilities for young adults, thought it a 
suitable place to live when married with children (SR5). Its “pro-
family” (SC1) credentials in this respect are very much intentional, as 
a counterpoint to Seoul’s limited open space in residential areas. 
 
 
Figure 7.22: example of exercise area in open space (Sejong) 
 
One of the MACCA interviewees (SM2) was candid about the 
possibility that Sejong would not appeal to all; without offering all 
the “fancy and cultural aspects” of a large metropolis, it offers in his 
view “a good city in terms of living environment, like a liveable city, 




our democratic society” (SM2). His point here is significant in terms 
of the need for urban sustainability initiatives to appeal to actual and 
potential residents; it seems reasonable to suggest that the promise of 
‘liveability’ should form a key part of any attempt to persuade the 
public of the benefits of living in an environmentally friendly city.  It 
has been argued that the UK’s eco-town initiative’s failure to inspire 
public enthusiasm was partly due to its overemphasis on green 
technology rather than on ‘community’ (Hubbard, 2012). However, 
the differential appeal of cities may be more problematic for 
questions of social equity if it describes demographic rather than 
merely attitudinal differences. Sejong’s actual population profile to 
date, skewed towards well-educated professional families, suggests 
the possibility of the future city being a wealthy enclave (possibly 
with nearby Jochiwon as its poorer relative) – even if City Hall is 
actively working against this eventuality (SC1). The limits of its 
appeal, furthermore, imply the limits of its transferability. 
 
Sejong’s civic nature does not imply that residents have inhabited 
it in a purely passive sense to date. While the broad mood among 
those spoken to during fieldwork was one of optimism, a variety of 
complaints were voiced, and had been expressed to the authorities. 
One MACCA interviewee (SM1) gave some examples including the 
limited parking spaces, retail variety, and the lack of a hospital. 
However, despite early press reports which constructed a ‘ghost 
town’ narrative (see eg Korea Times, 2011; Mundy, 2013), the overall 
mood among residents with whom the author spoke was one of 
optimism. Sejong may lack various services for the time being, but 
residents have responded by engaging with neighbourhood forums 
which collectively voice concerns to the authorities. This may appear 
to evidence an emergent public life taking shape beyond the limits of 
what has been formally planned in the city. However, such 
comments refer largely to public opinions expressed through official 
channels (including formally arranged meetings with residents’ 
groups and through the residents’ forum pages on the MACCA 
website), and are therefore selectively constructed to the extent that 
their expression is enabled and framed by those channels. One 
MACCA interviewee’s suggestion that the local population is more 
than averagely interested in local politics and development plans 
specifically because they have white-collar jobs and therefore 




been expressed through these channels. Formal channels may 
embody a genuine desire to listen to such opinions “to make the city 
more convenient to live” (SM3), but are intended to capture 
suggested improvements to the status quo, rather than to foster more 
open-ended debate.   
 
Given its ring shape, the new city may lack an obvious ‘ritual 
space of public protest’ (Parkinson, 2012:147). This contrasts with 
Seoul where – although street demonstrations require official 
permission to take place – certain particular spaces, such as the plaza 
in front of City Hall, are effectively reserved for such activities (SA1). 
At least in the short term, one resident suggested, political 
demonstration in Sejong seems unthinkable, if only because so many 
current residents are government officials (SR4). Indicatively, public 
access to the rooftop gardens running for two miles above the 
government complex, originally intended as a showpiece open space, 
has now been heavily restricted – at least partly because of the risk of 
political protests, including suicide attempts (SM3). While some 
demonstrations have taken place in Sejong, they have been small-
scale and tokenistic: “they just want to make trace that they were 
here to say something to the government” (SM3). There has been 
“nothing like violent protests” (SM3), partly because “also we have 
police who are like the government building guards, who are 
working to safeguard this place. And they are around here all the 
time” (SM3). 
 
At the same time, one MACCA interviewee, who had paid close 
attention to the uses made of Sejong’s open spaces, commented that 
these were very often sites where public opinions coalesced:  
 
“we interestingly found out without any 
expectation…that at the first village there are many 
people in small parks there, and also people come to 
there and organise their own little concerts and also 
organise their own clean-up activities of the 
neighbourhood, and it’s all organised at the small 
parks” (SM3). 
 
The same MACCA interviewee commented that such 
‘neighbourhood activities’, along with self-forming ‘hobby clubs’ (eg 




activities, for example, are typically organised in complexes provided 
by local authorities (SR4)). The adoption of ‘best practice’ urban 
design from abroad, along with the dislocation of residents from 
existing social structures, does appear, then to have catalysed an 
intersubjective public life – even though this remains largely related 
to sociability than to emergence; the clean-up activities, for example, 
would seem to be less of a ‘DIY’ appropriation of space, or 
characterised by critical political discourse, than a mark of approval 
of what has already been provided. 
 
One academic (SA1) commented that: “there is a great deal of 
artificiality here, a prearranged or predesigned mapping of our civic 
life which is conformist, the normal, the efficient”. Even if in the 
future what he called the “real city which is dirty and has a dark side, 
with drinking places” may come about, for the time being Sejong will 
be more like “living in a garden” (SA1). Another academic (SA2) 
suggested that Koreans tended to have a preference for explicitly 
artificial landscapes (Figure 7.23). 
 
 
Figure 7.23: ‘artificial’ landscape (Sejong) 
 
Echoing the way the city’s greenness is publicised in official 
brochures, local residents interviewed seemed less interested in the 
ecological dimensions of the city’s open spaces than in their 
contribution to ‘liveability’.  When asked if residents were interested 
in the relationship between their city and global environmental 
issues, one MACCA interviewee commented, “I don’t think they care 




environment is round here” (SM1). The following exchange typified 
several which the author had in research interviews and other 
informal conversations in Sejong: 
 
The houses are very environmentally friendly; they don’t use much 
energy and so on – are things like that important to you? 
 
SR2:  Environmentally is very important for me because yesterday 
I went to Sejong Lake Park to walk – I feel very satisfied with 
living in Sejong City, but I didn’t feel anything in Jochiwon 
because it’s quite an old city 
 
But what about environmental issues like saving the planet or climate 
change? 
 
SR2:  I don’t really think about climate change 
 
So what is good about living in the new house? 
 
SR2: Well, I feel like an IT person – how can I say?  I’m very 
comfortable with cutting-edge technology, so I feel like I’m a 
young person living in a good environment 
For residents, in short, environmental questions seem rather more 
obviously related to quality of life in terms of both physical 
landscape – and the novelty value of technology – than to broader 
questions of sustainability. However, the same MACCA interviewee 
(SM1) did not see this as undermining Sejong’s ecological credentials: 
a lack of public interest in, and of desire by big companies to 
prioritise, broader ecological issues, he argued, obliges the 
government to adopt a steering role. In time, he suggested, the 
experience of living in Sejong may alter awareness of broader 
environmental issues. If the ‘eco’ goals of the city have to be 
translated into ‘liveability’ ones for public consumption, this reflects 
the fact that expectations of the reactions of a given audience have 
had a shaping effect on the documents produced (as predicted in 





Despite the utopian rhetoric of Sejong’s documented envisionment, 




they “embody the political processes by which they are produced” 
(Freeman & Maybin, 2011:164–165), and have ongoing agency within 
only partly predictable processes of urban assemblage in a particular 
location, which is in turn enmeshed in a broader shifting context. Its 
green credentials, as presented in this documentation, are shaped by 
four key interrelated factors. First, the city is closely tied to national 
‘green growth’ policies (which, in turn, flow from economic 
development agendas). Second, these credentials potentially serve an 
image-building role for Korea generally, and as such are aimed at a 
disparate international audience of policy-makers, opinion formers 
and urban practitioners; Sejong is a ‘showcase’ in this respect. Third, 
they more instrumentally address an audience of (hi-tech) businesses 
from within Korea and internationally, whose investment they seek 
to attract. Finally, in their domestic public-facing aspect, they are 
translated into questions of ‘liveability’ (the environment equated 
with pleasant surroundings) and possibly exploit a rather 
consumerist love of novel technologies. Rather than reifying the 
documentation as a detached design for a neutral environmental 
‘laboratory’, we should understand it as having external relations 
with a series of real and imagined audiences, public and otherwise. 
Its ability to deliver a ‘sustainable city’ is subordinate to its need to 
satisfy these various audiences. 
The combination of the first three factors above may convincingly 
frame Sejong as an example of ‘neoliberal urban sustainability’ if this 
is read off the surface markers outlined in Chapter Five. It explicitly 
serves to further an ecological modernisation agenda, its future 
success is predicated on the involvement of high-tech industry, its 
genesis cannot be explained without reference to increasing 
economic competitiveness. Even if its story exceeds this ‘neoliberal’ 
framing, it would be difficult to contend that it represents a radically 
transformative vision of the urban future. Nevertheless, such a 
critique may do little more than demonstrate the logical eventuality 
that urban sustainability, when implemented by state authorities, 
will be delivered through the processes of a particular regime rather 
than in opposition to these. It is enabled as much as constrained by 
these institutionally embedded processes. An optimistic 
interpretation of an eco-city initiative such as Sejong would assess it 
not by the yardstick of its own utopian rhetoric, or by evaluating the 




offers sustainable solutions relative to its context.  Both Sejong and 
Portland may, then, offer particular lessons with regard to real-world 
implementation, to be inferred through critical reflection 
encompassing broader contexts – and in particular how or whether 
any successes might be transferable to other settings.  
Given the constraints of its context, then, what lessons might 
Sejong offer for the ‘urban age’? The smooth implementation to date 
may mark Sejong out as a success in its own terms, but does not 
make the overall developmental model easily transferable: its 
planning and implementation has been managed by a group of 
actors (MACCA’s ‘technical experts’) accorded great respect in 
Korean society, and whose actions would not immediately be met 
with distrust, and the entire project has been funded by the state. It 
would be difficult to replicate these enabling conditions elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, if we deem it a successful example of experimental 
eco-city practice, in relative if not in absolute terms, then it may be 
instructive that its technological success has depended on a strong 
state governing role.  
 
Looking beyond technology, we might ask what it teaches us 
about the ‘cityness’ of the sustainable city. Its envisioned publicness 
has been successfully realised; as intended, a civic public life has 
been assembled which – particularly in the freedom afforded to 
children, and family-friendliness – may be regarded as more 
inclusive in some respects than typical Korean urban environments. 
It has succeeded in becoming a particular type of city and – assuming 
it continues to attract employers and residents – may come to be seen 
as a best practice example of new town development. If, in practice, 
all cities are variously exclusive and have limited appeal, the 
reticence of many Seoulites to move to Sejong is not necessarily 
problematic: an urban sustainable future might be built on the 
collective contribution of a wide range of city types, ranging from the 
most civic to the most emergent, appealing more or less broadly and 
to different types of people.  
Judging a place as overly civic may imply a stance that cities 
should display emergent publicness – but this normative position is 
problematic in several ways. The ability to express views and issue 




reappropriation of space or civil protest – is self-evidently to be 
welcomed in a democratic society. But the problematic entanglement 
which gives rise to emergent expression is not itself a condition we 
can easily imagine most people aspiring to. The idea of governments 
explicitly planning problems, furthermore, makes little sense. Indeed, 
valorising problematic urban tensions may amount to an 
aestheticisation of the city – and this perspective may have little to do 
with benign governance. The extreme manifestation of the aesthetic 
view of the city is the flâneur – a fundamentally irresponsible figure 
(Parkhurst Ferguson, 1994); an amoral spectator “free from the 
constraints and demands of human interaction” (Kern, 1996:35–36). 
Relatedly, Lees (1985) describes a series of writers at the turn of the 
twentieth century for whom the urban milieu was reduced to a 
“stimulating spectacle for sensitive observers who lived there” 
(p.206). His examples include August Endell, for whom Berlin was a 
“fascinating feast”, a “brilliant panorama” made more interesting by 
the presence of sickness and despair (ibid, p.207). Lees comments that 
“Endell clearly echoed Charles Baudelaire and the fin de siècle 
decadents, as he transmuted the social hardship of the many into the 
aesthetic pleasure of the few” (Lees, 1985:207). Less dramatically, 
aestheticisation has been associated with a ‘gentrifier’ worldview 
celebrating social diversity from a position of relative social comfort 
(Ley, 1980; Butler, 1997; Lees, 2003). Butler’s (2003) study of 
gentrifiers in North London found that “difference, diversity and 
multiculturalism” were much valued, but primarily “as a kind of 
social wallpaper”. For the purposes of the governance of social 
sustainability at least, then, cityness qua problematic entanglements 
and social and political tensions is better apprehended as a 
descriptive theorisation rather than a necessary normative ideal. 
 
An outcome in which Sejong is not entirely inclusive or diverse 
does not detract from these qualities being mobilised as aspirations; 
it would be peculiar for a city governed in accordance with 
principles of democracy and sustainability (rather than, say, 
apartheid) to mandate exclusion or to offer de jure privileges to one 
social group over all others. Any de facto exclusion which results 
across different city spaces does not itself mark out these aspirations 
as problematic. Talen summarises the literature suggesting that a 
degree of segregation and partitioning is inevitable in cities, 




can strengthen social support networks, help protect against 
discrimination, and help to preserve cultural heritage” (Talen, 
2006:235). Similarly, although it is difficult to imagine individual 
citizens desiring to be regulated out of particular spaces, not all 
citizens will necessarily choose to live a ‘cosmopolitan’ public life (as 
discussed in Chapter Three). There is no guarantee in practice, 
furthermore, that “contact with others necessarily translates into 
respect for difference” (Valentine, 2008). Valentine traces this 
‘cosmopolitanism’ norm back to Gordon Allport’s (1954) influential 
‘contact hypothesis’ through which he sought to understand whether 
bringing different groups together is “the best way to reduce 
prejudice and promote social integration” (Valentine, 2008). In fact, 
however, Allport (1954) argued that casual and superficial forms of 
contact tend to fuel prejudice and suspicion. Relatedly, Valentine 
wonders if: 
“not everyone sees themselves as part of this 
cosmopolitanism or will choose to participate in 
interactions with people different from themselves.  
Spatial proximity can actually breed defensiveness 
and the bounding of identities and communities” 
(Valentine, 2008:326). 
 
Sejong might nevertheless be criticised as ‘too civic’ if the criterion 
is one of transferability. Civic publicness, as discussed in Chapter 
Three, is not simply an imposition but is assembled partly through 
social acquiescence. The Korean cultural norm of collectivism makes 
civic publicness a more likely outcome in this case. It may also be 
significant that Sejong – rather like Lloyd and South Waterfront 
EcoDistricts – is a new development; it does not have to contend 
with an existing landscape of variously assembled publicness. In this 
sense, the relevance of Sejong’s achievements for existing cities is 
diminished; in Chapter Six it was argued that GG’s difficulties 
reflected the difficulty of facilitating civic publicness in a formal 
landscape which mitigated against it, and the failure of a new 
imagined civic geography to disrupt the entrenched geography of 
more emergent NA public power. Since individual citizens are 
involved in the coproduction of publicness, the normative 
envisionment of civic publicness should not be equated with its 
actual assemblage; its appearance, on the other hand, may not 
indicate state oppression so much as a democratic consensus. The 







While a full conceptualisation of ‘cityness’ would encompass the 
hidden ‘personal’ sphere, as well as the public one in its emergent 
and civic modalities, it is difficult to conceive how governance norms 
might extend beyond civic publicness. The personal sphere is 
defended by, though outside the reach of, liberal government; in an 
attempt at ‘post-liberal’ governance approach such as that practiced 
in the Eco-Districts initiative, the attempt to govern through 
emergence appeared to be self-contradictory. But what takes place 
outside the public arena is in fact central to the way the public is 
assembled in practice. There may well be a risk that policies with 
nothing to say about emergence will effectively serve to suppress the 
city’s emergent potential.  But even if this is the case in Sejong, it may 
not indicate the city’s ‘failure’, insofar as its residents actively value 
the type of civic publicness which it offers.  
 
Simultaneously, however, the fact that the city is brand new 
means that there have been fewer obstacles to the realisation of the 
city’s vision; although incoming residents have imported cultural 
norms from elsewhere, there was no pre-existing spatially assembled 
publicness to act as source of friction. Such friction, it might be 
expected, will only grow in future as the internal variety of the city 
grows through its inhabitation, and ongoing processes of 
differentiation between different social groups become established. A 
similar model of envisioned civic publicness may be oppressive for 
cities elsewhere (in Korea and abroad), carrying at least the risk that 
civic goals themselves are subverted as new cities are inhabited, and 
constituting at worst a form of authoritarianism in pre-existing cities. 
Useful lessons might be learnt from Sejong as an example of 
experimental practice. But just as the subordination of environmental 
goals to economic considerations raises questions about Sejong’s ‘eco’ 
dimensions, it also falls far short of showcasing a global blueprint for 









This thesis has aimed to make an original diagnostic intervention 
into the eco-city phenomenon by exploring the nature of the ‘city’ in 
planned and implemented eco-city initiatives. It has considered the 
possibility that if the eco-city is to effect a more significant 
sustainability transition in ‘urban’ spaces, it may need somehow to 
encompass a more nuanced conceptualisation of cities as complex, 
unpredictable, and emergent spaces. The incompatibility of such a 
conceptualisation with liberal-modernist modes of planning may 
imply the need for what might be labelled ‘post-liberal’ modes of 
urban sustainability planning and governance. But since it remains 
unclear what such modes of planning might entail, the tendency for 
the sustainability agenda to have become increasingly focused on the 
urban is potentially problematic in several ways. First, the 
unpredictable, emergent qualities of the city are likely to undermine 
the implementation of plans for sustainability in many contexts. 
Second, the envisioned ‘city’ may be chimerical in the sense that it is 
a rhetorical construct; the promise of radical transformation in the 
‘urban age’ belies the rather more limited concrete scope of eco-city 
plans and policies. Third, the agendas thus rhetorically concealed 
may benefit already powerful state institutions and commercial 
actors. From a pessimistic perspective, rather than heralding a ‘post-
liberal’ sustainable future, the eco-city may be serving to reproduce 
the unsustainable, and so-called ‘neoliberal’, status quo. 
 
At the same time, it has been suggested that the characterisation of 
eco-city planning as reflecting or catalysing a process of 
neoliberalisation is over-simplistic. The thesis has not reduced the 
eco-city phenomenon to a readily delineable set of aspirations or 
processes: rather, its multiplicity as a process of real-world 
experimentation has been emphasised. This multiplicity raises the 
expectation that the eco-city will exceed any generalised narrative 




neoliberal interpretation of the eco-city appeared to have only 
limited explanatory value. In a more optimistic reading, then, 
ongoing close analysis of its varied manifestations in specific 
contexts may yield some clues as to how more convincingly 
sustainable urban outcomes might be achieved in future.  
 
It exploring the prospects for this to be achieved, the thesis has 
considered the quality of cityness through the lens of ‘publicness’, 
with the discussion guided by the following central research 
question: In what ways can eco-cities be characterised as ‘public’? 
Exploring this question has involved considering the nature of the 
publicness envisioned in eco-city plans and official documentation, 
the types of publicness that result in implemented eco-city initiatives, 
and the relationship between the two.  
 
The thesis makes original contributions to knowledge on both an 
empirical and theoretical level. Empirically, it has included an 
original analysis of mainstream urban sustainability documentation 
from the perspective of its conceptualisation of the public (also 
allowing for the idea of ‘trajective space’ to be introduced); and 
presented the findings from primary research into Portland’s 
EcoDistricts initiative and Sejong City, both of which have attracted 
relatively little attention in the academic literature. Theoretically, it 
has made innovative links between planning theory and theories of 
the public; it has extended recent debates over the idea of ‘urban 
assemblage’ by proposing the relevance of assemblage to the concept 
of the public; and it has developed a new model of publicness which 
obviates the partiality of dominant theoretical approaches to public 
space.  
 
This final chapter attempts to draw some conclusions from the 
analysis of the eco-city from the perspective of publicness, with 
regard to the broader question of how we might better plan for 
urban sustainability. It begins by summarising the main argument 
and the findings of the investigation. Since these findings in some 
ways call into question the practical and theoretical reasons for 
focusing on the cityness of the eco-city, these reasons are then 
revisited and refined in the light of the research. It is argued that they 
are justified even though the utopian tendencies in urban 




reflecting the eco-city’s generative effects as a conceptual ‘boundary 
object’. This justification permits an ensuing discussion of the three 
positions introduced in Chapter One and revisited below, each of 
which asserts a particular relationship between planning and 
emergent publicness. The three positions are not mutually exclusive; 
rather, the discussion of each in turn leads to a set of complementary 
conclusions relating to the realistic expectations that we might have 
of the eco-city, and the possibilities for ongoing research to 
contribute constructively to its future evolution. 
 
In the spirit of encouraging an open-minded approach to the eco-
city, the final section then steps back from the direct concerns of the 
thesis to question the universal relevance of the ‘problem of planning’ 
in which these concerns have been located. Here, with reference to 
the eco-city, it is speculatively argued that the discourse of the 
‘wicked problem’ underlying this theoretical problem may itself be 
implicated in the rise of neoliberalism, and that the ‘problem of 
planning’ may therefore be to some extent parochial rather than 
inescapable. Future research which acknowledges this possibility, 
alongside the significance of both civic and emergent publicness, 
may play a useful role in mitigating the potentially negative 




8.1  Summary of Main Findings and Argument 
 
Chapter One introduced the subject matter by suggesting that the 
eco-city phenomenon describes an aggregation of future-oriented 
governance experiments as much as a collection of attempts to test or 
encourage new ‘green’ technologies. To the extent that it marks a 
coherent body of international discourse and practice, the eco-city 
may be theorised as a collective attempt to tackle the problematic 
question of how we might plan for sustainability. This question is 
problematic since, on the one hand, the goal of sustainability 
implores us to take responsibility for the future; on the other, the 
endeavour of ‘planning’ appears to be misaligned with a 
contemporary tendency towards constructing the world as complex, 
non-linear, and characterised increasingly by ‘wicked problems’. 




only been intensified by the increasing focus of the agenda on the 
quintessentially complex and unpredictable space of the city. While 
the limitations of traditional top-down linear planning methods, 
applied through liberal institutions and framed by modernist 
assumptions, have long been apparent, it remains unclear whether 
newer ‘governance’ approaches will resolve the problematic: while 
some claim that these sow the seeds of as yet unimagined ‘post-
liberal’ modes of societal organisation, others more sceptically 
interpret them as catalysing a broader process of neoliberalisation. In 
this context, the broad variety of forms that eco-city initiatives take, 
and of contexts in which they are planned and implemented, 
potentially make the phenomenon a rich source of lessons for how 
the goal of sustainability might be better served. 
 
Chapter Two provided more detailed contextualisation of the 
empirical subject matter, locating the eco-city within a broader 
historical context of policy-making and environmental discourse. Its 
contemporary variety was partly explained by the layering of 
historical discourses which it exhibits. The eco-city phenomenon as a 
whole displays coherence as a polycentric process of experimentation, 
underpinned by an international body of discourse and shared 
learning, while individual initiatives are best understood as limited 
real-world experiments. These experiments display considerable 
variety, in terms of: geographical spread; the combinations of actors 
involved; environmental, economic, cultural, social, and political 
contexts; and modes of implementation, ranging from the strongly 
state-centric to those seeking to enable ‘bottom-up’ innovation. The 
metaphor of the ‘technological showcase’ was invoked to describe 
those experiments functioning as rather modernist ‘laboratories’ in 
deliberately protected ‘niches’; initiatives at the other end of the 
spectrum more closely resemble what Callon (2009) calls ‘research in 
the wild’.  
 
From an optimistic perspective, the very multiplicity, and 
incremental, reflexive nature of the eco-city process makes it well 
placed to address the ‘wicked problems’ in its sights. Alternatively, it 
seems possible that its dominant contemporary forms are 
reproducing, rather than leading to a substantial transformation of, 
the currently unsustainable structural status quo. This outcome may 




which obfuscates their more contingent institutional and economic 
agendas. In this context, the socio-political dimensions of urban 
sustainability may have remained relatively unconsidered. Relatedly, 
it was suggested that the ‘city’ itself remains poorly conceptualised, 
particularly in initiatives intended to function more as ‘technological 
showcases’, whose purpose may be partly related to municipal or 
national branding geared towards attracting investment, or whose 
technologies are designed by large engineering and IT companies in 
the hope of profitable replication elsewhere. 
 
It was suggested that the ‘rise of the eco-city’ has been enabled by 
the spread of a broader pro-urban discourse, in which the city is 
primarily a rhetorical construct. Furthering the goal of sustainability 
in the ‘urban age’ may therefore require a more satisfactory 
conceptualisation of ‘cityness’, better encompassing the complexity 
and unpredictability of real urban space, if the eco-city is to be more 
than a collection of experimental technological showcases. Building 
on various traditions which conceptualise the ‘public’ as a 
definitively urban quality, Chapter Three proposed that the quality 
of cityness might be analysed in terms of ‘publicness’. As a 
spatialised entity, a real, lived city is in a fundamental sense a 
varyingly ‘public space’; and open spaces are particularly important 
arenas for a city’s publicness. A new theoretical model of publicness 
was then advanced for the purposes of analysing the publicness of 
city space. This model obviates the partiality of dominant approaches 
to public space by conceptualising publicness as an ‘assemblage’ 
with a civic and emergent modality. With reference to Lefebvre’s 
model of social space, the inability of mainstream planning to 
capture the emergent modality of publicness was related to the 
‘Euclidean’ conceptualisation of space in traditional planning 
approaches.  
 
Chapter Four outlined a series of research questions which would 
guide the empirical research into the publicness of the eco-city, and 
described and justified the methods to be applied. These methods 
included discourse analysis to investigate the conceptualisation of 
the city’s publicness in formal eco-city documentation, a particular 
mobilisation of the new model of publicness to analyse the city space 




interviews with key actors in the two case study locations to 
augment desk research into their context and detailed progress.  
 
The following three chapters presented the findings of the primary 
empirical research. First, in Chapter Five, an analysis of a sample of 
official documents from different types of eco-city initiatives around 
the world was presented. Across these, it was argued, a coherent 
‘storyline’ is evident, structured around spatial metaphors. In place 
of the contestation and tension of real urban space suggested by 
Lefebvre’s notion of ‘representational space’, such documents 
construct a ‘trajective space’ evoking a sense of consensual progress 
towards a utopian goal. Both this trajective space and the resulting 
utopian space are typically implied by a diagnosis whereby existing 
urban space is constructed as bounded and threatened by external, 
fetishised forces. The overall effect is to valorise a very civic sense of 
publicness; the possibility of emergent publicness disrupting this 
static vision goes unconsidered. Insofar as real urban space is 
characterised by both emergent and civic publicness, however, the 
possibility of such disruption raises various questions about the 
sustainability of the goals envisioned. 
 
Such questions do not, however, assume a straightforward 
relationship between the planned publicness of a city and of the 
space which results. To the extent that institutionally-led plans rely 
on ideological closure as a basis for action, the civicness of the 
planned city may be an inevitable necessary fiction. If – in the near 
future at least – it seems unclear whether plans can encompass 
emergent publicness, then the practical case can be made that they 
should not attempt to. An alternative conclusion would be that ‘civic’ 
plans are unsatisfactory not so much in their failure to promote 
emergence, as in their potential to oppress it. A third possibility is 
that, despite the smooth civic surface of plans and policies, it may 
nevertheless be possible to discern in the eco-city experimental 
process some indications of innovative methods of governance 
which meaningfully enfold emergent publicness into their 
conceptual and practical configuration. The cogency and import of 
each of these three positions are debated later in this chapter.   
 
To explore further the relationship between planned and actually 




cases’ where eco-city plans had been implemented. The progressive 
governance approach adopted by the first of these consciously 
attempted to tap into bottom-up thinking. The context for this 
experiment – the city of Portland, Oregon, widely fêted for its active 
citizen engagement – might be seen as providing optimal conditions 
for emergent publicness to be incorporated into institutionally-led 
planning. The second, Sejong City, was being realised through a 
comprehensive, top-down planning process. If, in spite of Sejong’s 
particularly ‘civic’ approach, emergent publicness still assembled 
itself, then the case might be made that – in certain contexts at least – 
the ‘technological showcase’ approach to eco-city development may 
more efficiently bring about a sustainability transition. 
 
The analysis of the governance approach adopted by Portland’s 
EcoDistricts pilot initiative highlighted the paradox that emergent 
publicness will not be permitted to emerge through governance 
approaches to the extent that these are directed by state institutions. 
Rather than enabling radical urban transformation, then, Portland 
might be described as displaying the surface indicators and 
structural characteristics of ‘neoliberal urban sustainability’ in its 
policy-making. And yet this label was also seen to be limited in its 
explanatory power: the initiative was, simultaneously, genuinely 
welcomed by local actors as potentially empowering; and if its 
broader political and economic context is treated as a pre-existing 
condition, an alternative assessment would highlight its relatively 
progressive nature within this context. 
 
The analysis of the publicness of Portland’s open spaces divided 
them into three broad categories. First, those in and near the 
downtown area were characterised by their civicness. A less 
obviously policed area on the downtown fringe, however, along with 
one of the city’s gentrified districts, were strongly characterised by 
emergent publicness of different types. If Portland’s city centre is its 
traditional ‘showpiece’, and has historically been subjected to a 
broad range of sustainability-related policies, this may imply that its 
emergent public life has to some extent been suppressed by the 
regulatory implications of these policies. Significantly, these civic 
observation sites also encompassed two of the more successful EDs: 
South Waterfront and SoMa. In the Growing Gateway ED, boasting 




the observed open spaces fell into a rather different third category. A 
more emergent public life, resembling that of the city’s gentrified 
neighbourhoods, was explicitly rejected by the Gateway research 
participants, and – like the city centre EDs – plans for the area’s 
revitalisation were couched in civic terms. However, even civic 
publicness had not assembled, since the formal qualities of the (semi-
suburban) car-centric space proved too great an obstacle while the 
initiative remained under-resourced; there was little observable 
pedestrian activity of any sort. It was, furthermore, far from clear 
that local residents would support an intensification of streetlife; 
Gateway has traditionally defined itself culturally and politically in 
opposition to inner Portland. The question therefore arises of 
whether the cultivation of cityness (even in its civic modality) 
constitutes an anti-democratic imposition on suburban spaces of this 
type. While policy-makers deem civic publicness to be a desirable or 
necessary characteristic of urban sustainability, we might speculate 
that in certain spaces its assemblage is only achievable as a ‘top-
down’ imposition, with the backing of powerful resources. 
 
In Sejong, meanwhile, a differently ambivalent picture emerged. 
On the one hand, a reasonable case can be made that its civic 
planning is serving to oppress potential emergent publicness. On the 
other, there was no strong sense that current local residents desire 
much beyond civic publicness. The potential for oppression became 
evident through comparisons with the parallel analysis of a selection 
of open spaces in Seoul, where some assemblages of emergent 
publicness could be detected. And yet, even in Seoul, most of the 
observed spaces were more definitively characterised by civic 
compliance – despite the significantly larger numbers of pedestrians 
almost everywhere in comparison with Portland.  
 
The overall civicness of these Korean spaces (as envisioned in 
plans, as observed in real space, and as a culturally desirable norm) 
highlights some limitations of ‘performative’ approaches to public 
space which celebrate emergent publicness. Whether or not planning 
can encompass emergence, it might be argued that radically 
emergent behaviour is relatively infrequent in everyday life. A 
general sense of civic order may be actively desired by many citizens 
– especially in relatively homogeneous and collective societies, as 




western liberalism, a normative privileging of civic publicness need 
not only be interpreted (negatively) as the imposition of one 
conception of order onto the multiple actual and potential orderings 
of the ‘real’ city; it might instead be more positively aligned with the 
liberal principle of civility, enacted through tolerance, which serves 
to enable social differences to coexist in space. While, then, the 
tendency towards overly civic imaginations of public space in 
regeneration programmes and urban policies generally has been 
pejoratively described as gentrification or ‘Disneyfication’, a 
concomitant glorification of emergent publicness would seem 
equally questionable. If the former tendency may in certain 
circumstances oppress the public life of the city, the latter stance may 
not constitute an emancipatory goal so much as a denial of the 
public’s desire for everyday functional order. If, furthermore, 
emergent publicness often constitutes the visible expression of 
frustrations due to problematic entanglement, then the idea of 
planning for it has an absurd quality: it is reasonable to expect 
institutional plans to have as their stated aim the resolution, rather 
than encouragement, of problems for citizens. 
 
Since this summary of the analysis of the research findings calls 
into question both the possibility and desirability of planning for 
cityness (in its emergent, but even also in its civic modality), it may 
be useful at this stage to revisit the case for doing so. Remaking this 
case involves first acknowledging that the utopian – arguably even 
anti-urban – rhetoric of the eco-city may in fact have served a useful 
enabling role historically by encouraging collaboration among 
disparate groups of actors. 
 
 
8.2  The Usefulness of the Rhetorical City 
 
Although some effort was made in previous chapters to argue that 
the city is often weakly conceptualised in eco-city discourse, there 
may be good practical reasons to welcome the alignment of the 
sustainability agenda with an apparently vague notion of urbanity. 
The discursive rise of the city, as outlined in Chapters Two and Three, 
may suggest that it has become a conceptual ‘boundary object’ (Star 
& Grieserner, 1989). Boundary objects were originally defined in 




intersecting social worlds…and satisfy the informational 
requirements of each of them” (Star & Grieserner, 1989:393). They 
may be abstract or concrete, but “both plastic enough to adapt to 
local needs and the constraints of the several parties employing them, 
yet robust enough to retain a common identity across sites.  They are 
weakly structured in common use, and become strongly structured 
in individual use” (ibid). In Mol’s account, boundary objects are 
shared among different ‘social worlds’ which  
“each have their own codes, habits, instruments, and ways 
of making sense…The specific meanings each of them 
attaches to this object are different. But as long as nobody 
stresses these differences, the boundary object doesn’t 
seem to be two or three different objects. It remains fuzzy 
enough to absorb the possible tensions” 
(Mol, 2002:138). 
 
The ‘fuzzy’ city thus permits communication between different 
‘communities of practice’ (Lave & Wenger, 1991), as well as leverages 
the power of a broader shared pro-urban discourse. The 
overdetermination of the ‘rise of the city’, as outlined in Chapter Two, 
suggests that many different communities of practice have an 
interest in advocating the ‘city’ as a beneficial entity. As a boundary 
object, the city may allow an apparent consensus of goals to emerge 
between, for example, community activists and free-market 
economists, private sector property developers and local authority 
actors, NGOs in the developing world and entrepreneurial mayors in 
the West, between gentrifiers, flâneurs, and journalists, between 
followers of counter-culture and tourism development boards. Such 
consensus is encouraged by eco-city documentation which, if read 
literally, as discussed in Chapter Five, typically assumes that this can 
be, or claims that it has been, reached through inclusive participation 
processes. Leaving to one side questions over how inclusive such 
consensus can be, and whose interests it represents, the key point is 
that its construction as a foundation for decision-making and action 
is enabled by the boundary object of the city, even while the various 
types of actors involved may each frame this city rather differently. 
 
It would seem that considerable work has gone into the 
construction of the city as boundary object over time; the history of 
the eco-city may be interpreted as reflecting the progress of this 




in the first definitions of sustainable development; environmental 
thinking had previously tended to be anti-urban. The conceptual rise 
of the eco-city thus describes a process whereby earlier 
environmental goals have become discursively linked, through the 
boundary object of the city, to a series of other agendas (relating, for 
example, to economic policies, urban regeneration programmes, and 
coping strategies for rapid urbanisation in developing countries). 
From this perspective, the ‘eco-city’ concept is a variant on the city-
as-boundary-object, functioning as a framing device for multiple 
different plans and visions, at both the macro level and locally within 
each initiative; it is neither fully coherent in its totality, nor 
incompatibly heterogeneous in its particular manifestations. Its 
fuzziness, like that of sustainability itself (Kates et al., 2005), is 
enabling in that it permits communication between the different 
social worlds of the actors involved.  
 
The work of translation that the (eco-)city performs as a boundary 
object may be welcomed insofar as it has enabled a multi-faceted 
embrace of urban sustainability to emerge. The conceptual 
simplification of the city which it entails might be reinterpreted as a 
necessary condition for integrated sustainability initiatives to 
proceed. Even if, as argued in Chapter Five, striking similarities are 
observable internationally between the storylines underpinning eco-
city initiatives, and if this collective storyline only embraces cityness 
in a shallow manner, this too might be seen as rhetorically necessary. 
The implementation of the eco-city entails a process whereby a 
rhetorically singular and simplistic vision is translated in particular 
contexts into heterogeneous practices by contingent, hybrid 
networks of actors. In practice, then, for all the observable similarities 
across eco-city plans and policies, there is no reason to expect 
homogeneity across the urban environments which result. Despite 
the internationalisation of eco-city discourse, related contemporary 
plans are implemented (and devised) in particular places, and would 
therefore appear self-evidently to reflect the real-world urban 
contexts which they attempt to transform. To this extent, the 
contemporary eco-city cannot be detached from the ‘real’ city. What 
results in each case is tautologically ‘urban’ insofar as it takes place 
in city space (even if it fails to substantially transform this space). 
And if, furthermore, we accept the discursive assertion that humans 




significance as a distinctive category of human settlement; it is 
always implicit. 
 
In short, the rhetorical and even utopian dimensions of the eco-
city may be interpreted in a positive light, as inspiring action and 
collaboration. Although no ‘eco-city’ meets the absolute (or 
impossible) criterion of having realised the utopia which it promises, 
‘eco-city initiatives’ can still usefully be evaluated as relatively minor 
interventions in urban space. Rapoport (2014:137) similarly 
advocates critical engagement with eco-cities as “sites of 
experimentation and innovation” which may help “drive broader 
socio-technical transitions”, rather than as failing in the utopian 
ambitions with which they are marketed. Even in cases where whole 
new cities are constructed, these cities have to coexist with their local 
and regional surroundings, and are constrained by real-world 
economic, political, social and cultural structures. Accordingly, there 
is good reason to welcome eco-city initiatives on less grandiose terms, 
as limited practical experiments which – as a result either of their 
failures or successes – may yield useful lessons, and thereby 
potentially further the goal of urban sustainability. On this view, 
they are not lessened so much as enabled by the rhetoric which 
accompanies them. It may remain important to acknowledge that the 
city thus declared is a rhetorical construct; but this observation in 
itself provides no constructive guidance for how the process of eco-
city experimentation might more effectively proceed. 
 
While the utopian rhetoric of the eco-city is in some ways, then, a 
‘straw man’, there still remain good reasons to observe critically the 
practices which it obscures. Apprehending the eco-city simply as a 
set of increasingly common and globally distributed variegated 
experimental practices risks missing the point that the story of 
implemented ‘eco’ urban development is also one of increasing scale. 
Over time, tentative initial experiments focusing on individual 
streets or collections of buildings, as in the case of the 1990s Ökostädte 
in Germany and Austria (Damm, 2015), have given way to more 
holistic visions of ‘city-wide systems’ (Joss, 2015). In parallel, there 
has been a tendency for sustainability certification frameworks to 
evolve from considering individual buildings to urban 
neighbourhoods (Joss et al., 2015), alongside a recent proliferation of 




areas (ibid). 55  Retro-fitting policies often apply to whole local 
authority areas; in Asia, as exemplified by Sejong, sizeable new cities 
are being built with sustainability principles in mind. Even if, as 
argued in Chapter Three, cityness is not exclusively determined by, 
and should not be conflated with, scale, the overall upward trend in 
scalar ambition suggests that the nature of the cityness of the eco-city 
is only likely to become more important over time. The eco-city has 
our ‘urban future’ as its target. 
 
Portland’s EcoDistricts is one example of an initiative which at 
least implicitly recognises that urban transformation going beyond 
bounded experimentation potentially raises a series of as yet 
unformulated questions. As described in Chapter Six, a lack of 
understanding of what it would mean for a whole city to be 
sustainable was an explicit motivation for the initiative’s focus on the 
neighbourhood, as an intermediate scale of experimentation. While 
this may seem an appealing solution, it equally – in fact, deliberately 
– serves to defer the question of cityness, and such schemes arguably 
risk failing to the extent that they encounter it. If, already, or at some 
point in future, cities as a whole are the targets for sustainability, the 
question of the cityness of the eco-city may need to be more directly 
addressed, even if questions of whether or how this can be ‘planned’ 
remain unclear. And while this thesis has aimed primarily to explore 
the interface between planning and the emergent qualities of cities, 
the case of Gateway also flags up the further complication – a rather 
obvious point which is nevertheless suppressed by the blanket 
notion of an urban age – that there is no clear-cut distinction between 
the urban and the rural. As discussed in Chapter Three, cityness is 
not an absolute quality, but rather a tendency which differs in its 
intensity (and shifts in its modality) within nominally urban areas. 
 
 
8.3  Planning for (Public) Cityness 
 
There are important reasons, then, to question the planned and 
actual cityness of the eco-city, and how the one affects the other. 
Utopian rhetoric may facilitate the construction of the eco-city as a 
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generative boundary object, but the civic publicness thus 
conceptualised may limit the transformative capabilities of the 
resulting practices. This section therefore considers the prospects for 
overcoming or more productively acknowledging these limits within 
the broader urban sustainability discourse. It draws further on the 
research findings to interrogate three positions which might 
reasonably be taken on the relationship between planning and 
emergent publicness. The three conclusions then reached can be 
summarised as follows:  
 implementing plans for ‘technological showcase’ eco-cities 
need not be detrimental to the public city, so long as plans and 
policies themselves are treated as contingent, experimental, 
and fundamentally temporary; 
 
 the apparent inevitability that existing modes of planning 
cannot encompass emergent publicness need not be 
problematic if both the civic and emergent modalities of 
publicness are borne in mind while evaluating and learning 
from their outcomes in real city space; 
 
 furthering the goal of sustainability in urban contexts entails 
recognising (and encouraging) the openness of the eco-city as 
a field of experimentation. This includes acknowledging the 
possibility that truly ‘post-liberal’ approaches to planning the 
future may necessarily come to light outside the sphere of 
state institution-directed planning. 
 
Recognising the temporary nature of the ‘technological showcase’ 
While this thesis has located the question of how we should plan for 
‘cityness’ within a wider set of problems around planning in the face 
of uncertainty and complexity, there is no particular reason to expect 
a solution to these problems to be forthcoming. Since we lack a 
consistent, coherent vision of the form that ‘post-liberal’ societal 
organisation might take, our tools for planning the future may 
necessarily remain wedded to liberal modernity, and such planning 
seems only able to promote a civic modality of publicness. The case 
of Portland’s EcoDistricts appeared to demonstrate the vested 
interests of existing liberal institutions in constraining the outcomes 




public life of a city. For practical purposes, then, it is worth 
entertaining the possibility that planning for emergent publicness 
will only remain oxymoronic, at least in the short term. By extension, 
it will be futile for contemporary eco-city planners to concern 
themselves overly with the concept of ‘cityness’; the emergent city 
describes what takes place in spite of, or without regard, to their 
plans. From this line of argument, a coherent position might be 
derived that progress should entail first acknowledging that the 
‘technological showcase’ approach to eco-city development is the 
only one at our disposal.  This position might be expressed as follows: 
 
Realistically, since the emergent publicness of city space 
can never be planned for, eco-city initiatives can only ever 
be ‘technological showcases’. Eco-city policy-makers and 
practitioners should therefore focus on developing 
experimental technologies, without concerning themselves 
unduly with the qualities of cityness which might result. 
 
From this perspective, it is unproblematic that formal eco-city 
plans, policies and promotional documents consistently display a 
conceptualisation of publicness in very civic terms; that their vision 
of the city extends only to its compliant daily life. Accordingly, it 
would be perverse to accuse eco-city planning of being deliberately 
oppressive in its elevation of the civic; this outcome reflects no more 
than the inevitability of ideological closure in all institutional 
planning as currently conceived. The claim is not that the linearity of 
urban development documentation should be equated with the 
messy, multiple, contested urban reality onto which it maps. Rather, 
in Lefebvrian (1991) terms, that mainstream documents of this type 
are ‘representations of space’, and their horizons will always be 
exceeded by the emergent ‘representational space’ of the city itself. If, 
furthermore, as witnessed by the global spread of the eco-city 
phenomenon, the goals of such plans have popular appeal, this may 
be a positive thing given the practical need for policy-makers to tell 
‘stories’ in persuasive ways (Throgmorton, 2003; van Hulst, 2012).  
 
Nevertheless, the question again arises of how such plans might 
cope with emergent public behaviour which disrupts or undermines 
the rather static urban goals which they promote. In two senses, this 
matters little. First, if a scheme fails on its own terms, then useful 




adjustments might be made. A process of learning of this type is 
anticipated by the philosophy of iterative design embedded in the 
discourse of the ‘wicked problem’, as discussed in Chapter One, and 
aligned with contemporary tendencies to valorise the “situatedness, 
change-orientation and contingency” (Karvonen & van Heur, 
2014:379) of urban experimentation. From this perspective, it is only 
through processes of trial and error that the logics and contours of a 
problem become visible. Second, plans themselves are shaped partly 
by unpredictable processes which often involve emergent publicness; 
the decisions which they embody should not be confused with the 
decision-making processes leading up to them (or ongoing 
contestation following their publication). Since, in practice, plans 
may change and be replaced over time, they might be better 
understood as describing temporary agreements, as only 
“punctuation points” (Innes & Booher, 2015:206),  in the sense that “a 
solution is for now, but it soon creates the conditions that require 
new deliberations among new players” (ibid).  
 
At this point, however, the position faces a challenge. For Innes 
and Booher, the danger lies not so much in individual plans’ linearity 
as in the possibility that “temporary agreements may become part of 
the structure of domination and become fixed rather than adaptive. 
The antidote is to continue to surface and address conflict creatively” 
(ibid). This danger resonates with the eco-city if, as this thesis has 
suggested, the potential multiplicity of the field of urban 
sustainability has to some extent coalesced in the mainstream into a 
superficially singular normative vision, presented as an inevitable 
consensus vision, while its actual contingency is concealed through 
the use of rhetoric and persuasive story-telling. The rhetorical 
singularity of the eco-city is problematic only if it goes unchecked by 
ongoing reflexive and external criticism, including the 
acknowledgement of contingency and conflict.  
 
In other words, this first position potentially underplays the 
significance of the institutional and economic conditions which 
enable a ‘technological showcase’ to be realised, and may thereby 
ignore the eco-city’s own role in replicating these conditions. Its 
implicit valorisation of the eco-city phenomenon as a technical 
process characterised by productively open-ended, self-generating 




associated policies and practices have undergone changes over time 
in particular directions. Among the clear tendencies distinguishing 
the latest wave of eco-cities from earlier incarnations, as described in 
Chapter Three, are the increasing involvement of international firms, 
and the growing importance of the ‘green growth’ agenda. Either 
this outcome might be evaluated as an efficient, pragmatic one, or it 
implies that the conditions under which experimentation takes place 
are not equal everywhere; that it is no coincidence that the dominant 
mode of eco-city development has come to be one which is 
supported by, and will potentially reproduce, existing structures of 
power. 
 
All of which is not to argue that the eco-city as ‘technological 
showcase’ is in itself a flawed approach – particularly if the goal of 
planning for emergent publicness is indeed an unachievable one.  
The problem, rather, arises if the process of experimentation takes 
place without the types of ongoing adjustments that critical 
commentary can encourage. Such commentary should not only 
continue to identify specific failures and successes and the reasons 
for these, but also seek better to understand the role of emergent 
publicness in all of this.  
 
Recognising the importance of both civic and emergent publicness 
 
The assumption that emergent publicness is outside the purview of 
liberal-modern planning is not incompatible with an expectation that 
the normativity of the latter may be problematic. This expectation is 
reasonable since, whether an eco-city initiative has a whole city or a 
small part of it in its sights, the desired transformation describes a 
particular reordering, whereby a new envisioned urban space 
replaces what is currently imagined to be unsatisfactory. The 
‘laboratory’, in other words, is never normatively neutral. In 
encouraging certain assemblages of publicness, even temporarily, it 
at least potentially suppresses others. This matters both in terms of 
the potential disruption noted above (the suppressed may return to 
undermine the normative ideal), but also in its potential for various 
types of exclusions, with longer-term implications for social 





While emergent publicness cannot be planned for, it can 
be planned against. Consequently, there is a potential for 
the dominant mode of eco-city policy-making and practice 
to be anti-urban. 
 
This potential may be countered to some extent again through 
critical commentary, seeking to identify the particular types of civic 
norms imposed, and the possible and actual exclusions that result. 
But at the same time, as noted above, emphasising the importance of 
emergent publicness also carries certain risks. If the civic and 
emergent modalities of publicness are the targets of, respectively, the 
‘topographical’ and ‘performative’ approaches to public space 
(Iveson, 2007), both are problematically partial in their concerns. 
Because of their normative incompatibility, moreover, this partiality 
cannot be overcome simply by adopting both approaches 
simultaneously. The attempt to bridge the two in this thesis, so as to 
arrive at a more rounded conceptualisation of publicness, has 
therefore involved a shift of register away from normativity and onto 
the descriptive plane, with publicness theorised as a type of urban 
assemblage. The model of ‘publicness’ thus advanced as a basis for 
analysis provides no explicit prescriptions for how a new type of 
planning, taking better account of emergent city life, might or should 
be institutionalised or otherwise accomplished. Analyses of the eco-
city’s publicness which draw on assemblage theory may, however, 
help enable more open acknowledgement of the status of fixed plans 
as simultaneously necessary but temporary, as advocated above. 
Equally, if every description is inevitably prescriptive in some senses 
(Goldmann, 2001:6), the model embodies a hope that its more 
integrative analytical approach to publicness may provide a firmer 
foundation for diagnosing problematic normative urban theorising 
in future, and for a mode of urban sustainability planning which 
better accounts for unpredictable change in the city qua public space. 
 
Recognising the openness of the future 
 
The scope of the current research is limited in two important ways: it 
has examined only a small number of eco-city schemes in any depth, 
and has privileged those enabled by official policies. Based on this 
research alone, it would be wrong to assert that seminal, radical new 
approaches to planning, which better encompass emergent 




future. Accordingly, a third position might be adopted which partly 
contradicts the previous two: 
 
There is no reason to reject the possibility that some 
contemporary or future approaches to ‘planning’ the eco-
city might take better account of emergent ‘cityness’. 
 
The two main cases studied in this thesis did not actively support 
this possibility. To the extent that they represent two ends of a 
spectrum of contemporary institutional urban sustainability 
planning, they provide no evidence that the ‘mainstreamed’ eco-city 
has convincingly escaped its liberal framing. The planning and 
development of Sejong, first, was not intended to be progressive in a 
radical sense. Whether or not Korea’s governmental institutions 
should be described as liberal in form, the planning of Sejong City 
consciously imported conventional international ‘best practice’ in 
urban design, and the state has asserted a dominant agentive role in 
its top-down approach. In the case of Portland’s EcoDistricts, the 
state-driven attempt to allow solutions to emerge from ‘below’ was 
fundamentally paradoxical: the emergent dimensions of the city 
were co-opted into predefined policy frames; only those actions that 
fitted this frame were allowed to emerge. The implications of 
Gualini’s (2010) ‘post-liberal’ governance thesis, then, have not been 
fully played out in the empirical cases studied in this research; the 
mainstream eco-city shows little sign of enabling some form of 
“governing without Government” (Rhodes, 1996:667). If, however, 
the incrementalism of the eco-city is welcomed rather than criticised 
in terms of sustainability, with some possibility that small changes 
may escape from their ‘niche’ to effect change in the broader 
landscape, it still remains possible that in future its variegated 
experimental character will lead unexpectedly to innovative modes 
of future-oriented planning which adopt a more rounded approach 
to publicness. As was argued at the beginning of the thesis, the 
governance of the eco-city should not be thought of as lying outside 
its sustainability-related concerns, but rather as constituting one of 
the areas of technology towards which its experimentation is 
directed.  
 
If, furthermore, the ambition relates to the idea of somehow 




approaches to urban sustainable development may constitute more 
fertile ground for its realisation. For the reasons outlined in Chapter 
One, this thesis has deliberately focused on initiatives which are 
embedded within institutional policy-making. In considering 
questions of publicness, however, it is significant that what Smith 
(2007, cited in Bulkeley and Castán Broto, 2013) calls ‘green niches’ 
may be established specifically to oppose “incumbent regimes” 
(Smith, 2007:436). Such initiatives both embody emergent publicness, 
as potentially “grist in the urban mill” (Bulkeley & Castán Broto, 
2013:367), and more intentionally encourage it by “creating conflict, 
sparking controversy, offering the basis for contested new regimes of 
practice” (ibid:367-8). The current research might, then, be usefully 
complemented by a study of the publicness envisioned and realised 
in initiatives operating outside conventional regulatory apparatuses. 
Existing and future research into informality and participatory 
approaches to urban sustainability in the developing world, for 
example, might provide a useful starting point for this.   
 
The task for commentators, then, is to study closely what emerges 
from these technologies of governance in different contexts, and how 
the arrangement of actors and differential agency shifts as a result. 
An expectation of thereby uncovering a universally applicable, 
innovative mode of shaping the urban future may turn out to be 
misguided. But there remains a danger of dysfunctionality in the 
iterative experimental process if the future evolution of the field is 
shaped disproportionately by already powerful commercial and 




8.4  Limitations of the Present Research 
 
The conclusions offered above rest on a particular investigation into 
the eco-city phenomenon. This investigation does not constitute an 
exhaustive analysis of the subject matter, and might have been 
conducted otherwise: the discussion has been guided by certain 
questions and concerns, has focused on specific cases, and has been 
refracted through particular methodological lenses. While this does 
not mean that the approach taken has been an arbitrary one, there 




enquiry into the eco-city over any other. And yet, the argument that 
the eco-city is a multiple, fuzzy and contestable phenomenon – as 
made in this thesis – may imply that that any analytical account of it 
will only be a partial one. Rather than denying such partiality, it 
would seem important that the conclusions should be accompanied 
by open acknowledgement of the limitations of the approach 
adopted. While the practical limitations of the various methods 
deployed were noted and discussed as part of their descriptions in 
Chapter Four, this section therefore reflects further on the methods 
used and on the conceptual framing of the research, and the 
implications of their limitations for our understanding of the eco-city. 
 
The argument developed has drawn significantly on a conceptual 
distinction between the civic and emergent modalities of publicness. 
It has been proposed that this distinction should provide a useful 
basis on which to analyse eco-city experiments without normatively 
privileging either modality, with the advantage of being applicable 
in a wide variety of international contexts. Nevertheless, its 
development was shaped by the requirements of a particular set of 
research questions. In this sense, it is as much an outcome of the 
research as a starting point for the investigation. It is therefore hoped 
that the tool itself might be further refined through the process of 
application to different cases in future.  
 
In particular, it may be possible to draw a sharper conceptual 
distinction between the two modalities of publicness if more 
ambiguous processes of public assemblage are examined. In 
considering the adoption or rejection of new technologies of different 
types, various challenges might be imagined to the current 
preliminary iteration of the model, in terms of the feasibility of 
drawing a clear distinction between civic and emergent publicness. 
For example, where public contention or non-compliance coalesces 
around new technologies introduced by state authorities, the 
argument might be made that this publicness does not emerge 
autonomously, since its characteristics are shaped, whether 
positively or negatively, by the technology itself. In other words, 
where emergent behaviour and technology are thus co-assembled, 
the former might be understood to be interpellated by the latter. 
Equally problematically, attempting to distinguish between 




excludes the possibility that seemingly civic publicness may 
constitute a ‘horizontal’ reaction to other assemblages of publicness. 
A scenario might be imagined in which public compliance with a 
new technology (such as, for example, recycling facilities) has the 
appearance of civicness, while in fact describing a deliberate 
performative act of departure from a social norm (for example, of 
indifferent wastefulness). Equally, if questions of agency underpin 
distinctions between emergence and civicness, analytical problems 
may arise in situations where new regulations or technologies are 
introduced by state authorities specifically in response to emergent 
democratic pressures of one sort or another. The recognition that the 
distinctions between civic and emergent publicness need further 
theoretical clarification and empirical testing need not in itself, 
however, refute the broad analytical potential of the model in future 
research. 
 
In the current thesis specifically, the accusation might be made 
that the model’s application has been methodologically problematic 
in its reliance on the direct observation of space. In pointing towards 
a positivist approach to knowledge, the ambition of neutrally 
observing or objectively characterising eco-city spaces disrupts the 
broader discussion in which the eco-city is treated as a multiple 
phenomenon, partly constructed through divergent discourses, and 
elsewhere analysed through a more interpretive approach 
privileging differences of perspective. A related charge of 
epistemological inconsistency might be levelled at the narrative 
descriptions of the contexts of the two main case studies. These draw 
on a mixture of ‘facts’ (for example, historical events), as if to imply 
that singular contexts can be identified, and of interviewees’ 
divergent interpretations of these contexts. One partial response to 
such charges, following Evans and Marvin (2006) and Donaldson et 
al. (2010), is that since the study of (urban) sustainability necessarily 
tends towards interdisciplinarity, and a concomitant degree of 
epistemological ‘mess’ is unavoidable. In studying eco-cities, the risk 
of uncomfortable epistemological incompatibility might be offset 
against the possibility that such difficulties will inevitably arise as the 
field develops (Abott, 2001, cited in Donaldson et al, 2010:1534). This 
risk, indeed, may apply to the study of social phenomena more 
generally as they are mapped out and interlinked. Bhaskar (1998:45) 




manifest themselves in open systems; that is, in systems where 
invariant empirical regularities do not obtain. For social systems are 
not spontaneously, and cannot be experimentally, closed.” This, he 
argues, places an epistemological limit on positivism; ‘social’ 
phenomena remain varyingly impervious to the natural scientific 
method. Mess, from this perspective, is a starting point, rather than 
an outcome indicating lack of methodological rigour. 
 
If, furthermore, the eco-city itself is better understood as a 
multiple ‘boundary object’, then the key issue is not that we can only 
ever know the eco-city in different ways, but rather that the subject 
matter is ontologically messy (Donaldson et al., 2010). Mixed-method 
research which leads to ‘messy’ (Law, 2004) research outcomes may 
appear unjustifiable from a positivist perspective, since it confounds 
an expectation that the object of enquiry is ontologically stable and, 
in principle at least, knowable as a singularity. If social phenomena 
are nevertheless deemed worthy of study, it would seem important 
to acknowledge ontological uncertainty explicitly within social 
research design: to recognise that the phenomena being considered 
are contextually embedded, difficult to delineate, dynamic, and 
characterised by complexity and multiplicity. Less defensively, the 
case can be made that the messiness with which the social sciences 
construct the objects of their enquiry forms a useful counterpoint to 
the traditional ‘scientific’ method (Law, 2004) in a context of 
increasing acceptance that scientific knowledge does not emerge 
neutrally from a self-governing ‘republic of science’ (Polyani, 1962), 
but is rather shaped and constrained by a wide variety of social 
factors (Hulme, 2009).  
 
Acknowledging ontological uncertainty need not imply that all 
social phenomena are equally difficult to delineate. If social scientists 
consistently or selectively espouse a positivist philosophy, it would 
seem unclear whether this describes a default aspiration to meet a 
socially imposed natural scientific ‘gold standard’, or a premise that 
some social phenomena are at least superficially observable or 
countable, and that ‘hard’ data may serve useful research purposes 
even while failing to describe social phenomena exhaustively. If we 
understand social phenomena as varyingly amenable to positivist 
research methods, though rarely knowable as ‘experimentally closed’ 




methods would seem more justifiable, depending on the overall goal 
of the investigation. In the current research, the overall goal was not 
to analyse the component parts of the eco-city as scientific objects 
constructed as consistently amenable to measurement and testing. As 
ontologically heterogeneous objects of enquiry, the cases of Portland 
and Sejong, the observed spaces within these, and the documentation 
analysed in Chapter Five, all called for different methods of data 
collection. Crucially, furthermore, these data were not the final 
targets of enquiry. They have not constituted ends in themselves so 
much as ‘tools for thinking’ within a broader exploratory 
investigation of questions relating to the future of ‘planning’ a more 
sustainable future.  
   
By extension, as noted above, no claims are made that the 
approaches adopted are the only ones possible. Our understanding 
of the eco-city as a multiple entity will be enriched rather than 
diminished through complementary approaches being applied in 
future. This argument, that the study of the eco-city invites a wide 
variety of methodological approaches, however, is not to refute the 
possibility or desirability of critical reflection on the effectiveness of 
methods used in specific cases. Rather, as the field develops, it places 
a greater onus on the individual researcher – and on the audience of 
the research outcomes – to identify the ways in which investigations 
have succeeded or failed, both on their own terms and more broadly 
in generating new theoretical and empirical knowledge. In this spirit, 
it may be instructive to note that the promise of the critical case 
study method adopted here was not fully realised. The presupposed 
‘criticality’ of the two cases was diminished since analysis 
highlighted the primary significance of context as a critical factor, 
rather than of their divergent modes of governance considered in an 
abstract sense. Nevertheless, the framing of each as critical still 
enabled useful – and unexpected – broad conclusions to be reached. 
First, although the case of Sejong was originally approached based 
on the author’s proposition that planning processes might be 
enhanced by better encompassing emergent publicness, its study 
enabled the rather different conclusion that civic publicness is itself 
also a valid goal of planning. Second, if the two cases do indeed fall 
at either end of a spectrum of eco-city governance approaches, then 
the investigation at least justifies two hypotheses to be tested in 




and that even in its more experimental, innovative manifestations, 
strong ‘bounded rationalities’ are necessarily at work in the civic 
engagement processes involved.  
 
Further research which expands the conceptual framework of 
publicness advanced here, and knowledge of the eco-city 
phenomenon more generally, should only benefit from the inclusion 
of a wider range of cases – including, as suggested earlier in this 
chapter, those which are more obviously emergent in the sense of 
arising without direct reliance on the institutions of the state. 
Different research questions might be answered, adding further 
understanding, through more straightforwardly ‘comparative’ 
approaches to cases displaying a wider range of similar contextual 
variables. Such research might focus, for example, on initiatives 
yielding different outcomes of publicness despite close geographical 
proximity or cultural and economic comparability. Finally, rather 
than observing spaces, alternative methods of detecting emergent 
publicness might be employed. One example might be the study of 
textual protests created by public groups opposed to particular eco-
city developments. If different methods lead to different conclusions, 
this can only help define the epistemological and ontological 
contours of the subject matter in what is still an emergent field of 
enquiry, and indeed usefully call into question its deeper 
assumptions, as discussed speculatively in the final section below. 
 
 
8.5  Towards a Less Uncertain Future? 
 
In banal terms, the conclusions reached in this chapter deter us from 
seeking a single approach to urban sustainability, and remind us that 
the possibility of replicating apparently successful urban 
sustainability processes and practices depends on contextual as well 
as technological factors. But for researchers to adopt a truly open-
minded approach to learning from the eco-city as a process of 
decentred experimentation, in which the open-ended plurality of this 
process is valorised, it may also be necessary to decentre the research 
agenda itself by challenging its deeper assumptions. In this spirit, 
this final section steps outside the main concerns of the current thesis 




outlined in the opening chapter – might itself be productively 
questioned for the purposes of future research. 
 
Up to this point, Gualini’s (2010) ‘neoliberal thesis’ on governance 
has been questioned with regard to the eco-city, on the grounds that 
its normative concerns may also yield only a partial set of insights. 
The argument that the communicative governance approaches 
adopted in Portland constitute ‘neoliberalism in disguise’ was 
problematic in that it turned attention onto the broader experimental 
conditions and away from the EcoDistricts initiative itself, which was 
progressive relative to this context, and welcomed by local actors in 
Gateway specifically because it would potentially give voice to a 
frustrated public. In an attempt to understand global phenomena, 
and as illustrated by the case of Sejong, analyses framed by debates 
around neoliberalism may furthermore confuse rather than 
illuminate the nature of urban policy in settings with no tradition of 
(western) liberalism. Nevertheless, the ‘neoliberal thesis’ was 
defended insofar as it provided an antidote to eco-city rhetoric which 
conceals agendas aligned with the reproduction of the status quo. It 
is suggested here, additionally, that a consideration of the cases of 
Portland and Sejong in tandem, from the perspective of 
neoliberalism, raises questions about the diagnosis of the 
contemporary world as beset by an increasing number of ‘wicked’ 
problems and, relatedly, the assertion that humanity now lives in a 
post-modern era characterised in part by a sensibility of the world’s 
complexity. 
 
In this worldview, the objects of planning are seen as non-linear, 
underdetermined and uncertain; consequently, it entails a rejection 
of the possibility that given problems (and therefore the solutions to 
those problems) can be readily demarcated and neutrally defined. 
This understanding paves the way for more iterative modes of action 
and reflection, whereby pragmatic knowledge emerges incrementally 
from experimental applications of ideas in real-world contexts. In 
non-linear problem-solving, the problem and the solution define 
each other mutually through ongoing practice. As expressed in the 
ideal of governance, decisions about what practice should consist of, 
then, cannot logically be made ‘from above’, but should themselves 
emerge from real-world networks of contextually embedded actors. 




are offered up as promising an alternative to hubristic ‘modernist’ 
linearity. 
 
And yet this way of thinking itself exhibits linearity at a 
theoretical level, even while aspiring to obviate it at a practical one. 
As discussed in Chapter One, it defines a problem (that of non-
linearity) to which there is a solution, in the form of iterative 
processes of practice and reflection which emerge through 
contextually embedded networks of governance. But its own 
normative logic of dynamic iteration (whereby problems and 
solutions are dynamically co-constitutional) also implies that the 
diagnosis of non-linearity might itself be conjured up by its own 
process of resolution. If this is the case, then a tautological nexus 
arises in which non-linearity and non-linear solutions mutually 
reinforce each other’s discursive validity. This possibility need not 
invalidate empirical evidence which indicates that the world has 
indeed in some important ways become increasingly characterised 
by seemingly intractable, wicked problems; but it does imply that the 
interpretation of such evidence is overlayered with a particular 
discursive assemblage of ambitions, norms and practices. 
‘Wickedness’ is only one particular story that might be told about the 
world. It has a recent history, and different stories will no doubt be 
told in future.  
 
It may therefore be constructive to ask why this story has gained 
currency at this particular time; doing so may yield insights with 
corrective force. One reason for doing so is presented by the story’s 
own iterative logic: since this implies a dynamic rather than 
unidirectional sense of causality, the heightened sensibility of the 
world’s complexity is as much an outcome as it is a ‘root cause’ or 
starting point. As well as following the line of causality taking us 
from the diagnosis of wickedness and uncertainty to the solution of 
governance, we are implored by the logic of the story itself 
simultaneously to seek out causality further still in the opposite 
direction. If, in the reverse direction, this sensibility is partly 
constructed by the ideal or practices of governance (perhaps in a 
justificatory role), then might there be some other real-world 





The ‘neoliberal’ interpretation of governance – as embodying a 
‘roll-back’ of the state – may provide us with one such condition. 
Rather than being epistemologically excluded, as a modernist, 
structural explanation, from the discourse of the ‘wicked problem’, 
the condition of neoliberalism may comfortably be accommodated 
within the iterative logic of that discourse. Accordingly, the 
discourse of the wicked problem might be considered a neoliberal 
construct as much as a useful way of understanding the world.  
 
The case of Portland’s EcoDistricts may lend some weight to this 
conclusion, if it is indicative of a broader tendency to seek solutions 
which are variously ‘crowdsourced’. Such approaches may tend to 
exclude normativity, since their ontology replaces notions of the 
‘public good’ with what is efficient, or innovative. As was evident in 
Portland, however, the reality of such a process, when convened by 
formal institutions, may necessarily fail to live up to this ambition; 
only certain solutions will be allowed to emerge. In practice, then, 
contemporary governance is rather more normative than its 
rhetorical ideal might suggest, and these norms can be described as 
neoliberal to the extent that this descriptor has explanatory value. 
 
Even this conclusion, though, does not allow us to reject the 
governance approach to the eco-city on the grounds of hidden 
normativity. From a pragmatic perspective, if practices of 
governance describe the real-world outcomes of a dynamic 
arrangement of economic structural forces and discursive 
legitimation, then they might instead be welcomed as an emergent, 
negotiated mode of societal management specifically well suited to 
contemporary assumptions about the nature of the world. Criticism 
of this outcome might itself be accused of utopianism; governance 
might be justified on the grounds that its emergence demonstrates its 
own relevance. And this embrace of pragmatism need not be 
irresponsibly fatalistic: the proposition that governance is implicated 
in a mutual interdependence between neoliberalism and the 
discourse of the wicked problem does not imply the permanence of 
this state of affairs, nor does it exclude the agency of actors within 
the eco-city process to change it. It is not incompatible with the ‘post-
liberal’ thesis’ which points to the open-ended implications of 
governance: to the possibility that the decentring of power which it 




future. The nexus of non-linearity and governance, in other words, 
may be causally related to neoliberalism, but the future, in which 
governance might undermine this ‘cause’, is open. 
 
 A parallel challenge to the non-linear ‘wicked problem’ discourse 
is presented by the case of Sejong City. If, as suggested here, this 
discourse has a culturally specific discursive baggage in excess of its 
scientific explanatory force, and which is associated with a particular 
phase of western liberalism, the question also arises of its relevance 
to cultural contexts which have not arisen out of liberalism. While 
Sejong might be interpreted as a neoliberal project insofar as it 
constitutes an attempt to improve Korea’s competitiveness within the 
global economy, its top-down approach excludes it from the 
concerns of the neoliberal thesis, and might suggest that a rather 
different set of cultural traditions are at play internally – some of 
which, no doubt, might be usefully categorised as Confucian. It may, 
indeed, be the case that the sensibility of uncertainty is a far from 
universal one; in other cultures, different stories may hold sway or 
sit alongside varyingly ‘scientific’ understandings of uncertainty. 
Elsewhere – and perhaps particularly in the developing world – an 
understanding of the world as uncertain and non-linear may always 
have been the norm; for most people, there may be no ‘illusion’ of 
modernity to dispel. The argument might even be made that the 
story-telling process of the neoliberal wicked problem has 
exaggerated the extent to which the liberal West has traditionally 
been characterised by a sense of modernist certainty. While, then, 
governance approaches may well yield unexpected breakthroughs in 
our understanding of how society might be arranged in novel ways 
in future, there would seem to be no firm case to argue that they are 
necessarily aligned with the goal of sustainability in all contexts. 
 
This all has important implications for research into the eco-city in 
future. First, it vindicates the critical attention paid to the rise of 
‘neoliberal urban sustainability’, both in the prosaic sense of an 
outcome in which a business-as-usual agenda mobilises the 
appealing rhetoric of both sustainability and the ‘city’, and in the 
more subtle way that neoliberalism may be legitimised through the 
promotion of supposedly progressive governance-based decision-
making processes. The potential outcome is one in which the 




which governance processes serve to close down rather than open up 
the global ‘dialogue’ (Kates et al., 2005) of sustainability.  
 
Second, it suggests that furthering the goal of urban sustainability 
need not only mean choosing between an outmoded modernism on 
the one hand, and ambiguous governance underpinned by theories 
of communicative planning on the other. While this thesis has 
explored some of the problems presented by this choice, in reflection 
of its significance for contemporary eco-city practices and policies, it 
remains important to allow that different theoretical framings of the 
debate may lead to more productive outcomes. Whether or not it 
makes sense to construct uncertainty and ‘wickedness’ as the 
problem, and governance as the solution, these are not necessarily 
the only starting points from which experimentation and learning 
might proceed. Indeed, the discursive orientation of contemporary 
notions of governance, according to Rydin (2014), already faces 
significant theoretical challenges from the broader ‘material turn’ 
evident across the social sciences. The ‘flat’ ontologies characteristic 
of this material turn – exemplified by the idea of assemblage – signal 
a more “realist sensibility” (ibid: 590) at odds with the social 
constructivism at the heart of communicative planning (ibid). While 
the future of planning theory and practice cannot be predicted, 
questioning the centrality of governance to the debate may permit 
the possibility that, in certain contexts, more hierarchical modes of 
governing – and, equally, less state-centric modes of organisation – 
may have a useful role to play, and researchers should seek to 
identify where and why this is the case. 
 
The search for innovative urban sustainability processes which 
better encompass the emergent dimensions of the city demands 
engagement with questions around the potential for planning to 
escape the constraints of liberal modernity, to the extent that this has 
contemporary relevance as a theoretical and practical problem. 
However, such engagement should simultaneously acknowledge the 
possibility that apparently ‘post-liberal’ or ‘post-modern’ governance 
solutions may in fact oppress the public life of the city, and that the 
identification of more convincingly urban sustainable solutions in 





Summary Descriptions of Initiatives 
Analysed in Chapter Five  
 
Some background information is provided below on the 12 initiatives 
whose documentation is analysed in Chapter Five (see Table 4.3 for a 
list of these documents). The descriptive text in boxes A1-A12 below 
is quoted directly from the profiles in Joss’ et al. (2011) global Survey 
of eco-city initiatives, except in the cases of Eco2 Cities and the 
OECD Green Cities programmes, which were not profiled in the 
Survey. The text for Portland and Whitehill & Bordon was also 
updated to reflect changes between the publication of the Survey and 
the period when the desk research took place for Chapter Four. 
Further information about Portland and Sejong is provided in the 
case studies of each in Chapters Six and Seven respectively. 
Box A.1 Almere 
Type Urban expansion/in-fill 
Location The Netherlands 
Region Europe 
Almere is Holland’s newest city, established in 1976 on land reclaimed from 
the sea. Current plans for its population to grow from 190,000 to 350,000 by 
2030 are based on the seven Almere Principles, which include: cultivating 
ecological, social and economic diversity; connecting place to context; 
empowering citizens; and supporting ongoing technical innovation. They build 
on the city’s history of innovative environmental and technical projects, which 
the council describes as ‘catalysts for others to follow’. In 2002-3, the city built 
its own broadband infrastructure, rented out to commercial internet 
providers. In 2007, it completed in-fill development of a high-density mixed-
use city centre. Almere Solar Island provides 10% of the heating requirements 
of the Noorderplassen West district (the rest comes from residual heat from a 
co-generation plant). 500 houses in the Columbuskwartier district are either 
fitted with photovoltaic systems or have been built using the ‘Passive House’ 
concept. The council announced plans in 2011 to build a new carbon neutral 
district, Nobelhorst, over the next decade, in partnership with Ymere Housing 
Association. This will include 4,300 new homes (30% affordable or for social 
rent), 10 acres of office space, and an ecological education centre. On-site 




Box A.2 Auroville 
Type New Development 
Location Tamil Nadu, India 
Region Asia 
This self-styled ‘universal city in the making’ focuses on bringing together people 
from different countries and backgrounds to live in an ecologically friendly and 
harmonious way. Initiated in the 1960s by a group of volunteers inspired by 
Indian scholar Sri Aurobindo, Auroville has been endorsed by UNESCO and the 
Indian Government. The development consists of a series of small settlements 
where sustainable farming is practiced. Auroville has also participated in several 
reforestation campaigns in the region. The project has, however, been criticised 
by some for relying on a polluting, private transport system for goods and 
people.  To date, 400 houses are run solely on solar energy. Auroville is looking to 
expand the use of electric vehicles, in order to reduce car pollution. 
 
Box A.3 Eco2 Cities 
Type Framework 
Location n/a 
Region Global (though focused on developing countries) 
The Eco2 Cities initiative was launched in 2009 as part of the World Bank’s Urban 
and Local Government Strategy, and is aimed at cities in the developing world. Its 
approach was shaped by an analysis of ‘best practice’ urban sustainability 
initiatives around the world (including Curitiba, Stockholm and Yokohama). The 
initiative currently supports a series of ‘catalyst’ pilot projects in Vietnam, the 
Philippines and Indonesia, with the intention that these can be scaled up to city-
wide level. It focuses on a comprehensive integrated sustainable urban 
development framework – rather than prescribing specific technology or policy 
solutions – which seeks to encourage synergy between economic and ecological 
sustainability. It assists local stakeholders in defining priorities in each case, 
following which indicators are introduced, with cities choosing these as required. 
 







Box A.4 Ecociudad Valdespartera 
Type Urban expansion/in-fill 
Location Zaragoza, Spain 
Region Europe 
Ecociudad Valdespartera was initiated in 2001 through a co-operation between 
the municipal and regional authorities of Zaragoza with the aim to convert 
decommissioned military barracks into social housing and public facilities. The 
new district of Zaragoza is designed to meet current Spanish sustainable building 
criteria. The design incorporates the features of the surrounding environment. 
Buildings are oriented towards the sun to optimise natural heating and to allow 
the use of solar panels; grey water is used to water gardens; and vertical wind 
shields protect from prevailing winds. Green spaces containing native species 
have been interspersed with the dense network of streets. The first residents 
moved into the new district in 2004. Several green spaces/ecological corridors 
have been created within the city, to improve both the microclimate and water 
conservation. A new tram line opened in 2011, between Valdespartera and the 
centre of Zaragoza. 
 
Box A.5 Freiburg 
Type Retro-fit 
Location Baden-Württemberg, Germany 
Region Europe 
Since the 1970s, Freiburg has developed a reputation as Germany's ‘ecological 
capital’. In 1986, the city adopted a master plan for a sustainable city based on 
environmentally sustainable energy supply, resulting in advanced (solar 
technology based) energy efficiency and public transport programmes. In 1996, 
Freiburg passed its Climate Protection Protocol aimed at reducing CO2 emissions 
by 25% below 1992 levels by 2010. (In 2007, this was increased to 40% for 2030.) 
Over the first ten year period, CO2 emissions were reduced by more than 10% per 
capita. There has been a 100% increase in public transport use, with up to 35% of 
residents being non-car owners. Several neighbourhoods are experimenting with 








Box A.6 Greensburg GreenTown 
Type New Development 
Location Kansas, USA 
Region North America 
After a large part of Greensburg, Kansas was destroyed by a Tornado in 2007, the 
local population decided to rebuild the area as a sustainable eco town. This is a 
grassroots community effort bringing funds from outside the community to 
support innovative programmes that involve sustainable development. In 
addition, the local city council passed a resolution calling for all city buildings to 
be built to LEED standards, with several public buildings already having achieved 
LEED ‘Platinum’ standard. The entrance of Greensburg boosts a wind farm of 10 
turbines, providing electricity for the town. A ‘chain of eco homes’ contest was 
organized, resulting in twelve model homes being built at different prices, sizes, 
and energy efficiency features to demonstrate different green living options. The 
town also seeks to grow its eco-tourism industry. 
 
Box A.7 Huaibei 
Type Retro-fit 
Location Anhui Province, China 
Region Asia 
Fifty years of coal mining in and around Huaibei in Anhui province have caused 
significant environmental problems. In addition to suffering from poor air and 
ground water quality, the city has lost more than 100 km2 of land to subsidence.  
From being known as ‘coal city’, its 2008 eco-city masterplan aims to rebrand it 
as ‘water city’. The subsided areas will be reclaimed for new developments and 
recreational areas, or turned into lakes and wetlands. The city plans to build on 
its industrial heritage by diversifying into alternative energy, building a new 
‘Alternative Energy Park’. Projects to help develop its tourism industry include a 
new eco-friendly golf course, a reforestation programme, and restoration of 
canals and nearby villages. Urban agriculture will be encouraged, as well as 
improvements to the local transport network (including new light railway lines).  
Energy efficiency standards have been put in place for all new builds, with waste 












The Organisation for Economic and Development (OECD) adopted ‘Green 
Growth’ as a strategic pillar in 2009. Its Green Cities programme, initiated at the 
2010 Roundtable of OECD Mayors and Ministries, aimed to understand the 
concept and potential of green growth for cities, and advise policy makers on 
urban sustainability ‘best practice’. A preliminary report outlining the 
programme’s conceptual framework, was published in 2011. Its final ‘Green 
Growth in Cities’ report was published in 2013, based on further in-depth 
comparative international research. This included a series of high level 
recommendations relating to the financing and governance of green growth at 
city level, as well as how this can best be supported through national policies, 
and proposes a ‘preliminary’ set of indicators to monitor cities’ socio-economic 
growth, environmental impact, economic opportunities, and policy responses.  
(Sources: Hammer et al., 2011; OECD, 2013)) 
 
Box A.9 Portland EcoDistricts 
Type Retro-fit 
Location Oregon, USA 
Region North America 
For many years, Portland has been ranked as one of the greenest US cities. Early 
achievements include an integrated public transport system and the 
pedestrianisation of the city centre. The city established an integrated planning 
and sustainability office with focus on key areas including energy efficiency, 
waste management, and green building design. New buildings have to comply 
with strict regulations concerning building materials and greenhouse gas 
emissions, resulting in the largest number of LEED certified buildings among US 
cities. The city and regional authorities are noted for their strong land-use 
planning, including establishing substantial green zones in and around the city to 
control urban expansion.   
In 2009, the new Portland Sustainability Institute launched its EcoDistricts initiative in 
partnership with the City of Portland and five neighbourhoods (Gateway, Foster 
Green, Lloyd District, SoMa, and South Waterfront). The five pilot initiatives aim to 
promote sustainable neighbourhood development across different parts of the city. 
In addition, the Oregon Sustainability Center is planned as a model for sustainable 
urban high-rise construction and a hub for sustainable practices, research and 
entrepreneurship. Each of five initiatives were officially recognised formally 




Box A.10 Sejong 
Type New Development 
Location South Korea 
Region Asia 
Sejong, a new city approximately 100 miles from Seoul, was originally chosen to 
be the new national capital city of South Korea. Following the plan’s rejection by 
the Constitutional Court of Korea in 2004, the government decided to continue 
building it as a major administrative centre. Its 2007 masterplan envisaged a 
sustainable city, with schemes in place for water and waste management, energy 
efficiency, recycling, and urban agriculture, with provision made for large open 
areas and green roofs. These plans were amended in turn, with Sejong to become 
a ‘high-tech eco-friendly city’ instead. Finally, however, the large corporations 
backing the hi-tech plan pulled out after it was voted down by the South Korean 
Parliament in 2010. Construction is continuing on Sejong as an eco-city with a 
strong administrative function, amid ongoing political controversy. 
 
 
Box A.11 Sustainable Sydney 2030 
Type Retrofit 
Location New South Wales, Australia 
Region Australasia 
Based on two successive local government acts (1993; 1999), Sydney has 
embarked on a concerted sustainability programme addressing environmental, 
social and economic issues. Using various sustainability indicators, the city’s use 
of resources is closely monitored. An environmental partnership between the 
city authorities and civil society groups was established; an extensive public 
information campaign on conservation and sustainability was put in place; and a 
household energy savings programme was launched. More recently work on 
White Bay, a new neighbourhood, has begun using strict environmental norms. 
There, local transport will be based on a new system of stackable electric mini-
cars. Sydney’s overall vision is contained within the Sustainable Sydney 2030 
plan, published in 2009. This covers social and cultural sustainability as well as 






Box A.12 Whitehill & Bordon Eco-Town 
Type Urban expansion/in-fill 
Location Hampshire, England 
Region Europe 
In 2009, the UK government announced plans for the first four in a series of new 
eco-towns across England to address the national shortage of housing. The 
decision to build four new towns (from originally twelve selected sites) followed 
a lengthy and at times controversial public consultation process. The new eco-
towns were to be built on either brown- or green-field sites in Cornwall (St 
Austell), Hampshire (Whitehill & Bordon), Norfolk (Rackheath) and Oxfordshire 
(North West Bicester). The bulk of the funding (£60m spread across the four 
developments) is being provided by the Department for Communities and Local 
Government, with a further £2.5m from the Department for Children, Schools 
and Families set aside for the construction of a demonstration zero-carbon 
school in each town. Overall, the aim is to provide homes for around 30,000 
inhabitants within a period of five years, and to create 2,000 additional jobs. The 
new eco-towns are mostly new-builds, although in some cases they will also 
incorporate some refurbished buildings. They are located in the proximity of 
nearby towns, in order to take advantage of existing public transport networks 
and amenities. The building process is supposed to involve 30% less greenhouse 
gas emissions than traditional building processes. The towns will incorporate 
renewable (wind/solar) energy production and transport systems (eg electric 
vehicles).     
The planned Whitehill & Bordon carbon-neutral development originally made 
provision for up to 5,500 new houses, and two new schools, to be built mostly on 
the 230-hectare site of decommissioned military barracks in this garrison town 
(this land is expected to be released in 2015). The project is to be developed 
through a public-private partnership, with completion expected by 2026-2028, 
assuming suitable private investors are found. Retro-fitting of existing buildings is 
also taking place at present. Following public consultation between October and 
December 2011, amid ongoing local opposition from the Bordon Area Action 
Group, a revised masterplan was published in May 2012, in which the proposed 










Using the following template, a letter was sent to all interviewees 
following their agreement to participate, along with the respondent 
information and consent form shown overleaf.  The letter and 









Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in my PhD research 
project ‘Eco-Cities: Technological Showcases or Social Places’. 
 
The research interview with you will take place on [date, time, place]. 
 
Enclosed with this letter are some further information about the nature of 
the research and your participation in it, and an outline of the proposed 
interview topics. If you have time, please read these before the interview. 
However, there is no need for you to prepare anything in advance. 
 
Should you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to let me 
know. 
 







Mobile: +44 XXX XXX XXXX 
 
Enclosed: 




Participant Information  
 
Eco-Cities: Technological Showcases or Social Places 
 
You are invited to participate in a research interview about urban 
sustainability in [Portland/Sejong] [, with a special focus on the current 
EcoDistricts initiative]. 
 
You were selected as a possible participant because [completed as relevant]. 
 
I would ask you to read this form and ask any questions you may have 
before agreeing to participate in the research. 
 
The interview will be conducted by the project’s Principal Investigator, Rob 
Cowley, Doctoral Student in the Department of Politics and International 
Relations at the University of Westminster, London (UK). The research 
project of which this interview forms a part is being supervised by 
Professor Simon Joss, University of Westminster, and Dr Daniel 
Greenwood, University of Westminster. 
 
Background Information 
The broader purpose of this research is to understand the socio-political 
dimensions of contemporary urban sustainability (or ‘eco-city’) initiatives 
around the globe. It has a special focus on the conceptualisation and role of 
the ‘public’ in such initiatives, and the spatiality of the eco-city. 
[Portland/Sejong] is one of two locations which have been selected for 
more in-depth case study analysis. 
 
Procedures 
If you agree to take part in this research, the interview will entail answering 
a series of questions for 30-45 minutes. I would also like to ask for your 




I would like to assure you that all notes taken during the interview, and the 
audio recording, will be treated as strictly confidential and only used for 
the purposes of analysis. All records of this interview will be stored 
securely in line with University of Westminster policy. Only the Principal 
Investigator (Rob Cowley) will have access to these records. 
 
The analysis of the interview will be used to inform the findings of the final 
PhD thesis. It is possible that some of the comments you make during the 
interview will be quoted verbatim in this thesis. No such quoted comments 
(in the thesis or any other academic publication related to the thesis) will be 
attributed to you personally. 
  
Compensation 
You will not receive payment for participation in the research. 
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Voluntary Nature of the Research 
Participation in this research is voluntary. Your decision whether or not to 
participate will not affect your current or future relations with the 
University of Westminster. If you decide to participate, you are free to not 
answer any question, or withdraw at any time, or withdraw any 
information offered or opinions expressed during the interview, without 
affecting those relationships. 
 
If you feel, during the interview, that some of the interview questions are 
too sensitive and you do not feel comfortable in answering them, you may 
of course choose not to answer such questions or not to disclose 
information.  
 
Contacts and Questions 
The researcher conducting this interview is Rob Cowley, who is being 
supervised by Prof Simon Joss and Dr Daniel Greenwood. If you have any 
questions at this stage or later, you are encouraged to contact Rob Cowley 
or either of the supervisors at:  
 
Department of Politics and International Relations,  
University of Westminster 
32-38 Wells Street,  
London W1T 3UW, UK 
 
Rob Cowley: Robert.cowley@my.westminster.ac.uk 
Simon Joss: Josss@westminster.ac.uk 
Daniel Greenwood: D.Greenwood2@westminster.ac.uk 
 
If you would prefer to talk to someone outside the research team about any 
questions or concerns regarding this research, you are encouraged to 
contact Huzma Kelly, Secretary to the Research Ethics sub-Committee at 
the following address:  
University of Westminster Research Office, 101 New Cavendish Street, 
London W1W 6XH, UK.  
Email: h.kelly01@westminster.ac.uk  
 
You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records. 
 
Statement of Consent 
I have read the above information. I hereby consent to participate in the 
research, and grant my permission for an audio recording to be made of the 
interview. 
 
Signature of Interview Participant: _________________ Date: ____________  
Interview Participant:  
 





Interview Topics (Portland Version) 
 
This is an outline of the topics which the interview will cover. It may be 
helpful for you to read these before the interview, but it is not necessary, 
and no specific preparation is required on your part.  
 
The precise questions asked will vary according to your own areas of 
involvement and expertise. 
 




 Brief overview of your job role and current projects 
 
‘Publicness’ 
 Which aspects of city life do you see as ‘public’?   
 Which types of places are the most ‘public’?  In what ways? 
Portland 
 
 Your views on what makes Portland different to other cities 
 Key challenges that Portland faces in future 
 
Your Involvement in Urban Sustainability 
 Brief overview of your involvement, if any, in the development and 
implementation of the 2012 Portland Plan 
 Brief overview of your involvement, if any, in the development and 
implementation of the EcoDistricts initiative 
 
Goals and Constraints 
 Balance between overall goal of equity, environmental concerns, 
and economic development 
 Governance functions of sustainability planning in Portland – 
including external city ‘image’ 
 Factors which were key in bringing the EcoDistricts initiative to the 
point of official recognition and funding, and barriers 
 Can the EcoDistricts initiative make a wider difference, given the 




 How inclusive was the public consultation process of the 2012 
Portland Plan? 
 How controversial was it?  What opposition was there to it? 
 Has the EcoDistricts initiative mirrored planning more generally in 
Portland in these respects, or has it departed from the norm? 
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 To what extent has the EcoDistricts initiative been shaped by the 
mayor’s office, and to what extent by local people in each area? 
 
The Publicness of Open Space in Portland 
 How important are the open spaces of the city in Portland’s 
sustainability planning?  In what ways? Have plans and policies 
changed the way they are used? 
 How important are open spaces in the EcoDistricts initiative?  In 





 Ongoing implementational successes and difficulties of Portland 
Plan and EcoDistricts initiative 
 Public reactions to EcoDistricts initiative 
 
Could you recommend anybody else that it might be useful for me to speak 
to for the purposes of this research? 
 
Interview Topics (Sejong Version) 
 
The interview will last approximately 30-45 minutes, and will take the form 
of a conversation rather than a fixed series of questions and answers.  
However, as a guide, my intention is to ask you about the topics listed 
below.  
 
It may be helpful for you to read these before the interview, but it is not 
necessary, and no specific preparation is required on your part.  
 
 please tell me a little about your job role  
 what would you say are the most successful aspects of the MAC to 
date? 
 what would you say are the least successful aspects of the MAC to 
date? 
 in your view, on what criteria might the long-term success of the 
MAC project be assessed? 
 what are the main opportunities and threats to its success in the 
long term? 
 how inclusive was the public consultation process when the new 
city was being planned? 
 is there any ongoing opposition to the final plans?  Who from? 
 what effects will the new city have on the broader region? 
 to what extent will the new city contribute to achieving the goal of 
national decentralisation? 
 will a balance between economic, environmental, and social 
sustainability be achievable? 
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 how 'citylike' will the finished development be? 
 how will it most differ from other cities in Korea? 
 how do people who already live and work here feel about it? 
 what is the importance of public spaces in the new city? 
 to what extent can the MAC work as a model for other new 
developments in Korea?   
 could you recommend anybody else that it might be useful for me 











As described in Chapter Three, observations were conducted in a 
series of open spaces for each of the two in-depth case studies. In 
each location, pedestrians were counted on two occasions over a 
period of 15 minutes, on the dates shown in Table A.1:  
PORTLAND 
 




Gateway Halsey Street 3 June 2013 1 June 2013 
Oregon Clinic 5 June 2013 1 June 2013 
PDC Park 5 June 2013 1 June 2013 
Central City Old Town 29 May 2013 1 June 2013 
Pioneer Square 7 June 2013 1 June 2013 
Urban Plaza 7 June 2013 25 May 2013 
South Waterfront streetcar 
terminus 
6 June 2013 25 May 2013 
Director Park 7 June 2013 8 June 2013 
Pettygrove Park 29 May 2013 8 June 2013 
South Waterfront riverside walk 6 June 2013 25 May 2013 
South Waterfront pocket park 6 June 2013 25 May 2013 
Concordia Alberta Street 4 June 2013 8 June 2013 
Alberta Park 4 June 2013 8 June 2013 
KOREA 
 




Sejong Noeul Sam-ro 5 June 2014 14 June 2014 
Library 17 June 2014 7 June 2014 
Central Park, Hansol 5 June 2014 14 June 2014 
Residential space 17 June 2014 14 June 2014 
Seoul Jongno Sa-ga 20 June 2014 31 May 2014 
Cheonggyecheon 20 June 2014 31 May 2014 
Myeongdong 20 June 2014 31 May 2014 
Hongdae 18 June 2014 21 June 2014 
Hwigyeongdong 18 June 2014 21 June 2014 
Table A.1: dates of observation shifts in Portland and Korea 
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Some further contextual details about each location are provided 
below, along with more information about the precise vantage point 
from which counting took place. For Portland, Figures A.1-13 show 
the precise observational locations (marked ‘X’) on maps and satellite 
pictures, along with street level photographs of the immediate 
vicinity. All maps of the observational locations in Portland are 
shown at the same scale (with north facing upwards) and were 
sourced from Portland Maps, the City of Portland’s online map 
service. For Sejong and Seoul, Figures A.14-22 similarly indicate the 
precise observational point for each area with an ‘X’. Satellite images 
are not included for Sejong and Seoul, since up-to-date ones are not 
publicly available for all locations. The Sejong and Seoul maps are 
also shown at the same scale, with north facing upward, and are the 
author’s own, adapted from base maps of Seoul from 
OpenStreetMap and street maps displayed publicly in Sejong. 
 
Gateway Observation Locations 
Halsey Street 
Along with parallel NE Weidler Street, Halsey is lined with mostly 
single-storey buildings occupied by small businesses and retail 
establishments serving practical local needs, and a small number of 
restaurants and cafes. PoSI describes it as having “historical quality 
as Gateway’s ‘Main Street’ venue for parades and civic events” 
(DistrictLab, 2010:23). PoSI’s Pilot Study for GG envisaged changes 
to make it more pedestrian-friendly, along with water management 
features, to improve local connectivity and “support existing 
community assets through environmental improvements” 
(DistrictLab, 2010:49). It is flanked with residential streets. 
 
Observations took place at a key node along NE Halsey Street: the 
intersection with 111th Avenue. All pedestrians crossing an 














The footpath between the Oregon Clinic building and its parking 
area provides the main pedestrian access between Gateway’s ‘Transit 
Center’ and its main retail centre (clustered around the Gateway 
Fred Meyer supermarket). The immediate area is described by 
Abbott (1983:238) as an example of “the typical retail landscape of 
the early 1960s suburbs…essentially retailing strips set behind great, 
grey parking lots”. The path also provides the main access to an area 
of unused land between the two freeways, earmarked to become the 
new Gateway Green park (see Chapter Five). Several local 
interviewees suggested the broader area would ideally make a 
central civic focus point, and PoSI’s Pilot Study Report for GG 
(DistrictLab, 2010) identified the potential for improvements here to 
contribute to pedestrian connectivity in Gateway generally.  
However, it currently contains no formal seating or other features 
obviously designed to encourage people to linger.  
 
All pedestrians crossing an imaginary line outside the clinic, in 
both directions, were counted during the observations, from a 














This open space (approximately 1.6 hectares), the site of an old 
factory, is owned by PDC. It is intended that a quarter of the land 
will be sold for private development; PDC will use the profits to 
develop the remainder as a community park. It is unclear when this 
might happen, however, or precisely what facilities it will offer. 
Meanwhile, it remains an open field, used for occasional community 
events (some of which are organised by GG volunteers). It was 
repeatedly identified by interviewees as a locus of anti-social 
behaviour (attracting street drinkers during the daytime, and 
typically avoided at night). PoSI’s 2010 Pilot Study (DistrictLab, 
2010:23) presents it as an opportunity to “create a new civic space; 
destination and anchor for both Transit Center/Gateway Shopping 
Center and Halsey-Weidler couplet. Will increase connectivity, 
walkability, and habitat within the district”. Other than on its Halsey 
Street border, it is surrounded by residential streets of single-storey 
houses. 
 
The park was observed from a vantage point on its eastern side, 












Comparator Observation Locations Elsewhere in Portland 
Old Town 
Portland City Council has designated Old Town, to the immediate 
north of the main urban core, as an ‘entertainment district’. The area 
is characterised by its historic architecture, with most buildings three 
or more storeys high. Along with its many eating and drinking 
establishments and street markets, it accommodates a large number 
of homeless shelters, whose patrons are clearly in evidence on the 
streets. SW 2nd Avenue, where the observations were conducted, 
functions as more of a ‘link’ than a ‘place’, even though the 
‘entertainment district’ as a whole is partly intended to have strong 
‘place’ characteristics as a visitor destination. 
 
The observation point selected here was on the west side of SW 
2nd Ave, one of the main roads through the area, between the 
junctions with SW Pine Street and SW Ash Street. Counts were made 













Pioneer Square (more formally ‘Pioneer Courthouse Square’), opened 
in 1984, is often described as ‘Portland’s Living Room’. It occupies a 
full city block within the central ‘transit mall’ (SW 5th and SW 6th 
Avenues), and is surrounded by municipal, retail, and office 
establishments. It contains a wide variety of seating types (benches, 
stairs, walls, and those associated with cafés). According to its 
Administrative Office, it hosts “more than 300 programmed events 
each year” (Pioneer Courthouse Square, undated). Many of the 
buildings in its immediate vicinity are over ten storeys tall. 
 
The space was observed from the stairs on its southern side. A 
count was made of people entering the square, either walking past 
the author or through any of the other entrances. The large volume of 
people made it impractical to keep accurate simultaneous records of 
the demographic characteristics of users; these were estimated based 
on separate subsequent 15-minute counts which took into account 
one in every four users entering the square, with the totals being 











Urban Plaza  
Urban Plaza is located between various Portland State University 
buildings, within Portand’s central ‘transit mall’ and crossed by 
streetcar tracks. It include various types of seating (including those 
attached to cafés and restaurants), a water feature, and a memorial 
clock tower. Other than some restaurants and cafés, only a limited 
number of small retail establishments operate in its vicinity. 
Buildings in the immediate vicinity are generally between three and 
seven storeys high. Urban Plaza is located within the SoMa 
EcoDistrict (see Box 6.2 for more information). 
 
All pedestrians entering the space were counted from a vantage 












South Waterfront streetcar terminus 
This open space, on SW Bond Avenue at the northern edge of the 
built-up portion of South Waterfront, contains the terminus for 
streetcars to the downtown area, and provides access to the ‘tram’ 
(cable car) for the Oregon Health and Science University campus. A 
limited amount of seating is provided, including at the streetcar 
terminus shelter itself. There are no retail facilities in or directly 
adjoining the space. The land to the south and east of this space has 
not been built on, and is partly used for car parking. The building 
which marks the western border of the space is approximately 14 
storeys tall. More information about the South Waterfront EcoDistrict 
is provided in Box 6.1. 
 
The area observed was the open space around the streetcar 
terminus. Counts were made of all pedestrians crossing an imaginary 













Director Park  
This space occupies a city block between SW Yamhill Street and Park 
Street in Portland’s downtown area, covering an underground 
parking garage, and is flanked by retail and office land uses. It 
contains little vegetation, though offers various seating options, an 
accessible fountain and paddling pool, a street chess set, and a café. 
The City Council describes it as “[d]esigned in the style of a 
European piazza” (Portland Parks & Recreation, undated). The 
immediate vicinity of the space contains a variety of historic and 
modern buildings, of varying heights. 
  
The number of people entering the space from the south side was 
recorded from a vantage point nearby inside. Since it can be accessed 
from three of its sides, the result was multiplied by three to estimate 












Pettygrove Park  
Pettygrove Park, located three blocks to the east of Urban Plaza, is 
surrounded by tall office and residential buildings, and contains 
mature trees, pathways, planted areas and a series of grassy mounds. 
At the time of fieldwork, a restoration project was being planned 
(publicised on a noticeboard in the park) which aimed among other 
things to repair the park’s stormwater drainage system, replace some 
of the older trees, and increase the amount of sunlight in the park as 
well as improve lighting. It includes various types of seating 
(benches, walls and steps) and a water feature. It is connected to 
several other small nearby recreational spaces via pedestrian 
walkways; together they form the so-called ‘Portland Open Space 
Sequence’. It is not home to any commercial establishments. The 
buildings in the vicinity of the park are of varying heights, though 
some are over 20 storeys tall. Pettygrove Park is located within the 
SoMa EcoDistrict (see Box 6.2 for more information). 
 
All people entering the park during the observational shifts were 
counted from a vantage point on one of the grassy mounds in the 












South Waterfront riverside walk 
This pathway runs along the full length of the built-up portion of the 
South Waterfront area, and is flanked by benches. A local resident 
suggested to the author that it currently constituted the most sociable 
open space in South Waterfront. The land at the southern end of the 
walk has not yet been built on, and was used at the time of fieldwork 
as a temporary ‘community garden’ (allotment area). It is not directly 
connected with any commercial establishments. The residential 
blocks on its west side range in height up to approximately 20 
storeys. More information about the South Waterfront EcoDistrict is 
provided in Box 6.1. 
 
The observations were conducted from one of the benches on the 
southern side of the walkway. All pedestrians crossing an imaginary 







Figure A.10: observation location on South Waterfront 





South Waterfront pocket park56 
This small park, occupying half a block, appears to have no official 
name. While the land is privately owned, it is openly accessible to the 
public. It is located at the southern end of existing development, and 
surrounded by tall residential blocks (approximately 25 storeys) and 
other smaller (four-storey) buildings, many of which have service 
and retail facilities on ground floor. Part of the open space here 
contains planted vegetation, paths and benches. A second more open 
segment contains a water feature with a wall at the edge providing 
seating. More information about the South Waterfront district is 
provided in Box 6.1. 
 
The observations were conducted from one of the benches in the 
south-eastern corner of the space.  All pedestrians entering the space 
were counted.  
 
  
                                                          
56
  The author originally intended to observe Elizabeth Caruthers Park – South 
Waterfront’s main open space (2.12 acres, between SW Moody Avenue and SW 
Bond Avenue), but this was closed for renovations during the fieldwork period. 













Alberta Street  
Alberta Street is the main retail street in Concordia, one of Portland’s 
original ‘streetcar neighbourhoods’ dating from the 1920s. According 
to the local resident interviewed, Concordia was characterised in the 
1990s by its high crime levels, with the majority of premises on 
Alberta Street boarded up. It became significantly gentrified in the 
2000s – later than many other inner Portland districts (Abbott, 2011). 
It has been described as “emblematic” of Portland’s image as a 
‘creative’, ‘bohemian’ and ‘diverse’ city (Sullivan & Shaw, 2011), is 
currently well known for its “artsy” (Abbott, 2011) atmosphere, and 
contains a large number of independently owned boutiques, food 
outlets and pubs. The buildings on Alberta Street (mostly retail 
establishments) are typically two storeys high. The surrounding 
streets contain mostly detached residential properties with front 
porches. Each residential property owner is responsible for a small 
strip of land between the publicly owned sidewalk and the road. 
These are planted with a variety of vegetation, ranging from grass to 
trees and organic vegetables.   
 
Observations were conducted on the northeastern corner of the 
intersection between Alberta Street and NE 27th Avenue. Counts 
were made of the pedestrians crossing an imaginary line in front of 











Alberta Park  
Approximately 1km north of Alberta Street, this neighbourhood park 
covers 4 blocks, surrounded exclusively by residential buildings. 
Acquired in 1921 (when most of the neighbourhood was first being 
developed), it is covered with mature trees and grass, with various 
sports and children’s play facilities, and a ‘dog off-leash’ area. It 
hosts summertime open-air film screenings, free to the public.  
 
A vantage point outside the southern gate was chosen for the 
pedestrian counts. This appeared to be neither the most nor least 
used park entrance. The number of people entering through this gate 
was recorded and multiplied by four to estimate the total number of 











Sejong Observation Locations 
 
Noeul Sam-ro 
Noeul Sam-ro is the main retail street at the centre of the Hansol 
district, with a variety of shops, cafés and restaurants, and a local 
community centre. Though not pedestrianised, it has wide 
pavements on both sides, and a small amount of seating, as well as 
tables outside some of the food and drink establishments. It is 
located close to a hilly green park containing tombs from Korea’s 
Baekje dynasty, which is promoted as a heritage site.  It has a large 
water feature at its southern end, and a tunnel beneath a ‘green 
bridge’, in which local residents organise bring-and-buy sales and a 
weekly ‘farmers’ market’.  
 
The vantage point selected for the observation of the space was a 
table outside a café on a side road. This allowed the author to count 











The Sejong branch of the National Library of Korea opened in 
November 2013. It is located in the centre of the city, to the east of the 
Government Complex, immediately next to the central lake park. 
Entry to the library is unrestricted, and membership is free for all. It 
includes a café, convenience shop, and two restaurants. The 
basement children’s space, which includes a small cinema room, 
leads out to a play area behind the building.  Building work has not 
yet been completed on the land around the library, so it is currently 
isolated in the urban fabric. While no buses stopped directly outside 
the library at the time of fieldwork, it has facilities for both cycle and 
car parking. Research interviewees and other local residents in 
informal conversation were unanimous in their praise of the library, 
and the lake park behind it, as one of the successes of Sejong to date, 
claiming in most cases to visit either it or the park behind on a 
regular basis.  
 
All pedestrians going up and down the steps between the eastern 
side of the building and the library car park were counted from a 









Central Park (Hansol) 
This open space in Hansol (the first fully built-out part of Sejong) is 
located close to the area’s main transport facilities (a BRT stop, the 
terminus for coaches from Seoul, and a taxi rank). The pedestrian 
road which leads to it is surrounded by local shops and restaurants. 
It includes exercise machines, recycling facilities, various areas of 
greenery, a number of benches, and an elevated stage.  Chamsaem 
‘Smart’ school lies to its immediate south-west. The buildings next to 
the space are up to 25 storeys high. 
 
The space was observed from a bench at the edge of the green area, 
next to the pedestrian road. All pedestrians crossing an imaginary 




Figure A.16: observation location on pedestrianized 





Local residential space (Hansol) 
This open space is surrounded by nine residential buildings, each 
approximately 25 storeys high. It contains a mixture of planted green 
areas and paved pedestrian space. It has a water feature and an 
artistically designed seating area on its southeastern side, and a 
variety of benches. The space can be directly entered from the main 
road on the north-eastern side, on which a variety of retail 
establishments, local services, and local bus stops are situated. 
 
The vantage point for the observations was a bench in the centre 
of the space. All pedestrians crossing an imaginary line stretching 
across the width of the space from the observation point were 










Seoul Observation Locations 
Jongno Sa-ga 
Jongno, one of the main thoroughfares in the central traditional 
business district of Seoul, runs east to west from the southern end of 
the ceremonial space to the south of Gyeongbokgung Palace to 
Dongdaemun metro station. It carries a heavy volume of traffic, 
running in 4 lanes in each direction, and is served by several metro 
stations.  It is flanked by a mixture of 4-5 storey office and retail 
buildings, and high-rise office blocks. Two recreational spaces – 
Tapgol (Pagoda) park and Jongmyo park – are located to its 
immediate north, with the traditional markets of Gwangjang and 
Dongdaemun on its southern side towards the eastern end. There are 
very few formal seating places along its length. 
 
The observation vantage point was at the side of the pavement on 
the northern side, just to the east of the junction with 
Changgyyeonggung-no, and opposite Gwangjang food market.  All 
pedestrians crossing an imaginary line immediately in front of the 
author were counted in both directions, on the northern side of the 









The restored Cheonggyecheon river, which runs for several miles 
from east to west through the traditional business district of central 
Seoul, is renowned as “the most successful example of public policy 
in recent Korea” (Cho, 2010:163). The river was previously covered 
over, with an elevated urban motorway following its course. In the 
1990s, however, concerns were raised about the safety of the 
structure, and because the surrounding area had “degenerated into a 
zone of urban decay” (Cho, 2010:150). The decision was therefore 
taken to remove the overpass and restore the covered natural stream 
so as to encourage urban regeneration. The renovated river, with 
pedestrian walkways on both sides, and crossed by 22 vehicle and 
pedestrian bridges, was first opened to public in 2005 (Cho, 2010). 
The ‘linear park’ along its length has created “a landmark and a 
focus for leisure and tourism” (Marianaldi, 2007:61). It is “one of the 
most popular places in Seoul. Intense social activity occurs here: 
walking, strolling, meeting, lingering, resting, and playing” (ibid:65), 
used by more than 60,000 visitors per day on average (Landscape 
Architecture Foundation, 2011), with a wide variety of landscaping 
features along its length, including waterfalls, areas of vegetation, 
sculptures and stepping stones. Cho (2010) describes it as a civic 
space “decorated to the theme of nature” (158), rather than a natural 
river, and an “artificial spectacle” (161); its waterway relies on 
120,000 tons of water per day being pumped from the Han river (ibid). 
According to a series of studies, the project has had several positive 
effects on the local environment, significantly lowering the ‘urban 
heat island effect’, improving air quality, and increasing biodiversity, 
and has also increased public transport use and benefited local 
businesses (Landscape Architecture Foundation, 2011). 
 
Pedestrians were observed from a vantage point on the northern 
side of the river, between the Samildae-ro and Namdaemun-ro road 
bridges. All those crossing, in either direction, an imaginary line 




Figure A.19: observation location beside Cheonggyecheon river (Seoul) 
 
Myeongdong 
Myeongdong is the main ‘western-style’ commercial district in the 
centre of Seoul, and is a significant tourist attraction in the city. It 
takes the form of a lattice of pedestrianized streets bordered by four 
streets: Eulji-ro to the north, Samil-ro to the east, Toegye-ro to the 
south, and Namdaemun-ro to the west, with traditional Namdaemun 
market located to its immediate south-west. Typical buildings in the 
area contain approximately 5 storeys, but many are considerably 
higher than this. Its brightly lit upmarket shops and department 
stores are interspersed with restaurants, cafes and street-food stalls. 
Many of Seoul’s key financial institutions are also located in or near 
the area. 
 
Pedestrians were observed from a vantage point on the southern 
side of Myeongdong 8ga-gil, a pedestrian street running parallel to 
Toegye-ro and near Myeongdong metro station, between the 
junctions with Myeongdong 8-gil and Myongdong 10-gil. Since the 
space observed was very busy, counting took place in two stages.  
First, a record was made of the total number of pedestrians crossing 
an imaginary line in across the street in front of the author, in either 
direction. During a subsequent 15-minute observation, the 
demographic characteristics of one in every ten were noted, and the 




Figure A.20: observation location in retail district of Myeongdong (Seoul) 
 
Hongdae 
Hongdae is located approximately six kilometres to the east of the 
city centre in the Mapo ‘gu’ (borough) of the city, between Hongik 
University metro station to the north and Sangsu and Hapjeong 
metro stations to the south. Several universities are located in or near 
the area. It has a large number of retail establishments as well as art 
galleries, bars, nightclubs, restaurants and cafes, and many of its 
roads are pedestrianised. Cho (2002:429) uses Hongdae to exemplify 
those areas of Seoul whose open spaces largely attract “young urban 
dwellers, who are individualistic, consumerist and sensitive to 
commodities like brands, images and codes. For the most part, such 
civic spaces are located in streets or districts that exhibit a mix of 
commercial and cultural establishments, allowing for a lot of 
engagement and conversation, and cultural performance in a vibrant 
setting”.  He contrasts it with “traditional street parks where older 
generations gather” (ibid), such as Pagoda Park off Jongno (see 
above). Nolita park, a small patch of open space in the middle of the 
area, hosts performances from local bands and singers in the evening, 
as well as a large number street vendors selling food and handmade 
goods. The majority of buildings in the area do not exceed five 
storeys in height. 
 
The observation point chosen was on the eastern side of 
Eoulmadang-ro, the main (pedestrianised) street that runs through 
the area, approximately 100 metres to the south of the junction with 
Hongik-ro. Eoulmadang-ro has retail, eating and drinking 
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establishments on either side, and street stalls in the central partition. 
Pedestrians were counted who crossed an imaginary line, in both 
directions, between the author and Eoulmagang-ro central partition. 
Because of the large number of pedestrians, age and gender profiling 
information was gathered in a second 15-minute count during each 
observation, where the details of one in every ten passers-by was 










Hwigyeongdong is a middle-income area on the eastern side of the 
Gangbuk ‘gu’ (borough) of Seoul, approximately 8 kilometres east of 
the city centre. The observation took place in an open space inside 
the Hwigyeong Jugong housing complex, built at the turn of the 
century. Its residential tower blocks (mostly over twenty storeys high) 
offer a variety of local facilities at ground level, including a 
kindergarten, book exchange, schools, and old people’s centre. All its 
open spaces are publicly accessible, and include a series of 
recreational sports courts and planted areas. The southern edge of 
the estate immediately adjoins local retail facilities. 
 
The precise vantage point for the observations was on the 
southern side of a pagoda in an open space accessible by a broad 
walkway leading from the main pedestrian entrance on the southern 
side. All pedestrians entering this walkway in either direction were 




Figure A.22: observation location in open space between residential buildings 






Tally sheet used for counting 















































































Questionnaire used for on-street survey 
in Gateway (Portland)  
 
Good afternoon, I am conducting a short survey about local residents’ views on 
this area. Would you have a couple of minutes to answer a few questions? 
Screening question: Could I just check, do you normally live in the Gateway area? 
 IF NO OR UNSURE, TERMINATE INTERVIEW 
 CONTINUE IF YES 
Ask age if in doubt: And could I check that you are aged 18 or over? 
 IF NO, TERMINATE INTERVIEW 
 CONTINUE IF YES (ie 18+) 
Ask all 
Q1:  Thinking about your own experiences as a resident area, which two or three 
things, if any, would you most liked to see improved in the Gateway area?   
 Do not prompt. Probe further if respondent only has one answer: What 
else would you like to see improved? 
 WRITE IN ANSWER ON GRID (INCLUDING ‘NOTHING’/’DON’T KNOW’/ETC) 
Ask all 
Q2:  Are you aware of any local initiatives, schemes or voluntary organisations 
which aim to improve the area? Do not prompt.  
 ANSWER CODES: Y = YES; N= NO/DON’T KNOW 
Ask Q3 if ‘Yes’ at Q2 
Q3:  What is it, or are they, called? Do not prompt.  
 WRITE IN ANSWER ON GRID (OR ‘NOTHING’/’DON’T KNOW’/ETC) 
Ask all 
Q4:  Have you heard of the Growing Gateway EcoDistrict initiative? 
ANSWER CODES: Y = YES; N= NO; RECORD OTHER ANSWERS (EG DON’T KNOW) 
Record closest description following end of interview, but do not ask: 
 
Gender Ethnicity Age  
M:  Male W:  White A:  18-24 NB: DO NOT INTERVIEW UNDER 18s 
F:  Female O:  Other B:  25-44  
  C:  45-64  
















































































      





Information slip provided at end of 





Thank you for taking part in this short research interview. The findings will inform a doctoral 
research project conducted by Rob Cowley, from the University of Westminster, London (UK). The 
research explores different aspects of urban sustainability initiatives around the world. The 
responses you gave to the interview will be treated in the strictest confidence. They will be 
presented in aggregate form along with the results from other similar interviews in the areas, so that 
you will not be identifiable as an individual. If you have any questions about this interview, or would 
like to see a summary of the findings, you are encouraged to contact Rob Cowley 
(Robert.cowley@my.westminster.ac.uk) or either of his supervisors: Simon Joss 
(Josss@westminster.ac.uk) or Daniel Greenwood: (D.Greenwood2@westminster.ac.uk). If you 
would prefer to talk to someone outside the research team about aspect of this research, you are 
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